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OF THE

# ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND

ITS

ORGANIZATION, CAMPAIGNS, AND BATTLES

WRITTEN AT THE REQUEST OF

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

CHIEFLY FROM HIS PRIVATE MILITARY JOURNAL AND OFFICIAL AND OTHER  
DOCUMENTS FURNISHED BY HIM

BY

THOMAS B. VAN HORNE, U. S. A.

ILLUSTRATED WITH

CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE MAPS

COMPILED BY

EDWARD RUGER

LATE SUPERINTENDENT TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEER OFFICE, HEADQUARTERS  
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND

TWO VOLUMES AND ATLAS

VOL. I

CINCINNATI  
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## Dedication.

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THESE VOLUMES ARE DEDICATED

TO THE

SURVIVING MEMBERS OF THE ARMY

WHOSE ACHIEVEMENTS THEY NARRATE—SOLDIERS, WHO,  
IN STRENGTH OF PATRIOTISM AND VALOR  
IN BATTLE, HAVE NEVER  
BEEN SURPASSED.

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## PREFACE.

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DURING a conversation with General George H. Thomas, at Nashville, Tennessee, in the summer of 1865, some remark was made relating to the achievements of his army, when he said to me, "I wish you to write a *narrative* history of the Army of the Cumberland." Taking a moment for reflection, I replied, that if, upon trial, I should meet his expectations, I should be glad to produce such a work. He then said: "Write nothing but the truth. You will contravene received opinions, and you must fortify yourself." These short but comprehensive sentences constituted my instructions, and taken in connection with the fact that the materials for the work were mainly collected and supplied by General Thomas, gave him as close a relation to it as was possible without direct authorship.

It is not known when it first occurred to General Thomas to have the history of his army written, but had it been his purpose from the beginning of his connection with it, in the organization and command of its first brigade, he could not have been more exhaustive in collecting the materials upon which it is based. His "Military Journal," accurate in the mention of the operations of each day, was a safeguard against errors in chronology, gave brief notes of the more important facts and events, and was suggestive of lines of investigation, for which ample resources were provided in the copies of orders, telegrams, official reports, and other papers, unofficial,

but equally authoritative as the muniments of a truthful narrative, which in greatest profusion he placed in my hands. He gave especial attention to the collection of pertinent documents after the work had been projected, and received assistance from General W. D. Whipple and Colonels A. L. Hough, S. C. Kellogg, and J. P. Williard, members of his staff in nearest relation. From the time the composition of the history was begun until his death, I was in constant communication with him, and he knew fully its scope and the pivotal facts which would constitute its framework and determine its purview, and lived to examine and approve several completed chapters relating to campaigns and battles in which he was a prominent actor. The history and the maps which illustrate it, have been prepared through independent research, but from the same sources of knowledge, and under identical relations to General Thomas.

I am also greatly indebted to many of the corps, division, and brigade commanders, and other officers of the army, for suggestions and encouragement during the years spent in preparing this work.

It may not be irrelevant or inappropriate for me to state that, in investigation and description, I have followed the logical order, tracing operations from inception to issue, and interpreting them by their objects as well as their results.

The manuscript was completed in December, 1872. Upon my return to my post in January, 1873, I left it in the East, and did not see it again until I began to read the proof-sheets, in July, 1875.

THOS. B. VAN HORNE.

*September, 1875.*

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## INTRODUCTION.

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THE election, by the Republican party, of Abraham Lincoln, as President of the United States, on the 6th day of November, 1860, was the occasion for an attempt to compass the destruction of the Union. The men who made that attempt had for years meditated the establishment of a confederacy comprising all the slaveholding states. The antagonisms which culminated in the secession of eleven of these states may be traced to the remote past. They were revealed even in the Convention of 1787. John C. Calhoun gave logical consistency to the doctrines of state-rights, and in the effort to give them practical realization, in 1832, very nearly anticipated the struggle that has recently deluged the land with blood. Compromises, often repeated in our history, promising eternal harmony, had failed to give more than temporary quiet to the country. The near approach of each successive presidential election furnished the occasion for some new presentation of the old issues, and invited the renewal of the contest for sectional dominance. And thus every fourth year revealed, with greater plainness, the relentless character of the antagonism, between the free and slave states. Questions of political supremacy and material interests were mingled with the less dangerous discussion of abstract differences in the theory of government; and the sober, thoughtful, patriotic men of the country saw, with growing alarm, that every presidential canvass gave proof that political issues were becoming more positive, in correspondence with the increasing intensity of sectional animosity.

During the political campaign which preceded the presidential election of 1860, the Southern leaders of the school of Calhoun used all possible influences to commit the Southern people to secession, in the event of the success of the Republican party. The specious assumption of inveterate

differences in the type of civilization, North and South; the vaunted assertion of superior manhood and transcendent chivalry; the declared certainty of hostile interference with slavery by the party electing Mr. Lincoln, and the appeal to passion and prejudice, gave these men the power to precipitate eleven of the slaveholding states into secession and rebellion. It may be safe to aver that the majority of the Southern people, if they had been allowed a free and forcible expression of their opinions and feelings, would have decided against secession. But the Union men of the South lacked organization, and, acting without concert, were unable to resist the large and ambitious minority, which, compassing great wealth and talent, with organization compact and firm, was controlled by men of reckless daring and acknowledged power.

On the first Monday in December, 1860, the official announcement of the election of Mr. Lincoln was made in due form in the Senate chamber at Washington. On the 20th of the same month, a convention of the people of South Carolina passed an ordinance of secession. Six states, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas, withdrew in quick succession from the sisterhood of states. Soon the bold announcement of a new nationality—the Confederate States of America—startled the country and the world. The actors in this, the greatest political crime in history, at once prepared for war—the usual consequent of the assumption of independent national existence—and threats of Northern invasion, in the event of war, were proclaimed as boldly as the existence of the new government.

Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas delayed secession for some months. The legislature of Virginia proposed an informal national convention, to devise measures to prevent the dismemberment of the Union, and consequent civil war. Tennessee decided, by a heavy majority, against calling a convention to consider the question of secession. North Carolina was also without a convention. The convention of Arkansas, after a somewhat protracted session, adjourned without taking definite action. These states thus awaited the consequences of the secession of the Gulf States.

Although the majority of the people of the United States did not admit that the right to secede was reserved to the individual states, and regarded the conduct of the Gulf States, if persistently continued, as the actual initiation of civil war, and although these states, beyond their act of secession, had committed open acts of war, some of which were even perpetrated before the passage of ordinances of secession, still the general government took no step looking to the suppression of the rebellion

inaugurated by secession. War was so distasteful to the government and people, that the purpose was patent to avoid it if possible. Forts and arsenals had been seized, and portions of the national army had been surrendered to the insurgents, but still the nation hesitated to draw the sword.

During this period of hesitancy, there were indications of reaction in the seceded states, while the more northern slaveholding states grew more decided in the expression of their purpose to remain in the Union. Thus it became apparent to the leading insurgents that something startling must be done, or these states would be lost to the projected Southern Confederacy.

All the important forts on the coasts of the seceding states, except Pickens and Sumter, had been seized by the insurgents. The bombardment and fall of the latter constituted the second great act in the drama of rebellion. South Carolina had been the first to secede, and her assumed leadership in revolt and traditional disloyalty, alike required that her guns should inaugurate the war with emphasis and call the nation to arms. On the 12th day of April, 1861, in obedience to orders of Jefferson Davis, President of the so-called Confederate States, General Beauregard commenced the bombardment of Fort Sumter. The gallant Anderson and his equally gallant command resisted the tremendous cannonading for nearly two days. But being without food and ammunition, exhausted by constant exertion, and almost stifled by the heat and smoke of the burning outbuildings, the heroic garrison made such terms with the enemy as would best conserve their own honor and that of their country, and retired from the fort under their colors.

On the 14th day of April, the day after the capitulation, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, issued a proclamation, calling forth the militia of the several states of the Union, to the aggregate number of seventy-five thousand, to suppress the combinations in the seceded states, which were too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. Then Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, by conventions, or through the less legitimate action of legislatures, promptly seceded, and made common cause with the states already in open rebellion.

The four border slaveholding states—Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri—now filled the chasm between the two sections, which were hurrying their preparations for war on a gigantic scale. The situation of these states was critical, whatever might be their action. Their citizens were divided in political sentiment, and of all the states, North or South,

they were most exposed to the perils of war. Their geographical position, their common interest in slavery with the revolted states, and their identity in other great interests with the Northern States, necessitated delay in action, and produced vacillation in choice of Northern or Southern alliance. Delaware and Maryland, however, soon declared their purpose of remaining in the Union. Kentucky and Missouri having more slaves and more attachment to the institution of slavery, could not so easily determine their status. The governors of these states were in sympathy with the Southern cause, while a large and influential party in each state favored the Northern. It is safe to assert, too, that in other respects the loyalists of Kentucky had more to embarrass them in the positive declaration of their attachment to the Union, than the citizens of the other states that declined secession.

As the first organized loyal regiments of Kentucky troops constituted the nucleus of the Army of the Cumberland, this history is commenced with a retrospect of the situation in that state during the first months of the war.

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## HISTORY

OF THE

# ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.

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## CHAPTER I.

### DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATUS OF KENTUCKY.

AT the inception of our gigantic civil war, the leading types of political sentiment prevalent throughout the entire country were represented by large classes in Kentucky. Bold unionists confronted arrant secessionists; timid loyalists and wavering rebels joined hands in an impracticable conservatism. As an expression of the reigning chaos of opinion, and by the consent of multitudes in direct antagonism, Kentucky assumed the position of neutrality. All her citizens not radically and unconditionally for the Union, protested against the march of armies for the suppression of the rebellion upon the soil of the State. It was the great blunder of Southern Union men, that they so early and so fully committed themselves against the coercion of the seceded states, or the maintenance of the Union by force, that when war was actual, they were driven into rebellion in no small degree by their previous false position. The loyal men of Kentucky barely escaped the common fate of the Union men in other Southern States. Several prominent men in Kentucky had, from the time of the election of Mr. Lincoln, been so bold in opposition to the secession of the state, and so open in their declaration of purpose to sustain the general government, that co-

ercive measures were hailed with delight. But very many of those claiming to be Union men, while ostensibly opposing the secession of Kentucky, were reticent with regard to their action in the event of war. They were not in open sympathy with the secession movement, but clamorous in their demand for armed neutrality as the legitimate and only safe position for Kentucky. So prevalent was this opinion, and so bold its expression, that "armed neutrality" was the accredited status of the state before her legislature gave it the more formal pretense of legitimacy.

Governor B. Magoffin, in his message to the legislature convened in extra session January 17, 1861, recommended that the state militia should be put upon a war footing, in readiness for the forcible assumption of such position as the State might choose. He also recommended that a convention should be called, and plainly indicated his desire for the secession of the state.

The legislatures of the more Southern States were mainly composed of men elected upon other issues, but generally pledged to secession. Hence their readiness to call conventions, and even assume the prerogatives of conventions. But fortunately for Kentucky, the Union men in her legislature were too prudent and too patriotic to unite with the secessionists in calling a convention; and thus they prevented the usual initial step in secession. Neither did the legislature meet the governor's expectation in providing for the equipment of the state militia.

The history of Kentucky, during the period beginning with the presidential election and ending with the fall of Sumter, furnishes no facts of great moment beyond the steady resistance of the masses of her people and the majority of her legislature to every movement inclining to secession. There were, however, marked indications of divided sentiment and purpose. One instance may serve as the type of many. It was determined by the loyal citizens of Louisville that the national flag should be raised with suitable pomp upon the court-house on the 22d day of February. Hon. James Speed delivered a patriotic address on the occasion. The address elicited no disloyal demonstration; but when the flag was raised, Simon B.

Buckner, in chief command of the state guard as inspector-general of the state, gave no order to salute, as required by the published programme and patriotic duty. In manifest disloyalty to the flag, Buckner, and a large portion of his command, moved from the court-house yard. Major Woodruff and his battalion, the "Marion Rifles," in emphatic contrast remained and saluted the national colors. The two officers, and those acting with them, represented not only the antagonistic sentiment of the state guard, but also of the citizens of the entire state.

But though political affairs in Kentucky were chaotic during the early months of 1861, the issues of the grand contest, whose sweep and power were soon to solve with inexorable definiteness all the problems engrossing the thought and sentiment of the whole country, were gradually assuming positive shape. Fort Sumter fell on the 14th day of April. On the day following, the President issued the proclamation calling for seventy-five thousand men, and assigning the quotas of all the states. In response, Governor Magoffin addressed the following message to the Secretary of War:

"FRANKFORT, April 15, 1861.

"HON. SIMON CAMERON, *Secretary of War:*

"Your dispatch has been received. In answer, I say emphatically that Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States.

"B. MAGOFFIN,  
*"Governor of Kentucky."*

This bold presumptuous answer, though not prophetic, gave hope to the South that Kentucky would secede. Radical secessionists, as a class, were noisy, madly assertive, and in the realm of hypothesis, amazingly unprophetic; and Governor Magoffin, interpreting public sentiment by his own feelings, and mistaking secession clamor for the revealed purpose of Kentucky, defiantly ignored the constitutional subordination of the state to the general government. As yet Kentucky had taken no steps indicating secession as a probable contingency; neither had she made unequivocal assertion of loyalty; and as in the past, so now in the crisis of the border

slaveholding states, the official declaration of her governor was only the expression of individual opinion.

Kentucky, as a state, was not yet ready to furnish troops for the United States service, but there were citizens in great numbers ready to commit themselves to the unconditional support of the general government. And while at this period, as previously, the flag of revolt had been boldly unfurled throughout the state, and men had been openly recruited for the rebel army, there were many eager to take position under the flag of their country.

On the 6th day of May, the legislature of Kentucky convened in extra session, for the third time since the election of Mr. Lincoln. The message of Governor Magoffin evinced the expectation that the state would immediately secede. The legislature affirmed "armed neutrality" as the status of the state, and then by implication censured the governor for the language of his official announcement. Still, the fact was patent that Kentucky, as represented by her legislature, though advancing in loyal expression, was yet far from active loyalty. Neutrality, in such a contest, was itself, proof of a lack of fealty. During this extra session, another advance was made in the right direction. The militia law of the state was so amended as to compel the state guard to take the oath of allegiance, not only to Kentucky, but also to the United States. This act recognized the obligation of the state to the general government, but it did not reach active support.

While the politicians in the seceded states took the lead in all treasonable movements, and were far in advance of the people in intensity of disloyalty, those in Kentucky who were loyal, were in the main far behind the masses in loyal feeling, and were far more timid in open resistance to the formidable organized effort to precipitate the state into alliance with those in rebellion. As soon as the grand issue was fairly made by the bombardment of Fort Sumter, undereurrents against the rebellion, compassing, for the most part, quiet citizens, set in with great power. During the extra legislative session of May, and while the old political leaders, though claiming to be loyal, were timid to the degree of moral cowardice, a few citizens of Louisville, unknown to the political

arena, gave existence to an organization that doubtless determined the status of Kentucky. This organization was called the "Union Club."

Previous to the 17th of May, the Union men of Kentucky had no such organization as could determine their numerical strength and consolidate their power. The "Citizens and Working Men's Association" had triumphed in the election of J. M. Delph, as mayor of Louisville. This association claimed to be, par excellence, the Union party of Louisville. It demanded fidelity to the Union at the expense of former party affiliations, and on this simple issue, unaided by a single journal of the city, carried the municipal election. The administration of the city government, conducted under circumstances which demanded great prudence and firmness, demonstrated the wisdom of those whose votes placed Mr. Delph in office. This organization, however, had not sufficient compactness for a revolutionary period. The rebels in Kentucky and throughout the entire South were most thoroughly organized, in anticipation of the necessity of overriding majorities. The notorious Bickley, at the head of the "Knights of the Golden Circle," was at this period drilling squads in the streets of Louisville. Outspoken loyalists were threatened with assassination. Under the pressure of such circumstances, G. A. Hall, C. C. Hull, R. E. Hull, J. P. Hull, R. L. Post, C. Z. Webster, H. G. S. Whipple, Thos. A. Morgan, W. B. Hegan, F. H. Hegan, Robert Ayars, and a few others, on the 17th day of May, 1861, organized this "Union Club." The members were solemnly sworn to unconditional loyalty. The ritual was mainly compiled from the grand declarations of Washington, Webster, and Clay. It especially enforced the patriotic affirmation of the latter: "If Kentucky to-morrow unfurls the banner of resistance, I never will fight under that banner. I owe a paramount allegiance to the whole Union; a subordinate one to my own state." With such declarations, as expressive of its purpose and patriotism, this organization was meet for the times. Secret associations are the concomitants of modern revolutions, powerful for good or evil, in accordance with the principles they embody and the ends they subserve. This one was potent, if not decisive, in saving Ken-

tucky from secession. It soon diffused itself throughout the state, reaching the legislature with its influence, and on the 1st of July, the day for a special congressional election, it gave a hundred thousand loyal votes. During the months of July and August the development and expression of loyalty was so marked, that the secessionists despaired of the withdrawal of the state, except through an appeal to arms. The election held early in August demonstrated that a large majority of the people of Kentucky were opposed to secession. This fact did not deter John C. Breckinridge and his co-peers in treason from efforts to force the state from the Union. Not being ready for the execution of the war measures which they were planning, they called themselves the Peace party. Though they held the doctrine of state-rights, they declined aequiescence in the declared purpose of the state to remain in the Union, and while clamoring for peace, they secretly arranged with the so-called Confederate government to supply them with arms, and extend its military jurisdiction over the state. There was no thought of submission to the overwhelming public sentiment which had been repeatedly expressed through the previous elections. These traitors assumed that the National government was broken up; that the Confederate government had attained lawful existence, and that Kentucky, whether the majority of her people were willing or unwilling, belonged to the Confederate government.

---

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1861.

*To his Excellency, Beriah Magoffin:*

Call made on you by to-night's mail for four regiments of militia for immediate service.

SIMON CAMERON,  
*Secretary of War.*

---

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, FRANKFORT, April 15, 1861.

*To Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, Washington City:*

Your dispatch is received. In answer, I say *emphatically*, that Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States.

B. MAGOFFIN,  
*Governor of Kentucky.*

## • PROCLAMATION OF GOV. MAGOFFIN, APRIL 24.

Recent events are of so startling a character as to render it imperatively necessary, that the legislature of Kentucky be again convened in extraordinary session. It is now apparent that the most energetic measures are being resorted to by the government at Washington to prosecute a war upon an extended scale with the seceded states. Already large sums of money and supplies of men are being raised in the Northern States for that purpose. The tread of armies is the response which is being made to the measures of pacification which are being discussed before our people; whilst up to this moment we are comparatively in a defenseless attitude.

Whatever else should be done, it is, in my judgment, the duty of Kentucky, without delay, to place herself in a complete position for defense. The causes for apprehension are now certainly grave enough to impel every Kentuckian to demand that this be done, and to require of the legislature of the state such additional action as may be necessary for the general welfare. To this end I now call upon the members of the General Assembly to convene at the capitol in Frankfort, on the 6th day of May, 1861.

In testimony whereof, I, Beriah Magoffin, governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, have hereunto subscribed my name, and caused the seal of the commonwealth to be affixed. Done at the city of Frankfort, the 24th day of April, 1861, and in the sixty-ninth year of the commonwealth.

By the Governor:

B. MAGOFFIN.

Tuos. B. MONROE, *Secretary of State.*

By Jas. W. TATE, *Assistant Secretary.*

---

ACTION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, MAY 16.

Considering the deplorable condition of the country, and for which the State of Kentucky is in no way responsible, and looking to the best means of preserving the internal peace, and securing the lives, liberty, and property of the citizens of the state, therefore—

1. *Resolved, by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, That this state, and the citizens thereof, should take no part in the civil war now waged, except as mediators and friends to the belligerent parties; and that Kentucky should, during the contest, occupy the position of strict neutrality.*

*Resolved further, That the act of the governor in refusing to furnish troops or military force, upon the call of the executive authority of the United States, under existing circumstances, is approved.*

## CHAPTER II.

### INTERNAL MILITARY AFFAIRS OF KENTUCKY.

THE history of military affairs in Kentucky during the year 1861 can not be complete, even in outline, without adequate mention of the “State Guard” and “Home Guard.”

The prominent disunionists in Kentucky doubtless knew, long before it occurred, that the presidential election of 1860 would either give national sway to their radical views of state sovereignty, or furnish the pretext for the dissolution of the Union. Men of the state-rights school in the Gulf States could not entertain strong assurance of their independence without the co-operation of the border slave-holding states. Their alliance in the event of war, and their support in the event of peaceable secession, were regarded as conditions of success. And as the latter states would be the first to suffer the consequences of secession, if secession should result in war, it was a matter of great moment to the secessionists in Kentucky, as well as those farther south, that there should be a military force on the border, ready for war. For this purpose, doubtless, the organization of the militia of Kentucky was effected. This object was so disguised that men the farthest removed from disloyalty co-operated in the passage of a law authorizing an army in Kentucky of compactness and numbers equal to some of the standing armies of Europe.

The act of the legislature which gave existence to the “State Guard,” became a law by approval of the governor, March 5, 1860. It was drafted mainly by S. B. Buckner, and gave great power to those who had chief command of the troops organized in conformity to its elaborate provisions. The citizens capable of bearing arms were divided into three classes,

designated "The Militia of Reserve," "The Enrolled Militia," and "The Active, or Volunteer Militia."

The militia of reserve consisted of white persons, resident in the state, less than eighteen years of age, and more than forty-five, and of all persons exempt by law from enrollment and military service, and not members of the "Active Militia." In extreme danger the reserve militia could be called to active service.

The enrolled militia consisted of all able-bodied white male persons between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, who were citizens or residents of the state, except persons who had served five years in the army or navy of the United States, persons who were members of the active volunteer militia, and those exempted from military service by the laws of the United States or the State of Kentucky.

The volunteer militia, or state guard, were organized into companies, battalions, brigades, divisions, and army corps, with uniforms and equipments complete. Most of the independent military companies of the state became component parts of the state guard upon its organization. Provision was made for the election of one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, and as many majors as necessary in each county. General officers were to be multiplied in proportion to the extent of the organization. The inspector-general of the state, under the governor, was commander-in-chief of the volunteer militia, with the rank of major-general, wearing, when on duty, the uniform of a lieutenant-general. This officer had power to disband at will such companies, or larger organizations, as failed to conform to the law or his view of military propriety. Thus, through the rigid subordination of officers, from the highest to the lowest, there was a concentration of power in the commander-in-chief unusual in a free state during actual war.

At first, beyond the election and appointment of officers of high rank, political influence did not palpably rule in the organization of the state guard. S. B. Buckner was appointed inspector-general, and Thomas L. Crittenden elected brigadier-general. In the end, many of the officers joined the Confederate army, while many became commanders in the United States service. The prominent Union men of Kentucky give

concurrent testimony to the fact that it was the original design of the authors of the "Act for the better organization of the Kentucky militia," to use the forces authorized by its provisions to precipitate the state from the Union. It is certain that the encampments, discipline, and general conduct of the state guard were adapted to prepare a force for revolutionary surprise. The history of the commander-in-chief warrants the belief that it was his intention, when the foreshadows of war were plainly visible, to use his command to force Kentucky out of the Union, if possible, and in the event of failure in this, to transfer it to the rebel army. When the issue came, the scheme failed in its main purpose, and almost entirely in its contingent one. A prominent cause of failure was the inability of Governor Magoffin and his inspector-general to provide arms for such a military establishment as their purposes demanded. The legislature refused adequate appropriations, and such arms as they desired could not be purchased. Hence, the "armed neutrality" of Kentucky consisted more in assumption than in actual military strength. Strenuous efforts, however, to secure arms were made. Governor Magoffin, soon after the fall of Sumter, accredited Buckner to the North and Dr. Blackburn to the South for their purchase.

Colonel Prentiss, at Cairo, engaged the attention of Buckner in a direction opposite to that of his mission, but Dr. Blackburn brought arms from the extreme South, so nearly worthless as, in his own language, to be "suitable for neutrals." If, however, Dr. Blackburn did not purchase good guns for his rebel friends in Kentucky, he revealed their intentions in a speech in New Orleans. Having been called to the rostrum upon the arrival of a military company from Kentucky, the doctor boldly pledged his state to the rebellion.

For some time after war was threatened, it was deemed desirable that the loyal men in the state guard should remain, but when the time came for loyal organization it was at first found to be difficult for them to withdraw. Later, the requirement by the legislature of a new oath afforded easy means of withdrawal, as discretion was allowed. Thereafter, the state guard was known to be acting in the interests of the rebellion.

Another military organization, though of less imposing

form, exerted more power in the struggle in Kentucky than the state guard. This was the home guard. Improvised, loosely organized military companies called "Home Guards," sprang into existence in the city of Louisville and other places, when first the cloud of war began to gather blackness. Their avowed object was home defense. Those comprising them represented the parties contending for supremacy in the state, with a predominance of the loyal element.

The "Home Guard" proper was originally organized by authority of an ordinance enacted by the general council of the city of Louisville, and was subsequently extended to other portions of the state. The ordinance approved by Mayor Delph, May 25th, was nominally based upon a vague provision of the city charter. The imminence of revolution, rather than the charter, induced the city authorities to provide for the formation of the "Home Guard." The ordinance made provision for a brigade of two regiments, with the necessary field and staff officers. The members were required to take the oath prescribed for other city officers, and were further required to swear that they would obey all orders of officers legally placed over them. The mayor was the commander-in-chief, with power to appoint a brigadier-general and other officers. Lovell H. Rousseau was first appointed as brigadier-general. He soon became an officer in the United States service, and James Speed succeeded him in command. The home guard was soon filled to its maximum strength. The Marion Rifles, already favorably mentioned as a portion of the state guard, found congenial associations in this loyal organization. The opposition to it by the state guard and secessionists generally was open, persistent, and menacing. Buckner, the commander of the state guard, formally called on General Speed and threatened bloodshed. But Speed and his brigade were too much in earnest, too patriotic and brave, to give heed to private or official threats. Arms were obtained from the general government through Lieutenant W. Nelson, of the navy, and ammunition from Governor Morton, of Indiana.

During the winter and spring, Lieutenant Nelson, a native of Kentucky, had repeatedly visited the state. His purpose

was to ascertain the undercurrents of sentiment and the probable action of prominent men should the government be forced, in the prosecution of the war, to disregard, directly or indirectly, the neutrality of Kentucky. He reached the conclusion, in mingling with all classes, that the Union sentiment needed the support of bayonets. He learned that such support of the Southern cause was meditated, and believing that prompt action would prevent the secession of Kentucky, he told President Lincoln that he must furnish the loyal men with arms, or, in the end, fight for the restoration of the state to the Union. The President acted upon this suggestion, and made Lieutenant Nelson the agent for the transmission of arms to Kentucky. Ten thousand guns were placed at his disposal, and money furnished to pay for their transportation. Lieutenant Nelson went to Kentucky in advance of his guns, and arranged with Joshua F. Speed, of Louisville, for a secret meeting of prominent Union men at Frankfort. This meeting occurred in the latter part of April, and was attended by J. J. Crittenden, Garret Davis, James Harlan, Joshua F. Speed, James Speed, Charles A. Wickliffe, Thornton F. Marshall, Lieutenant Nelson, and four others. Men were designated who could be safely intrusted with the disposition of arms. Nelson's guns reached Kentucky soon after the formation of the home guard of the city of Louisville. The regiments of the city, and all companies of fifty men, in the northern, central, and eastern portions of the state, were supplied by Lieutenant Nelson, upon the order of Joshua F. Speed, who had been designated by President Lincoln for this duty.

Thus armed, the home guard confronted the state guard, and defeated the schemes of the secessionists in respect to Kentucky. Encampments of the state guard were ordered subsequently, and its companies and battalions were drilled, but all to no purpose. Armed Union men were soon in the ascendant, and "armed neutrality" waned in proportion to the number of guns in their hands. Collisions were threatened, but fortunately for the secessionists, they never occurred, as the parades of the two organizations revealed the superiority of the home guard. The magazine containing the ammunition belonging to the state, was under the control of

Buckner, but Mayor Delph boldly demanded the keys, and overawed by the strength of the mayor's command, Buckner reluctantly surrendered them. Subsequently, the state guard was despoiled of their arms by the mayor's order, and as fugitives they drifted to the Southern army.

## CHAPTER III.

### ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES TROOPS IN KENTUCKY.

DURING the excitement which immediately succeeded the inauguration of war at Charleston, it was unsafe in Louisville and other parts of the state to utter Union sentiments; much greater danger was incident to an avowal of purpose to enlist troops for the United States service. Still there were men bold enough to do this, despite threats of assassination. Immediately after the President's call for troops, James V. Guthrie, a resident of Covington, Ky., and W. E. Woodruff, major commanding the battalion of Marion Rifles of Louisville, offered their services to the President, and asked authority to raise two regiments, as a part of the quota of their state. The authority was given on the 23d of April. Their camp was established on the north bank of the Ohio river, just above Cincinnati, and was designated "Camp Clay." On the 6th day of May, two full regiments of three months' men were mustered into the service of the United States, as the 1st and 2d regiments of Kentucky Volunteer Infantry—the former under the command of Colonel Guthrie, the latter under Colonel Woodruff. Though thus styled, the majority of the enlisted men were from Ohio.

Colonels Guthrie and Woodruff at once concluded that men enlisted for the short period of three months would be of little value in a war that already promised protraction, and sought and obtained permission to reorganize their regiments for three years' service, or during the war. The length of the proposed term deterred many from re-enlisting. Very many of those who refused to re-enlist were from Ohio, and in the reorganization of the regiments, recruits were drawn from

Kentucky. Colonel Woodruff and his officers, in full uniform, openly recruited in Louisville and other parts of Kentucky, and soon refilled their regiment. Their action induced denunciation and threats. Recruiting for the Southern army in the state had been open and demonstrative. It had not been unusual to see the Confederate flag flying above men on the march for the South, as the enemies of their country, but to enlist for loyal service was regarded as an invasion of rights.

Colonel Woodruff's regiment was remustered into the service of the United States on the 9th of June, Colonel Guthrie's on the day following, each with designation unchanged. As Kentucky had not recognized these regiments, they were armed and equipped by the authorities of Ohio.

On the 9th of July, the First and Second Kentucky Infantry, as a portion of the brigade of Brigadier-General J. D. Cox, embarked on steamers for Western Virginia. Colonel Guthrie went up the Kanawha, and Colonel Woodruff passed up the Ohio to Guyandotte. The river was at a low stage, and it was frequently necessary for the regiment to disembark, that the steamer might pass the bars. Whenever practicable, the landing was made on the Ohio side, but in one instance it was impossible to avoid the Kentucky shore. As a consequence, the neutrality of the state was first formally violated, by her own sons marching under the national flag on her soil. After efficient service in Western Virginia, these regiments were transferred, in January, 1862, to the Army of the Ohio.

Early in June, Lovell H. Rousseau repaired to Washington, to impress the national authorities with the necessity of enlisting troops for the United States army, and to request authority to raise one or more regiments in Kentucky. Rousseau, as senator in the legislature of Kentucky, had been very bold in opposing the plans of his disloyal compeers, and had been remarkably earnest in urging the committal of the state to the support of the general government. He, with General J. T. Boyle and a few others, had opposed the neutrality policy from its first mention. It was fitting then, that he should be amongst the first to propose the organization of troops in Kentucky.

Rousseau was appointed colonel, and invested with author-

ity to raise two regiments; but the location of his camp was to be determined by a few of the most prominent Union men of Kentucky.

Upon Rousseau's return from Washington, General James Speed, in compliance with instructions from President Lincoln, called a meeting at Louisville, to determine the location of Rousseau's camp. Hon. James Guthrie was chairman of the meeting. There were present, in addition, Garret Davis, C. D. Pennabaker, Samuel Gill, James Speed, J. F. Speed, Samuel Lusk, J. T. Boyle, Morgan Vance, T. E. Bramlette, E. Graves, A. B. Hobson, J. H. Ward, James Harlan, Colonels Hawkins, Dudley, and Rousseau. Of these, James Speed, Vance, Ward, and Rousseau were in favor of establishing the camp in Kentucky. The majority, fearing that this step would affect unfavorably the congressional election, appointed for the first of July, urged its location in Indiana. Accordingly, "Camp Joe Holt" was established on the north bank of the Ohio river, between Jeffersonville and New Albany. Influenced by the same consideration, Lieutenant Nelson had previously commenced the enrollment of troops in central Kentucky without an encampment, and his action was regarded as a judicious precedent, in view of the paramount importance of electing Union men to Congress.

His camp having been established, Colonel Rousseau, with the aid of his officers and a few friends of earnest loyalty, but in the face of menacing persistent opposition, soon recruited the "Kentucky Legion" (afterward the Fifth Kentucky Infantry), "Stone's Battery," and several companies of infantry and cavalry, which subsequently became the initial elements of the "Sixth Kentucky Infantry" and the Second Kentucky Cavalry.

"Camp Dick Robinson," situated between Danville and Lexington, Ky., was established by Lieutenant Nelson, on the 2d day of July, 1861. The officers of four regiments had previously been appointed, and nearly two thousand men had been very quietly recruited. These went immediately into camp to the amazement of rebels, "constitutional union men," and "neutrals." The rebels threatened in vain; timid Union men expostulated with Nelson and his prominent associate

officers; on the ground that the camp was irritating the people, and sent a delegation to Washington to request President Lincoln to remove the camp from the state. Governor Magoffin officially demanded its removal in order to prevent civil war. The President refused compliance on the ground that the troops were Kentuckians, and were not menacing their fellow-citizens. The camp was therefore maintained and fortified. The first four regiments organized at this camp were the Third, Fourth, and Seventh regiments of infantry, and the First Kentucky Cavalry, commanded respectively by Colonels T. E. Bramlette, Speed S. Fry, T. T. Garrard, and Frank Wolford.

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COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

FRANKFORT, August 19, 1861.

*To his Excellency, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States.*

SIR:—From the commencement of the unhappy hostilities now pending in this country, the people of Kentucky have indicated an earnest desire and purpose, as far as lay in their power, while maintaining their original political status, to do nothing by which to involve themselves in war. Up to this time they have succeeded in securing to themselves and to the state, peace and tranquillity as the fruits of the policy they adopted. My single object now is to promote the continuance of these blessings to the people of this state.

Until within a brief period the people of Kentucky were quiet and tranquil, free from domestic strife, and undisturbed by internal commotion. They have resisted no law, rebelled against no authority, engaged in no revolution, but constantly proclaimed their firm determination to pursue their peaceful avocations, earnestly hoping that their own soil would be spared the presence of armed troops, and that the scene of conflict would be kept removed beyond the border of their state. By thus avoiding all occasions for the introduction of bodies of armed soldiers, and offering no provocation for the presence of military force, the people of Kentucky have sincerely striven to preserve in their state domestic peace, and avert the calamities of sanguinary engagements.

Recently a large body of soldiers have been enlisted in the United States army, and collected in military camps in the central portion of Kentucky. This movement was preceded by the active organization of companies, regiments, etc., consisting of men sworn into the United States service under officers holding commissions from yourself. Ordnance, arms, munitions, and supplies of war are being transported into the state, and placed in large quantities in these camps. In a word, an

army is now being organized and quartered within the state, supplied with all the appliances of war, without the consent or advice of the authorities of the state, and without consultation with those most prominently known as loyal citizens. This movement now imperils that peace and tranquillity which, from the beginning of our pending difficulties, have been the paramount desire of this people, and which, up to this time, they have so secured to the state.

Within Kentucky there has been, and is likely, to be no occasion for the presence of military force. The people are quiet and tranquil, feeling no apprehension of any occasion arising to invoke protection from the Federal army. They have asked that their territory be left free from military occupation, and the present tranquillity of their communication left uninvasion by soldiers. They do not desire that Kentucky shall be required to supply the battle-field for the contending armies, or become the theater of war.

Now, therefore, as governor of the State of Kentucky, and in the name of the people, I have the honor to represent, and with the single and earnest desire to avert from their peaceful homes the horrors of war, I urge the removal from the limits of Kentucky of the military force now organized and in camp within the state. If such action as is hereby urged, be promptly taken, I firmly believe the peace of the people of Kentucky will be preserved, and the horrors of a bloody war will be averted from a people now peaceful and tranquil.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. MAGOFFIN.

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#### REPLY OF THE PRESIDENT.

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1861.

*To his Excellency, B. Magoffin, Governor of the State of Kentucky.*

SIR:—Your letter of the 19th inst., in which you urge the removal from the limits of Kentucky of the military force now organized and in camp within that state, is received. I may not possess full and accurate knowledge of this subject, but I believe it is true that there is a military force in camp within Kentucky, acting by authority of the United States, which force is not very large, and is not now being augmented.

I also believe that some arms have been furnished to this force by the United States. I also believe this force consists exclusively of Kentuckians, having their camp in the immediate vicinity of their own homes, and not assailing or menacing any of the good people of Kentucky.

In all I have done in the premises, I have acted upon the urgent solicitation of many Kentuckians, and in accordance with what I believed, and still believe, to be the wish of a majority of all the Union-loving people of Kentucky.

While I have conversed on this subject with many eminent men of Kentucky, including a large majority of her members of Congress, I do not remember that any one of them, or any other person, except your excel-

lency and the bearer of your excellency's letter, has urged me to remove the military force from Kentucky or to disband it. One other very worthy citizen of Kentucky did solicit me to have the augmenting of the force suspended for a time.

Taking all the means within my reach to form a judgment, I do not believe it is the popular wish of Kentucky that this force shall be removed beyond her limits; and with this impression, I must respectfully decline to so remove it.

I most cordially sympathize with your excellency in the wish to preserve the peace of my own native state, Kentucky. It is with regret I search and can not find in your not very short letter, any declaration or intimation that you entertain any desire for the preservation of the Federal Union.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

## CHAPTER IV.

### COMMAND OF GENERAL ANDERSON.

THE foregoing topical presentation of affairs, civil and military, in Kentucky, has been made, that explanatory digressions might be avoided, and that the narrative might proceed with events, as far as practicable, in their exact chronological order and logical connection.

On the 28th day of May, 1861, that portion of Kentucky, extending one hundred miles south of the Ohio river, was constituted a military department, designated as the "Department of Kentucky," with Brigadier-General Robert Anderson as commander. As the national authorities, at this period, were dealing very gently with Kentucky, General Anderson's headquarters were established at Cincinnati, Ohio. During the months of June, July, and August, his command of this department was only a nominal one. He did not directly interfere with the movements of loyal men or secessionists. Colonel Prentiss, of another command, as early as the 5th of June, had broken up a Confederate camp five miles inland from Cairo. But otherwise, Kentucky, though claiming neutrality, but unofficially furnishing troops for loyal and disloyal service, was allowed the untrammelled management of her own affairs. Rousseau and Nelson were enrolling troops for the United States army, not strictly according to prescribed forms, but as best they could, improvising what was not supplied by government, and forcing success in the midst of formidable difficulties.

During this period of Kentucky's neutrality, collisions and bloodshed were anticipated by all parties. A conflict was especially imminent at Louisville on the 22d of July, the day

following the defeat of General McDowell at Bull Run, as then the secessionists of the city, under the leadership of the notorious Tompkins, local chief of the "Knights of the Golden Circle," plainly indicated their purpose to control the city or hazard a conflict. As, however, in olden time it often occurred that great armies accepted the issues of dualistic contests between leaders or champions, so in Louisville, the killing of Tompkins by G. A. Green, a loyal policeman, seemingly at least, arrested the preparations for a general struggle. The excitement consequent upon this event revealed such a host of loyal men in the city, that secessionists were intimidated in the midst of their exultation over their victory in Virginia.

The month of August was the crisis. The plans of the secessionists were fully matured at a meeting in Scott county, on the 17th of August. The governor's protest against Camp Dick Robinson was one feature of it, and its purpose doubtless was to remove all the national troops from Kentucky, that with the help of Confederate soldiers from Tennessee, the secessionists might commit the state to the rebellion. This having failed, their next efforts were to embarrass the organization of national troops, and secretly organize themselves to co-operate with external forces to compel Kentucky to take her proper place amongst her "sister Southern States."

The soldiers at Camp Dick Robinson were without arms, except ordinary rifles and shot-guns, and it was a difficult and delicate matter to secure a supply. The government, at the request of Lieutenant Nelson, now acting brigadier-general, had sent six thousand muskets, one hundred thousand rounds of ammunition, and a quantity of powder and lead had been shipped to Cincinnati. The secessionists knew of this and were determined to prevent their transmission to Camp Dick Robinson.

The munitions were first put on the cars at Covington, Kentucky, and sent toward Lexington. The train was stopped in Harrison County by a band of armed men and compelled to return to Cincinnati, and the principal stockholder of the road was notified that it would be destroyed if it was used to transport arms into Kentucky. The arms and ammunition were next shipped on a steamboat for the Kentucky river, to

be delivered at Hickman's bridge near the camp. The steamer was stopped in Owen county and forced to return. They were then shipped to Louisville, and thence by a special train to Lexington. General Nelson having been advised of their shipment by telegraph, sent Colonel Thomas E. Bramlette to Lexington, with instructions to send them by railroad to Nicholasville, whence they were to be hauled to camp in wagons guarded by a squadron of Colonel Wolford's cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Letcher. When near Lexington, Colonel Bramlette, having learned from Captain Dobyns and Lieutenant Wheat, that great excitement was prevailing in the town in regard to the arms, and that the secessionists were preparing to seize them, and had so alarmed the officials of the road as to prevent their farther transportation by rail, directed the captain and lieutenant to proceed to Nicholasville and order up the transportation and cavalry with all possible speed. On reaching Lexington, he found that Dr. Ethelbert Dudley, afterward colonel in the national army, who had a company of "Home Guards," had made arrangements for the prompt assembling of his men should the secessionists attempt to seize the arms. Upon the arrival of the cavalry, this class became intensely excited and rallied under the leadership of J. C. Breckinridge, who threatened to drive the "Lincoln hirelings" from the town. John H. Morgan assembled at the armory the "State Guards" under his command, to assist Breckinridge in his work of treason. Messengers were sent requesting Colonel Bramlette to withdraw his troops from the town to avoid bloodshed, promising that Breckinridge would then use his influence to have the arms pass unmolested. Colonel Bramlette replied "that he would not depart without the arms and munitions, and that if armed rebels appeared upon the street, blood would be shed, and he would not leave a living secessionist in Lexington." He then loaded the arms and munitions, and took them to Camp Dick Robinson without further molestation.

On the 15th of August, General Anderson's command was extended so as to embrace the States of Kentucky and Tennessee, under the title of the "Department of the Cumberland;" his headquarters, however, were not removed from Cincinnati

until the 1st of September, when they were established in Louisville. By this time it was plainly manifest that even the nominal neutrality of Kentucky could be maintained no longer. The leading secessionists had despaired of the secession of the state through the independent action of Kentuckians, and many of them had joined the Confederate forces, encamped on the northern confines of Tennessee. As these men could no longer organize rebellion within the limits of Kentucky, they invited invasion as the only means untried to force her into alliance with the Confederacy, against the expressed decision of the majority of the people—a course which was a burlesque upon their vaunted attachment to the doctrine of state-rights.

At this time there were three Confederate generals with encampments and organized troops near the southern boundary of Kentucky. General Polk was on the Mississippi river, in the northwest corner of Tennessee; Buckner, who had recently exchanged the uniform of a lieutenant-general, which he had worn as inspector-general of the "State Guard," for that of a brigadier-general in the rebel army, was at Camp Boone, situated near the Louisville and Nashville railroad within the limits of Tennessee, and Zollicoffer was in Tennessee, south of Barboursville, Kentucky. These generals were waiting for a pretext to invade the state.

The initial invasion was made by Leonidas Polk, who, having thrown aside his insignia as a minister of the "Gospel of Peace," had grasped the sword.

This quondam bishop occupied Hickman and Chalk Bluffs, Kentucky, with his command, on the 5th of September, under the pretext of military necessity, and on the 7th took possession of Columbus. As a counter movement, on the 6th, Brigadier-General U. S. Grant landed troops at Paducah, with two gunboats in support, and was reinforced on the 7th. A few days later, Zollicoffer occupied Cumberland Gap, and threw a portion of his forces into Kentucky. Thus the armies of the United States and those of the so-called Confederate States were upon the soil of Kentucky, and she was compelled to abandon her neutrality, and choose alliance with one or the other belligerent power, or retain her position by resist-

ing both. Fortunately, a loyal legislature was in session to take action in the crisis—a legislature whose members could not reflect the sentiments of their constituents and attempt the maintenance of neutrality, or withhold positive allegiance to the national government. On the 9th, General Polk, having first obtained an official approval of his act from the Confederate President, informed Governor Magoffin, that under a military necessity he had occupied Columbus. The governor promptly communicated the facts to the legislature, by special message, and the legislature, on the 12th, by a large majority of votes, directed the governor to issue a proclamation ordering the Confederate troops, encamped in the state, to evacuate the soil of Kentucky, and resolutions were adopted asserting the wanton violation of the peace and neutrality of Kentucky, the invasion of her soil, and the infringement of the rights of her citizens by the so-called Confederate forces; empowering the governor to call out the military forces of the state to expel the invaders; invoking the United States to give such assistance to Kentucky as was warranted by the fourth article of the national constitution, and requesting Brigadier-General Robert Anderson to enter upon his duties as commander of the district embracing Kentucky. This action terminated formal neutrality, and committed the state to the positive support of the national government.

This position of Kentucky has historic interest, from the fact that the experiment had such issue that its repetition is not probable. Neutrality considered as a principle, or viewed in relation to the organic subordination of the individual state to the general government and the imperative requirements of patriotism, is wholly without justification. As an expedient even, its assumption by loyal men can not be justified or palliated by the fact that advantages may have resulted from it. That Kentucky's neutrality was not wholly evil is very apparent, and to this day many of the leading loyal men of the state, some of whom opposed the position from first to last, believe that the cause of the "Union" gained more than that of the "Rebellion" by the equivocal status of Kentucky for the first six months of the war. As, however, the results of the early positive loyalty of the Union men of Kentucky

can now be only conjectural, the consequences of their neutrality, in comparison, can not be determined. It is not, however, improbable that had the loyal people precipitated action, the proximate results would have been disastrous, as under the pressure of passion and prejudice, secession might have resulted, since the secessionists were organized, and loyal citizens were not. At the beginning of the war, it was evident that a large portion of the people of Kentucky were in hearty sympathy with the rebellion, and the strength of this party was seemingly much greater than it really was, in consequence of their surpassing noisiness. Another large class was entirely undecided. Delay of state action gave time for reflection, for the organization of loyal men, and the development of the true issues of the war, and threw open to the vision of the far-sighted the terrible consequences of secession. The statesmen of Kentucky must have foreseen that neutrality could not be maintained through a protracted war, involving the decided action of all the other states, but in view of the apparent strength of the disloyal and the uncertainty with regard to a loyal majority, it may have been expedient for them to delay final action as long as possible. Neutrality practically was only procrastination in the choice of Northern or Southern alliance. The intelligent of the whole country knew that the bombardment of Fort Sumter rendered futile all further efforts for the conciliation of the two great sections. The purpose of the Northern States was not dubiously revealed, that the "National Flag" which was lowered at Charleston should float there again, no matter how long or how bloody might be the intervening war. And the Southern people knew full well that their independence could only be gained by the sword.

The fame of Kentucky has suffered through her neutrality, but still her fifty-six thousand loyal soldiers, displaying gallantry and patriotism in the great Western battles, give warrant to the historian to say, with emphasis, that though the state was tardy in the expression of loyalty, she made a good record, especially for a slaveholding state, in a war which overthrew the institution which commanded her inveterate attachment. Great honor should be awarded the multitudes in Kentucky, who, though they hesitated at the threshhold of

unconditional loyalty, yet at last, true to the traditional patriotism of the state, and despite their community of material interests, and their social and political harmonies with the revolted states, did reach that high type of loyalty, which has its revelation on fields of blood. Some hesitation was natural, if not commendable, at a time when the final action of the state in the event of a general war was problematical to her wisest statesmen. But most emphatic praise is due to those who, in face of what seemed to be the dominant sentiment of the people of the state in April, boldly drew their swords for the maintenance of the Union. And, in striking contrast, the severest condemnation should rest upon those who were alike disloyal to the nation and their own state—supporting the rebellion against the general government and fighting against Kentucky.

August 15th, Brigadier-General George H. Thomas relieved Lieut. William Nelson as commander of Camp Dick Robinson; the latter was soon after raised to the rank of brigadier-general, and assigned to duty at Maysville, Kentucky, to organize a force to operate in the eastern portion of the state. The going of the former to the camp was known to the secessionists, and combinations were formed to prevent it; but from some cause he was not molested in the passage. He found four partly organized Kentucky regiments, in almost total destitution of quartermaster and commissary stores. Directing personally the minutest details, he hurried the completion of what Nelson had begun—the organization and equipment of the primal Kentucky brigades. Beyond his camp he was connected with matters which imposed additional responsibility and labor. The general direction of the "Home Guard" in central Kentucky devolved upon him; his proximity to the capital connected him with the interests there focalized, and what was of greater moment, the enemy was in his front. Zollicoffer's strength and attitude were regarded as extremely threatening. His movement had been made to subserve several purposes: to prevent the escape to the national lines of loyal East Tennesseeans; to oppose an advance to that region to succor Union men, and cut or hold the Tennessee and Virginia railroad; and with the ulterior intention of

co-operating with Polk and Buckner in the permanent occupancy of Kentucky. The members of the legislature, and loyal citizens in central Kentucky, fearing invasion and revolutionary surprise, General Thomas was requested by the formal action of the former, to send troops to Lexington for the protection of Union men.

General Thomas soon mustered into the service four Kentucky and two Tennessee regiments, and organized the First Kentucky brigade, the first formed in the state, which was consequently the first brigade of the Army of the Cumberland, and its nucleus. This army had other lines of origin. But as among the initial sources of rivers, one spring, from the force and direction of its living current, has precedence, so has this brigade in the organization of this army. The Third and Fourth Kentucky Infantry and the First Kentucky Cavalry were the first formed in the state, and the two former were at first designated as the First and Second Kentucky Infantry; but when the state became officially loyal, her legislature recognized the two regiments that Colonels Guthrie and Woodruff had organized in Ohio, then Bramlette's and Fry's regiments became the Third and Fourth. Besides, this brigade has claims as the leading source, because the troops composing it were the first to perform duty in Kentucky as soldiers of the United States. Thus from the time of the organization of this brigade, the number of troops embraced, their movements in the state under the national colors before any others, and its subsequent designation as the first brigade, first division of the army, its claims, as *the nucleus*, are unquestionable.

A second invasion was conducted by S. B. Buckner, on the 17th of September. As the commander of the state guard, this Kentuckian and ex-officer of the United States had served the Southern cause to the extent of his power. Just before he entered the Confederate army he visited Washington, and had the freedom of the city and its defenses by virtue of his declared purpose to be a non-combatant during the war. But three weeks from the day he left Washington, having in the meantime gone to Richmond and accepted a commission as brigadier-general from the Confederate President, he moved

from his camp in Tennessee to capture Louisville. Rumors of his advance had been current in Louisville for a day or two. Even reliable information had reached General Anderson that he meditated this movement. Dr. J. M. Bailey, late consul to Glasgow, and surgeon of the Twenty-sixth Kentucky during the war, residing at the time in the vicinity of Camp Boone, learned on the 15th that an effort would be immediately made for the capture of Louisville, and the day following communicated the fact to General Anderson. Buckner planned a surprise. He doubtless knew that General Anderson had no organized army, and but few troops of any type. Anticipating assistance in Louisville, he was sanguine of an easy capture. He seized the morning train in passage to the North, cut the telegraph wire, and started toward Louisville. The earliest indications of his coming were the delay of the train due early in the evening, and the interruption of telegraphic communication. These occurrences, however, were not rightly interpreted at first. A train was sent to relieve the one expected, on the supposition that an ordinary accident had detained it. As this train did not return, a locomotive was sent. The locomotive was seized as the train had been; but from the engine a fireman had escaped, who hurried to Louisville on a hand-car and made known what had occurred. Invasions by railroad had not this early in the war been reduced to a science, and Buckner having failed to anticipate the difficulties of such an advance, where all were not friends, was suddenly arrested in his rolling march. The displacement of a rail between Bowling Green and Elizabethtown, by Crutcher, a loyal young man, caused the locomotive to leave the track, and produced a delay fatal to his success.

As soon as General Anderson received positive information of the advance of Buckner, he sent Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, second to himself in command, to Camp Joe Holt to order Colonel Rousseau to report with all his available troops, as quickly as possible, at the Nashville depot in Louisville. In the meantime, in obedience to the order of Mayor Delph, the home guard, under command of Major A. Y. Johnston, chief engineer of the fire department of the city,

in great numbers assembled at the depot. Before midnight their train was ready to move. As it started, the van of Rousseau's command entered the depot. Rousseau soon followed, and overtook the advance train at Shepherdsville at dawn next morning.

General Anderson threw forward at once about three thousand men, nearly all his available force. There were twelve hundred in Rousseau's command, the remainder were of the home guard. He placed General Sherman in command, deeming it his duty to remain in the city that he might hurry forward the troops expected from the adjoining Northern States. General Sherman moved very cautiously during the darkness. He had with him in the front car Mr. Fink, superintendent of the railroad, and Major Johnston, that he might be advised concerning the country, and be ready to make his dispositions with respect to the train and troops in the event of an emergency.

On reaching the Rolling fork of Salt river, General Sherman ascertained that the railroad bridge had been burned by order of Buckner, to prevent the rapid advance of our troops, as he had learned on reaching Elizabethtown that they were in motion toward him. During the day the troops under Rousseau forded the stream, and advanced to guard Muldraugh's hill. The home guard went into camp at Lebanon Junction, using the tents of which the state guard had been despoiled. In the evening, Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Johnson, of the Third Kentucky Cavalry, bringing with him some additional companies of the home guard, reached the camp and assumed general command, by order of General Anderson.

Buckner having failed in his main purpose, soon withdrew to Bowling Green and intrenched himself. General Sherman established his camp at Muldraugh's hill, and guarding the railroad in his rear, awaited the coming of reinforcements. The waiting was not protracted. The home guard had been ordered to active duty for ten days; but previous to their return to Louisville, several regiments from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois had reached Sherman. The earlier regiments were the Sixth, Thirty-eighth, and Thirty-ninth Indiana, respectively

under Colonels Crittenden, Scribner, and Harrison; the Forty-ninth Ohio, under Colonel Gibson; and the Twenty-fourth Illinois, under Colonel Heeker.

In conjunction with Buckner's movement upon Louisville, Zollicoffer advanced from Tennessee, through Cumberland Gap, to Cumberland Ford, threatening Camp Dick Robinson. Zollicoffer's vanguard reached Barboursville on the 18th, and skirmished with a small body of the home guard. General Thomas threw forward Colonel T. T. Garrard, with the Seventh Kentucky Infantry and the First Kentucky Cavalry, to Rock Castle hills, with instructions to obstruct the road and oppose the advance of the enemy. Captain Brown was advanced to London, as a party of observation, and to intercept any small body of disloyal citizens seeking to join the enemy. These dispositions and Buckner's retreat from Muldraugh's hill, caused Zollicoffer to retire.

Simultaneously with these movements, the secessionists hitherto discomfited in every effort to invite or force Kentucky from the Union, made a final effort to accomplish this end. A call was published in the various newspapers throughout the state in the interests of the rebellion, as also in posters scattered broadcast, urging the "State-Rights" and "Peace Men" to assemble at Lexington on the 20th of September, for the purpose of having a camp drill, to continue for several days, under the supervision of Major J. C. Breckinridge, Colonel Humphrey Marshall, and other distinguished men. Information received by General Thomas indicated that under cover of this call the disloyal element of the state intended to concentrate and organize at Lexington, seize upon all the arms there and in the arsenal at Frankfort, then to unite with Zollicoffer in the expectation that the combined forces could compel the evacuation of Camp Dick Robinson, and subsequently, in conjunction with Buckner, to reach Louisville and secure Kentucky to the rebellion. On the 18th, General Thomas directed Colonel Bramlette to move immediately to Lexington and occupy the "Fair Grounds," with instructions to observe the gathering very closely, and in the event of any demonstrations or movements of hostile nature, to arrest the persons making them; but should there be none, not to arrest those having assembled.

In compliance with these instructions, Colonel Bramlette marched to Nicholasville, seized a train of cars, and moved to Lexington, occupying the fair grounds at 4 p. m. on the 19th. The secessionists had been notified of his approach about midnight, and Major Breckinridge, Colonel William Preston, George C. Hodge, and others fled through the mountains toward Virginia, Colonel Marshall to his camp, and John H. Morgan and his men joined Buckner at Muldraugh's hill just before his retreat. Zollicoffer's advance prevented General Thomas from sending Wolford, with a part of his cavalry, to Lexington, to co-operate with Bramlette as he had intended, otherwise many of these men might have been captured.

The presence of rebel armies in Kentucky had no tendency to make rebels of Kentuckians. The rampant secessionists who had left the state had made their Southern friends believe that the military occupancy of Kentucky would insure her withdrawal from the Union; but the effect was antipodal to the one anticipated. As has been mentioned, the legislature, as early as September 12th, by resolution directed the governor to issue a proclamation ordering the invading forces to leave the state, and had invited General Anderson to enter immediately upon the active discharge of his duties as commander of the department.

In response to this invitation, General Anderson assumed command by proclamation issued September 21st, in which he earnestly invoked the citizens of his native state to arm themselves for self-defense and for the expulsion of the invaders. About the same time, General Thomas L. Crittenden, commander of the "State Guard," with equal earnestness urged the members of his command to repair to places designated for rendezvous, to be mustered into the service of the United States. On the 25th of September, the legislature passed a bill providing for the enlistment of forty thousand volunteers, to serve from one to three years.

This turn of affairs imposed heavy duties upon the department commander, and General Anderson's health failing, he was relieved, at his own request, October 7th. The day following, General Sherman assumed command of the department.

## [GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 57.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
WASHINGTON, August 15, 1861.

I. The States of Kentucky and Tennessee will, in future, constitute a separate military command, to be known as the Department of the Cumberland, under the command of Brigadier-General Robert Anderson, U. S. Army.

By order:

L. THOMAS,  
*Adjutant-General.*

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, FRANKFORT, September 9, 1861.

*Gentlemen of the Senate and House of Representatives:*

I have received the following dispatches, by telegraph, from General Leonidas Polk, which I deem proper to lay before you.

B. MAGOFFIN.

COLUMBUS, KY., September 9, 1861.

*Governor B. Magoffin:*

A military necessity having required me to occupy this town, I have taken possession of it by the forces under my command. The circumstances leading to this act were reported promptly to the President of the Confederate States. His reply was, the necessity justified the action. A copy of my proclamation I have the honor to transmit you by mail.

Respectfully,

LEONIDAS POLK,

*Major-General Commanding.*

COLUMBUS, KY., September 9, 1861.

*Governor B. Magoffin, Frankfort, Ky.*

I should have dispatched you immediately, as the troops under my command took possession of this position, the very few words I addressed to the people here; but my duties since that time have so pressed me, that I have but now the first leisure time to communicate with you. It will be sufficient for me to inform you, which my short address here will do, that I had information on which I could rely, that the Federal forces intended and were preparing to seize Columbus. I need not describe the danger resulting to West Tennessee from such success. Realizing my responsibility, I could not permit them quietly to lose, through the command intrusted to me, so important a position. In evidence of the information I possessed, I will state as the Confederate forces occupied this place, the Federal troops were formed in formidable numbers in position upon the opposite bank, with their cannon turned upon Columbus; the citizens of the town had fled with terror, and not a word of assurance of safety or protection had been addressed to them.

Since I have taken possession of this place, I have been informed by

highly responsible citizens of your state, that certain representatives of the Federal government are setting up complaints of my act of occupying it, and are making it a pretense for seizing other positions. Upon this course of proceeding I have no comment to make, but I am prepared to say that I will agree to withdraw the Confederate troops from Kentucky, provided she will agree that the troops of the Federal government be withdrawn simultaneously, with a guaranty, which I will give reciprocally for the Confederate government, that the Federals shall not be allowed to enter or occupy any point of Kentucky in the future.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant, respectfully,

LEONIDAS POLK,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

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#### PROCLAMATION BY THE GOVERNOR.

In obedience to the subjoined joint resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the government of the Confederate States, the State of Tennessee, and all others concerned, are hereby informed that "Kentucky expects the Confederate or Tennessee troops to be withdrawn from her soil unconditionally."

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my name, and caused the seal of the commonwealth to be affixed. Done at Frankfort, this 13th day of September, A. D. 1861, and in the seventieth year of the commonwealth.

By the Governor:

B. MAGOFFIN.

Thos. B. MONROE, JR., *Secretary of the State.*

September 14, 1861.

*Resolved, by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, That his excellency, Governor Magoffin, be, and he is, hereby instructed to inform those concerned that Kentucky expects the Confederate or Tennessee troops to be withdrawn from her soil unconditionally.*

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#### THE KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS.

Offered in the Kentucky Senate, September 9, 1861, by Senator Whitaker, and adopted September 12, 1861.

*Resolved, That Kentucky's peace and neutrality have been wantonly violated, her soil has been invaded, the rights of her citizens have been grossly infringed by the so-called Southern Confederate forces. This has been done without cause; therefore,*

*Be it resolved by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, That the governor be requested to call out the military force of the state to expel and drive out the invaders.*

*Resolved, That the United States be invoked to give aid and assistance, that protection against invasion which is granted to each one of the states*

by the fourth section of the fourth article of the constitution of the United States.

*Resolved*, That General Robert Anderson be, and is hereby requested to enter immediately upon the active discharge of his duties in this military district.

*Resolved*, That we appeal to the people of Kentucky by the ties of patriotism and honor, by the ties of common interest and common defense, by the remembrances of the past, and by the hopes of future national existence, to assist in repelling and driving out the wanton violators of our peace and neutrality, the lawless invaders of our soil.

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#### PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL ANDERSON.

LOUISVILLE, KY., *September 21.*

KENTUCKIANS:—Called by the legislature of this, my native state, I hereby assume command of this department. I come to enforce, not to make laws, and, God willing, to protect your property and your lives.

The enemies of the country have dared to invade our soil. Kentucky is in danger. She has vainly striven to keep peace with her neighbors. Our state is now invaded by those who professed to be her friends, but who now seek to conquer her. No true son of Kentucky can longer hesitate as to his duty to his state and country. The invaders must, and, God willing, will be expelled. The leader of the hostile forces, who now approaches, is, I regret to say, a Kentuckian, making war on Kentucky and Kentuckians. Let all past differences of opinion be overlooked. Every one who now rallies to the support of our Union and our state, is a friend. Rally, then, my countrymen, around the flag our fathers loved, and which has shielded us so long. I call you to arms for self-defense, and for the protection of all that is dear to freemen. Let us trust in God and do our duty, as did our fathers.

ROBERT ANDERSON,  
*Brigadier-General U. S. A.*

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#### PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL CRITTENDEN.

*To the Militia of Kentucky:*

By the authority which you yourselves have appointed, you are called upon to defend your state. Misguided countrymen, whom you loved too well to fight, despite their wrongs to you, waging unnatural war, have tarnished the bright fame of Kentucky, and for the first time since your sires bequeathed to you this noble state, the soil is polluted by the tread of hostile armies.

I will not impugn the patriotism and courage of my countrymen by supposing that any appeal, however eloquent, could arouse them to energy and prompt action as this simple statement.

But to the State Guard I must add a word. Now is your opportunity to wipe out every reproach that has been put upon you. You owe it not

only to your duty as men and citizens, but to that solemn obligation of soldiers which you can not forget without dishonor, to respond to this call.

The State Guard will rendezvous as soon as possible at Louisville, and report to me. The residue of the militia and such of the Home Guard as choose to volunteer, will rendezvous as soon as possible at Louisville, Frankfort, Camp Dick Robinson, General Sherman's Camp, New Haven, and Henderson.

Come in battalions, regiments, companies, or come as individuals, and you shall be mustered into the service under pay at once.

T. L. CRITTENDEN,  
*Brigadier-General Kentucky State Guard.*

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[GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 6.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
LOUISVILLE, Ky., October 7, 1861.

The following telegraphic order was received yesterday at these headquarters:

"*Brigadier-General Anderson :*

"To give you rest necessary to restoration of health, call Brigadier-General Sherman to command the Department of the Cumberland. Turn over to him your instructions, and report here in person as soon as you may, without retarding your recovery.

"*WASHINGTON, D. C., October 6, 1861.*

*WINFIELD SCOTT.*"

In obedience to the above orders, I hereby relinquish the command of the department to Brigadier-General Sherman.

Regretting deeply the necessity which renders this step proper, I do it with less reluctance, because my successor, Brigadier-General Sherman, is the man I had selected for that purpose. God grant that he may be the means of delivering this department from the hands of marauding bands, who, under the guise of relieving and benefiting Kentucky, are doing all the injury they can to those who will not join them in their accursed warfare.

R. ANDERSON,  
Official: *Brigadier-General U. S. A., Commanding.*  
O. D. GREEN, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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[GENERAL ORDERS, NO 7.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
LOUISVILLE, Ky., October 8, 1861.

Brigadier-General Robert Anderson having relinquished the command of this department in General Orders No. 6, of this date, the undersigned assumes command of this department.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Brigadier-General.*

## CHAPTER V.

### OPERATIONS OF GENERAL THOMAS, IN KENTUCKY, UNDER GENERAL SHERMAN.

As yet, no effort had been made to give an army organization to the troops of the department. Those on the Louisville and Nashville railroad were without even regular brigade organization. There had been too much hurry in their movements to allow this initial step. But now, as regiments in great numbers were coming into the department, and as the establishment of numerous camps of rendezvous and instruction for volunteers promised the speedy formation of a large number of Kentucky regiments, the organization of a grand army became the paramount duty of the hour.

There were, however, unusual embarrassments attending its performance. Many of the regiments were of very recent organization, and all had been hurried to the front to repel invasion, and at the same time to link themselves together in the simple and complex relations of a great army, in the immediate presence of the enemy. With them the school of the soldier involved the experience of war, and as a consequence the facts of organization and the events of actual conflict demand concurrent narration. At first, troops were massed as emergencies required. Subsequently, these improvised commands were transformed into brigades and divisions. And as there was no general movement of the forces in Kentucky until the advance of the "Army of the Ohio," under Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, after the fall of Fort Donelson, it is obviously appropriate to group anterior events, as connected with the troops comprising each division, beginning with the first.

Very soon after the formation of the Kentucky brigade,

composed, as has been stated, of four Kentucky and two Tennessee regiments, several regiments from Ohio and Indiana were added to the command of General Thomas. Such, however, was the necessary diffusion of these troops that regular brigade organization could not at once be effected.

The first movement General Thomas meditated for his command was an advance from Camp Dick Robinson to Cumberland Ford. The threatening attitude of the enemy, and the protection of Union men on the southeastern border of Kentucky, already clamorous for help, rendered it imperative that an advance toward Tennessee should be undertaken as soon as practicable. But an immediate advance was plainly impracticable. It was known that the rebel authorities were transporting troops in large numbers from Virginia and the far South to Barboursville, Kentucky, and that the force under the Confederate general, Zollicoffer, was augmenting more rapidly than the command of General Thomas. Besides, the national troops were raw, and destitute of adequate equipments, artillery, and transportation. Under these circumstances, General Thomas used the "Home Guard" to protect roads and keep the disloyal element in awe, and holding his other troops for emergency and discipline, waited impatiently for reinforcements and munitions.

Immediately after the withdrawal of Zollicoffer, General Thomas suggested to General Anderson the importance of concentrating for an advance to Knoxville, Tennessee, to seize the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad, destroy all the bridges for some distance east and west from Knoxville, and then to turn upon Zollicoffer while in the passes of the Cumberland Mountains, and by getting between him and his supplies, effect the capture or dispersion of his army. The desirableness of this movement was enhanced by the fact that Nashville had recently been made a base of supplies for the Confederate army in Virginia. Its success would sever the most direct railroad connection between the Confederate armies east and west, and relieve from tyranny the loyal people of East Tennessee.

But barely sufficient troops for successful defense were furnished, and in a few days General Thomas was again thrown

upon the defensive, by the advance of Zollicoffer to London. In this emergency, he sent forward all the Ohio troops and the Third Kentucky Infantry; ordered the obstruction of the Richmond road, on the north side of Rock Castle hills, from the river to Big Hill, and the one connecting the Richmond and Mount Vernon roads, and urged Brigadier-General O. M. Mitchell, in command at Cincinnati, Ohio, to send reinforcements and artillery. As, however, the enemy made no effort to force the passage of Rock Castle hills, and soon retired to Cumberland Ford, General Thomas was again urgent for such reinforcements as would justify him in the assumption of the offensive. He suggested, in addition, that a column of four regiments should move up the Big Sandy through the counties of Floyd, Letcher, and Harlan, in co-operation with his own advance by Barboursville to East Tennessee. In response, six regiments were sent to him, but they were destitute of such munitions as would warrant an advance to East Tennessee. A few days later he asked for four well-equipped regiments and two field batteries, believing that this addition to his force and requisite transportation would assure the capture of Knoxville. The regiments were furnished, but as in the case of others before them, in destitution of such appointments as were necessary for such a campaign as he proposed. Anxious to assume the offensive, he was nevertheless forced to await the pleasure of the enemy.

To give support to the troops at Rock Castle hills, General Thomas ordered Colonel Connell, in command of the Seventeenth Ohio Infantry, to move from Camp Dick Robinson to Big Hill, to observe the Richmond road. He subsequently directed him to advance to London, but as the force at Rock Castle hills was again threatened by Zollicoffer, Colonel Connell's destination was changed, while en route to the latter place, where he arrived on the 20th of October. General Thomas also sent from Camp Dick Robinson, Brigadier-General Albin Schoepf, who had recently reported to him for duty, with the regiments of Colonels Coburn, Wolford, and Steedman, and Standardt's battery, to Colonel Garrard's support. General Schoepf, with Coburn's and Wolford's regiments, reached Rock Castle hills during the afternoon of the 20th.

On the following morning, Steedman and Standardt arrived with their commands.

The arrival of reinforcements was opportune, as late in the forenoon of the 21st, Zollicoffer, having found his command in close proximity to the positions of Colonels Coburn and Wolford, and under concealment of a dense forest, suddenly appeared in their front. The foremost rank bore their hats on their bayonets and claimed to be friends. Soon throwing off disguise, they opened fire, which being unexpected and vigorous caused decided confusion in the ranks of the national troops. The enemy's advantage, however, was only temporary, as Colonels Coburn and Wolford soon rallied their regiments and gallantly repulsed him. Colonels Connell and Steedman, assisted by Standardt's battery, engaged the enemy with similar result. In the afternoon, Zollicoffer made another assault, pressing most heavily against the position of Colonel Garrard, but he was again repulsed at all points, and during the following night retreated toward London. The enemy fought bravely, coming within fifty yards of the works. Their loss was thirty killed and a large number wounded. General Schoepf's loss was five killed and eighteen wounded.

The issue of this engagement rendered fruitless the movement of three or four thousand rebels, a few days later, from Burksville to Albany, with their advance thrown forward to Monticello, menacing Somerset, held by the Twelfth Kentucky Infantry under Colonel W. A. Hoskins. This force was doubtless intended for co-operation with Zollicoffer in the invasion of central Kentucky, in the event of his success at Rock Castle hills. The union of this force with his command, would have given Zollicoffer an army of ten or eleven thousand men, adequate in the extravagance of Southern arrogance and expectation, for the grandest achievements.

The defeat of Zollicoffer prevented the projected conjunction of these columns, and the one at Monticello, having knowledge of this defeat, and of the reinforcements sent to Somerset by General Thomas, withdrew into Tennessee without inviting an engagement.

Immediately after the battle of Rock Castle Hills, General Thomas resumed preparation for an advance to Cumberland

Gap. He moved the command of General Schoepf, augmented by the Tennessee troops, to the junction of the Richmond and Crab Orchard roads, subsequently posting it at London, and established his headquarters and a depot of supplies at Crab Orchard. But circumstances beyond his control still prevented his long-contemplated campaign. Before leaving Washington for a command in Kentucky, assigned to him at the earnest solicitation of General Anderson, he had tried to impress General Scott with the necessity of full preparation to meet a heavy force of the enemy in the direction of East Tennessee, and upon his assumption of command at Camp Dick Robinson, he had addressed himself to the accomplishment of this object. His oft-repeated requests for troops, had only secured tardy reinforcements of raw troops, destitute of adequate equipments, artillery, and transportation. He now held the line from the Ohio to London, and from Lexington to Frankfort; Cincinnati was his base of supplies, and Camp Dick Robinson his main depot. His communication by rail terminated at Nicholasville. Foreseeing defeat, should he attempt the invasion of East Tennessee without having an army of ample strength and equipment, as he was persistently urged to do by prominent loyalists from that region, he repeated his request for such appointments for his command as the proposed campaign demanded. Hitherto, General Sherman had approved his plans and his efforts for their execution, but now, fearing that the long weak line which connected General Thomas with his base of supplies might be severed by the enemy, he forbade his farther advance.

On the 11th of November, General Sherman informed General Thomas that he had received a telegram from Brigadier-General A. McD. McCook, at Camp Nevin, that the enemy had disappeared from Green river, and that there was a rumor that Buckner was moving in force upon Louisville, between him and General Thomas. Giving partial credence to this rumor, General Sherman ordered General Thomas, if not engaged in front, to withdraw his command back of the Kentucky river, and act as circumstances should demand. General Thomas replied that he did not credit the report, but would give orders at once for the retrograde movement. He accord-

ingly ordered General Schoepf to break up his camp immediately, and join him with all his troops, at Crab Orchard or Nicholasville. The following day, General Sherman expressed the conviction that the rebel General Albert Sidney Johnston who had assumed command of the insurgent army at Bowling Green, with Hardee and Buckner as his lieutenants, was preparing "to strike a great blow in Kentucky, by moving from Bowling Green with a force not far short of forty-five thousand men, with a large portion of artillery," and directed General Thomas to hold himself in readiness for a prompt withdrawal to Danville, leaving the Tennessee troops and Colonel Garrard near Rock Castle river, to watch the enemy in the direction of Cumberland Gap. General Sherman was not fully assured that Johnston meditated so bold an assumption of the offensive, but regarded such an event as very probable. On any other supposition it seemed difficult to account for the activity of the insurgent forces in Kentucky, or the boastful expectancy of secessionists, that the day of their triumph was near. Johnston had impressed a large number of wagons in the vicinity of Bowling Green—a fact which pointed to the probable advance of his army. Zollicoffer had retired into East Tennessee, and had blockaded the roads in his retreat—a step which might indicate his re-approach by Somerset from a more reliable base of supplies, or his union with Johnston on his northward march. A force of nearly three thousand men were also reported in motion from Tompkinsville, toward Columbia, menacing Colonels Grider and Hazzard, who were recruiting regiments at the latter place. As, however, the purpose of the enemy was in doubt, General Sherman directed General Thomas to remain at Crab Orchard, ready to move to Somerset or Danville, as circumstances should require, but to make effort to intercept the force moving from Tompkinsville.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
LOUISVILLE, KY., October 25, 1861.

*General Geo. H. Thomas, Camp Dick Robinson.*

SIR:—Do n't push too far. Your line is already long and weak. I can not now re-enforce you. Nelson has got into difficulty with the militia, and I have no person to send there. An interruption of the railroads,

## 42 GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL SHERMAN.

by an incursion from Prestonburg, would cut you off from that source of supply. Call to your assistance the regiment from train. The state board is impressed with the necessity of energy in the organization of volunteers, but we are still embarrassed for want of clothing and arms. Promises are a poor substitute for them, but are all we have. I will again urge on the department the pressing necessity for more good officers and large re-enforcements of men.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Brigadier-General Commanding.*

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CAMP DICK ROBINSON, October 31, 1861.

*Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, Commanding Department of the Cumberland, Louisville, Ky.*

GENERAL:—I shall start for the Crab Orchard Springs to-day. I have directed the quartermaster to make arrangements to have all the stores for the troops hauled from Nicholasville to Crab Orchard, by contract, and will endeavor to have a government train organized to transport the supplies from the latter place to the camp, in advance, and gradually work out of the confusion into which the transportation has fallen, in consequence of the inexperience of those gentlemen who have been performing the duties of quartermaster.

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Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General U. S. A., Commanding.*

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CINCINNATI, O., September 20, 1861.

*To General George H. Thomas, Commanding Camp Dick Robinson, Ky.*

DEAR SIR:—I commenced the shipment of wagons to you, and before I had fairly gotten under way, I had orders from Western Virginia for four hundred. The consequence is, you are left without for the present. I will cheerfully do anything I can for you at any time, but these same difficulties will be constantly occurring. General Rosecrans' orders must of course take precedence.

JOHN H. DICKINSON,  
*Captain and Assistant Quartermaster.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
LOUISVILLE, KY., November 5, 1861.

*Brigadier-General Thomas, Crab Orchard.*

SIR:—In the present aspect of affairs, it is impossible to say how or where we shall winter. This will depend on our enemies; they will not allow us to choose. I have done all in my power to provide men and material, adequate to the importance of the crisis; but all things come disjointed—regiments without overcoats, or wagons, or horses, or those

essentials to movement. McCook has a good body of men, but the force of the enemy far exceeds him, and the railroad on which he depends, is in such a country that it requires large guards. All of these, in case of attack, would be terribly exposed. I can hardly sleep to think what would be your fate in case the Kentucky River bridge should be destroyed, or the railroad to your rear; and I have demanded again and again a force adequate to all these vicissitudes, a very large force beyond the ability of the states to furnish. Nelson and you ought simply to guard those avenues of approach to the interior, but from this point we should have made a bold forward movement; but I have never had a force approximating the magnitude of the occasion. I wish I could make your communications perfectly safe, and the cost would be nothing. There should be at least ten good regiments to your rear, capable of sustaining the head of your column at London, but I am unable to provide; and hereabouts the army should be such as to prevent all idea of attack; but Buckner and Hardee have across Green river a very large force, and may advance at their pleasure.

In this stage of the case, I can only repeat my former orders for you to hold in check the force of Zollicoffer, and await events. The road to Richmond depending on the ferry, appears to me less safe to you than the one crossing Kentucky river by bridge. I have nothing from Nelson for some days.

Truly yours,  
W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Brigadier-General Commanding.*

LOUISVILLE, Ky., November 11, 1861.

*General Thomas:*

I am just in receipt of a telegraphic dispatch from McCook, at Camp Nevin, that the force in his front along Green river has disappeared, and that there is a rumor that Buckner is moving in force toward Lexington between us. If not engaged in front, at once withdraw your force back of Kentucky river, and act according to the state of facts then. If it be true that the force at the Gap has been increased, as represented, to twenty-thousand, it would be madness to contend. My information is positive as to the state of affairs along Green river, but conjectured as to the other, and I send a special messenger to convey it to you.

Yours,  
W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Brigadier-General.*

CRAB ORCHARD, November 12, 1861.

*General W. T. Sherman, Commanding Department of the Cumberland, Louisville, Ky.*

**GENERAL:**—Your dispatch received. I will give orders at once for a retrograde movement, but I am sure the enemy are not moving between us. All my information indicates that they are moving South.

## 44 GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL SHERMAN.

I send this by Lieutenant Jones, Second Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, who will take back any orders you may have for me.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS, CRAB ORCHARD, November 13, 1861.

*General W. T. Sherman, Commanding Department of the Cumberland, Louisville, Ky.*

GENERAL:—Colonel Bramlette writes me from Somerset, on the 11th, but does not think that the enemy have any intention of advancing.

From General Schoepf's camp the report is that Zollicoffer has retired beyond Cumberland Gap, leaving some cavalry pickets on the Tennessee side of Cumberland Ford. I will send you a copy of Colonel Bramlette's report to-night by mail.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Brigadier-General U. S. V.*

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Louisville, Ky., November 12, 1861.

*General Geo. H. Thomas, Commanding Crab Orchard.*

SIR:—I sent a special dispatch to you last night, intimating the necessity of withdrawing your forces further back. I am convinced from many facts that Sidney A. Johnston is making Herculean efforts to strike a blow in Kentucky; that he designs to move from Bowling Green on Lexington, Louisville, and Cincinnati. I may be in error, but he has pressed into service some one thousand five hundred wagons at and near Bowling Green, and his force is not far short of forty-five thousand men, with a large portion of artillery.

The movement may depend on new circumstances, but I think the best disposition of your forces is to leave the Tennesseeans and Colonel Garrard in a kind of ambush, near Rockcastle river, and draw back of Danville the balance. Establish communication with Bramlette and Wolford, and with the other Kentucky regiments, such as Bruce's and Barnes'.

Have all things planned, and defer the execution of them till you know from the direction of Greenville, Campbellsville, and Lebanon, that my conjecture is right.

\* \* \* \* \*

If the movement be made in force, our effort should be to concentrate before they reach the neighborhood of Danville. We can not trust the telegraph, but when I telegraph to Nicholasville, "your application by letter is granted," you will understand that my conjectures are correct. When I telegraph, it is denied, then my information is wrong. We find it impossible to penetrate their designs, except I know their force is very

large, and they have pressed in all the wagons from several counties, for which they could have no other use than what I name.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Brigadier-General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS, LOUISVILLE, November 14, 1861.

*To General Thomas, Crab Orchard:*

Your application is granted.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Brigadier-General Commanding.*

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Received at 4.30 p. m.

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HEADQUARTERS LOUISVILLE, November 16, 1861.

*To General Geo. H. Thomas, Crab Orchard.*

General Buell has arrived and assumed command. He will send you orders. In the meantime, remain at Crab Orchard.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Brigadier-General Commanding.*

Received at 2.20 p. m.

## CHAPTER VI.

### OPERATIONS OF GENERAL THOMAS, IN KENTUCKY, UNDER GENERAL BUELL, INCLUDING THE BATTLE OF MILL SPRINGS.

By general orders No. 97, war department, issued November 9th, the Department of the Cumberland was discontinued, and the Department of Ohio constituted, embracing the States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky (east of the Cumberland river), and Tennessee, and Brigadier-General D. C. Buell was assigned to its command.

General Buell assumed command of the new department on the 15th of November. General Sherman advised General Thomas of the fact, and directed him to await orders from the new commander.

On the 17th, General Buell ordered General Thomas, by verbal message, expressed through Captain T. S. Everts, assistant adjutant-general, to move his command to Columbia, leaving the First and Second Tennessee and Seventh Kentucky regiments, under Lieutenant Carter, U. S. N., acting brigadier-general, at London, to observe any approach of the enemy through Kentucky, from Cumberland Gap. Four days later, General Carter was ordered to break up camp at London, and join General Thomas at Lebanon. This movement was considered so urgent, that he was directed to impress wagons if he could not hire them. Still the order requiring it was revoked before the troops were put in motion, and with the exception of the sick who were sent to Crab Orchard, the command was left temporarily at London. In moving as directed, General Thomas sent General Schoepf, with the Fourteenth Ohio and Fourth Kentucky regiments, and Standardt's and Kinney's batteries, by way of Stanford and Danville, the pre-

scribed route through Liberty being impassable, and followed with the Tenth, Seventeenth and Thirty-eighth Ohio regiments, the Thirty-third Indiana having been left at Crab Orchard, until the sick could be removed and the depot broken up. He had previously sent Colonels Bramlette's and Wolford's regiments from Somerset, to assist Colonels Grider and Hazzard at Columbia, in opposing the rebel force approaching from Tompkinsville, which, without making or inviting an attack, fell back into Monroe county.

General Thomas reached Danville, November 22d. At this time, General Schoepf, with a part of his command, was encamped at Broomfield, between Danville and Lebanon. Colonel Steedman and Captain Standardt had taken the wrong road at Stanford, and were moving on Lebanon through Hustonville. On the 26th, General Thomas ordered General Schoepf to move to Lebanon, and directed Colonels Connell and Bradley to march their regiments from Danville to the same place. By his order, Colonel Barnes proceeded from Irvine, through Richmond, Lancaster, and Danville, to the same destination. This movement of troops was both costly and fruitless. The roads were exceedingly bad, the march was a hurried one, and no enemy was found at Lebanon or Columbia, and none even threatening these points, with Louisville and Cincinnati as ultimate objectives, as had been anticipated by the department commanders.

While General Thomas, in obedience to orders, was concentrating his command at Lebanon and Columbia, Zollicoffer having marched from Cumberland Gap through Jacksboro', Huntsville, and Jamestown, Tennessee, made his appearance with a strong force at Monticello, Kentucky, and threw forward a detachment to the Cumberland river, threatening Colonel Hoskins, in position near Somerset. Officers on the outlook at remote points reported the approach of the enemy. General Carter, at London, through a reconnoisance by Lieutenant-Colonel Spears, with six hundred men, in the direction of Cumberland Ford, had learned as early as the 24th that Zollicoffer had moved with nearly all his troops toward Jamestown. A day or two earlier Colonel Hoskins, near Somerset, and Colonel Bramlette, at Columbia, had each ascertained that

he had reached Monticello. Each of these officers communicated the fact to General Thomas, who made prompt dispositions to arrest his advance at the Cumberland river. He sent five hundred of Wolford's cavalry from Columbia to reinforce Colonel Hoskins, and ordered General Schoepf, with Standardt's battery from Lebanon, and Colonel Connell and Bradley's regiments, en route thither, to move to the Cumberland river in front of Somerset, and fortify a position commanding the crossing and the river above and below the crossing. Captain Prime, of the engineers, was sent by General Buell to superintend the fortifications. General Schoepf was also specially urged to ascertain the movements of the enemy, and promptly report them, and not only to resist his crossing, but to prevent him from collecting the means of crossing.

For some days the situation of Colonel Hoskins was very critical. He was confronting an army in close proximity, whose cavalry skirmished with his pickets at Mill Springs, a point near his position. Doubtful of his ability to maintain his ground until the arrival of reinforcements from Lebanon, he called upon General Carter, at London, for assistance, who being restrained by his orders from General Buell, refused compliance. Fortunately, the enemy made no effort to cross the river before the arrival of General Schoepf, which occurred December 1st. General Schoepf at once selected a position on the north bank of the Cumberland, six miles from Somerset, and well sheltered from the artillery of the enemy on the opposite side of the river.

On the 29th of November, General Buell placed General Thomas in command of all troops east of New Haven, instructing him to make no important movement except in the event of danger, without his approval, but to prepare for emergencies, while avoiding a threatening attitude. The line of defense assigned to him extended from London to Columbia, and his troops were distributed as follows: The First and Second Tennessee, and Seventh Kentucky regiments, under command of General Carter, held London; the Fourth and Tenth Kentucky, Fourteenth Ohio, and Tenth Indiana regiments, and battery E, First Ohio Artillery, were posted at

Lebanon; the Third Kentucky Infantry, and First Kentucky Cavalry, at Columbia; the Thirty-third Indiana at Crab Orchard; the Thirty-first Ohio regiment, and battery A, First Ohio Artillery, at Camp Dick Robinson; the Seventeenth and Thirty-eighth Ohio, and battery B, First Ohio Artillery, confronted Zollicoffer near Somerset; and the Eighth Kentucky and Thirty-fifth Ohio were in motion toward Lebanon.

On the 2d of December the enemy made a brisk but harmless bombardment of General Schoepf's camp, and then moved toward Mill Springs. Believing that this movement looked to a lodgment on the north side of the Cumberland, General Schoepf sent Captain Dillion with two companies of cavalry, to guard the ford and prevent his crossing, and ordered Colonel Connell, with his regiment, the Seventeenth Ohio, three pieces of artillery, and one company of cavalry, to march from Somerset to co-operate with Captain Dillion. The latter, in palpable disregard of orders, went into camp two miles from Fishing Creek, and neglecting even to post pickets to watch the ford, allowed Zollicoffer to establish himself on the north bank of the Cumberland, not only without opposition, but without his knowledge. Ignorant of the success of the enemy, Colonel Connell reached the vicinity of the ford to find himself confronted by a strong force on his own side of the river, and with such means of crossing reinforcements as not only to preclude his own attack, but even to imperil his command. Waiting for the aid of darkness, he withdrew his troops in safety back of Fishing creek, in absence of a tenable position in closer proximity to the enemy. As the lodgment of the enemy on the north bank of the river, and his threatening bearing, revealed a purpose beyond mere menaee, General Schoepf, on the 5th, requested General Carter, at London, and Colonel Coburn, at Crab Orchard, to move to his support, and discovering that the force of the enemy on the north bank, already superior to his own, was constantly increasing, and that his position, being between roads leading from the different ferries, was susceptible of easy lateral approach, he withdrew to a strong position, three miles beyond Somerset, commanding the Crab Orchard and Stanford roads, and

again urged General Carter to come to his assistance. General Thomas, however, had previously made provision for General Schoepf's reinforcement. December 3d he ordered Colonels Walker and Vanderveer's\* regiments from Camp Dick Robinson to Somerset, and Captain Hewitt's battery from Broomfields. While these regiments seemed easily available for the emergency at Somerset, and were in motion thither, Colonel Walker was remanded to Camp Dick Robinson by General Buell. It is evident that at this time, and for some weeks subsequently, General Buell did not anticipate any serious trouble from Zollicoffer at Somerset. Acting upon this belief, he turned back troops en route to Somerset, and reversed orders in other cases requiring the movement of reinforcements to that point. He even forbade General Thomas to send other troops to General Schoepf until he had first secured his approval, asserting that the force at Somerset was sufficient. His apprehension of the situation, however, was not entertained by general officers in Southern Kentucky, and General Carter, deeming the danger to the command at Somerset a justification for moving without direct orders, left London with the First and Second Tennessee regiments December 7th, and reached General Schoepf on the 9th. When he started he sent a messenger to recall Colonel Garrard from a reconnaissance which he was conducting toward Barboursville, that he also might follow as quickly as possible; but subsequent orders required Colonel Garrard to remain at London.

On the 2d of December, General Buell issued an order giving brigade and division organization to the troops under his command, styling them collectively the "Army of the Ohio," and assigning brigade and division commanders. By this order the brigades were numbered consecutively throughout the army and not by divisions. On the 6th, in obedience to the general order of the department commander, General Thomas formally assumed command of the First Division. This division comprised four brigades, and other troops, designated as follows :

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\* Colonel Vanderveer had been ordered to Camp Dick Robinson while en route to Lebanon.

*First Brigade.*

Brigadier-General Albin Schoepf commanding.

33d Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel John Coburn.

17th Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel J. M. Connell.

12th Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel W. A. Hoskins.

38th Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel E. D. Bradley.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel M. D. Manson commanding.

4th Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel S. S. Fry.

14th Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel J. B. Steedman.

10th Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel M. D. Manson.

10th Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel J. M. Harlan.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel Robert L. McCook commanding.

18th United States Infantry, Colonel H. B. Carrington.

2d Regiment Minnesota Volunteers, Colonel H. P. Van Cleve.

35th Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel F. Vanderveer.

9th Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel R. L. McCook.

*Twelfth Brigade.*

Brigadier-General S. P. Carter commanding

1st Regiment East Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel R. R. Byrd.

2d Regiment East Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel J. P. S. Carter.

7th Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel T. T. Garrard.

31st Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel M. B. Walker

*Troops not assigned to Brigades.*

1st Regiment Kentucky Cavalry, Colonel F. Wolford.

Squadron Indiana Cavalry, Captain Graham.

Battery B, 1st Kentucky Artillery, Captain J. M. Hewitt.

Battery B, 1st Ohio Artillery, Captain W. B. Standardt.

Battery C, 1st Ohio Artillery, Captain D. Kinney.

Major W. E. Lawrence commanding artillery.

As Zollicoffer, having a force greatly superior to General Schoepf, withheld attack, General Buell still feared that, under cover of his offensive attitude at Somerset, he might advance with the greater portion of his command on Colum-

bia, and then unite with Buckner, he ordered General Thomas to place Brigadier-General J. T. Boyle in command at Columbia, with instructions to fortify his position, and observe the enemy very closely toward the Cumberland river. He also directed General Thomas to move Brigadier-General Ward, with his command, from Campbellsville to Green river, in readiness to reinforce General Boyle in case of need. In harmony with these precautions, Colonel Wolford, with a portion of his regiment, was posted for outlook at Williams' farm, six miles from the Columbia and Somerset road, with his pickets well offered toward the enemy, to give timely notice of his approach to Columbia, or of his march into central Kentucky, through Caseyville.

In the meantime, Zollicoffer became more demonstrative in the vicinity of Somerset. His cavalry on the right, provoked a spirited skirmish with the Thirty-fifth Ohio, three miles from Somerset, which resulted in the loss of two or three men on each side. The enemy had previously captured Major Helvetti, of the cavalry, and Captain Prine, who had been too venturesome in making observations.

Fearing that General Schoepf might be overpowered by Zollicoffer, General Thomas requested General Buell to permit him to go to his assistance. As has been stated, General Buell had previously directed him to withhold reinforcements, and now, when danger seemed still more imminent, he forbade him to take troops to Somerset, expressing the hope that General Schoepf would be able to drive Zollicoffer across the Cumberland, and asserting that he did not intend to be diverted from more important purposes by the annoying affairs at Somerset. These purposes doubtless had reference to operations in the direction of Columbia, as he ordered General Thomas to be ready for a quick transfer of one or two brigades to that place. As the only help for General Schoepf at command, General Thomas, December 11th, ordered Colonel M. B. Walker from Camp Dick Robinson to Somerset.

At this time, Zollicoffer's cavalry were ravaging the country about Jamestown and Creelsboro, and General Hindman, in command of about seven thousand men, was threatening Columbia from Bear Wallow and More's Hill. The cavalry

of the enemy were driven back conjointly, by Colonel Wolford from Williams' farm; Lieutenant-Colonel Letcher, of the First Kentucky Cavalry, from Columbia, and Colonel Hazard, in act of conveying a large party of loyal Tennesseeans, from Burksville. Thus, General Hindman's advance resulted in nothing beyond menace. The Confederate generals in Kentucky, seemed reluctant to assume the offensive with such positiveness as had been anticipated. Two facts may account for their gentleness: Their armies were weaker than our commanders had supposed, and they were doubtless waiting for more active support from Kentucky secessionists. For while it was true that Kentuckians swelled the Confederate armies very considerably, Kentucky secessionists, as a whole, were more noisy than warlike. To quicken their zeal for the rebellion and elicit their active support, Zollicoffer issued a proclamation December 16th, in which he presented Southern opinions concerning the causes of the war, and the purposes of the North in prosecuting it, and, appealing to their prejudices and passions, urged Kentuckians to assist him in driving the Northern hordes across the Ohio river. He intimated that if brave Kentuckians would refuse to aid the disheartened forces of the government in their effort to subjugate the South, and heartily join their Southern brethren, the success of the South would be assured. There was, however, no response, even in approximate correspondence, with the boastful tone of the proclamation.

A reconnoissance by General Schoepf, in strong force, with artillery, on the 18th, revealed the fact that Zollicoffer was intrenching on the north side of the Cumberland, in the angle formed by the junction of Fishing creek and that river, with his lines of fortification extended to each stream. General Schoepf moved toward this position in two columns, the heavier under his own command, and the other under General Carter. But not intending an assault, he accomplished nothing beyond pushing back the cavalry of the enemy, and ascertaining his probable purpose, as indicated by his repose behind his fortifications. The same day Colonel Hoskins made a reconnoissance to Waitsboro, but found no enemy.

General Buell, having finally concluded that it was impor-

tant to dislodge Zollicoffer, directed General Thomas, December 29th, to communicate with General Schoepf, and arrange for a combined attack. General Thomas was to move in force from Lebanon, through Columbia, and strike Zollicoffer's left flank, while General Schoepf should assault in front. Accordingly, on the 31st, General Thomas started from Lebanon, with Colonel Manson's brigade and two regiments of Colonel McCook's, to march by way of Campbellsville, Columbia, and Webb's Cross-roads. Heavy rains had swollen the streams and rendered the roads almost impassable, and the progress of the command was very slow, and at times was almost entirely arrested. But after a toilsome march of eighteen days, portions of Manson's and McCook's brigades and Kinney's battery reached Logan's Cross-roads, a point ten miles from Zollicoffer's intrenched camp. As the Fourth and Tenth Kentucky regiments, the Fourteenth Ohio, and Eighteenth United States Infantry were still in the rear, General Thomas halted to await their arrival and communicate with General Schoepf. He made a careful disposition of the troops in hand, posting the Tenth Indiana, Wolford's cavalry, and Kinney's battery on the direct road to the enemy's position, and placing the Ninth Ohio and Second Minnesota regiments on the Robertsport road, three-fourths of a mile to the right. To prevent surprise, he threw out strong pickets beyond the junction of the Somerset and Mill Springs road with the one leading directly to the enemy, and posted cavalry pickets some distance in advance of those of the infantry. After consultation with General Schoepf, General Thomas directed him to send to his camp the Twelfth Kentucky, First and Second Tennessee regiments, and Standardt's battery, to remain until the troops in the rear should come up. Having heard in the evening of the 17th of January, 1862, that a large train of wagons, with its escort, was encamped on the Robertsport and Danville road, six miles from the camp of the Fourteenth Ohio, he ordered Colonel Steedman to send his wagons forward under strong guard, and then to march with his own and Colonel Harlan's regiment to the place where the train and escort were said to be encamped, and capture or disperse them. The next day, the Fourth Kentucky regiment, the battalion

of Michigan engineers, and Wetmore's battery joined General Thomas.

General Crittenden, who had recently assumed command of the Confederate army at Mill Springs, was not ignorant of the approach of General Thomas, and hoping to crush him before he could concentrate his command, moved against him early on the morning of the 19th. At about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  o'clock A. M. the national cavalry pickets encountered the enemy, and, slowly retiring, reported to Colonel Manson the approach of the army. Colonel Manson immediately threw forward the Tenth Indiana, ordered the Fourth Kentucky to move in support, and then in person made known to General Thomas the state of affairs at the front. General Thomas sent him back to his command, with instructions to hold the enemy in check until the other troops could be brought into action. In a few minutes all were formed and in motion to the field, except the battalion of Michigan engineers and Captain Greenwood's company of the Thirtieth Ohio, who were left as camp guard.

Upon going to the field soon after, General Thomas found the Tenth Indiana formed in front of their encampment, apparently awaiting orders, and threw them forward to the support of the Fourth Kentucky, which was the only entire regiment then engaged. He then rode forward to observe the enemy, and make such dispositions as successful resistance demanded. When he reached the position held by the Fourth Kentucky, Tenth Indiana, and Wolford's cavalry, he discovered the enemy advancing through a corn-field to gain the left of the Fourth Kentucky, which was resisting the foe in front with persistent bravery. To thwart this flank movement, he ordered up General Carter's brigade, which was yet some distance in the rear, and a section of Kinney's battery, and promptly put Kinney's guns in position at the edge of the field to the left of the Fourth Kentucky, which rendered efficient service in arresting a regiment of Alabamians moving against the left of Colonel Fry's regiment. He also brought up the Second Minnesota and Ninth Ohio, put the former in the rear of the Fourth Kentucky and Tenth Indiana, now nearly out of ammunition, and placed the Ninth Ohio in line on the right of the road.

Immediately after these dispositions had been made, the enemy opened fire in such manner as indicated his determination to overwhelm General Thomas before additional troops could be brought into action. For nearly half an hour the contest was most obstinately maintained, on both sides, when the two gallant regiments (Second Minnesota and Tenth Ohio) were supported on the left by the First and Second East Tennessee regiments under General Carter, and the Twelfth Kentucky, under Colonel Hoskins. The fire of these fresh troops soon caused the enemy's right to give ground, and while the Second Minnesota kept up a most galling fire in the center, the Ninth Ohio, with fixed bayonets, made a most determined charge and completely turned his left flank, when the whole line was swept from the field.

As soon as practicable the regiments were reformed, supplied with ammunition, and pressed forward in vigorous pursuit. A show of resistance was made by a small body of cavalry, which was routed by a few shots from Standardt's battery, otherwise the whole force, in disorderly rout, hurried to the protection of their intrenchments. Colonel Steedman, with his own regiment, and Colonel Harlan's, and General Schoepf, with his brigade, joined General Thomas in time to participate in the pursuit.

When near the intrenched camp of the enemy, the troops were deployed, and advanced in line of battle to the summit of the hill at Moulden's. From this hill vigorous cannonading by Standardt's and Wetmore's batteries was maintained until dark. Kinney's battery was placed on the extreme right at Russell's to deter the enemy from crossing at the ferry, and full preparation was made for storming the intrenchments on the following morning. But during the night the enemy abandoned his fortifications, and everything within them, crossed the river quietly and burned his boats. The national troops moved upon the fortifications the next morning, but found no enemy to defend them. The destruction of the boats prevented immediate pursuit, and the dispersion of the enemy in all directions in their utter demoralization and haste to escape, rendered any subsequent general pursuit en-

tirely useless, and General Schoepf's brigade alone followed the enemy to Monticello.

The enemy left in his intrenchments all his badly wounded, twelve pieces of artillery, a heavy amount of ammunition, a large number of small arms, one hundred and fifty wagons, more than a thousand horses and mules, and abundant quartermaster and commissary stores. His flags, left upon the battle-field, gave evidence of his positive defeat, and the wounded left in the intrenchments revealed his absorbing anxiety to reach the south bank of the Cumberland.

General Crittenden moved against General Thomas with ten regiments of infantry, besides independent companies, six pieces of artillery, and two or more battalions of cavalry. He was defeated by six regiments of infantry, one battery, and a portion of Wolford's cavalry. He lost, as far as known, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, three hundred and ninety-two men. Of this aggregate, one hundred and ninety-two were killed, including General Zollicoffer, who was killed by a shot from the pistol of Colonel S. S. Fry. As he fell in the crisis of the engagement, his loss greatly contributed to the discomfiture of the enemy. Lieutenant Bailie Peyton was also among the slain. Both of these were men of prominence and influence in the rebellion.

General Thomas lost thirty-nine killed, including one commissioned officer, and two hundred and seven wounded. Among the latter were Colonel Robert McCook and Lieutenant Andrew Burt, of the Tenth Ohio, acting aid-de-camp to the general commanding.

The victory at Mill Springs was the first decisive one that crowned the national arms, and it gave joy and hope to the loyal everywhere. In its positiveness, it was the type of the grander triumph at Nashville in the last but most decisive field engagement which occurred in the West during the war.

The President issued a congratulatory order, and the general in chief charged General Buell to convey his thanks to General Thomas and his troops for this brilliant victory. These official expressions of thanks were not more emphatic than was the spontaneous utterance of gratitude by the people.

Immediately after the battle of Mill Springs, General Thomas concentrated his command at Somerset, and there awaited the development of general plans for offensive operations. The success of General Grant and Commodore Foote at Fort Henry, on the Cumberland river, February 6, 1862, induced General Buell to concentrate his forces for a co-operative movement in pressing back the enemy's line. He accordingly ordered the first division to Lebanon. At Lebanon (February 15th), General Thomas received orders to move his division as rapidly as possible by way of Bardstown, New Haven, and Munfordsville, to take part in the contemplated operations against Bowling Green. Before this movement could be executed, the order requiring it was revoked, and on the 22d General Thomas was directed to proceed with his division, and the First Ohio Cavalry, then at Bardstown, by forced marches, to Louisville, to embark for the Cumberland river. This order was promptly executed, and on the 26th the division took boats at Louisville and debarked at Nashville during the 2d, 3d, and 4th days of March.

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[GENERAL ORDERS NO. 37.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
WASHINGTON, November 9, 1861.

The following departments are formed from the present Department of the West:

\* \* \* \* \*

IV. The Department of the Ohio. To consist of the States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, that portion of Kentucky east of the Cumberland river, and the State of Tennessee, to be commanded by Brigadier-General D. C. Buell; headquarters at Louisville.

\* \* \* \* \*

By order:

JULIUS P. GARESCHE,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

## [GENERAL ORDERS NO. 1.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
LOUISVILLE, KY., November 15, 1861.

I. In pursuance of General Orders No. 37, of the 9th instant, from the Adjutant-General's office, Brigadier-General D. C. Buell hereby assumes command of the Department of the Ohio.

\* \* \* \* \*

By command of General Buell.

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, and Chief of Staff.*HEADQUARTERS FIRST KENTUCKY BRIGADE.  
CRAB ORCHARD, November 17, 1861.*Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, Commanding Department of the Cumberland, Louisville, Ky.*

GENERAL:—Captain T. S. Evarts, Assistant Adjutant-General, arrived to-day at 5 p. m. He informs me that your verbal orders are to move my command in the direction of Columbia. Some of the wagons, belonging to the regiments just arrived, have not yet reached this place, the roads between this and London being in such wretched condition. The regiments will not be ready to move before Tuesday. If the road from here to London remains in the same condition as now, it will not be possible to subsist the troops there through the winter, and I would respectfully recommend that they be withdrawn. They now have on hand nearly one month's supply of provisions, and forty rounds of ammunition.

\* \* \* \* \*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General U. S. V. Commanding.*HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
LOUISVILLE, KY., November 18, 1861.*Brigadier-General Geo. H. Thomas, Commanding Division, Crab Orchard, Ky.*

SIR:—General Buell directs me to say, that the orders he has given you in reference to the movement of your command contemplates the whole of it, and it will in consequence not be necessary to continue the depot from which you are now supplied. You will come upon a line, of which Louisville, and not Cincinnati, will be the main depot.

\* \* \* \* \*

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

*General Thomas, Danville, Ky.*

LOUISVILLE, Ky., November 22, 1861.

If the regiments at London have not started to move at the time you can communicate with them, order them to remain at London.

By command of General Buell.

J. B. FRY,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.**General Thomas.*

CAMP TERRY BOYLE, November 28, 1861.

GENERAL:—There is no doubt that Zollicoffer, with eight thousand men, is in Clinton and Wayne, the advance being close to the Cumberland river. They will cross the river in a short time and take Somerset, and go on Danville, or Crab Orchard, if not prevented. They are at this time constructing boats to cross the river.

\* \* \* \* \*

FRANK WOLFORD.

HEADQUARTERS EAST TENNESSEE BRIGADE,  
CAMP CALVERT, November 28, 1861.*Brigadier-General Geo. H. Thomas, U. S. A., Commanding, etc., Danville.*

GENERAL:—\* \* \* This morning I received a dispatch from Colonel Hoskins, stating that he was threatened with an attack by the rebels, whose forces were estimated at from three thousand to ten thousand, and asking me for assistance, but as my orders are to remain at London, I can not, without authority from headquarters, go to his aid.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. CARTER,

*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

LOUISVILLE, November 29, 1861.

*General Thomas, Lebanon.*

I have communication from General Boyle. He will speak to you on the subject. I do not expect Zollicoffer to cross the Cumberland in force, but he will try by demonstration to drive us from Somerset, or even attack there if we are not watchful; and he will prepare the means of crossing, so as to threaten our flank, if we advance. We will be organized to-day. In the meantime consider yourself in command of everything east of New Haven, but make no important move without referring to me, except to avert immediate danger. \* \* \* Get your regiments in order as rapidly as possible, and be always ready to move. I wish to avoid for the present anything like threatening demonstrations, and only be prepared for emergencies, until we are ready to act.

D. C. BUELL,

*Brigadier-General Commanding.*

BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS, LOUISVILLE, KY.

LEBANON, December 6, 1861.

*General Thomas:*

Send no more reinforcements to General Schoepf, until you report to me; his force was sufficient at first. Order General Boyle to proceed to Columbia to-morrow, and keep his scouts well out toward the Cumberland; caution all officers to ascertain and report facts, not merely forward rumors; see that no more troops march without ammunition; direct General Schoepf to arrest Captain Dillion, and forward charges against him.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
LEBANON, December 8, 1861.

*Brigadier-General Schoepf, Commanding at Somerset, Ky.*

GENERAL:—The following dispatch was received this evening from department headquarters, per telegraph:

“The affairs at Somerset are annoying, but I do not intend to be diverted more than necessary from more important purposes. I hope Schoepf will be able to drive the enemy across the river again. Keep an eye on Columbia, and be prepared to push a brigade or two rapidly to that point. Organize and equip your brigades as rapidly as possible; see that they have ammunition.

[Signed,]

“ D. C. BUELL,  
“General.”

\* \* \* \* \*

The above was in answer to my telegram last evening, to know if I should go to your assistance, General Buell having previously directed me to send no more reinforcements until I had reported to him. You must do the best you can under the circumstances.

Respectfully,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*U. S. V. Commanding.*

BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS.

LEBANON, December 11, 1861.

*To General Thomas:*

Does General Boyle report the enemy as advancing on Columbia? At what place, or on what road are they? What kind of troops are they composed of? Order General Boyle to take a strong position where he is and fortify himself. Order General Ward to move his command forward at once to Green river, so as to be ready to reinforce Columbia in case of an actual attack. Be prepared to move promptly in any direction, but keep up the regular duties of your command. Can you not communicate speedily with Schoepf through Liberty? Answer.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
LOUISVILLE, KY., *December 29, 1861.*

GENERAL:—I send you a sketch of the country about Somerset, which shows more of the roads than your maps. We conversed about the advancement on Zollicoffer through Columbia, and if you remember my idea it is hardly necessary to add anything on the subject. It is for you to move against his left and endeavor to cut him off from his bridge, while Schoopf, with whom of course you will communicate, attacks in front. The maps will indicate the proper moves for that object. The result should be at least a severe blow to him, or a hasty flight across the river. But to effect the former, the movement should be made rapidly and secretly, and the blow should be vigorous and decided. There should be no delay after your arrival. It would be better not to have undertaken it if it should result in confining an additional force merely to watching the enemy.

Take such portion of the cavalry from Columbia as you think necessary. Draw all the supplies you can from the country, and move as light as possible.

Having accomplished the object, be ready to move promptly in any direction, but wait until you hear from me, unless circumstances should require you to move without delay, as I may want you to proceed from there to the other matter about which we have conversed.

Acknowledge receipt of this by telegraph and report frequently.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,

*Brigadier-General Commanding.*

*Brigadier-General Geo. H. Thomas, Commanding First Division, Lebanon.*

## CHAPTER VII.

### ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH DIVISIONS.

WHEN General Sherman assumed command of the department he left Brigadier-General L. H. Rousseau, recently promoted, in command of all the troops on the Louisville and Nashville road, near Elizabethtown. The latter at once moved his command to Nolin, fifty-three miles distant from Louisville. Here, Camp Nevin was established, in which the Second division was organized.

By General Sherman's order, Brigadier-General A. McD. McCook assumed command, October 14th. He proceeded at once to organize brigades. Hitherto the regiments had been thrown together without definite relations. On the 18th, General McCook announced the organization of the central division, composed of three brigades, designated as the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth, and commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals L. H. Rousseau, T. J. Wood, and R. W. Johnson. This division was simply a provisional one, and sustained no special relations to other commands in the department. Such organization was imperatively needed, both for the instruction of new troops and for effective resistance, in the event of attack. As separate regiments arrived, they were added to the brigades already formed. But when the brigade under Brigadier-General J. S. Negley reached Camp Nevin, its organization was maintained, and it was styled the Seventh brigade.

Upon the organization of the "Army of the Ohio," General McCook's command became the Second division. This

## 64 2D, 3D, 4TH, 5TH, AND 6TH DIVISIONS.

change of designation was officially announced December 3d. Its permanent organization was as follows:

### *Fourth Brigade.*

Brigadier-General L. H. Rousseau commanding.

1st Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel B. F. Smith.

5th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel H. M. Buckley.

6th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel T. T. Crittenden.

1st Battalion, 15th U. S. Infantry. }  
1st Battalion, 19th U. S. Infantry. } Major John H. King.

### *Fifth Brigade.*

Brigadier-General T. J. Wood commanding.

29th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel John F. Miller.

30th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Sion S. Baes.

34th Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Colonel E. N. Kirk.

77th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, Colonel F. S. Stambaugh.

### *Sixth Brigade.*

Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson commanding.

15th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel M. R. Dickey.

49th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel W. H. Gibson.

32d Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel August Willich.

39th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel T. J. Harrison.

### *Seventh Brigade.*

Brigadier-General J. S. Negley commanding.

1st Regiment Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J. C. Starkweather.

38th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel B. F. Seribner.

78th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, Colonel William Sirwell.

79th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, Colonel H. A. Hambright.

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1st Regiment Kentucky Cavalry, Colonel Buckner Board.

Battery A, 1st Ohio Artillery, Captain C. S. Cotter.

Battery A, 1st Kentucky Artillery, Captain D. C. Stone.

26th Pennsylvania Artillery, Captain Chas. F. Mueller.

Nearly two months had now been spent in preparing this division for active service. As yet no attempt had been made to press back the enemy, and no fighting had occurred, except a skirmish with the enemy's cavalry by a detachment of the Thirty-ninth Indiana, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jervis, a few miles from Camp Nevin, which resulted in a slight loss to the enemy. But on the 9th of December, pursuant to instructions from General Buell, General McCook issued orders for an advance. The next morning General Johnston moved his brigade toward Munfordsville, a village on the north bank of Green river. He encamped at Bacon creek to await the construction of bridges for the passage of trains and artillery, but threw forward a detachment of the Thirty-second Indiana to Green river, the enemy retiring as our troops advanced. Two days later, the remaining brigades of the division reached Bacon creek, and the Fifth brigade moved upon its vanguard at Green river. Colonel Willich threw two companies of his regiment across the river to prevent surprise during the construction of a temporary bridge. By working day and night, the Thirty-second Indiana completed the bridge on the morning of the 17th. Four companies of this regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Von Trebra, at once crossed and advanced to the declivity of a hill near Rowlett's Station, and an equal number were placed at the bridge as a reserve. Early in the afternoon the pickets observed the enemy in the woods to their right and front, and Colonel Von Trebra sent two companies against them. The enemy fell back without resisting, and the national troops in pursuit suddenly received a volley from a squadron of cavalry. They returned the fire, and then

fell back in order. This was the commencement of a spirited fight, which was maintained for an hour and a half. With each alternation of advance and retreat, additional troops were brought into action, until the eight companies were hotly engaged with a greatly superior force, including infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The enemy's cavalry made repeated charges, at times with temporary success, but with final defeat, under the lead of Colonel Terry, of the "Texas Rangers," whose fall caused their precipitate flight from the field. At this juncture, Colonel Willich, who had been on duty at brigade headquarters, appeared, and observing that the right of his line was giving way before two regiments of infantry, he drew back and made a new alignment. The enemy then retreated. General Hindman claimed in his official report that he withdrew his command in consequence of the approach of McCook's division. It was true that the division was on the north bank of the river, and that the proximity of reinforcements was announced by Cotter's battery from the south side; but no other help was afforded the Thirty-second Indiana.

The marked feature of this contest was the repeated repulsion of a heavy force of cavalry attacking with great gallantry, by one-half of a full company of infantry, well handled in resistance.

General Hindman's force consisted of two regiments and a battalion of infantry, a regiment and a squadron of cavalry, and a battery. The fighting, however, was done mainly by the cavalry.

The Thirty-second Indiana lost Lieutenant Sachs and eight men killed and ten wounded. The enemy's loss was undoubtedly greater, although General Hindman's report only admitted the loss of Colonel Terry and three others killed and ten wounded.

General Buell commended the conduct of the Thirty-second Indiana in orders, and authorized the name of "Rowlett's Station" to be inscribed on their regimental colors.

The Second division, after marching and countermarching, as the exigencies of the campaign required, followed the

Third division to Nashville, reaching that city on the 3d of March.

During the summer and fall, Brigadier-General O. M. Mitchell was in command at Cincinnati, chiefly engaged in equipping troops, collecting supplies, and forwarding men and munitions for the various campaigns in progress in the West. On the 19th of November he was relieved and assigned by General Buell to the command of Camp Jenkins, near Louisville, Kentucky. He was soon after ordered to Camp John Quincy Adams, at Bacon creek, to give discipline and organization to troops there collecting. December 3d, he was assigned to the command of the Third division, then created, which comprised three brigades.

*Eighth Brigade.*

Colonel J. B. Turchin commanding.

19th Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J. B. Turchin.

37th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Major J. S. Hall.

18th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel T. R. Stanley.

24th Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Colonel G. Mihalotzy.

*Seventeenth Brigade.*

Brigadier-General E. Dumont commanding.

3d Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel John Beatty.

13th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel W. S. Smith.

10th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Burke.

15th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Curran Pope.

*Ninth Brigade.*

Colonel J. W. Sill commanding.

22d Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J. W. Sill.

21st Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J. S. Norton.

2d Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel L. A. Harris.

10th Regiment Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, Colonel A. R. Chapin.

*Artillery.*

Captain C. O. Loomis commanding.

Battery E, First Ohio Artillery, Captain W. P. Edgerton.

Battery, Fifth Indiana, Captain P. Simonson.

Battery, Cold Water, Michigan, Captain C. O. Loomis.

A large portion of these troops, recently transferred to the "Department of the Ohio," had seen service under General Rosecrans in Western Virginia, and General Nelson in Eastern Kentucky. Their experience of war gave veteran character to the division, and warranted its assignment to the van in the movement upon Bowling Green and Nashville, and its subsequent perilous insulation on the Memphis and Charleston railroad. When, on February 13th, the Second division was turned back from Munfordsville in the effort to reinforce General Grant at Fort Donelson, the Third division moved with great celerity toward Bowling Green to deter the enemy from throwing troops to the beleaguered fort. Its arrival on the north bank of Barren river, opposite Bowling Green, on the day following, was announced by the roar of cannon, whose bombs bursting in the city spread terror among the inhabitants and hurried the retreat of the rear-guard of General Johnston's army. During the night previous, the enemy burned both bridges over Barren river, and before leaving the city had set fire to the public buildings, railroad cars, and other property. The swollen stream, without bridges, prevented the immediate advance of the troops to arrest the conflagration. The night following, however, by means of a small ferry-boat, found a few miles down the river, Turchin's brigade and a few troopers effected a passage and occupied the city at 5 o'clock the next morning, saving from destruction a portion of the rolling-stock of the railroad.

The continued high water offered such a barrier to the transfer of troops, artillery, and trains to the south bank, that a week elapsed before General Mitchell could resume his march toward Nashville. Having, during this time, by great labor, effected the landing of two brigades and a half on the south bank, he, on the morning of the 22d, put them in motion without trains, and marching by Franklin, Mitchellsville, and Tyree

Springs, reached Edgefield, opposite Nashville, in the evening of the 24th, simultaneously with General Buell, who, with a thousand men, had used the rolling-stock captured at Bowling Green. General Buell had learned on the 20th, that General Johnston had withdrawn his troops from Clarksville, and had fallen back to Nashville, burning both bridges at the latter place. He had also telegraphed to General Halleck, and sent a courier to Clarksville, giving information of his movements, and requesting that gunboats be sent up the river to Nashville.

Soon after, Lieutenant William Nelson, U. S. N., was superseded by General Thomas, at Camp Dick Robinson, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general, and ordered to Maysville, Kentucky, to organize a force to operate in the eastern part of the state. Having driven the rebels from Eastern Kentucky, he was, late in November, ordered with his command to Louisville. On the 3d of December, he was placed in command of the Fourth division, composed of three brigades, designated and organized as follows:

*Tenth Brigade.*

Colonel Jacob Ammen commanding.

24th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Jacob Ammen.

51st Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Stanley Matthews.

36th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel William Grose.

6th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel N. L. Anderson.

*Nineteenth Brigade.*

Colonel W. B. Hazen commanding.

41st Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel W. B. Hazen.

9th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Col. G. C. Moody.

6th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel W. C. Whittaker.

*Twenty-second Brigade.*

Colonel S. D. Bruce commanding.

20th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel S. D. Bruce.

1st Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel D. A. Enyart.

2d Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel T. D. Sedgewick.

*Cavalry and Artillery.*

2d Regiment Indiana Cavalry, Colonel E. M. McCook.

Battery D, 1st Ohio Artillery, Captain A. J. Konkle.

Battery 10, 1st Indiana Artillery, Cap. J. B. Cox.

Battery 7, 1st Indiana Artillery, Captain S. J. Harris.

The division was immediately transferred to Camp Wickliffe, near New Haven. On February 13th, General Nelson, with two brigades, moved from New Haven to the Ohio river, to embark to reinforce General Grant, at Fort Donelson. Not reaching this destination in time to participate in the reduction of the fort, he proceeded by water to Nashville, arriving there on the 25th. Here he was soon after joined by Colonel Bruce with his brigade, who had marched thither by the direct route through Bowling Green.

Early in October, General Sherman placed Brigadier-General T. L. Crittenden, in command of the troops organizing at Owensboro and in the vicinity of Henderson. These were the Third Kentucky Cavalry, and the Eleventh, Seventeenth, and Twenty-sixth Infantry, commanded respectively by Colonels Jackson, Hawkins, McHenry, and Burbridge. General Crittenden was first directed to threaten the enemy's left by a demonstration against Hopkinsville, held by a thousand men. The enemy evinced activity on this flank, as on the other before General Thomas, and several slight engagements occurred during October. Late in the month a force of four or five hundred men threatened Colonel McHenry at Hartford. General Crittenden sent Colonel Burbridge from Owensboro with two hundred and fifty men, including infantry, cavalry, and artillery, to his assistance. With his own command, augmented by eighty men from McHenry's regiment, under Cap-

tain Morton, Colonel Burbridge encountered the enemy at Woodbury, and routed him, with a loss of about fifty killed and a large number wounded. About the same time, Colonel McHenry defeated a band of the enemy at Morgantown.

The most formidable menace, however, was made late in November. During the earlier portion of the month the augmentation of the enemy's forces at Hopkinsville and Russellville indicated, as was supposed, an effort to turn the right of the line. On the 24th, General Breckinridge entered Rochester with about four thousand men, and at the same time a large force of cavalry advanced from Hopkinsville and occupied Greenville. The indications of this movement, for so long a time before its execution, gave General Crittenden time to take such measures for defense that Breckinridge refrained from attack and retired to Bowling Green. He had doubtless meditated the penetration of Crittenden's line, the destruction of the locks on Green river, and probably the interruption of McCook's communications.

On the 3d of December, General Crittenden was appointed as commander of the Fifth division, comprising the Eleventh, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth brigades.

*Eleventh Brigade.*

Colonel S. Beatty commanding.

19th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel S. Beatty.  
59th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J. P. Fyffe.  
13th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel W. E. Hobson.

9th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel B. C. Grider.

21st Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel S. W. Price.

3d Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel T. E. Branlette.

*Thirteenth Brigade.*

Colonel Charles Cruft commanding.

31st Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel C. Cruft.  
44th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel H. B. Reed.  
17th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J. H. McHenry.

25th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel James W. Shackelford.



*Twentieth Brigade.*

Colonel C. G. Harker commanding.

65th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel C. G. Harker.

64th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J. W. Forsythe.

51st Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel A. D. Streight.

13th Regiment Michigan Volunteer Infantry, Colonel M. Shoemaker.

*Twenty-first Brigade.*

Colonel G. D. Wagner commanding.

15th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel G. D. Wagner.

40th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J. W. Blake.

57th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel W. S. Hines.

24th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel L. G. Grigsby.

*Artillery.*

5th Ohio Battery, Captain C. Bradley.

6th Indiana Battery, Captain George Estep.

10th Indiana Battery, Captain J. B. Cox.

The 3d Ohio Cavalry, Colonel Lewis Zahm, was subsequently added.

The plan of operations in contemplation at this period required the accumulation of supplies at Somerset, and General Wood was ordered, in conjunction with General Schoepf's brigade, of the First division, to employ his division in repairing the road from Lebanon to Somerset through Danville. A change of plan soon required the recall of the Sixth division to Lebanon, and its prompt movement thence by railroad to Munfordsville. Assisting in the repair of the railroad, it moved through Bowling Green and Franklin to Nashville, where it arrived March 6, 1862.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### OPERATIONS OF GENERAL NELSON, COLONEL GARFIELD, AND GENERAL CARTER IN EASTERN KENTUCKY.

WHEN General Nelson was ordered to Maysville to organize troops, it was anticipated that the insurgents would greatly annoy the loyal people in Eastern Kentucky, and unless opposed would penetrate the central portions of the state. Early in October it was ascertained that Colonel J. S. Williams had collected a force of two thousand men at Prestongburg, on the Big Sandy river, threatening Central Kentucky by way of McCormick's Gap. To repel this invasion, General Nelson moved from Maysville to Olympia Springs with all the troops in hand; the Second Ohio, under Colonel L. A. Harris, having previously marched to the latter place from Paris, and the Twenty-first Ohio, under Colonel Norton, from Nicholasville. From Olympia Springs, General Nelson advanced to McCormick's Gap, where he divided his command, sending Colonel Harris, with his regiment, a section of Konkle's battery, and Captain McLaughlin's company of Ohio cavalry, to West Liberty, and retaining under his own direction the Twenty-first, Thirty-third, and Fifty-ninth Ohio regiments, under Colonels Sill, Norton, and Fyffe respectively, the Kentucky volunteers under Colonels Marshall and Metcalfe, the remainder of Konkle's battery, and a small body of cavalry, he advanced upon Hazel Green. Both places were occupied on the 23d, the former after a severe skirmish, in which Colonel Harris killed ten of the enemy, wounded five, and captured six, with a loss to himself of one wounded. Advancing from these points, the two columns united at Licking Station and followed the enemy toward Prestongburg. At the latter place, General Nelson again

divided his command, sending Colonel Sill, with the Twenty-first Ohio, two battalions of Kentucky troops, and a section of Konkle's battery, by a detour to the right, to the rear of the enemy in position on Ivy Mountain. On the day following, he advanced with the remainder of his force on the direct road to Piketon. Pressing on, he encountered the enemy in ambush, on the mountain side at Ivy creek. After a spirited engagement, in which the Second and Twenty-first Ohio regiments, Metcalfe's battalion, and two sections of Konkle's battery participated, the enemy was routed, leaving thirty men either killed or badly wounded on the field. Nelson's loss was six killed and twenty-four wounded. This engagement occurred on the 8th of October. Pursuit was commenced immediately, but owing to the destruction of the bridges over the swollen streams and obstruction of the roads, General Nelson did not reach Piketon until the morning of the 10th, finding the place occupied by Colonel Sill, who, having met with little opposition, had arrived the night previous. The enemy retreated through Pound Gap, and General Nelson's command was soon withdrawn to Louisville.

After the withdrawal of Nelson's troops, the loyal people in the valley of the Big Sandy were again subjected to depredations by irregular bands of Confederate soldiers. This state of affairs demanded the return of the national troops to that region. Colonel L. P. Moore, commanding the Fourteenth Kentucky regiment at Catlettsburg, was directed to prepare for a speedy advance up the valley. Soon after, Colonel Lindsay commanding the Twenty-second Kentucky, was ordered from Portsmouth to join Colonel Moore and assume command of the two regiments. Pending the preparation for this expedition, General Humphrey Marshall invaded Kentucky through Whitesburg, with a force variously estimated as ranging from three to six thousand men, and intrenched himself near Paintville, on the road from that place to Prestonsburg. To drive back these troops, General Buell organized the Eighteenth brigade, comprising the Fourteenth and Twenty-second Kentucky Infantry, and the Fortieth and Forty-second Ohio Infantry, three battalions of Woodford's Kentucky Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Letcher, and an

independent battalion of Ohio Cavalry under Major McLaughlin, with Colonel J. A. Garfield as commander. Having received intructions from General Buell in person, Colonel Garfield proceeded to the mouth of the Big Sandy, arriving there on the 22d of December. At this time the troops composing his brigade were posted at Maysville, Catlettsburg, Paris, and Lebanon, and were at once put in motion toward the enemy. Colonel Garfield moved up the valley of the Sandy, from Catlettsburg with the Forty-second Ohio, Fourteenth Kentucky, and McLaughlin's troopers, reaching the mouth of George's creek on the 25th. The necessary repair of the roads delayed his advance from this point until the 31st. On that day he moved up the creek and passed toward Paintville. On the 6th of January, while en route, he was joined by Colonel Bolle's West Virginia Cavalry, and also by three hundred men of the Twenty-second Kentucky, who had marched from Maysville. The day following, Colonel Bolles drove the enemy's cavalry from a strong position at the mouth of Jennie's creek, losing two men killed and one wounded, and inflicting upon the enemy a loss of six killed and many wounded. Marshall here offered no further resistance, and abandoned his intrenched camp upon the near approach of Garfield's troops. Colonel Garfield here rested for two days, and during the time was joined by the Fortieth Ohio regiment, and three battalions of Woodford's Cavalry, the latter having marched from Lebanon. Having now his entire command in hand, he determined to provoke a battle or press the foe still farther toward Virginia. Accordingly, on the 9th, with his cavalry in advance, and his reserve at Paintville, he moved toward Prestonburg. When near this place, he ascertained that Marshall was some three miles distant on Abbott's creek. Anticipating an engagement, the next day he ordered forward his reserve under Colonel Sheldon. The following morning, in making a detour in hope of capturing the enemy, Colonel Garfield encountered his cavalry at the mouth of Middle creek, opposite Prestonburg. This force maintained a brisk skirmish while slowly falling back upon the main body, which was strongly posted on the hills near the confluence of the two branches of the stream, two and a half miles distant. The ground occupied by Mar-

shall was so favorable for the concealment of his dispositions for defense, that Garfield was compelled to throw forward several detachments to draw his fire at different points, and thus disclose his exact position. These tentative movements proved to have been so judiciously directed, that with subsequent provision against a flank attack, the battle was conducted to a successful issue by the repeated reinforcement of the several detachments which first advanced against the enemy. The engagement was inaugurated mainly by two Kentucky companies on the right, and two Ohio companies under Captains Jones and Williams, from the Fortieth and Forty-second regiments, on the left. Those on the right were reinforced by Major Burke, with two companies from the Fourteenth Kentucky, and those on the left, first by Major Parker, with a hundred men from the Forty-second Ohio, and subsequently by Colonel Cranor with one hundred and fifty men from the two Ohio and Fourteenth Kentucky regiments. While these troops were hotly engaged, the enemy attempted to turn Garfield's right, but was foiled and driven back by Lieutenant-Colonel Monroe, with one hundred and twenty men from the Fourteenth and Twenty-second Kentucky regiments. At 4 p. m., Lieutenant-Colonel Sheldon reached the field from Paintville with the reserve. Thus strengthened, Colonel Garfield pressed the enemy from his position, but darkness prevented pursuit. Reaching the valley, Marshall burned his stores and hurried on in disordered flight. The disparity in numbers and losses in this engagement was remarkable. Colonel Garfield reports the number of his own troops actually engaged, to have been nine hundred; his loss, one killed and twenty wounded; while the force of the enemy was thirty-five hundred, and his acknowledged loss, one hundred and twenty-five killed, the number of wounded being unknown. Twenty-five prisoners were taken during the engagement, and others the next day by Colonel Letcher, in pursuit.

Not being able to supply his command at Prestongburg, Colonel Garfield returned to Paintville. While there, he was directed by General Buell to advance as soon as possible to Piketon, and drive the enemy from Kentucky. In obedience to this order, early in February he commenced the concentra-

tion of his troops at Piketon, sending them forward as his supplies would warrant, but before preparations could be made to advance from Piketon, Marshall withdrew entirely from Kentucky, established his headquarters at Gladesville, and evinced no purpose to re-enter the state. A month later, Colonel Garfield having learned that he was collecting the Virginia militia to defend the mountain passes, determined to move against him at Pound Gap. Accordingly, with six hundred infantry and one hundred cavalry, he advanced from Piketon. The Gap was held by Major J. B. Thompson with five hundred men, strongly intrenched. This force Colonel Garfield proposed to attack in front, flank, and rear, with the hope of capturing it, but owing to the failure of the detachment sent to the rear to cut off the retreat of the enemy, he only succeeded in routing and dispersing his forces. Having thus freed Eastern Kentucky from the presence and depredations of the enemy, Colonel Garfield was ordered to Louisville with his troops, and was assigned to the command of the Twentieth brigade, Sixth division, Army of the Ohio.

On the 26th of January, General Carter's brigade, augmented by the Sixteenth Ohio Infantry, Colonel De Courcey, and the Forty-ninth Indiana, Colonel Kay, Major Mundy's battalion of Kentucky cavalry, and Wetmore's battery, was ordered from Somerset to London, preparatory to a prompt movement upon Cumberland Gap. General Carter reached London with his command early in February, and took position at Cumberland Ford about the 10th of the month. This advance was regarded as the first step toward the penetration of East Tennessee by a large army, under General Thomas. This projected invasion having been abandoned, for reasons hereafter mentioned, General Carter was left in proximity to Cumberland Gap, to prevent a counter invasion from that direction. Wishing to ascertain the strength of the enemy, he sent Lieutenant-Colonel Mundy, with a detachment, to reconnoiter the position. Colonel Mundy reached Cumberland Gap on the 14th of February, and having driven in the enemy's pickets, he approached sufficiently near to discern the formidable character of the defenses, and draw the fire of the

artillery. Subsequently, several reconnoissances were made in different directions, and one or two more expeditions, having more serious purposes, resulted in successful skirmishes, but in no way changed the relative positions of the contending forces.

## CHAPTER IX.

### GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE CENTRAL THEATER OF WAR, FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE FALL OF NASHVILLE.

THE preceding narrative of facts, as related to the organization and operations of the divisions of the army separately, has failed to compass the broader features of the situation in Kentucky and Tennessee, previous to the capture of Nashville, and hence a general view is here introduced.

The recognition of the neutrality of Kentucky by the President, and the demand for troops in Eastern and Western Virginia, prevented early provision for large armies in the great central theater of military operations. The strategic importance of Cairo, Illinois, had not been overlooked, for soon after the fall of Sumter, it was occupied by national troops. But the accumulation of forces was slow, even at that point, though it was hedged in between the States of Missouri and Kentucky, then in such critical hesitation with regard to Northern or Southern alliance.

The insurgents, also, for a time, professed respect for the neutrality of Kentucky. But they were not, in consequence, less active in preparation for a bold policy, whenever the interests of their cause should demand the invasion of the state. Anticipating civil war as at least the probable result of secession, the Southern people really prepared for such a struggle before they attempted the withdrawal of the Southern States from the Union. And after the actual inauguration of war, while the loyal states contiguous to Kentucky and Missouri were sending most of their first equipped regiments to the East, the Confederate generals were massing their

earliest Western volunteers on the northorn boundary of Tennessee.

Thus, when both the national and insurgent authorities declined further respect for the false position of Kentucky, President Lincoln could only throw a few raw regiments into the state, to repel a bold and apparently threatening invasion. General Anderson succeeded in defeating the effort of the Confederate general, Buckner, to capture Louisville, but during the period of his command in Kentucky, the state of affairs was considered critical in the extreme. In October, General W. T. Sherman assumed the administration of affairs, in room of the hero of Fort Sumter, under a weight of responsibility and surcharge of embarrassments, which rendered anxious and despairing the soldier who afterward was hopeful in conducting campaigns of boldest aggression. Apprehending the magnitude of the struggle, and seeing his slender forces distributed from Henderson to the Big Sandy river, and from Cincinnati and Louisville to London and Nolin, confronting hostile forces of supposed superior strength and of easy concentration for offense, he startled the authorities at Washington and the people at large by the announcement that he needed two hundred thousand men. This estimate for an army resulted in his speedy supersession by Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, through an order from Washington. The main efforts of both Anderson and Sherman had been directed to defense, and in this, each had been successful.

The earlier period of General Buell's command was devoted to the same end. But he assumed the direction of military operations under more hopeful circumstances. The insurgents had gained no advantages in Kentucky since their primal advance, and were now relatively weaker than when they first made revelation of aggressive purpose. He came from Washington under instructions to inaugurate offensive operations, and was hopeful of commanding the resources necessary for their success. His instructions pointed to the especial importance of sending a heavy column into East Tennessee. The rapidity with which new regiments were thrown into

Kentucky soon made it evident that General A. S. Johnston, who commanded the insurgent forces in the West, had lost the opportunity for the successful invasion of Northern Kentucky, if at any previous period he had had sufficient strength to warrant such an enterprise. This rapid increase of troops imposed upon General Buell the necessity of an offensive initiative in some direction, as soon as a distinctive army organization could be given to his forces.

The subsequent grandeur of the service rendered by the Army of the Cumberland, then called the Army of the Ohio, must be taken as full proof that he who first laid his organizing hand upon it, did his work well, and transmitted his personal influence upon it through all its accretions and battles to the end of the war. He transformed citizens into soldiers, by instruction, discipline, and drill; exacted from his officers the strictest attention to all their new duties; eliminated such as gave no promise of efficiency; reduced the baggage of his army, and consequently the wagons for its transportation, and soon was ready for active operations.

After a careful study\* of the East Tennessee enterprise, he reached the conclusion that its success would require an army of thirty thousand men—twenty thousand for an advancing column, and ten thousand for the line of communications, which involved wagon transportation for two hundred miles, most of this distance through a barren and mountainous region. In room of this movement, which in his view was so beset with difficulties as to be altogether unpromising, if not impracticable, he suggested an advance against Nashville, by the march of a column to the left of Bowling Green, through Glasgow and Gallatin, co-operative with another which should ascend the Cumberland river on steamers, under convoy of gunboats, with dependence for supplies, after the conjunction of the columns, upon river transportation. Hoping that this plan would be approved at Washington, he held his forces in readiness for its execution, and rather than change his dispositions, having reference to its prosecution, he permitted Zollicoffer to threaten central Kentucky, from the north bank of

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\* General Buell's statement before the military commission.

the Cumberland river, near Somerset, for several weeks, making no adequate effort to dislodge him. However, in the absence of official approval at Washington, he held his forces in waiting to move against Nashville, and continued his efforts to provide sufficient transportation for the expedition into East Tennessee, in consideration of the probability of being required to conduct it. On the 29th of December, the attitude of Zollicoffer became so threatening as to demand an effort for his dislodgment from the north bank of the Cumberland. He sent General Thomas to accomplish this work, and on the 1st of January, renewed his request for permission to turn toward the capital of Tennessee. As General McClellan, the commander-in-chief, was ill at the time, the President directed him to confer with Major-General Halleck, in command in Missouri, with regard to the concerted action of their armies.\* In compliance, he addressed, January 3d, a lengthy communication to General Halleck, giving estimates of Johnston's forces, at different points on his defensive line, and suggesting a plan for the co-operation of their armies very nearly similar to the one whose execution subsequently resulted in the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, and the evacuation of Bowling Green, Nashville, and Columbus. His plan proposed an advance upon Nashville, through Kentucky, strong demonstrations against the flanks of Johnston's line, Bowling Green and Columbus, to issue in real attacks should Johnston weaken these points to strengthen others, and the ascent of twenty thousand men on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, under convoy of gunboats. On the 6th, General Halleck replied, that such was the demand for troops in Southwestern Missouri, that he would have but ten thousand men to form a movable column, and objected to the proposed plan as contemplating operations on exterior lines, but offered to make a demonstration from Paducah, toward Columbus, and expressed the hope that in a few weeks he could render material assistance.

As General Halleck proposed no definite co-operation, and as General Thomas' movement against Zollicoffer was pend-

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\* General Buell's statement before the military commission.

ing, General Buell was restricted to operations in his own department, and to thoughts of aggression with his own forces. He had not decided upon his first step in offense, when the victory of General Thomas at Mill Springs, over Generals Crittenden and Zollicoffer, resulted in the complete dispersion of their army. This victory, on the one hand, opened the way for the expedition into East Tennessee, as there was no longer a strong guard to the mountain fortress at Cumberland Gap and the contiguous passes, and rendered more inviting the movement upon Nashville, as it deprived Johnston's right flank of a heavy supporting column. But the failure of co-operation between Generals Halleck and Buell, induced the President and General McClellan to express to the latter their conviction that the so long-meditated movement into East Tennessee was of primary importance, and he again addressed himself to preparation to push an army, under General Thomas, in that direction.

Carter's brigade, accompanied by Wetmore's battery, was at once advanced from Somerset to London, and efforts were made to repair the roads and accumulate supplies and transportation. But again progress was slow; and on February 1st, General Buell advised the general-in-chief that he deemed the enterprise impracticable, and that he would abandon it and advance against Nashville. The fact that he had a day or two previous been advised by General Halleck that he had ordered an advance against Fort Henry, was doubtless a strong incentive to change the direction of his offensive operations, as the first step in his own plan was now upon trial. General Halleck gave no information as to his plans, and did not solicit co-operation. Nevertheless, General Buell determined that, unless restricted by orders from Washington, he would at least accomplish what he had prescribed for himself in his own plan, although the initial movement of it had been undertaken by another, and in every way that was possible contribute to the success of the aggression on the Tennessee river. He therefore disposed the greater portion of his troops for the advance upon Bowling Green, and sent Colonel Cruft's brigade and eight new regiments to join the column moving against Fort Henry. Having learned soon

after that this fort had surrendered to Commodore Foote, and that the works at Fort Donelson had been greatly strengthened and its garrison largely reinforced, and fearing that his advance upon Bowling Green could not be sufficiently rapid to prevent such further reinforcements as would endanger the success of the effort to reduce it, he directed three divisions toward Fort Donelson, by water, and three toward Bowling Green. This force was sent to Fort Donelson in response to a request from General Halleck for aid and co-operation. The wisdom of General Buell's original plan was now apparent, though in consequence of its initiation on the rivers without the suggested co-ordinate movement, the enemy had thrown the largest portion of his forces from Bowling Green to Fort Donelson, instead of offering his main resistance at the former place, as General Buell anticipated in the event of his own advance simultaneously with General Halleck's column, as he had suggested.

Fort Henry was surrendered on the 6th of February. General Grant disposed his troops before Fort Donelson on the 12th. When the former fell, the latter was weak; but during the six intervening days, General Johnston had sent sixteen thousand men from Bowling Green, and when they arrived, the forces within the intrenchments were superior to those assuming a beleaguered attitude under General Grant. General Buell's forethought made provision for this emergency, as the troops that he had sent without solicitation from General Halleck, reached General Grant, with the fleet of gunboats under Commodore Foote, on the 14th. Had not General Buell sent these troops before he had been requested to do so, the issue at Donelson might have been very different, as with their efficient aid, success was at one time doubtful in the extreme.

With a strange lack of forecast and provision for probable contingencies, the Confederate general, Floyd, in chief command of the forces in the fort, had allowed General Grant's investing lines to close the roads leading to Nashville. Hardly had this been done before it dawned upon Floyd and his subordinates, Pillow and Buckner, that their safety lay in opening these only avenues of escape. Urged by this conviction, they

made a bold and well-sustained effort, early in the morning of the 15th, to accomplish this paramount object. A heavy line of troops, with a similar one in near support, was hurled against the right of General Grant's line, resting upon the coveted roads. After a somewhat protracted and very fierce conflict, the right of the investing line was doubled upon the center, and the enemy was in possession of the roads. During this conflict, General Grant was with Commodore Foote on the gunboats, and upon his return he found his right wing in disorder. The enemy had been partially repulsed by Colonel Cruft's brigade of General Lewis Wallace's division, which had been improvised at Paducah, and mainly formed from the troops that General Buell had sent. Colonel Cruft had been thrown into the action by General Wallace, in response to the request of General McCleernand, whose division was holding the right of the line. He maintained his position after all the troops on his right and left had fallen back, and he was then ordered to withdraw his command and occupy the slope of a hill to the rear. Here he was again heavily engaged, and though twice repulsing the enemy in his front, was forced to retire to a new line. Colonel Thayer's brigade of the same division was severely engaged also, and arrested the success of the enemy to the left of Cruft. The action of these brigades was essential to a reformation of the shattered troops. Later in the day, Cruft's brigade, in co-operation with two regiments, the Eighth Missouri and Eleventh Indiana, under command of Colonel M. L. Smith of the former, supported by other regiments from Wallace's division, by a gallant charge, under orders from General Grant, drove back the enemy into his intrenchments and reclosed the roads. Troops from McCleernand's division advanced in support on their left, but their action in restoring the investment on the right had marked prominence. This success, coupled with the more decisive issue of General Smith's assault on the enemy's works on the left, was decisive of the general contest. For the next day, after the responsibility and disgrace of capitulation had been transferred from Floyd to Pillow, and from Pillow to Buckner, the latter reluctantly surrendered without conditions.

The primal success of the enemy in the morning really opened the roads for escape, but the hope of complete victory led the generals away from this first object and wrought their ruin.

The loss of this fort, commanding the navigation of the Cumberland river, and the surrender of a large army, except as the result of blundering management on the part of the generals in immediate command, puts under condemnation General Johnston's division of his forces. When, however, he resolved "to defend Nashville at Donelson," it is not probable that the loss of the greater portion of the army set for its defense, was regarded by him as a possibility. He doubtless anticipated the reunion of the sundered portions of his army, even if the larger one could not successfully defend the fort. The two fractions were each on interior lines, with respect to both Grant and Buell, and there were fewer contingencies to bar conjunction than there were to jeopard his whole army in the event of concentration against either. There had been no recent period when he could have safely assumed the offensive in any direction, and he had done well to make such impression of strength upon the generals opposed to him, as to prevent an attack by General Buell alone, or a combination of the armies of Grant and Buell, long before practicable. Neither General Johnston, nor General Buckner in previous command, had ever had such strength as warranted an offensive movement in force. When Buckner first occupied Bowling Green, after his pretentious but feeble movement upon Louisville, he had only four thousand men. By the 15th of October, there were about twelve thousand Confederate troops at that place, with no further increase until December. The highest number reported by the Confederate generals upon their defensive line, from Mill Springs to Columbus, was thirty-seven thousand. General Johnston, therefore, had been from the first too weak to attack Buell, and during the later months of the year too weak to resist him. In concentration, he would have been stronger than Grant, but General Grant had been beyond his reach, seated behind the Ohio river, upon whose waters a fleet of gunboats steamed in proud mastery. Besides,

an advance against Grant would have uncovered Nashville to Buell.

There were objections quite as strong against concentrating against Buell, who had an army sufficiently large to overwhelm him, in offense or defense, and the withdrawal of all his river forces to Buell's front would have left them and Nashville at the mercy of Grant. Thus, as he had been too weak to concentrate for offense against either of his antagonists, he could offer only feeble resistance to both combined. And in view of actual events, the withdrawal of all his forces to a new line, when he saw the two armies converging upon him, would have been his safest course. The fact that he abandoned Bowling Green the very day that Grant appeared before Donelson, shows that he had no thought of resisting Buell at that point after he had sent away sixteen thousand men. And when, as he neared Nashville, he learned that Fort Donelson had fallen with its large garrison into the hands of General Grant, he ordered the evacuation of Columbus, and passing through the capital of Tennessee, he sought a new line and the heaviest possible concentration far to the South, in hope to regain what was then so plainly lost. Not being pursued beyond Nashville, he stopped for a time at Murfreesboro to gather together the troops that had held Bowling Green, Clarksville, and Nashville, the few that had escaped from Fort Donelson before the surrender, and those that had been collected from the dispersion at Mill Springs.

The victory at Mill Springs, the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, and the enforced evacuation of Bowling Green, Columbus, and Nashville, form a series of successes, which gave the first marked prestige to the national arms, and in no small degree revealed the power of the national government to suppress the rebellion. The significance of these victories produced a profound impression in the South. To the more thoughtful, it suggested the possibility, if not the probability, of the ultimate failure of their cause. The frenzied dismay of the citizens of Nashville at the fall of Donelson, and the indefinite southward retreat of the legions which had so long stood between them and the national armies, was only the complex feeling of disappointment and discouragement which

pervaded the Southern people, finding expression even in official utterances from Richmond. From the inception of the struggle, the Southerners had been exceedingly hopeful. The more intelligent could not have expected uniform success, but the masses anticipated the independence of the States Confederate in rebellion, as the result of a succession of victories. The issue of the first great battle of the war intensified this hopefulness. The disorderly retreat of the Army of the Potomac from Bull Run was jubilantly hailed as the typical issue of all succeeding battles. But, now, a succession of alarming disasters and defeats had made evident the realities and the possibilities of the gigantic struggle, which the South had so madly and so hopefully invoked—the national armies were now to be feared, whether in open battle or before intrenched positions. And their sweep far southward, with serried ranks and boldest step, while producing intense disappointments and dread, must have suggested, at least to sober minds, that the independence of the South was by no means assured.

In the North, the results of the first great central campaign were cheering in the extreme. The defeat at Bull Run had produced mortification and depression, and the useless sacrifice of life at Ball's Bluff had brought sadness to all loyal hearts. And hitherto, success and defeat had been so nearly balanced in the West, that the outlook had given no special promise. But, with this experience of positive disaster and uncertain prospects, there came a clearer discernment of the character of the conflict, and while there was less hope than at first of its speedy termination, the loyal people gave persistent support to war measures of gigantic compass. The importance, then, of these first great victories can not be measured by the mere capture of forts, cities, prisoners, and munitions, but by their inspiring moral effect as contrasted with the consequences of disasters of equal range. In a war of such proportions, involving so many occult causes of success and failure, ruling influences and events may not always be determined with positive certainty; but in searching for pivotal events, the philosophical historian would not be likely to

overlook the conduct and issues of the campaign which culminated so gloriously at Donelson.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
LOUISVILLE, *January 3, 1862.*

GENERAL:—I received your dispatch, and, with more delay than I meant, proceed to the subject of it in compliance with your request, and, I may add, also at the wish of the President.

I do not underrate the difficulties in Missouri, but I think it is not extravagant to say that the great power of the rebellion in the West is arranged on a front, the flanks of which are Columbus and Bowling Green, and the center about where the railroad between these points crosses the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, including Nashville and the fortified points below. It is, I have no doubt, within bounds to estimate their force on that line at eighty thousand men; including a column about Somerset, Kentucky, in rear of their right flank, it is more.

Of this force, forty thousand may be set down as at Bowling Green; twenty thousand at Columbus, though you doubtless have more information on that point than I have; and twenty thousand at the center, considering railroad facilities which enable the enemy to concentrate in a few hours on any single point of this front. You will at once see the importance of a combined attack on its center and flanks, or at least of demonstrations which may be converted into real attacks, and fully occupy the enemy on the whole front. It is probable that you may have given the subject, as far as Columbus and the center are concerned, more attention than I have with reference to the former; at least, I can make no more than the general suggestion already expressed, that it should be fully occupied.

The attack upon the center should be made by two gunboat expeditions, with, I should say, twenty thousand men on the two rivers. They should, of course, be organized with reference to the depth of the water in the rivers; and whether they should be of equal or unequal strength, would depend upon that and other considerations, and can hardly be determined until the moment of departure. The mode of attack must depend upon the strength of the enemy at the several points and the features of the localities. It will be of the first importance to break the railroad communication, and, if possible, that should be done by columns moving rapidly to the bridges over the Cumberland and the Tennessee. The former probably would not be reached at first, being some thirty-one miles above the first principal battery that I know of, at Dover. The other is eighteen miles above Fort Henry—the first I know of on the Tennessee. If the expeditions should not be strong enough to do the work alone, they should establish themselves firmly at the nearest possible point, and remain at least until they ascertained that reinforce-

ments from my column or some other source would not reach them. By uniting, they could establish themselves permanently under the protection of the gunboats.

I say this much rather to lay the subject before you than to propose any definite plan for your side. Whatever is done should be done speedily, within a few days. The work will become more difficult every day. Please let me hear from you at once.

Very truly yours,

D. C. BUELL,

*Brigadier-General Commanding.*

*General H. W. Halleck, Commanding Department of the Missouri.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

ST. LOUIS, January 6, 1862.

*Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, Louisville, Ky.*

GENERAL:—I have delayed writing to you for several days in hopes of getting some favorable news from the Southwest. The news received is, however, unfavorable, it being stated that Price is making a stand near Springfield, and that all our available forces will be required to dislodge him and drive him out.

My last advices from Columbus represent that the enemy has about twenty thousand men there. I have only about fifteen at Cairo, Fort Holt, and Paducah, and after leaving guards at those places, I could not send into the field over ten or eleven thousand. Moreover, many of these are very imperfectly armed.

Under these circumstances it would be madness for me to attempt any serious operation against Camp Beauregard or Columbus. Probably, in the course of a few weeks, I will be able to send additional troops to Cairo and Paducah to co-operate with you, but at present it is impossible; and it seems to me that if you deem such co-operation necessary to your success, your movement on Bowling Green should be delayed. I know nothing of the plan of campaign, never having received any information on the subject; but it strikes me that to operate from Louisville and Paducah or Cairo, against an enemy at Bowling Green, is a plain case of exterior lines like that of McDowell and Patterson, which, unless each of the columns is superior to the enemy, leads to disaster ninety-nine times in a hundred.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

*Major-General.*

## EXTRACT FROM GENERAL BUELL'S STATEMENT BEFORE THE MILITARY COMMISSION.

I had no communication with General Halleck since his reply to my letter of January 3d; but on the 30th, I received a dispatch from him saying, without giving particulars, that he had ordered an expedition against Fort Henry.

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On the 6th (February), I ordered one brigade from the mouth of Green river, and eight new regiments, to re-enforce General Halleck's expedition. They did not, however, arrive until after the capture of that place, which occurred on the 7th, but took part in the subsequent operations against Fort Donelson.

February 7, 1862.

*To Colonel Crust, Commanding Thirteenth Brigade, Calhoun, Ky.*

SIR:—You are hereby directed to proceed with your brigade up the Tennessee river, and join the expedition near Fort Henry, under Brigadier-General Grant.

The transport steamers have been ordered to take you on board at the mouth of Green river, unless some other point should be preferable; and they must remain where they land you until you discharge them, which will be done as soon as the nature of the case will admit.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. FRY,  
*A. A. G., Chief of Staff.*

St. Louis, February 15, 1862.

*General Buell, Louisville:*

Telegram about division relieves me greatly. To move from Bowling Green on Nashville, is not good strategy. Come and help me take and hold Fort Donelson and Clarksville; then move to Florence, cutting the railroad at Decatur, and Nashville must be abandoned precisely as Bowling Green has been. All we want is troops in mass on the right point, and the enemy is defeated with scarcely a blow; but I fear I have not force enough for this new strategic move, and at the same time observe Columbus. Come and help me, and all will be right. We can clear Tennessee as we have cleared Kentucky.

H. W. HALLECK.

At the date of this dispatch asking for help at Donelson, the division which General Buell sent without solicitation, was fighting on the right of Grant's line, driving back the enemy from the open roads for escape.

## EXTRACT FROM GENERAL GRANT'S REPORT OF THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.

Referring to the attack of the enemy, he said:

"About the close of this action the ammunition in the cartridge-boxes gave out, which, with the loss of many field officers, produced great confusion in the ranks. Seeing that the enemy did not take advantage of this fact, I ordered a charge upon the left—the enemy's right—with the division under General C. F. Smith, which was most brilliantly executed, and gave to our arms full assurance of victory. The battle lasted until dark, giving us possession of part of their intrenchments. An attack was ordered upon their other flank, after the charge by General Smith was commenced, by the divisions under Generals McClernand and Wallace, which, notwithstanding the hours of exposure to a heavy fire in the fore part of the day, was gallantly made, and the enemy further repulsed."

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## EXTRACT FROM GENERAL WALLACE'S REPORT.

Referring to the ascent to the enemy's position, he said:

"About quarter the way up, they received the first volley from the hill-top around which it ran, disclosing somewhat of the strength of the enemy. Instantly, under orders of Colonel Smith, both his regiments lay down. The skirmishers were the chief victims. George B. Swarthout, captain of Company H, Eighth Missouri, was killed, gallantly fighting far in advance. Soon as the fury of the fire abated, both regiments rose and marched on; and in that way, they at length closed upon the enemy, falling when the volleys grew hottest, dashing on when they slackened or ceased. Meanwhile, their own firing was constant and deadly. Meanwhile, also, Colonel Cruft's line was marching up in support and to the right of Colonel Smith. The woods through which he moved seemed actually to crackle with musketry. Finally, the Eighth and Eleventh cleared the hill, driving the rebel regiments at least three-quarters of a mile before them, and halting within one hundred and fifty yards of the intrenchments behind which the enemy took refuge. This was about 5 o'clock, and concluded the day's fighting. In my opinion, it also brought forth the surrender."

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## EXTRACT FROM COLONEL CRUFT'S REPORT.

At about 4 p. m. an order was received from General Wallace to co-operate with Colonel Smith's brigade (consisting of the Eighth Missouri and Eleventh Indiana) in carrying the enemy's works on the right, in front of Dover, by storm: The officers and men, though much fatigued from the action of the morning, and worn from loss of rest and lack of food, responded cheerfully to the order and wheeled into column. The enemy was in force on the hill, under cover of the wood, on both sides of the only road leading up in the direction of the works. It was necessary to

cross an open space of several hundred feet exposed to the enemy's fire, before the foot of the hill could be reached. The Eighth Missouri led the advance up the road; the Eleventh Indiana charged up the hill on the left; Forty-fourth Indiana followed up the road; five companies of the Thirty-first Indiana were ordered up the hill on the extreme left, and the remainder of the regiment, with the residue of the brigade, were ordered to the right to outflank the enemy and attack in rear. The assault was a complete success. All the regiments behaved handsomely. The whole of my brigade was actively engaged. In a sharp and desperate fight of a few minutes' duration, the hill was carried by storm, and the enemy, with tremendous cheers, driven up to and within his breast-works. The flank attack of the portion of my brigade up the hill, in a line at right angle to the main advance, was gallantly conducted, and contributed no doubt largely to the rout of the enemy.

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#### GENERAL BUCKNER TO GENERAL GRANT.

HEADQUARTERS FORT DONELSON, *February 16, 1862.*

SIR:—In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the commanding officer of the Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and post under my command, and in that view, suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General C. S. A.*

*To Brigadier-General Grant, Commanding U. S. Forces near Fort Donelson.*

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#### GENERAL GRANT'S REPLY.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD,  
CAMP NEAR DONELSON, *February 16.*

*To General S. B. Buckner, Confederate Army:*

Yours of this date, proposing an armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms other than an unconditional surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately on your works.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General U. S. V. Commanding.*

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#### GENERAL BUCKNER'S LETTER OF SURRENDER.

HEADQUARTERS, DOVER, TENN., *February 16, 1862.*

*To Brigadier-General U. S. Grant, U. S. A.*

SIR:—The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to

an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER,

*Brigadier-General C. S. A.*

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#### FROM POLLARD'S SOUTHERN HISTORY OF THE WAR.

About the middle of September, General Buckner advanced with a small force of about four thousand men, which was increased, by the 15th of October, to twelve thousand; and though other accessions of force were received, it continued at about the same strength until the end of November, measles and other diseases keeping down the effective force. The enemy's force then was reported to the War Department at fifty thousand, and an advance was impossible.

Our own people were as much imposed upon as were the enemy, with respect to the real strength of General Johnston's forces; and while they were conjecturing the brilliant results of an advance movement, the fact was, that inevitable disasters might have been known by the government to have been in store for the Southern cause in Kentucky and Tennessee, and to be awaiting only the development of a crisis. The utter inadequacy of General Johnston's forces was known to the government. The authorities at Richmond appeared to hope for results without the legitimate means for acquiring them; to look for relief from vague and undefined sources; and to await, with dull expectation, what was next to happen. . . .

We have noticed before the extreme inadequacy of General Johnston's forces. It is doubtful whether he ever had over twenty-three thousand effective troops at Bowling Green. Of these, after reinforcing Fort Donelson, he had scarcely more than eleven thousand effective men. Shortly after the disaster at Mill Springs, General Beauregard had been sent from the Potomac to General Johnston's line in Kentucky. At a conference which took place between the two generals, General Beauregard expressed his surprise at the smallness of General Johnston's forces, and was impressed with the danger of his position. There is nothing more remarkable in the history of war than the false impressions of the people of the South as to the extent of our forces at the principal strategic point in Kentucky, and the long and apathetic toleration, by the government in Richmond, of a prospect that promised nothing but eventual disaster. On establishing himself in Bowling Green early in October, General Johnston wrote to the War Department: "We have received but little accession to our ranks since the Confederate forces crossed the line; in fact, no such enthusiastic demonstration as to justify any movements not warranted by our ability to maintain our own communications." He repeatedly called upon the government for reinforcements. He made a

call upon several states of the Southwest, including Tennessee, for large numbers of troops. The call was revoked at the instance of the authorities in Richmond, who declined to furnish twelve months' volunteers with arms; and General Johnston, thus discouraged and baffled by a government which was friendly enough to him personally, but insensible to the public exigency for which he pleaded, was left in the situation of imminent peril, in which General Beauregard was so surprised to find him.

A memorandum was made of the conference between the two generals. In the plans of General Johnston, General Beauregard entirely concurred. It was determined to fight for Nashville at Donelson, and General Johnston gave the best part of his army to do it, retaining only, to cover his front, fourteen thousand men, about three thousand of whom were so enfeebled by recent sickness, that they were unable to march.

In a letter to the President of the Confederacy, explaining the conditions of his Kentucky campaign, General A. S. Johnston said: "I magnified my forces to the enemy, but made known my true strength to the department and the governors of states."

## CHAPTER X.

### ADVANCE OF THE ARMY OF THE OHIO FROM NASHVILLE TO SAVANNAH, AND THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

THE occupation of Nashville by the Army of the Ohio, and of other strategic positions by the army under General Halleck, at that season of the year which invites military enterprise and the manifest urgency of renewed aggression before the enemy could recover from recent defeats, forbade delay in the formation of plans for new operations. General Johnston had been hurled from his first chosen defensive line, and the configuration of the region to which his standards pointed, gave unerring indication of the location of his second. Mountains, rivers, and railroads determine the grand strategic points and lines of defense equally with those of aggressive maneuver and supply, and palpable military possibilities gave prophecy of the concentration of the western insurgent forces at Corinth, Mississippi. Here the Memphis and Charleston and the Ohio and Mobile railroads intersect, and thus form a railroad center which sustains relations to the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers and the railroad system of the South, especially with the great road connecting these rivers and Richmond, Virginia. Hence, this position was regarded by the enemy as sustaining important relations to all proximate and remote military operations, and as had been anticipated by the generals in command of the Western national armies, all the insurgent forces were speedily put in motion thither, as the grand key-point east of the Mississippi in the solution of their paramount Western problem—the maintenance of the mastery of the lower portion of the Mississippi river.

In the preceding campaign, General Johnston had been

forced into error by public opinion in the South, in holding a long line against vastly superior armies, and now it became evident that aggression and resistance by the enemy was to be conducted with massed forces.

This attitude of the enemy demanded the intimate co-operation, if not the actual consolidation of the armies commanded by Generals Halleck and Buell. While their fields of operation were distinct, it was perhaps appropriate that these commanders should sustain a common relation to the chief at Washington. But now a common objective required that the two armies should be united under one field commander. The necessity of co-operation had previously existed, and there had been partial concurrence in their operations on the Cumberland river. Perceiving the necessity of the still closer union of their armies to meet the palpable concentration of the insurgent forces, Generals Halleck and Buell agreed upon a plan of operations early in March, whose execution would require their close association; and Savannah, on the east or right bank of the Tennessee river, had been designated as the point for concentration. So important an object was not, however, left to the voluntary agreement of the two generals, but was enforced by the President's war order No. 3, which consolidated three Western departments in one, under the command of Major-General Halleck, and threw upon him the responsibility for general results flowing from the various operations of the vast forces and resources in the West. General Halleck at once ordered General Buell to march his army to Savannah—a movement for which provision had been made in the plan of co-operation previously agreed upon.

At this juncture the Army of the Ohio comprised ninety-two regiments of infantry—exclusive of those which had been sent to General Halleck—with an aggregate of seventy-nine thousand three hundred and thirty-four men; eleven regiments, one battalion, and seven detached companies of cavalry, aggregating eleven thousand four hundred and ninety-six men; and twenty-eight field and two siege batteries, with three thousand nine hundred and thirty-five men. The grand total was ninety-four thousand seven hundred and eighty-

three men. Of this aggregate, seventy-three thousand four hundred and seventy-two men were in condition for the field, comprising sixty thousand eight hundred and eighty-two infantry, nine thousand two hundred and thirty-seven cavalry, and three thousand three hundred and sixty-eight artillery.

The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth divisions, commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals Thomas, McCook, Nelson, Crittenden, and Wood, with a contingent force of cavalry, in all thirty-seven thousand effective men, constituted the main army, which, under the personal command of General Buell, was to join General Halleck in the projected movement against the enemy at Corinth, Mississippi. The remaining thirty-six thousand effective troops were disposed by General Buell for the defense of his communications, the enforcement of quietness within his lines in Kentucky and Tennessee, and for two expeditions co-operative with the ruling movement—one, under General Morgan, to seize Cumberland Gap, and the other, under General O. M. Mitchell, to strike the Memphis and Charleston railroad south of Nashville.

Before starting to Savannah, General Buell organized the Seventh division of his army, and assigned Brigadier-General G. W. Morgan to its command. This division comprised the troops under General Carter, at Cumberland Ford; the Eighteenth brigade, recently withdrawn from Eastern Kentucky, and several additional regiments which had been posted at various points in Kentucky. General Morgan was instructed to operate against Cumberland Gap, and occupy East Tennessee, in the event of an open way thither; and should the offensive be impracticable, to hold the enemy in check. Brigadier-General O. M. Mitchell, with his division, was ordered to move upon the "Memphis and Charleston" railroad through Murfreesboro and Fayetteville. The Sixteenth brigade, Brigadier-General W. T. Ward commanding, was posted at the camp of instruction at Bardstown, Kentucky. Brigadier-General Dumont was placed in command of the garrison at Nashville. Colonel Duffield, in command of the Twenty-third brigade, including the Ninth Michigan, Third Minnesota, and Eighth and Twenty-third Kentucky regiments, was ordered from Kentucky to take post at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, to protect

the road from Shelbyville to Lavergne, and reinforce either General Buell or General Mitchell, as circumstances might require. General Boyle's brigade, the Eleventh, composed of the Third, Ninth, Thirteenth and Twenty-first Kentucky, and the Nineteenth and Fifty-ninth Ohio regiments, and the Sixth Ohio battery, was assigned to General Crittenden's division; and Colonel Brue's brigade, the Twenty-second, comprising the First, Second, and Twentieth Kentucky regiments, was attached to General Nelson's.

Having thrown forward a detachment of cavalry, to save, if possible, the bridges between Nashville and Columbia, on the 15th of March,\* General Buell put McCook's division on the road in their rear, as the head of his infantry column. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and First divisions, in the order mentioned, followed at intervals between the 15th and 20th. The cavalry saved all the bridges, except those over Rutherford's creek, four miles north of Columbia, and over Duck river at that place. Rutherford's creek was soon crossed, but the water in Duck river being forty feet deep, a somewhat protracted delay was unavoidable.

General Buell had no pontoons, and he was forced to take time to build a bridge or wait for the subsidence of the water. As the reduction of the water to a fordable stage involved an indefinite waiting, Johnson's brigade of McCook's division was employed in the construction of a bridge. But though the Thirty-second Indiana regiment was composed largely of mechanics, and the whole brigade worked energetically, the bridge was not completed until the 29th. At a later period of the war, when there were organized "mechanics and engineers," and every army commander regarded pontoon trains as essential as those for supply, the high water in Duck river would have hardly caused a halt; but as General Buell was situated, it was a serious matter to pass this river with his army and trains. As his delay at this point has such historical significance, the truth requires that this embarrassment should thus be mentioned, in connection with the fact that he was

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\* This was previous to the reception of an order from General Halleck to make the movement.

not under orders to hasten his march to Savannah. He had supposed that General Grant's army was on the east bank of the Tennessee river, as the place designated for the conjunction of the two armies was on that bank; and when on the march, he learned first that General Grant's forces were on the west bank, he was assured that there was security for them in the natural strength of their position.

General Halleck's original object in sending a column up the Tennessee by steamers, was to destroy the railroad connections at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt, and this expedition, at first, had no recognized relation to the subsequent union of the armies of the Ohio and Tennessee. This enterprise, under the direction of General C. F. Smith, was a failure, in consequence of the lateness of its inauguration, as the enemy's strength at the objective points was such as to preclude all effort to reach the railroad at either of them. After abandoning the object of his expedition, General Smith steamed down the river, and debarked his forces at Pittsburg Landing. General Smith did not select this point as one for the concentration of the two armies to move against Corinth, as he was at the time ignorant of any such purpose. Subsequently, when reinforcements were moved up the river with a view to the conjunction of the armies under Generals Grant and Buell for offense against Corinth, under the immediate command of General Halleck, they in great part took position at Pittsburg Landing. Thus, without General Buell's knowledge, the place of concentration was changed, and he was left to learn the fact while on the march.

When, before the bridge at Columbia was fully completed, it was ascertained that General Grant's army was on the west bank of the Tennessee river, General Nelson sought permission from General Buell to ford the stream, and move rapidly to Savannah. Though not fully sympathizing with his excitable division commander in his fear that the enemy would attack General Grant before the reinforcing army could reach him, General Buell gave him promise that, could he get his men safely over the stream, with his trains, and all his artillery and baggage, he should have the advance thenceforward to the Tennessee river. This fact, exceedingly trifling in itself,

had significance of intensest interest and greatest moment. It gave the impetuous Nelson the head of Buell's army, whose speed in the advance, rapid beyond expectation and the requirement of orders, brought his division to Savannah the day before the battle of "Shiloh," or "Pittsburg Landing."

At 6 a. m. March 29th, Nelson's division, Ammen's brigade leading, plunged into Duck river, and following the tortuous ford, reached the opposite bank and the head of the army. The bridge was completed the same day, and the immediate resumption of the march was resumed. On the 31st, with an interval of six miles from the head of each division and the one following, to give room for troops, artillery, and trains, the Army of the Ohio moved toward Savannah. Only one route was practicable, a single narrow roadway, in poor condition for the ordinary travel of a sparsely inhabited region, and six miles was deemed requisite as the length of each division in unembarrassed movement. This road led through Mount Pleasant and Waynesboro, and General Nelson, passing beyond the latter place earlier than had been anticipated by General Buell, defeated the adoption of a measure that would have prevented the participation of the Army of the Ohio in the battle of "Shiloh." General Buell had not yet received an intimation that General Grant was in any danger, or that there was need of haste in the movement of his army, and desiring to have his forces in good shape to meet a comrade army, obtained permission from General Halleck to stop for rest at Waynesboro. The army commander had also under consideration the propriety of moving to Hamburg, above Pittsburg Landing, and thence to place of conjunction. Stronger evidence could not be adduced than this project of stopping at Waynesboro, that neither General Halleck nor General Buell, at this time, thought that there was anything actual, probable, or possible, in the situation at Pittsburg Landing, to demand the hurried advance of the Army of the Ohio. But General Nelson, ignorant of this proposal to halt at Waynesboro, and alive to the probability of an early attack upon General Grant, hurried through the place for rest and trimming up for a handsome introduction to the Army of the Tennessee, and by sweeping impetuously on the road to

Savannah, he both defeated the deflection toward Hamburg and the halt at Waynesboro; for before General Buell thought it necessary to give orders to Nelson, other divisions, to which the speed of the first had been communicated, were also beyond Waynesboro, and could not then be recalled.

That General Grant felt secure at this time is equally manifest. Telegraphic communications between him and Nelson were established on the 3d of April. The latter telegraphed that he could be at Savannah with his division on the 5th. On the 4th, General Grant\* replied that he need not hasten his march, as transports to convey him to Pittsburg Landing would not be ready before the 8th. Nevertheless, Nelson hastened on, and it was well he did, for he gave motion to the whole army behind him, and General Johnston was even then on the march from Corinth, with his entire army, to crush General Grant before General Buell could give him assistance.

During the 4th and 5th, the rain fell continuously, the country was broken and the roads bad; but Nelson's division, by brigades, reached Savannah during the 5th, and Crittenden's division encamped at night a few miles distant. General Buell also reached Savannah on the 5th, but did not communicate with General Grant, as the latter had previously made an appointment for a meeting on the 6th.

A variety of facts support the assumption that neither General Halleck, General Grant, nor the division commanders on the field beyond Pittsburg Landing, had the remotest expectation that the enemy would advance in offense from Corinth with full strength. General Halleck proposed to command the united armies in their advance upon Corinth, and yet he was not to leave his headquarters at St. Louis, Missouri, until the 7th. On the 5th, General Sherman, though not the senior division commander, yet virtually so, from the confidence reposed in him by General Grant, telegraphed to the latter: "All is quiet along my lines now; the enemy has cavalry in our

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\*This fact has been asserted by General Buell in several papers published since the war. He has been equally explicit in declaring his ignorance of the establishment of the Army of the Tennessee, at Pittsburg Landing, instead of Savannah, until he reached Columbia, although he had inquired particularly of General Halleck.

front, and I think there are two regiments and one battery six miles out." Again: "I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day more than some picket firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday, and will not press our pickets far. I will not be drawn out far, unless with the certainty of advantage, and I do not apprehend anything like an attack upon our position." General Grant telegraphed the same day as follows: "The main force of the enemy is at Corinth, with troops at different points east." "The number of men at Corinth, and within supporting distance of it, can not be far from eighty thousand men." "Some skirmishing took place between our outguards and the enemy's, yesterday and the day before." "I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared, should such a thing take place." "It is my present intention to send them (Buell's three foremost divisions) to Hamburg, some four miles above Pittsburg, when they all get here."

It has been claimed, and doubtless with truth, that the position of General Grant's army before Pittsburg Landing was an exceedingly eligible one. Its surface was broken, and it was flanked on right and left by creeks that, in a great measure, forbade turning movements. But the location of the several divisions on the field did not indicate the expectation of a defensive battle more clearly than did the utterances of the commanders. General Sherman, with two brigades of his division, held the advance position near Shiloh Meeting-house, on the main road to Corinth. One of his brigades was on the right, guarding the bridge on the Purdy road over Owl creek; another was on the extreme left, guarding the ford of Lick creek, on the Hamburg road. General McClemand's division was in the rear of General Sherman; General Prentiss' division was between the direct, or right road to Corinth, and the brigade on the extreme left; and the two divisions of Generals Hurlbut and C. F. Smith, General W. H. L. Wallace commanding the latter, were near Pittsburg Landing, two or three miles in the rear. These divisions had thus their camps mainly on the roads leading toward the enemy's position at Corinth. They were widely separated, and did not sustain such relations to each other that it was possible to form quickly a

connected defensive line; they had no defenses and no designated line for defense in the event of a sudden attack, and there was no general on the field to take, by special authority, the command of the whole force in an emergency.

While the national army was unprepared for battle, and unexpectant of such an event, and was passing the night of the 5th in fancied security, Johnston's army of forty thousand men was in close proximity, and ready for the bloody revelation of its presence and purpose on the following morning. General Johnston was already a day later, in attaining position for attack, than he had anticipated, and this loss of a day had brought the Army of the Ohio one day's march nearer to the conjunction with General Grant, to prevent which was the object of his advance. Usually the indications of approaching battle are so palpable that the men in the ranks, as well as officers of all grades, foresee the deadly struggle and nerve themselves to meet it. But in this case the nearness of the enemy in force was not known in the national army, and there was no special preparation for the conflict.

Early in the morning of the 6th of April, 1862, a Sabbath day of unusual brightness, cannonading in the direction of Pittsburg Landing was distinctly heard at Savannah. General Grant supposed that it indicated an attack upon his most advanced positions, and not waiting to meet General Buell as he had appointed, and not leaving any instructions or suggestions for his guidance in moving his army to the field, or even expressing a desire that he should give him support, he gave an order to General Nelson to march his division up to Pittsburg Landing, and taking a steamer, hastened toward the noise of battle. He did, however, advise General Buell, by note, that an attack had been made, whose occurrence he had not anticipated before Monday or Tuesday; apologized for not meeting him as he had contemplated, and mentioned the fact that he had ordered General Nelson to move with his division "to oppose Pittsburg Landing." The omission to request him to take any other divisions to the field, or even to hasten their march to Savannah, must be accepted as conclusive that General Grant did not at the time anticipate such a battle as would require the assistance of other portions of the

Army of the Ohio. General Buell was thus left free to manage his army; but being without any knowledge of roads, and having no steamers for his troops, he could do little, except to dispatch orders to the rear to hasten forward his nearest divisions—Crittenden's and McCook's. As the day wore on, the noise from the front more and more plainly indicated that a general engagement was progressing, and General Buell, to learn the true condition of affairs and procure transportation for his forces, seized a small boat and steamed up the river. He subsequently received a note from General Grant, addressed to the "commanding officer, advance forces, near Pittsburg, Tennessee," advising him that his forces had been engaged since early morning contending against an army estimated at a hundred thousand men, and that the introduction of fresh troops upon the field would inspire his men and dishearten the enemy.

As General Grant had mentioned in his instructions to General Nelson that he could obtain a guide at Savannah, the latter at once instituted a search for one. Failing in this, he sent Captain Kendrick of his staff, to discover, if possible, a practicable route to the battle-field. During the absence of this officer, the certainty of a general battle became manifest, increasing the anxiety of those who were so near and yet unable to reach the field. Inited by the distant cannonading, the nearest divisions pressed forward rapidly, the roads having been cleared of trains by General Buell's order, that the march of three additional divisions should be unimpeded.

About noon, Captain Kendrick returned, and reported that the road nearest the river was impracticable, on account of the overflow, but that the second was practicable for infantry and cavalry, but not for artillery and trains. By this time a guide had been secured, and the division was soon in rapid motion. As the battle-field was approached, the character of the conflict and its issues became apparent. The artillery, at work on the bluff above the landing, indicated the nearness of the foe, and the louder roar of cannon up the river, gave proof that the gunboats were battering the flank of the enemy, while the masses of fugitives, huddled in terror under the river bank, spoke plainly of broken lines and general demoraliza-

tion. Moving steadily to the field through these proofs of disaster, Nelson's troops gave evidence of thorough discipline and courage. The rear of an army in successful action is often depressing to those going to the front, but such a scene as Pittsburg Landing presented at 5 p. m., when Nelson succeeded in crossing Ammen's brigade, was enough to appall the stoutest hearts. This brigade went into action at once, on the left of Grant's line, at the very crisis of the final effort of the enemy to break through to the river. It formed under the eye of General Buell, and upon ground of his selection. A short time previous, General Bragg, on the right of the line, had hurled his command against General Grant's left, upon whose stability rested the safety of his army. Bragg had partially succeeded, when two regiments of Ammen's brigade, the Sixth Ohio and Thirty-sixth Indiana, moved into position near a battery, then entirely without support. The enemy no doubt had anticipated a complete victory as the result of Bragg's assault. To gain the landing, it was only necessary to press back Grant's left flank one-eighth of a mile. This accomplished, and the position would have been no longer tenable. Fortunately, the ground was favorable for defense. It was very uneven, and through it extended a deep ravine, full of back water from the river. Near the river, this ravine was very deep, and barred attack on the extremity of the line. Thus, the ground placed Bragg at disadvantage, while the gunboats, fresh troops, and the persistent resistance of Hurlbut's division, effected his repulse, and the maintenance of the left saved the army. The night falling soon after this repulse, the fighting ceased, and both armies rested on their arms, with the consciousness that the conflict was to be renewed on the morrow. Having rendered efficient service during the later hours of the day, throughout the night the gunboats Tyler and Lexington threw their heavy shells, at regular intervals, into the lines of the enemy, whose roar and the heavy rain deprived the weary soldiers of both armies of needed rest.

The Army of the Tennessee had fought at great disadvantage from the fact that it had been attacked before it could be well formed, and the isolated divisions and brigades had been

well enveloped before support could be rendered. But though roughly handled by the enemy, barring the immense number of fugitives, it had fought with great gallantry and persistence. At the close of the day, with thinned ranks and broken organizations, it held a short line round the hill, upon whose summit had been placed the heavy guns intended for offensive purpose, but at last essential to defense. General Sherman said, officially of his command, that "it had become of a mixed character." His central brigades had been attacked very early in the morning, and though other troops in the advanced positions had become vigorously engaged, it was not until about 8 A. M. that he "became satisfied for the first time that the enemy designed a determined attack on the whole camp. " The divisions were hurried to the front, and throughout a day of hardest fighting all the divisions had been driven back from point to point, and all had been shattered. Nearly all of Prentiss' division, not killed or wounded, had been captured. General H. W. L. Wallace had been mortally wounded, and his division had become fragmentary. The divisions of McClemand and Hurlbut had maintained greater compactness, but had lost heavily. But the last line of the Army of the Tennessee before Pittsburg Landing was a demonstration of the unaccomplished purpose of the enemy.

Each army was yet hopeful of final victory. The success of the enemy warranted the hope of further advantage, and he had not heard of the presence of a portion of Buell's army on the field, and the proximity of such other portions as would on the morrow change essentially the conditions of the conflict.

General Beauregard, who had succeeded to supreme command after the fall of General Johnston, about 2 P. M. the previous day, jubilant over the palpable advantages gained, and assured of complete victory, sent such dispatches to Richmond as to evoke from Mr. Davis a message of congratulation to the Confederate congress, asserting the total defeat and rout of General Grant's army.

Late in the evening, General Nelson succeeded in crossing the remainder of his division, and during the night Crittenden's division reached the field on transports, which

had been sent to Savannah at the request of General Buell, when he first met General Grant. McCook's division, by a forced march, reached Savannah late in the evening, and finding that no provision had been especially made for the transportation of his men, General McCook impressed boats as they touched the shore. It was known that this was the last division from the Army of the Ohio that could reach the field in time for the battle of the next day. But a fourth fresh division of General Grant's army, commanded by General L. Wallace, arrived at night from Crump's Landing. General Buell examined the ground in front of General Grant's line, and selected positions for his divisions, and gave directions for their formation. No regularly defined plan of battle was agreed upon between the army commanders. There was simply an understanding that they would assume the offensive the next morning, and that the Army of the Ohio should take the left of the field. The battle-field is an undulating table-land of very considerable elevation, breaking into ravines along the Tennessee river, and bounded on the south and west by Lick creek and Owl creek, which have sources in proximity, but in their divergence compass a wide space, mostly wooded, but only here and there so densely as to embarrass the movement of troops. Small farms and cultivated fields occasionally broke the continuity of the forest, but rather gave variety to the scene than suggested special dispositions of troops.

General Buell first formed General Nelson's division next to the river as the left of the battle front, and General Grant assigned Wallace's first division to the right flank near Snake creek, below the mouth of Owl creek. Between these extremes the remaining forces were formed—Crittenden's division on the right of Nelson's, with a space for McCook's on his right when it should arrive, and on the right of the position for this division the troops engaged the day previous, somewhat refreshed, extended the line to Wallace's left.

At 5 a. m. Nelson's division was formed in line of battle, without artillery or reserves, and moved forward. The skirmishers soon met the enemy's pickets and drove them rapidly for nearly a mile, too far for the security of his right, as Crit-

tenden's division was yet some distance behind. Nelson was therefore halted, by General Buell's order, that Crittenden might advance abreast. This done, the two divisions moved forward again with a strong line of skirmishers in front and on the left flank. Nelson soon encountered the enemy in such force as not only to check him, but to force his slow retirement. His need of artillery\* was extreme, and Mendenhall's regular battery from Crittenden's division was sent to his support, whose well-directed fire deterred the enemy from further advance.

The character of Nelson's onset revealed to General Beauregard the presence of reinforcements to General Grant. He says in his report of the battle, that "at 6 A. M. a hot fire of musketry and artillery opened from the enemy's quarter on his advanced line, assured me of the junction of his forces, and soon the battle raged with a fury which satisfied me that I was attacked by a largely superior force." The presence of Buell was indeed the prophecy of his defeat, as from the first, the enemy's assurance of victory was contingent upon the failure of the Army of the Ohio to reach the field during the conflict. This state of things, though dreaded previously, was unexpected, as he had received the night previous a special dispatch "that delay had been encountered by General Buell in his march from Columbia, and that his main forces therefore could not reach the field of battle in time to save General Grant's shattered fugitive forces from capture or destruction on the following day."† With this hope he had disposed his forces, the evening previous, for a renewal of the conflict. There had been fearful disorganization in his own army during the previous day. Many of his troops were fugitives in the rear, and added to the usual causes of disorder in desperate battle, there had been an overwhelming temptation to many of his troops to straggle, to gather the rich spoils of the captured camps of five divisions. But notwithstanding this depletion of his army, from these causes and the severer casualties of deadly conflict, and the disappointment of not

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\* His own was at Savannah.

† Quoted from his official report.

having crushed Grant before Buell could join him, he still fought them both with such determination and persistence as are usually born of hope.

At the time that the recession of Nelson's line was arrested, McCook's foremost brigade, Rousseau's, moved into position on the right of Crittenden. This brigade extended the line, but Rousseau's flank was for a time as much exposed as Crittenden's had been, as there was still a wide space between the two armies. Before, however, the enemy could take advantage of this exposure, Kirk's brigade reached the field and was placed in reserve on the right flank. Each brigade of Buell's army was now required to furnish its own reserves, while Boyle's brigade of Crittenden's division was designated as a general reserve, and was so placed as to be facile of movement whenever there should be need of support. General Buell also availed himself of the fragmentary forces of the Army of the Tennessee, found in his rear.

The Army of the Ohio now offered a battle front one mile and a half long, about half the distance between Nelson's left and Wallace's right. The left flank was covered with skirmishers, and was in some degree protected by the roughness of the ground near the river. The right had no assured connection with the Army of the Tennessee, but rested in a wood. To strengthen the right, thus exposed to an enfilading or reverse fire, Gibson's brigade of McCook's division on coming to the field was placed in reserve in proximity. In front of Nelson was an open field, partially screened by woods, which extended beyond the enemy's line. Crittenden's left brigade and McCook's right were covered by a dense undergrowth, while in front of their right and left brigades respectively the ground was open. The ground, mainly level in front of Nelson, formed a hollow before Crittenden, which fell into a small creek, passing in front of McCook. The Hamburg road penetrated the line near Nelson's left. The enemy was in heavy force beyond the open ground in Buell's front, in a line slightly oblique to his line, having one battery so posted as to command Nelson's left, another to sweep his front and the woods before Crittenden's left, a third bearing upon the junction of Crittenden's right and McCook's left, and a fourth in the

immediate front of the latter. Beauregard had massed his forces on his right the evening previous, under General Bragg, to grasp the landing, and in consequence this flank was strong for defense in the morning.

As Nelson's division was well offered to the enemy in this complete formation, it soon became hotly engaged, as the introduction to the general action, from flank to flank. The enemy resisted all attacks most stubbornly, and in turn assaulted boldly and repeatedly with temporary success. In the second effort to advance the national line, Crittenden became most warmly engaged. Hazen's brigade, on Nelson's right, captured, in a charge, the second battery of the enemy, which had been exceedingly annoying. But in this act the brigade was subject to a cross fire of artillery from the adjacent batteries, conjointly with an infantry attack, and was forced back with the loss of the battery and a very large number of men. The enemy followed this advantage and advanced to the front of Crittenden's left, where he was repulsed and hurled back by Smith's brigade. In the meantime, Nelson was pressed by a strong force, with evident intent to turn his left, held by Ammen's brigade. This brigade fought gallantly to maintain a position second to none on the field, but at length began to give ground, and a decided advantage to the enemy seemed inevitable, as Nelson had neither artillery nor infantry to direct to its support, Hazen's brigade having been shattered, and Bruce's being needed in its own position. But the impending disaster was averted by Terrell's regular battery of McCook's division, which, having just arrived from Savannah, dashed into position, and by its rapid and accurate firing silenced the enemy's first battery, which was aiding the infantry force pressing Ammen. Subsequently, the enemy repeated the attack, and endangered both the brigade and Terrell's battery, the latter having lost very many gunners and being without adequate support. In this emergency, the Nineteenth Ohio, from Crittenden's division, and the Second Iowa and Fifteenth Illinois, from the Army of the Tennessee, were sent to Nelson's assistance. This reinforcement permitted the Sixth Ohio to become the special support of Terrell's battery, furnishing gunners in room of those he had lost. The enemy, however, did not

at once relax his effort to turn the flank, but was finally forced back. Then, by a flank attack by Nelson, and a direct one by Crittenden, aided by a concentric fire from the batteries of Mendenhall, Terrell, and Bartlett, he was driven beyond the position of his second and third batteries. Afterward, the enemy assumed a new position some distance to the rear, and again opened with artillery, but his guns were soon silenced by Mendenhall, and were subsequently captured by Crittenden's division. These successes decided the contest on the left, and Nelson swung round over the ground which had been lost the day before.

The action in the center of the general line, or the right of Buell's, was not less spirited or decisive than that on the left. The initial attacks, by the extreme divisions of the two armies, had been made almost simultaneously, and the intermediate divisions became involved in turn from both left and right. Thus, McCook followed Crittenden in attacking the enemy. This division met the same stubborn resistance, and made frequent charges. Rousseau's brigade, having taken an advanced position early in the day, repulsed a charge as its introduction to battle. It then gave a counter-blow, drove the opposing force some distance, and captured a battery. The direction of Rousseau's advance left an opening between McCook and Crittenden, which the enemy perceived, and began to mass troops to occupy. To prevent this, General McCook ordered Colonel Willich, commanding the Thirty-second Indiana, to drive back the enemy, and by the bayonet and bullet this was gallantly accomplished. The remainder of Gibson's brigade followed Willich, and soon both brigades, Rousseau's and Gibson's, were in hottest conflict. Willich's regiment at one time became wedged between other forces, and receiving their fire was compelled to withdraw. This led to confusion, but order was soon restored. Kirk's brigade reached the field just as Rousseau had exhausted his ammunition, and took his position, that he might replenish. While Rousseau was absent, Gibson was severely pressed, as the enemy continued his movements to separate Crittenden and McCook. His left regiment, the Forty-ninth Ohio, was involved in imminent

danger and was compelled to change front twice under fire to prevent the turning of the position. Upon the return of Rousseau, his brigade, and two regiments of Hurlbut's division hitherto in reserve, went into line, when General McCook's whole division thus supported, advanced and drove the enemy beyond General Sherman's camps. The last severe fighting was purely defensive on the part of the enemy to hold his main line of retreat and cover his retiring columns.

Just as the fighting ceased, General Wood, with two brigades of his division, arrived, and one of them, Wagner's, joined in pursuit of the enemy. None of the troops followed far, as their extreme fatigue and the approach of darkness prevented. General Thomas' division was still in the rear. Being the last on the march, its approach had been retarded by the trains of the other divisions left on the road.

The losses of each army were heavy. According to official reports, General Grant lost fourteen hundred and thirty-seven killed, five thousand six hundred and seventy-nine wounded, and two thousand nine hundred and thirty-four captured. General Buell lost two hundred and thirty-six killed, one thousand eight hundred and sixteen wounded, and eighty-eight captured. The total loss in the two armies was twelve thousand one hundred and ninety. The enemy lost one thousand seven hundred and twenty-eight killed, eight thousand and twelve wounded, and nine hundred and fifty-seven captured; total, ten thousand six hundred and ninety-seven.

Early the next morning after the battle, Generals Sherman and Wood, with two brigades each, were sent forward by General Grant to discover the position of the enemy, if in position, or to pursue him, if in retreat. The movement was promptly made, and resulted in the discovery that Beauregard had withdrawn his infantry and artillery beyond Lick creek, and had left a large body of cavalry in his rear. General Sherman encountered this force and drove it some distance toward the main army, when he and Wood returned to camp. General Beauregard succeeded in removing the artillery, which he captured on the 6th, but lost guns and munitions on the 7th, and was compelled to leave his severely wounded men in hospitals near the field.

As was common during the war, especially at the beginning, each army commander greatly overestimated the strength of the other. General Beauregard computed General Grant's forces on the 6th, at forty-five thousand, and his reinforcements on the 7th at thirty-three thousand, claiming for himself about forty thousand at the commencement of the battle, and not over twenty thousand on the 7th. While General Grant during the battle, was led to believe that he was fighting one hundred thousand men, giving no other estimate after its conclusion, at least in his official report. He had on the field at the beginning of the battle about thirty-three thousand men, and General Buell gave him the second day about twenty thousand.

General Albert Sidney Johnston, the commander-in-chief of the insurgent forces in the West, died on the field, from a gunshot wound. G. M. Johnson, provisional governor of Kentucky, and General Gladden were mortally wounded, and four other general officers were wounded. General Grant lost but one general, W. H. L. Wallace, temporary commander of General C. F. Smith's division.

The battle of "Shiloh," viewed in reference to the antecedent plans and movements which produced it, the strength and losses of the armies engaged, and the persistent fighting of each, both when flushed with success and hopeless of victory, must be regarded as one of vast results as affecting the general struggle; also, as one unique in type as regards some at least of its prominent features.

The position of the Army of the Tennessee, on the west bank of the Tennessee river, awaiting the coming of the Army of the Ohio, for co-operation in offense against the concentrated forces of the enemy in position in proximity, certainly invited the attack. The invitation was accepted with such tardiness as prevented success. General Johnston did indeed intend to deliver battle on the 5th; but the fact that he did not, or could not as he had planned, proves that his forecast was at fault. General Grant did not anticipate battle before General Buell could join him, especially after he was known to be near, and General Johnston deferred his advance until it was possible for Buell to participate, although

he also knew that he was in motion to accomplish this object. Thus this great battle was fought as the result of the mutual misapprehension of the commanding generals of the probabilities and possibilities to each. It was delivered too early for General Grant's plans and those of his chief, and too late for the success of General Johnston. The stern, soldierly character of the great majority of the men of the Army of the Tennessee saved it from overthrow when fighting under conditions of positive disadvantage. The opportune and essential aid of the Army of the Ohio was revealed in the type and issue of the second battle. It was an extraordinary experience in the history of war, that two armies, under separate commanders, should fight a successful battle without definitely recognized relations or specific plan,\* each fighting almost alone on the same wide field, and yet each fighting for the other as parts of the same army.

The compact line of the Army of the Ohio, the absence of all stragglers, the space it occupied in the battle front, the way it was handled, and the manner of its fighting from flank to flank, give it a record for discipline and valor in its first great engagement that will not suffer in comparison with that of any other army on any other field of the war. The exact service it rendered on the bloody ground of "Shiloh" can not be a matter of doubt. The official report of General Buell, and those of the division, brigade, and regimental commanders, giving the details of the engagement on the left and center, bring into bold relief the distinguished gallantry and success of each unit, large and small; while the testimony from the officers of the Army of the Tennessee, and even those of the enemy, is equally emphatic. General Sherman used language of strongest compliment in his report. When General Beauregard had despaired of success on his right, and anxious to secure a safe retreat, had massed his forces on the Corinth road, near the "Shiloh Chapel," and having there made such impression upon the line as to threaten the isola-

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\* General Buell states in his official report, that he knew nothing of the position of General Grant's forces, except a few regiments that he put in position with his own troops.

tion of Wallace's division, McCook's division sprang to the front, and General Sherman thus speaks of its action: "Here I saw for the first time the well-ordered and compact Kentucky forces of General Buell, whose soldierly movement at once gave confidence to our newer and less disciplined forces. Here I saw Willich's regiment advanced upon a point of water-oaks and thickets in beautiful style. Then arose the severest musketry fire I ever heard, and lasted some twenty minutes, when the splendid regiment had to fall back." Again: "Willich's regiment had been repulsed, but a whole brigade of McCook's division advanced beautifully deployed, and entered this dreaded wood. I ordered my second brigade, then commanded by Colonel T. Kilby Smith (Colonel Stuart being wounded), to form on its right, and my fourth brigade, Colonel Buckland, on its right, all to advance abreast with this Kentucky brigade before mentioned, which I afterward found to be Rousseau's brigade of McCook's division. I gave personal direction to the twenty-four pounder guns, whose well-directed fire first silenced the enemy's guns to the left, and afterward at the Shiloh Meeting-house. Rousseau's brigade moved in splendid order steadily to the front, sweeping everything before it, and at 4 p. m. we stood upon the ground of our original front line, and the enemy was in full retreat. I directed my reserve brigades to resume at once their original camps. I am now ordered by General Grant to give personal credit where I think it is due, and censure where I think it merited. I concede that General McCook's splendid division from Kentucky drove back the enemy along the Corinth road, which was the great center of the field of battle, and where Beauregard commanded in person, supported by Bragg's, Polk's, and Breckinridge's divisions."

General Wallace, whose division, it will be remembered, held the extreme right, and had driven the enemy's left a great distance, thus speaks of the action of Willich's regiment, in its effect upon his own command, which at the time was in peril of complete isolation, as from the recession of General Sherman's right, his own left was exposed. General Wallace had previously made a most determined effort to turn the enemy's left by changing front by a left wheel, relying

upon the forces on his left for the support of that flank of his division. But the supporting troops had given way, his own reserves had been thrown to that flank, and dispositions had been made to cover his retreat in the event of need. "Fortunately," he states, "before the enemy could avail themselves of their advantage, some fresh troops dashed against them, and once more drove them back. For this favor my acknowledgments are especially due to Colonel August Willich and his famous regiment."

From these statements it appears that while Wallace had wheeled upon the enemy's flank, and his own left flank was in peril, that troops from the Army of the Ohio gave it security, and that consequently General Buell's forces were holding the whole battle front to the left of the imperiled flank of the extreme right division of the two armies. General McCook's division, fighting in view of the two right division commanders of the Army of the Tennessee, deserved all the praise they generously bestowed, but it was not more deserving than the other two divisions of the army, Crittenden and Nelson's, which defeated and routed the whole right of the Confederate army.

The results of this battle repeated the significance of previous ones—that the war was one of vast proportions, and that its duration might extend far into the future. At its beginning, hope of its early termination was entertained North and South, but as it progressed, great battles, whether decisive or not, seemed only to feed the energy and intensify the ruling sentiments of the two sections. After "Donelson" the enemy took position far to the south, to gather strength for a decisive offensive blow, to restore prestige to his arms, and regain the vast fertile region of country which he had lost. General Beauregard had been sent to the West to assist General Johnston in the assumption of the offensive in Kentucky. When that was impossible, the two generals gathered troops from all quarters at Corinth. Bragg's veterans from Fort Pickens, and Polk's forces guarding the Mississippi river at Columbus, Kentucky, were called thither, and the governors of the States of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana were invoked for additional forces, that the speedy concentration of

a vast army might assure success. Their first object was to overwhelm General Smith, should he advance from the protection of the gunboats, and the second and greater one was to strike a sudden blow to crush the army under General Grant, in position before Pittsburg Landing, and in the direction of Savannah, before he could be reinforced by General Buell. Perhaps no battle of the war was projected with greater objects than that of "Shiloh." The aims were to crush, first, Grant, then Buell, and then take the offensive throughout the West. But the magnitude of the interests involved, did not find correspondence in the strength of the army gathered at Corinth, and the initial movement of the grand scheme was undertaken too late to succeed. To cover up the total failure of the plan, minor advantages were magnified in the report of General Beauregard, and an adroit apology was given for the withdrawal of the army from the battle-field. The leaders declared themselves satisfied with the result, and the press throughout the South expressed the hopefulness of final triumph which General Beauregard claimed for himself and his defeated army. But beneath this show of hope there must have been the profoundest disappointment. A hopeless defensive at once took the place of a bold aggression, freighted with the grandest anticipated results. "Shiloh" buried hopes which had stronger foundations than any of the admitted expectations of subsequent campaigns and battles. This battle was to the enemy not merely another proof of what "Mill Springs" and "Donelson" had palpably revealed—the persistence and pluck of the national troops—but it was the miscarriage of a new mode of warfare, for the quick destruction of two armies destined for conjunction and co-operation in room of the diffusion of their forces to defend territory. This fact gives broad significance to the issue of the battle of "Shiloh." A grand plan there failed through inadequate resources and comparative feebleness of execution. And failure from either cause, where the possibilities lying beyond initial success were so promising, meant the loss of the cause rather than that of a great battle. But the Northern people, though claiming a victory, measured its scope by the more palpable and immediate results. It was

a victory because it was not a crushing defeat. The Confederate army was not so crippled that it could not safely withdraw from the field and enter upon preparations for battle on some other field. It did not therefore appear especially decisive. And this feeling, coupled with the sadness engendered by the multitude of the slain, and the sufferings of the far greater multitude of the wounded, was a heavy offset to the joy which the victory produced.

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NASHVILLE, March 3, 1862.

*General Halleck, St. Louis:*

What can I do to aid your operations against Columbus? Remember I am separated from you by the Tennessee river. Johnston is moving toward Decatur, and burning bridges as he goes.

D. C. BUELL.

ST. LOUIS, March 4, 1862.

*General Buell, Nashville:*

If Johnston has destroyed the railroad and bridges in his rear, he can not return to attack you. Why not come to the Tennessee, and operate with me to cut Johnston's line with Memphis, Randolph, and New Madrid? Columbus has been evacuated and destroyed. Enemy is concentrating at New Madrid and Island No. 10. I am concentrating a force of twenty thousand against him. Grant, with all available force, has gone up the Tennessee to destroy connection at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. Estimated strength of enemy at New Madrid, Randolph, and Memphis is fifty thousand. It is of vital importance to separate them from Johnston's army. Come over to Savannah or Florence, and we can do it. We then can operate on Decatur or Memphis, or both, as may appear best.

II. W. HALLECK.

NASHVILLE, March 5, 1862.

*General Halleck, St. Louis:*

Your views accord with my own generally, but some slight modifications seem to me necessary. At least there are details about which we ought to be able to consult freely. Can we not meet at Louisville in a day or so? I think it very important. The concentration of my troops and transportation can not be completed for some days. We have had two formidable rivers to cross, and have forced ourselves here without transportation or baggage. The thing which I think of vital importance is that you seize and hold the bridge at Florence in force. Johnston is now at Shelbyville, some fifty miles south of this. I hope you will arrange for our meeting at Louisville.

D. C. BUELL.

ST. LOUIS, March 6, 1862.

*General Buell, Nashville:*

I can not possibly leave here at the present time. Events are passing on so rapidly that I must be all the time in telegraphic communication with Curtis, Grant, Pope, and Commodore Foote. We must consult by telegraph. News down the Tennessee that Beauregard has twenty thousand men at Corinth, and is rapidly fortifying it. Smith will probably not be strong enough to attack it. It is a great misfortune to lose that point. I shall reinforce Smith as rapidly as possible. If you can send a division by water around into the Tennessee, it would require only a small amount of transportation to do it. Would receive all its supplies by the river.

H. W. HALLECK.

NASHVILLE, March 9, 1862.

*General Halleck, St. Louis:*

I did not get your dispatch of the 6th until yesterday, that of the 8th to-day. I suggest the following: The enemy can move from one side of the river to the other at pleasure, and if we attempt to operate on both sides without the same facility of transit, we are liable to be beaten in detail. The point I previously suggested is the only one from which we can act centrally. That secured, we can act according to circumstances either way. If you occupy that point, I will reinforce you by water or join you by land. Otherwise I may detach too little to save you, or else so much as to endanger Middle Tennessee, the importance of which I need not allude to. If we could meet, I think that we could better understand each other.

D. C. BUELL.

ST. LOUIS, March 10, 1862.

*General Buell, Nashville:*

My forces are moving up the Tennessee river, as rapidly as we can obtain transportation. Florence was the point originally designated, but on account of the enemy's forces at Corinth and Humboldt, it is deemed best to land at Savannah, and establish a depot. The transportation will serve as ferries. The selection is left to C. F. Smith, who commands the advance. Pope has turned Island No. 10, but the enemy shows no disposition to evacuate. Curtis is asking for reinforcements in Arkansas. I must send him some troops intended for Tennessee. You do not say whether we are to expect any reinforcements from Nashville.

H. W. HALLECK.

NASHVILLE, March 10, 1862.

*General Halleck, St. Louis:*

The possession and absolute security of the country north of the Tennessee river, with Nashville as a center, is of vital importance both in a political and military point of view. Under no circumstances should it be jeopardized. It enables us, with the Tennessee as a base, to operate east, west, and south. All our arrangements should look to centralization

for that object. We can not tell now which direction to take when we get within reach of the enemy. You can not well tell what force you may meet at the west; still less can I tell what may come in the direction of Stevenson. With this view, the establishment of your force on this side of the river as high up as possible, is evidently judicious; and with the same view it would be unnecessary and inadvisable to change the line on which I propose to advance. I can join you almost, if not quite as soon as by water, in better condition, and with greater security to your operations and mine. I believe you can not be too promptly nor too strongly established on the Tennessee. I shall advance in a very few days, as soon as our transportation is ready.

D. C. BUELL.

[PRESIDENT'S WAR ORDER, NO. 3.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, March 11, 1862.

Major-General McClellan, having personally taken the field, at the head of the Army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the command of the other military departments, he retaining command of the Department of the Potomac.

*Ordered further:* That the two departments now under the respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under General Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, Tennessee, be consolidated and designated the Department of the Mississippi; and that, until otherwise ordered, Major-General Halleck have command of said department.

\* \* \* \* \*

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By order of Secretary of War.

L. THOMAS, *Adjutant-General.*

Official.

Wm. D. WHIPPLE, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

—  
NASHVILLE, March 20, 1862.

To General L. Thomas, *Adjutant-General, Washington:*

The following is the force, in whole, of the late Department of the Ohio, as nearly as can be ascertained at present:

92 regiments of infantry—60,882 for duty—79,334 aggregate, present and absent.

11 regiments, 1 battalion, and 7 detached companies cavalry—9,222 for duty—11,496 aggregate, present and absent.

28 field, and 2 siege batteries—3,368 for duty—3,953 aggregate, present and absent.

The above figures include battalions of the 15th, 16th, 18th, and 19th regular infantry, and 2 companies of regular cavalry. Will report more particularly by letter.

The data are found in great detail in last department return, except that eight regiments were detached for operations against Fort Donelson, and have not been returned.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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## [CIRCULAR.]

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DIVISION,  
CAMP NEAR SPRING HILL, TENN., *March 28, 1872.*

Reveille will be sounded to-morrow at 4 o'clock A. M. At 6 A. M., the Tenth brigade will move with one day's rations in haversacks, in the following order: 1. The 24th Ohio regiment; 2. The 6th Ohio regiment; 3. The 36th Indiana regiment. The wagons will be carefully loaded, with reference to fording Duck river; tents and other articles not liable to injury from water, at the bottom, and ammunition at the top.

On reaching the ford, the men will strip off their pantaloons, secure their cartridge-boxes about their necks, and load knapsacks on the wagons. Bayonets will be fixed, and pantaloons in a neat roll will be carried on the point of the bayonets.

A halt will be ordered on the other side of the ford to allow the men to take off their drawers, wring them dry, and resume their clothing and knapsacks.

Strong parties will be detailed to accompany the wagons, to assist them in crossing the ford. The rear guard to each regiment will consist of one company under charge of a field officer, whose particular province will be to assist the passage of the train over the ford. The ammunition boxes of the artillery will be taken off the limbers and passed across the river on scows.

By command of Brigadier-General Nelson.

J. MILLS KENDRICK  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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SAVANNAH, *April 6, 1862.*

*Brigadier-General William Nelson, Commanding Division in General Buell's Army:*

An attack having been made upon our forces, you will move your entire command to the river, opposite Pittsburg. You can easily obtain a guide in the village.

By order of Major-General Grant.

JOHN A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

SAVANNAH, April 6, 1862.

*General D. C. Buell:*

Heavy firing is heard up the river, indicating plainly that an attack has been made upon our most advanced positions. I have been looking for this, but did not believe that the attack could be made before Monday or Tuesday. This necessitates my joining the forces up the river, instead of meeting you to-day as I had contemplated. I have directed Nelson to move to the river with his division. He can march to opposite Pittsburgh.

Respectfully, your obedient servant.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

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PITTSBURG, April 6, 1862.

*Commanding Officer, Advance Forces, near Pittsburgh, Tennessee.*

GENERAL:—The attack upon my forces has been very spirited from early this morning. The appearance of fresh troops on the field now would have a powerful effect, both by inspiring our men and disheartening the enemy. If you will get upon the field, leaving all baggage on the east bank of the river, it will be a move to our advantage, and possibly save the day to us.

The rebel force is estimated at over one hundred thousand men.

My headquarters will be in the log building on the top of the hill, where you will be furnished a staff officer to guide you to your place in the field.

Respectfully, etc.,  
U. S. GRANT,  
*Major-General.*

This communication General Buell received, who states in his official report of the battle that he requested General Grant to send steamers to Savannah to bring up Crittenden's division, which had arrived during the morning.

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## EXTRACT FROM GENERAL BUELL'S REPORT.

I found upon the ground parts of about two regiments, perhaps one thousand men, and subsequently a similar fragment came up of General Grant's force. The first I directed to act with McCook's attack, and the second one was similarly employed on the left. I sent other straggling troops of General Grant's force immediately on General McCook's right, as some firing had already commenced. I had no direct knowledge of the disposition of the remainder of General Grant's force, nor is it my province to speak of them. I regret that I am unable to name those that came under my direction in the way I had stated, for they rendered willing and efficient service during the day.

## EXTRACT FROM GENERAL GRANT'S OFFICIAL REPORT.

As there is a deep and impassable ravine for artillery or cavalry, and very difficult for infantry at this point, no troops were stationed here except the necessary artillerists and a small infantry force for their support. Just at this moment, the advance of Major-General Buell's column and a part of the division of General Nelson arrived, the two generals named both being present. An advance was immediately made upon the point of attack, and the enemy was soon driven back.

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During the night all was quiet, and, feeling that a great moral advantage would be gained by becoming the attacking party, an advance was ordered as soon as day dawned. The result was the gradual repulse of the enemy at all points of the line, from 9 until probably 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when it became evident the enemy was retreating.

## EXTRACT FROM GENERAL BEAUREGARD'S REPORT.

After speaking of the call upon various governors of states for troops the general gives this passage:

"At the same time, General Johnston being at Murfreesboro, on the march to form a junction of his forces with mine, was called on to send at least a brigade by railroad, so that he might fall on and crush the enemy should he attempt an advance from under his gunboats. The call on General Johnston was promptly complied with. His entire force was also hastened in this direction, and by the first of April our united forces were concentrated along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad from Bethel to Corinth, and from the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, from Corinth to Iuka.

"It was then determined to resume the offensive and strike a sudden blow at the enemy in position under General Grant, on the west bank of the Tennessee at Pittsburg, and in the direction of Savannah, before he was reinforced by the army under General Buell, then known to be advancing for that purpose by rapid marches from Nashville, via Columbia. About the same time General Johnston was advised that such an operation conformed to the expectations of the President."

## EXTRACT FROM THE MESSAGE OF MR. DAVIS TO THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, APRIL 8TH.

The great importance of the news just received from Tennessee induces me to depart from the established usages, and to make to you this communication in advance of official reports. From official telegraphic dispatches, received from official sources, I am able to announce to you, with entire confidence, that it has pleased Almighty God to crown the Confederate arms with a glorious and decisive victory over our invaders.

## CHAPTER XI.

### OPERATIONS AGAINST CORINTH.

AFTER the failure of General Beauregard's grand offensive enterprise, the whole South was put upon a strain to prepare to withstand at Corinth the combined armies under General Halleck. Generals Van Dorn and Sterling Price, with their forces, were withdrawn from the scenes of campaigns and battles in the far West. And while these and other troops were concentrating at Corinth, General Beauregard threw forward toward Pittsburg, heavy detachments to resist all ordinary reconnoitering forces, and retard the advance of the national armies.

General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing, April 11th, and lost no time in arranging for a vast concentration of armies to advance against Corinth, prepared for any type of resistance which might be offered. He called to him the divisions of Generals Davis and Asboth, made veteran by battles and marches in Missouri and Arkansas, and the Army of the Mississippi, under General Pope, fresh from its victories at New Madrid and Island No. 10. In the unification of his immense forces, General Halleck designated the grand units, as right wing, center, left wing, reserves, and cavalry, commanded respectively by Major-Generals George H. Thomas, D. C. Buell, John Pope, and J. A. McClemand, and Brigadier-General A. J. Smith. The "Right Wing" comprised four divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, and the First of the Army of the Ohio, under command of Major-General W. T. Sherman, and Brigadier-Generals T. W. Sherman, J. A. Davis, S. H. Hurlbut, and J. J. McKean; the center, the divisions of Brigadier-Generals McCook, Nelson, Crittenden, and Wood,

of the Army of the Ohio; the left wing, the divisions of Brigadier-Generals E. A. Paine, D. S. Stanley, and S. Hamilton; the reserves, the divisions of Major-General L. Wallace and Brigadier-General H. M. Judah; and the cavalry division, under the command of Brigadier-General G. Granger. This plan of organization gave unity to the whole force without materially changing the formation of the distinct armies of which it was composed. Major-General U. S. Grant was announced as second in command.

For the moment, the general struggle was resting upon the two immense armies concentrated in Virginia and on the west bank of the Tennessee river. Never, during the war, did heavier masses, in the aggregate, confront each other, than in the two opposing armies in the East and the two in the West. The people of the country had not yet entirely given up the idea that a few great battles would terminate the war, or at least give such preponderance to one party or the other as to foreshadow the final result. Hence, at no time before the end was distinctly in view as contingent upon a single battle or surrender, did two campaigns focalize more interest or hope than those before Richmond and Corinth. But in the first stages of a war, which, from the peculiar causes of its existence, was not likely to terminate until one of the contending parties should be exhausted, battles of marked decisiveness were not probable, and the spring and summer of 1862, seemingly prophetic of decisive conflicts, passed away without materially changing the relative strength of the warring sections.

General Halleck, though greatly stronger than his adversary, studiously avoided either inviting or provoking a general engagement, adopting the policy of gradual approaches by parallels. And step by step, by short advances, fortifying each new position, he slowly neared his objective. General Beauregard resisted each successive encroachment with greater stubbornness and stronger forces, but never in such strength as to precipitate a general battle, as for such an issue he was not prepared.

On the 3d and 4th of May, General Halleck advanced his whole line, and repeated this movement on the 7th, 17th, and 28th. These advances always involved heavy skirmishing,

and at times very sharp fighting by strong lines; and the national armies were not always the aggressors. May 9th, General Paine's division, in the advance of the Army of the Mississippi or left wing, was assailed by the enemy in heavy force, at Farmington, Mississippi. Paine was not reinforced, and having fought manfully for several hours, was able to withdraw in safety across Seven Mile creek, to General Pope's main line. Had not reinforcements been forbidden by the commander-in-chief, there might have been a heavy engagement, as the enemy, stimulated by the hope of capturing the isolated division, threw forward strong columns. The same day there was a similar effort, with similar issue, to capture an advanced detachment of McCook's division. The advance of the 17th brought on a spirited combat of respectable proportions on the right. General T. W. Sherman then drove the enemy across Bridge creek, and occupied the ground north of the creek on the Monterey and Corinth road. Whereupon, General Thomas directed General W. T. Sherman to reconnoiter the enemy's left. This movement resulted in driving back that flank some distance, and in a corresponding advance of the whole "Right Wing."

The advance of the 28th met far more opposition than any preceding one. The enemy then attempted to retake a position which had been wrested from him by the right wing, but was repulsed. He also attacked McCook's division in the center of the general line, but was defeated again.

This seeming boldness in aggression was only a feint to cover the retreat of General Beauregard's whole army from Corinth. The near approach of the national lines, now ready for the complete envelopment of his position, made it necessary for him to give battle in some form, retreat, or allow himself to be shut up by a siege. He chose retreat, though it is evident that he did not lightly esteem the advantages of the position which he was compelled to abandon. It was the vaunted "strategic position" of the campaign, but he was unable even in defense to cope with General Halleck's armies, and in leaving it, he hoped that there might be some compensation for its loss, by again changing the theater of the war.

in the West, and causing the diffusion of the forces in array before him.

The explosions at Corinth, early in the morning of May 30th, revealed General Beauregard's purpose and its accomplishment. For several days he had been sending off his munitions and stores, and during the night of the 29th he had so quietly and secretly withdrawn his army, that his own pickets at post did not know that they had been left, a sacrifice for the safety of their comrades. A reconnaissance verified the supposed significance of the explosions, and the "Left Wing," forty thousand strong, moved at once in pursuit, and General Buell, with McCook's, Crittenden's, and T. W. Sherman's divisions, followed in support. Although the railroad had been seriously damaged at Booneville by Colonel Elliott, in command of cavalry, having passed through Iuka to that point on the 29th, there was no such protracted detention at that place as to enable the pursuing forces to overtake the rear guard of the retreating army. General Beauregard halted at Okolona; the national cavalry, under General Granger, advanced to Baldwin and Guntown, and the campaign was terminated. Thus, Corinth, made historic as the objective of an imposing campaign, fell at last without general engagement or siege.

Soon after, Memphis, and all other points on the Mississippi river above that city, passed to the control of the national forces, and with them another section of the mighty river, as did also the whole region traversed by the "Memphis and Charleston Railroad," to the borders of East Tennessee. The possession of this vast region seemed at first a far greater advantage than it really was. To be utilized, it required a heavy elimination from the offensive strength of the Western armies. The insurgent army was not destroyed, nor even greatly diminished by losses, and hence the absolute strength of the rebellion was not diminished in proportion to the loss of territory. The impression prevailed that this was the case, but the subsequent diffusion of forces to guard it, and the facility with which, in consequence, the enemy first changed the theater of war and then assumed the aggressive to regain it, demonstrated the fact, that at that period of the war, the mere grasp of Southern territory was a waste of strength.

## CHAPTER XII.

OPERATIONS OF GENERAL O. M. MITCHELL, GENERAL NEGLEY, GENERAL G. W. MORGAN, AND COLONEL DUFFIELD, AND THE EXPEDITION TO DESTROY RAILROADS IN GEORGIA.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL O. M. MITCHELL, commanding the Second division, left Nashville about the middle of March and advanced to Murfreesboro. General Johnston, in retreating from one place to the other, had destroyed all the bridges to prevent pursuit, and the repair of these on the railroad first commanded the attention of General Mitchell. He built twelve hundred feet of heavy bridges in ten days, when being relieved at Murfreesboro by the Twenty-third brigade, under Colonel Duffield, he moved forward to Shelbyville and there established a depot of supplies. From Shelbyville, he made a bold and rapid advance through Fayetteville to Huntsville, Alabama. His van, consisting of Turchin's brigade, Colonel Kennett's Ohio cavalry, and Captain Simonson's battery, entered Huntsville early in the morning of the 7th of April, completely surprising the citizens of the town, capturing one hundred and seventy prisoners, fifteen locomotives, one hundred and fifty passenger and freight cars, and other property of great value to the enemy. Colonels Sill's and Lytle's brigades and Loomis' and Edgerton's batteries followed closely.

The next day, using the captured rolling-stock, General Mitchell sent Colonel Sill eastward to capture Stevenson, the junction of the Memphis and Charleston and Nashville and Chattanooga railroads, and Colonel Turchin westward to seize Decatur and Tuscumbia. Both expeditions were successful, and thus, within a few days, one hundred and twenty miles

of this important railroad, connecting Corinth and Richmond, fell into his keeping. To hold what he had gained, detachments of troops were posted at the more important points, and the whole command was kept in constant readiness to move to any place on the line which the enemy might threaten or attack.

The necessity for a movement in force soon occurred, as General Kirby Smith advanced from Bridgeport against the detachment beyond Stevenson. As rapidly as possible, on the 29th of April, General Mitchell moved from Huntsville by rail to oppose him. On reaching his menaced detachment, four miles west from Bridgeport, he found that his troops had driven the enemy's pickets back across Widow's creek, the bridge over which had been burned. He then sent a portion of his force to reinforce the detachment in front of the enemy, to hold him there by a feigned effort to cross, while with the remainder he made a detour and advanced upon Bridgeport. The enemy at this point was surprised and thrown into confusion, and, mainly by the action of the artillery, was driven across the Tennessee river. The railroad bridge, reaching from the western bank of the river to the island, though fired by the enemy, was saved, but the one extending from the island to the eastern bank was destroyed.

Having routed one portion of Smith's force, General Mitchell made preparation to attack the other, which was guarding the crossing of Widow's creek before his own troops, anticipating that the report of cannon at Bridgeport would hasten their return to assist their comrades, and waiting their approach, he dispersed them also with his artillery.

Unofficial reports place the enemy's loss in this engagement at seventy-two in killed and wounded, and three hundred and fifty prisoners.

About the 10th of May, General Mitchell was placed in command of all the troops between Nashville and Huntsville. He at once ordered General Negley, who, with his brigade from the Second division, had been left at Columbia when the main army moved upon Savannah, to move from that place to Rodgersville, Alabama, held by a brigade of the enemy under General Adams. He also sent a force, in com-

mand of Colonel Lytle, from Athens, Alabama, to co-operate with him. Upon the near approach of these two columns—May 13th—the enemy dispersed and sought safety by crossing the Tennessee river, and the two commanders co-operating returned to their former positions.

The engagement at Bridgeport and the expedition against Rodgersville gave General Mitchell the control of that portion of Alabama lying north of the Tennessee river. This region he held firmly, making the impression, by his rapid movements, that his force was much larger than it really was. The seizure of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, and the complete occupancy of Northern Alabama, involved a series of bold and brilliant operations, which had important relations to those before Corinth and at Cumberland Gap, and also to the subsequent advance of the Army of the Ohio toward East Tennessee.

On the 29th of May, General Mitchell put in motion an expedition against Chattanooga, Tennessee. General Negley moved from Columbia to Fayetteville, and was there joined by Turchin's brigade, from Huntsville, and the Eighteenth Ohio, under Colonel T. R. Stanley, from Athens. From Fayetteville the column advanced through Winchester, Cowan, and the University Place to Jasper. When near the latter place, Colonel Hambright, commanding the vanguard, encountered a brigade of the enemy, under General Adams. After a sharp skirmish, General Adams fled, leaving behind him some twenty of his dead, as many who were wounded, twelve others as prisoners, and his ammunition and supply trains. From Jasper, General Negley advanced to the north bank of the Tennessee, opposite Chattanooga, arriving on the 7th of June. Colonel Sill's command had been sent to Shellmound, to attract the attention of the enemy and prevent his crossing the river at that point. During the evening of the 7th and morning of the 8th, General Negley bombarded Chattanooga, making a feint of crossing the river and assaulting the place, and then withdrew. This attitude drew General Kirby Smith from Knoxville to London, with a large portion of his command, on his way to relieve Chattanooga. Here he learned that General Negley had withdrawn from East Tennessee. General

Negley took position, on his return, at Shelbyville, and the co-operative forces resumed their former positions. The main advantage resulting was the intensification of the enemy's confusion, and the consequent derangement of his plans.

Brigadier-General G. W. Morgan arrived at Cumberland Ford, and assumed command of the forces in Eastern Kentucky, April 11th. The Cumberland Valley was destitute of supplies, the productions of the region having been exhausted by General Carter's brigade and the enemy. Forage had to be hauled at first from forty to fifty miles, and subsequently from eighty to ninety, over roads almost impassable. General Morgan concentrated his entire command at Cumberland Ford, consisting of the Twenty-fourth brigade (formerly the Twelfth), the Twenty-fifth, Twenty-sixth, and Twenty-seventh, commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals S. P. Carter and J. G. Spears, and Colonels J. S. DeCourcey and John Coburn.\* Some of the regiments were rearmed, and the artillery was increased from six to twenty-two pieces. Supplies and ammunition were brought forward, and a floating bridge was placed upon the Cumberland river.

Soon after his assumption of command, General Morgan ascertained, through a reconnoissance, that the defensive works at Cumberland Gap had been grouped on the enemy's left, and that the natural strength of the position was his dependence on the right. This gap is a deep depression in the Cumberland range, being the great gateway through the mountains for the roads of an extensive region. It is situated on the eastern side of the boundary line between Kentucky and Tennessee, and near the line separating Western Virginia from Kentucky and Tennessee. The eastern slope of the mountains is very abrupt, often presenting perpendicular heights of several hundred feet. The western slope is less steep, but is very much broken by spurs, knobs, and ravines. The ascent, therefore, on either side is exceedingly difficult. East of the Cumberland range, in close proximity, is a secondary parallel range, called Poor Valley Ridge. On the west there is another,

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\*The Twenty-seventh brigade, in June, passed to the command of Brigadier-General A. Baird.

inferior in height and extent. By personal observation, during a reconnoissance, General Morgan perceived a knob to the right of the fortifications, which commanded them, and sent at once for siege guns to be used from that point; but before they could be brought, the enemy fortified this eminence and defeated the plan. A subsequent reconnoissance, with Carter's and DeCourcy's brigades, without the expectation of even a skirmish, resulted in a spirited contest, brought on by an attack by the enemy. The loss was not heavy on either side, and except in demonstrating the difficulty and hazard of an attempt to carry the position by storm, the reconnoissance was fruitless.

General Morgan now determined to demonstrate on the enemy's left, and, if possible, force him to an open fight or to the abandonment of his fortifications. To conceal his purpose, and at the same time threaten Clinton, one of the enemy's depots of supplies, he posted General Spears, with three regiments, at the foot of Pine Mountain, on the road through Big Creek Gap, this road having been blockaded by the enemy for eighteen miles from the Gap toward Spears' position. This action induced the enemy to place at the Gap two brigades of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and two batteries, under command of Brigadier-General Barton. So large a force having been detached from the main army, General Morgan proposed to leave Carter's brigade at Cumberland Ford, and with Baird's and DeCourcy's brigades cross Pine Mountain, and passing the Cumberland chain at Rogers' Gap, debouch into Powell's valley, and at the same time threaten Knoxville, Clinton, and Cumberland Gap. Before, however, this plan could be executed, General E. K. Smith, commanding the Confederate forces in East Tennessee, advanced from Knoxville, through Clinton, to Woodson's Gap, with about eight thousand men, having the double object of cutting Spears off and threatening Cumberland Ford, by detaching a brigade for the purpose.

On the 6th of June, with his whole command in hand, General Morgan moved upon the road leading through Rogers' Gap into Powell's valley. On the 10th, he sent two hundred men to burn the bridge at Lowdon, and this was accomplished

without loss. By the 12th, two brigades were in the valley, and General Morgan had arranged to move against Cumberland Gap the next day with three brigades, Baird's, Spears', and De Courcy's, when telegrams from General Buell were received, which led him to order his command to counter-march to Williamsburg. In this movement, the siege guns blockaded the Gap, and De Courcy was delayed in leaving Powell's valley, and on the next day (the 13th) a rumor reached him that the enemy was evacuating Cumberland Gap. This rumor reached General Morgan, in conjunction with a telegram from General Buell, advising him that General Mitchell had been ordered to demonstrate against Chattanooga, and induced him to resume his movement against Cumberland Gap.

General Smith, en route to relieve Chattanooga, threatened by General Negley, heard at London of General Morgan's advance into Powell's valley, and also of Negley's withdrawal, and immediately retraced his steps, turning his main column toward Clinton to oppose Morgan, and sending General Barton to observe Rogers' Gap and the Knoxville road. On the 17th, General Morgan learned that Smith was moving toward Clinton, that Barton was approaching the valley on his right flank, that Rains with a force was at Baptist Gap, and that General Stevenson was in supporting distance, but determined nevertheless to move the next day directly upon Cumberland Gap. Accordingly, on the morning of the 18th, he marched his whole force rapidly up the valley, and reaching the fortifications late in the evening, found them vacant. Thus, this position of wonderful natural strength, and strongly fortified, was occupied by the national forces without an engagement. The generals of the opposing forces must certainly have regarded a direct movement upon such a position improbable, or else supposed that they would be able to prevent its success, should it be made. But while maneuvering somewhat remotely from their stronghold, with offensive rather than defensive intent, Morgan dashed upon it when there were no troops to utilize its defensive advantages.

On the 11th of April, Colonel Duffield, commanding at Murfreesboro, sent Lieutenant J. W. Childs, with a detachment

of the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry on a scouting expedition toward McMinnville. Ascertaining that the Confederate brigadier-general, J. P. M. Maury, was at his home, five miles beyond McMinnville, Lieutenant Childs proceeded thither, and captured him, taking him to Murfreesboro, whence he was forwarded as a prisoner of war to Nashville.

May 4th, Colonel John H. Morgan, returning from his attack upon General Mitchell's train at Pulaski, with about eight hundred cavalry, crossed the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, moving toward Lebanon. Brigadier-General Dumont, from Nashville, and Colonel Duffield, from Murfreesboro' (both having been in previous pursuit of him), reached the latter place the same day, and immediately gave chase, with detachments of Wynkoop's Seventh Pennsylvania, and Wolford's and Green Clay Smith's Kentucky cavalry regiments. Arriving at Lebanon on the 5th, General Dumont surprised and attacked Morgan, and after a severe fight of an hour and a half, completely routed him, following in pursuit some eighteen miles. During the engagement, the citizens kept up a galling fire upon the national troops, and while General Dumont was pursuing Morgan, sixty-five men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, having secreted themselves in the Odd Fellows Hall, unexpectedly opened fire upon a small force under Colonel Duffield, who had been left to collect the wounded and care for them. Having rallied his men, Colonel Duffield advanced, under cover of the house, to close range, and by a precise and rapid fire, forced the enemy to surrender. There were six commissioned officers in the party. Morgan lost one hundred and fifty men captured, one hundred stand of arms, and over one hundred and fifty horses ; his loss in killed and wounded was not reported. Colonels Wolford and Smith were both wounded, and there were six killed and twenty-three others wounded, and one captured, in Dumont's command.

In the month of April, at the suggestion of Mr. J. J. Andrews, a citizen of Kentucky, in the secret service of the government, General O. M. Mitchell organized an expedition for the destruction of the bridges on the "Western and Atlantic Railroad," between Chattanooga and Atlanta, Georgia. The

party consisted of Mr. Andrews, the leader; William Campbell, a citizen of Kentucky, and twenty non-commissioned officers and privates, from the Second, Twenty-first, and Thirty-third Ohio regiments,\* selected because of their known bravery and discretion. Dressing in citizens' clothing, having only side-arms, and separating into squads, they set forth, April 11th. Twenty-two of the number reached Chattanooga, and, without being suspected, took passage for Marietta, Georgia, arriving there at midnight. The next morning they took passage for Chattanooga, and at Big Shanty (where there was no telegraph office or extra locomotive), while the conductor and engineer were at breakfast, detached the locomotive and three box-cars, and started for Chattanooga at full speed. Mr. Andrews had a schedule of the road, according to which they should have met but one train that day, but two extra trains had been put on, and in waiting at stations for these to pass an hour was lost, which gave the pursuers opportunity to overtake them. They made every possible effort to escape, cutting the telegraph wires, and placing obstructions on the track behind them, but all in vain. When the relentless pursuers, who had followed them, by hand-cars and a coal-engine, and afterward with a locomotive from a passenger train, were in sight, they leaped from their cars, a few miles south of Chattanooga, and sought safety by scattering in the woods. The population of the surrounding country joined in search for them, and all were captured—most of them in a day or two, two not for three weeks.

Private Jacob Parrott, of the Thirty-third Ohio, was fearfully flogged by a lieutenant to extort from him a confession as to the object of the expedition; but his fortitude was proof against suffering and threats. Mr. Andrews was tried as a spy at Chattanooga, condemned, and subsequently hung at Atlanta. Twelve of the party were transferred to Knoxville, and seven were there tried as spies and condemned,

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\* The names of the twenty were George D. Wilson, Marion A. Ross, Perry G. Shadrach, Samuel Slavens, Samuel Robinson, John Scott, W. W. Brown, Wm. Knight, J. R. Porter, J. A. Wilson, John Wollam, Jacob Parrott, Wm. Bensinger, E. H. Mason, Mark Wood, M. J. Hankins, D. A. Dorsey, Robert Buffum, Wm. Baddick, and Wm. Pettinger.

though in their trial it was clearly set forth by their counsel that the expedition was purely military. Soon after the trial, all at Chattanooga and Knoxville were transferred to Atlanta, where, without time to prepare, the seven condemned at Knoxville were hung. Fourteen were now left, and anticipating the fate of their comrades, they resorted to a bold measure to effect escape. When the door of their prison was opened by the jailer to bring them food, they seized him, then disarmed seven guards, and eight of them were beyond pursuit before an alarm was given, six being recaptured. Of the eight, six reached the national lines. The fate of the remaining two is unknown. The six recaptured were sent to Richmond, Virginia, and were finally exchanged as ordinary soldiers—an act which condemned as unjustifiable the execution of their comrades. Had acts similar to theirs, in type and intent at least, been similarly punished, the execution of captives would have been a prominent element in the history of the war. The bodies of those who were hung at Atlanta were subsequently removed and reburied at the National Cemetery at Chattanooga. This expedition was authorized by General Buell.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### THE ADVANCE TOWARD CHATTANOOGA FROM CORINTH, AND THE RETREAT FROM SOUTHERN TENNESSEE TO LOUISVILLE, KY.

THE withdrawal of the Confederate army from Corinth left General Halleck's combined armies without an immediate objective worthy of their collective proportions. This vast aggregation of forces was therefore resolved into its original parts, and separate fields were sought for the distinct armies of which it had been composed. The opposing Confederate army suffered similar disintegration. Neither of the belligerents proposed yet to abandon Northern Mississippi; but each resolved to enter upon active operations two hundred miles eastward. And again small armies began to operate upon fields so remote as to forbid all positive unity of purpose or harmony of action on either side of the grand hostile front, extending from the Atlantic ocean to the barren deserts of the West.

From the beginning of the war, the occupancy of East Tennessee in such force as to hold in permanent grasp that mountain region, with the great railroad coursing through it, which connected Richmond with the Mississippi Valley and the central Gulf States, had been regarded by the authorities at Washington and the Northern people as one of the most important military advantages that could be attained west of the Alleghany Mountains. For a time other objectives had attracted the Army of the Ohio far to the West and South. But as these had now been gained, this army was charged with a campaign having for its primal object the capture of Chattanooga, as the condition precedent to offensive movements east and south from that strategic position. The series

of grand operations which terminated in the occupation of Corinth and Memphis, and the sweep of Mitchell's bold detachments eastward and westward from Huntsville, had wrested from the enemy the "Memphis and Charleston Railroad" throughout its whole length. The possession of the roads passing from Stevenson, through Chattanooga, to Knoxville, and southward from Chattanooga and Cleveland to Dalton, Georgia, was scarcely less essential to the suppression of the rebellion than the opening of the Mississippi river to gun-boats and transports which bore the national flag. And this was the prescribed object of the projected eastward march of the Army of the Ohio. To accomplish it easily, advantage was to be taken of the concentration of the Western insurgent forces in Northern Mississippi.

After such disastrous defeats as the enemy had suffered, and such consciousness of weakness as the refusal to give battle at Corinth evinced, the leaders in the South could not be ignorant of the vital character of their next efforts. Thus far in the West their attempts at offense and defense had alike failed. Their armies had been pressed back the depth of a state, between the Mississippi river on the west and the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad on the east, and without some interruption to this course of defeat their cause was hopeless. In this emergency they adopted the wisest measures, and by hiding them for a time under seeming passivity, they set to work with greatest energy and earnestness to gather strength for their execution.

If Chattanooga was vitally important to the national cause, both as regarded strategy and political considerations, it was not less so to the insurgents. They could assume the offensive from no other point with any hope of success—at least this place was a vital point in an offensive line. The very remoteness of Chattanooga from the recent theater of war, scarcely less than its inherent strategic value, called thither the Confederate forces to spring thence to Northern Kentucky.

This common aim incited the eastward march of the two armies, which were destined to severest conflict to the close of the war. General Bragg, who had succeeded General Beauregard, in Western command, put his columns in motion simul-

taneously with the movement of the Army of the Ohio. Each party thought to take advantage of the heavy concentration of the other in Northern Mississippi, so as to operate in East Tennessee without strong opposition. But the advantage was with General Bragg with respect to the ruling contingency to each—the occupation of Chattanooga in force—as he had an open way behind the hills upon the south bank of the Tennessee, with communications established when he should get there; while General Buell's advance involved the supply of his army without communications, and a vital draft upon his strength to create them.

General Buell was informed that his army would return to Tennessee, while he was moving with two of his divisions, McCook's and Crittenden's, toward Brownsville, Mississippi, to support General Pope. He at once turned these divisions eastward, and sought General Halleck to confer with him in regard to the proposed campaign. It plainly involved problems which previous campaigns had not compassed, and for which, consequently, the conditions and experiences of anterior operations could not furnish a solution. Hitherto the national armies had not moved far from a secure base of supplies, and Pittsburg Landing and Nashville were both connected with Louisville, the primal base, by rivers navigable always during winter and spring, and so guarded by gunboats as to assure uninterrupted communications with this grand source of supply. The advance to East Tennessee from Corinth was conditioned upon the use of railroads for a great distance, either the one running east from Corinth, or those leading south from Nashville. And with Corinth or Eastport in the west, or Nashville to the north, as the main secondary base, without a large fraction of an army to guard communications, they would not be secure. General Halleck preferred the Memphis and Charleston railroad as the channel of supply, while General Buell regarded the Nashville and Decatur, and the Nashville and Chattanooga roads, as far preferable. The objections to the Memphis and Charleston road were, that it crossed the Tennessee river by a long bridge, which had been destroyed, and that it ran from Corinth to Decatur parallel to the enemy's front, and was, in consequence,

liable to interruptions from raids. The other road did not promise a line of supply free from perilous contingencies, but, on the whole, General Buell considered it the more eligible.\*

This difference of opinion, with regard to lines of supply, induced disagreement as to the line of advance. General Buell desired to move through Middle Tennessee to McMinnville, and thence to Chattanooga, in accordance with his preference for Nashville as a secondary base; while his superior ordered him to march on the line of the Memphis and Charleston road, and to repair the track as he advanced. It would have been well had the forecast of the campaign compassed all the conditions of its conduct, progress, and issue; but in advance of actual experiment, provision for the ruling contingencies was not made. The necessity of all possible haste in transferring the army to East Tennessee was enforced in official instructions, but the prescribed condition of march—the repair of the railroad—barred rapidity of motion.

On the 11th of June, McCook's and Crittenden's divisions moved eastward—the former from Corinth, and the latter from Booneville. At the time, Wood's division was on the railroad east of Corinth, engaged in its reconstruction. General McCook reached Florence on the 15th, closely followed by General Crittenden, who had touched the line of march first at Iuka. In the meantime, General Wood had advanced beyond Tuscumbia, having left the repair of the railroad west of Tuscumbia to the supervision of General Nelson. To facilitate the march of the forces eastward, General Mitchell, and Captain Morton, of the engineers, had been directed to prepare the means of crossing the river at Florence and Decatur, and the former officer had been ordered to collect supplies at Athens. Ferry-boats having been provided at the places designated, Generals McCook and Crittenden commenced crossing their forces at Florence on the 22d, but the report of an attack upon Nelson caused a suspension of the movement, that support might be afforded him in the event of need. At

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\* General Buell has represented that General Halleck at first gave his consent to his plans, and afterward insisted upon the Memphis and Charleston road as the line of supply, and the more southern line of advance.

the same time, Major-General Thomas, having been first relieved from the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and then of the troops holding Corinth, and restored to the command of his former division in the Army of the Ohio, was ordered by General Buell to move from the rear to reinforce Nelson. The falsity of the rumored attack was soon ascertained, and then the crossing at Florence was resumed. The wagons and teams were first put over the river, and dispatched to convey supplies over a gap in the railroad north of Athens. On the 25th, the divisions of McCook, Crittenden, and Nelson crossed and moved toward Athens, reaching that place on the 29th. During this slow advance, supplies had been provided with great difficulty. They were conveyed from Corinth to Iuka by a few cars, drawn by a half-serviceable locomotive, thence to Eastport by wagons, and from that place to Florence on light-draught boats. The boats could carry only from thirty to forty tons over the shoals, and soon ceased running altogether, when supplies were conveyed from Waterloo to Florence by wagon trains on the north side of the river.

The embarrassments of the situation were now fully revealed. Since early spring, from various causes, General Buell's effective force had been greatly reduced. His own estimate was twenty-five thousand effective men for an offensive column, and sixteen thousand variously disposed at important points on the railroads in Middle Tennessee and Northern Alabama. He had no secure communications, and was still more than a hundred miles from Chattanooga with his main column. His outlying forces were scattered from Iuka to Stevenson, and many of his smaller detachments were remote from his line of march, and some on that line were exposed to attacks from the superior cavalry of the enemy, which since the evacuation of Corinth had been transferred to the north side of the Tennessee river, while guerrilla bands in Northern Alabama, Middle Tennessee, and Southern Kentucky had been largely multiplied. He was still under orders to repair the Memphis and Charleston road, and was urging its completion with the least possible delay; but distrusting its reliability when completed, he was also putting the roads to Nashville in running order, which still further diffused his

forces. The offensive column, in advancing upon Chattanooga, could receive no accessions from the troops guarding the roads, as matters then stood, and on the whole the outlook was very unpromising. An immediate advance was impracticable, and in the event of the activity of the enemy, delay assured the miscarriage of the campaign.

June 29th, General Buell established his headquarters at Huntsville, and grappled with the difficulties in his way, making prompt dispositions for the attainment of several important objects—the repair of the railroads leading south from Nashville, the location of the grand units of his army so as to conceal the purpose of the campaign, and at the same time render their subsistence and concentration as easy as possible, and to provide the means of crossing the Tennessee river at Bridgeport whenever the offensive column should be ready to dash on to Chattanooga.

As wagon transportation was not sufficient to carry supplies over the gaps in the railroads and beyond Bridgeport, General Buell became convinced that railroad connection with Nashville was one of the cardinal elements in the solution of the problem of the advance to Chattanooga. Another scarcely less vital matter was the defense of bridges, by stockades, that all possible contributions might be drawn to the aggressive forces. He therefore increased the force on the railroads with engineer and other troops, and hired mechanics, and instructed the military superintendent of railroads to hurry them to completion.

Apprehending an attack upon the detachments of Mitchell's division at Battle Creek, and on the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, General Buell, early in July, ordered McCook and Crittenden's divisions to advance from Athens to Battle Creek, in order to show a strong front toward Chattanooga, and at the same time put strong detachments from these divisions on the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad. He left General Nelson at Athens, with instructions to put a large working party from his division on the Nashville and Decatur road. He directed General Wood to move his division across the river at Decatur, and on the north bank guard that important place, the ferry and the town. In the meantime, General

Thomas held the road from Tuscumbia eastward, with a heavy detachment at Eastport to protect supplies, and a strong cavalry picket at Russellville, to observe the enemy in the direction of Fulton. General Buell himself organized regular railroad guards, and reunited the regiments and brigades which had been broken up by General Mitchell's diversified operations, organized a brigade to move from the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad to McMinnville, ordered horses for his cavalry, and made other minor preparations for the contemplated movement into East Tennessee upon the opening of railroad communications and the accumulation of sufficient supplies. Generals McCook and Crittenden arrived at Battle Creek about the middle of July. The former put a brigade at work on the railroad from Stevenson to Decherd.

While these movements and preparations were going on, the enemy's cavalry became more active in Kentucky, and in the immediate rear of the army. Detachments in Kentucky and Tennessee were captured, and General Buell's communications far and near were endangered. This boldness was really more threatening than was at first apparent, as it was an indication of General Bragg's purpose to assume the offensive from Western Virginia to Corinth. After the refusal of battle at Corinth, it was not anticipated by the national commanders that the enemy would soon attempt general offense in the West. But with the change of commanders by the enemy, there was formed a plan of general aggression, whose foreshadows were now seen. When Colonel John H. Morgan appeared, early in July, in Kentucky, having swept from Knoxville through Sparta, Tennessee, he announced in proclamation that his cavalry force (of twelve or fifteen hundred men) was the vanguard of an army advancing for the liberation of the state. This was so like his usual boasting, that, in absence of other indications of such a movement, it was not accepted as evidence. Neither did the dash of Colonel Forrest, with his bold troops, from Chattanooga to Murfreesboro, without any other announcement than the destructive force of his movement, indicate of itself anything beyond a raid to interrupt General Buell's communications. And while

no columns of infantry assumed an offensive attitude, and no rumors of a concentration of forces at Chattanooga were wafted northward, there was no thought of changing the plan of the East Tennessee campaign.

Provisions were made as soon as practicable, to save the communications from serious interruptions, but only with partial success. Generals Boyle and Green Clay Smith were active in resisting Morgan in Kentucky, but his movements were so rapid and adroitly concealed, that his blows could not be anticipated, and he effected great damage without receiving harm, as accurate intelligence of the combinations formed against him was communicated by his numerous friends. He therefore effected some damage, and drew to his colors many young Kentuckians, to whom his partisan warfare was exceedingly attractive.

Having crossed the Cumberland river at Celina, Morgan attacked and defeated Major Jordan, commanding a detachment of the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, at Tompkinsville, Kentucky, July 9th. Moving thence by Glasgow, he threatened Bowling Green, and advanced to Lebanon, sending a detachment toward Lebanon Junction to destroy the railroad. Colonel A. Y. Johnson, commanding at Lebanon, made effort to gather reinforcements, but was forced to surrender, with the loss of a large amount of government property. Morgan then passed through Harrodsburg and Lawrenceburg, and threatening Frankfort by the way, crossed the Kentucky river, entered Versailles, and then demonstrated toward Lexington. Having destroyed portions of the railroads between Louisville and Lexington, Lexington and Frankfort, and Paris and Lexington, he advanced rapidly on Cynthiana, arriving there on the 17th. Lieutenant-Colonel Landrum defended the place gallantly but unsuccessfully, with three hundred poorly armed home guards and forty regular soldiers. By this time, Morgan perceived that he was in danger from various detachments moving to intercept him, and turned toward Tennessee, moving through Eastern Kentucky to Sparta, to be ready to co-operate with General Bragg in his advance.

Forrest was still more successful in a smaller circuit. Brig-

adier-General Crittenden and Colonel Duffield arrived at Murfreesboro on the 11th of July; the former to command the post, and the latter to command the Twenty-third brigade, destined for McMinnville. When relieved at Murfreesboro and Tullahoma, Colonel Lester, of the Third Minnesota regiment, had been in command of the post in the absence of Colonel Duffield, and owing to unpleasant feelings among the troops composing the garrison, he had scattered them somewhat widely in and about the town. For some reason not apparent, neither General Crittenden nor Colonel Duffield assumed command, and while there was a general lack of unity, harmony, and a proper disposition of troops for defense, Forrest, having advanced from Chattanooga through McMinnville, with a force variously estimated at from eighteen hundred to thirty-five hundred men, appeared before the town at dawn on the 13th. Dividing his force, he sent Colonel Wharton with two regiments against the force posted on the Liberty turnpike, and with the remainder dashed into the town. Wharton met a spirited resistance, but finally forced the detachment, consisting of five companies of the Ninth Michigan and a squadron of the Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, to surrender. Forrest overwhelmed the smaller force in the town and captured it, including General Crittenden. Soon after, Colonel Lester, without having offered very serious resistance at his post, on the east bank of Stone river, surrendered himself and nine companies of his regiment. The consequences of this disaster were very serious, the loss of a large garrison, munitions and stores, great damage to the railroad which had been opened the day before, and the postponement of the occupation of McMinnville.

To prevent further damage and dislodge Forrest from his communications, General Buell dispatched General Nelson with his division, from Athens, via Columbia and Nashville, to Murfreesboro. Nelson was delayed, first at Columbia, by the washing away of a bridge, and then at Nashville, by the destruction of bridges north of Murfreesboro by Forrest. These detentions gave the enemy time for more injury and leisurely withdrawal.

Simultaneously with the departure of General Nelson, Gen-

eral Wood, with two brigades of his division, was ordered to move from Decatur to Shelbyville. Subsequently, he took post at Decherd, to give greater security to the important bridge over Elk river, and guard the route from the mountains through Winchester into Northern Alabama. His third brigade was sent to Stevenson to construct defensive works to assure the safety of the supplies there accumulating for the projected advance to Chattanooga.

During the period of these changes, the enemy had been comparatively quiet where his chief activity had at first been anticipated—in front of General Thomas, between Iuka and Decatur. Some skirmishing, provoked by reconnoitering parties sent south by General Thomas, occurred, but there were no indications of the presence of heavy forces. A regiment of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Colonel Streight, moved about twenty miles south from Decatur, to escort some loyal mountaineers who wished to enlist in the national army. Colonel Streight, in the expedition, encountered only cavalry on local duty for purposes of observation and conscription. The absence of the enemy in force on the western portion of the line was another token of his aggressive purpose eastward. But General Buell's own aggressive drift, rather than the apparent attitude of the enemy, required that his rear division should move eastward. Accordingly, July 15th, General Thomas received orders to prepare to join the advanced forces as soon as relieved from guarding the railroad by General Grant's troops. At this time the main portion of the division was at Tuscumbia, but the remainder was scattered in detachments from Iuka to Decatur.

By the 21st, General Thomas was able to put his command in motion. Schoepf's brigade crossed the river at Decatur on the 23d. The next day, Fry's crossed at Florence, and proceeded to Pulaski, to look after the safety of Reynolds' Station and the trains running between there and Athens. While the remainder of the division was yet scattered in small detachments, a heavy force of irregular cavalry made a dash on the railroad between Tuscumbia and Decatur, and by surprising and capturing one detachment and frightening another from its post, interrupted communications and caused a with-

drawal from the road. On the 27th, General Thomas crossed the river at Florence, with General Robert McCook's brigade, and advanced to Athens. Fry's brigade was then recalled from Pulaski, and the division marched toward Decherd. General Thomas left his command and proceeded to Huntsville, and after consultation with General Buell took the railroad for Decherd. The same day, Brigadier-General Robert L. McCook was killed by guerrillas, on the Hazel Green and Winchester road. He was riding at the time in an ambulance, prostrated by sickness. All the circumstances indicated that he was wantonly murdered, and General Buell instituted vigorous measures to inflict punishment upon those who were guilty. General McCook was a brilliant officer, and his death was universally deplored.

About this time General Buell made earnest request for more cavalry to protect his communications and pursue the raiding troopers of the enemy, in large bodies. He had tried stockades at bridges held by small detachments of infantry, and found these ineffectual, in conjunction with his cavalry, in giving security to his four hundred miles of railroad.

While at Murfreesboro, General Nelson constructed strong field works, so that a small force could hold the place. He then was ordered to McMinnville with his division, reaching there on the 5th of August. As the railroad between Nashville and Stevenson had been completed on the 28th of July, and the one from Nashville to Decatur on the 3d of August, the movement of troops to positions on the north of the Cumberland Mountains was in provision for an emergency, hitherto unexpected, but now threatening to arrest altogether the advance into East Tennessee.

For some time, General Bragg had been massing troops in East Tennessee drawn from Mississippi and other states. He had distributed his forces eastward from Chattanooga, carefully concealing his intention, strength, and main point of concentration. He reached Chattanooga on the 29th of July, and from that time rumors that he would assume the offensive became current. Reports at first, however, were contradictory as to his movements, strength, and purposes. At one time, it was asserted that he was crossing at Chattanooga, then at

Cleveland, and in turn at various other points. To elicit the truth if possible, General Buell sent reconnoitering parties in all directions, and in the absence of reliable information concerning the intentions of the enemy, made all possible preparations for defense. Fortifications were made at the most important points, so that they could be held by small garrisons when it became necessary to concentrate the army. Fearing that his department did not contain sufficient available troops to enable him to cope with General Bragg, he requested permission from Major-General Halleck, than commander-in-chief at Washington, to call upon General Grant for troops should his need become extreme.

At this juncture, the insurgents everywhere were exerting their entire strength. Their defeats in the West and on the South Atlantic coast had revealed to them the necessity of forcing into their armies all the able-bodied men in the South. This they had in great measure accomplished, while acting merely on the defensive for several months. And now large armies confronted General McClellan on the Peninsula of Virginia, General Morgan at Cumberland Gap, General Buell on the confines of East Tennessee, and General Grant in Northern Mississippi.

This attitude of the enemy, from the Atlantic ocean to the Mississippi river, was not revealed alone by the concentration on the foreground, but by the incessant action of his cavalry and guerrilla bands upon the communications of the national armies. The bold troopers, Morgan and Forrest, again dashed to General Buell's rear. The former captured the garrison at Gallatin, and at other points toward Nashville destroyed trains, and by burning one inside the tunnel south of Gallatin, wrought immense damage to it, and was only repulsed at Edgefield Junction, a few miles north of Nashville. While Morgan was dashing thus destructively upon the Louisville and Nashville railroad, doubly valuable at the season of low water in the Cumberland river, Forrest was in close support between Gallatin and McMinnville. General Buell's cavalry was too feeble to cope with the enemy's, and his effort to withstand Morgan and Forrest resulted in disaster. Since Morgan's first raid, he had withdrawn his cavalry forces from

their service in detachments against guerrilla bands, and formed them into two bodies for more effective resistance to the regular cavalry of the enemy. One of these bodies, composed of detachments of the Second Indiana, Fourth and Fifth Kentucky, and Seventh Pennsylvania regiments, he placed under the command of Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson, and sent it against Morgan's force from McMinnville on the 11th of August. In moving against Morgan, Johnson got between him and Forrest. Fearing the result, General Buell endeavored to support him with infantry, but failed. Johnson pushed against Morgan at Gallatin, having sought him in vain at other points, in hope of capturing him before Forrest could render aid. The attack was made, but resulted in the defeat and retreat of Johnson. Morgan pursued so closely as to force him to battle, and after an unequal contest of a few minutes' duration, forced him to surrender himself and the small force then with him—about seventy-five men, who alone remained firm to the last. General Johnson lost, besides, thirty killed and fifty wounded. The remainder of his command escaped in small parties to Nashville. This disaster eliminated a considerable portion of General Buell's cavalry at the time that the strength of this arm was most important. After this occurrence, Forrest swept around Nashville, and Morgan remained north of Nashville, to prevent the repair of the railroad. The enemy was equally active in the vicinity of Columbia, Clarksville, and McMinnville. Major McGowan defeated and routed an irregular force of the enemy infesting Duck river, near Columbia; Colonel Rodney Mason surrendered to Colonel Woodward at Clarksville; Major J. H. Hart repulsed the enemy at Fort Donelson, and Colonel Wynkoop met a superior force and retired before it, when on a reconnaissance toward Sparta from McMinnville.

It was now probable that General Buell's campaign, planned for aggression, was to eventuate in defensive operations. His army was well disposed for rapid concentration against General Bragg, should he advance from Chattanooga to the west or northwest. Generals McCook and Crittenden were at Battle Creek; General Nelson at McMinnville; the divisions of Generals Thomas and Wood were on the Nashville and Chat-

tanooga railroad, or near it; and General Rousseau's (recently General Mitchell's) was distributed on the other line, from Huntsville toward Nashville.

General Bragg's infantry forces, under his more immediate command, were massed at Chattanooga and Knoxville. Generals Hardee's and Polk's corps were at the former place, and General Smith's at the latter. This disposition of his army indicated a co-operative movement on separate lines of advance. The direct co-operation of these columns was not the result expected by General Buell, unless in concentration against his position, as he had not divined the purpose of his antagonist. His own dispositions looked to easy concentration against the enemy approaching across the mountains from Chattanooga, or through Northern Alabama, to turn his position from the south or west. To provide against an attack upon McMinnville, he directed General Thomas to repair the railroad from Tullahoma to that place, and throw forward a brigade to Pelham for observation. From the summits of the mountains, near Battle Creek, his signal officers were watching the movements of the enemy in the valley, toward Chattanooga, to give warning of an advance from that direction.

Deeming his forces insufficient to thwart the enemy, whatever might be his special plans, he requested General Grant to send him two divisions. General Grant refused, on the ground that he was himself under too great pressure to permit the reduction of his army. This attitude of the enemy in Mississippi was a part of the plan of general co-operation from Knoxville to Corinth; and the fact that it prevented the reinforcement of General Buell, gave proof of the completeness of General Bragg's preparations and the wisdom of his initial movement. For as the success of the general plan hinged upon the advancement of his central column to the north of the Cumberland Mountains, the prevention of reinforcements to General Buell was an essential condition of the success of his dominant movement.

The threatening bearing of General Smith before Cumberland Gap was an additional source of anxiety to General Buell. He was responsible, as department commander, for affairs in Kentucky. He therefore, in advance of a state of

things which subsequently induced the creation of a new department, with General Wright in command, relieved General Nelson, August 16th, of the command of the Fourth division, and sent him to Kentucky to take charge of affairs in that state, and organize the fresh troops arriving for its defense. The raid of Morgan, in July, greatly alarmed the citizens of Cincinnati and Louisville, as it revealed how easily a bold raider could dash far behind the national army. So that General Buell was neither in advance by this step of a new alarm nor of the actual danger, as General Kirby Smith was even then in motion toward Central Kentucky.

When General Nelson was sent to Kentucky, General Thomas was relieved temporarily of the command of the First division, and ordered to McMinnville, to direct affairs at that important point. He assumed command on the 19th, and on that day General Bragg threw across the river from Chattanooga three thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry. Fearing that these troops might be followed closely by General Bragg's whole army, General Buell directed General Thomas to call Wood's division near to McMinnville, in readiness to support the troops already there should the enemy advance in force upon that place, or in that direction. To be nearer the new theater of operations, he transferred his own headquarters to Stevenson. General Buell regarded Nashville as General Bragg's objective, and made his dispositions to give battle before he could free himself from the embarrassments incident to offensive warfare in a mountainous region.

His first object was to check the enemy before he could reach the Sequatchie Valley. Accordingly, upon receiving the first intelligence, on the 19th, of an advance, he directed General McCook, with his two brigades, to move up the valley from Battle Creek, to the Anderson and Therman road, and hold the enemy in check, if possible. In the event of being hard pressed, he was to fall back on the Therman road until he should form a junction with General Thomas, who would advance from McMinnville for his relief. He directed General Crittenden to move his division up the valley to the Tracy City and Altamont road, to support McCook and observe the old Nashville and Chattanooga road, which enters

the valley at the point designated. Should he be compelled to fall back, he was to do so on the Higginbottom road, toward Tracy City and Altamont, until he should meet reinforcements. He instructed General Thomas to hold his command in readiness to advance from McMinnville at the shortest notice, either upon the Therman or Dunlap road.

In moving up the valley on the 20th, General McCook became fearful that the enemy would intercept him before he could reach the Therman road, and therefore retraced his steps to the mouth of Battle Creek, and then moved on the road leading up that stream for some distance, and then over the mountain, as there was no road nearer the enemy practicable for artillery.

Though it was now evident that General Bragg had assumed the offensive, his plan of operations had not been indicated. He had simply thrown his vanguard across the Tennessee river, with evident purpose of crossing Waldron's Ridge, intervening between Chattanooga and the Sequatchie Valley, but his proximate and ulterior objectives could only be revealed by the direction of his march after reaching the valley. Once in the valley he could turn down and sweep past McCook and Crittenden, and secure a route into Northern Alabama, get between General Grant and General Buell, and then pass toward Corinth or Nashville. If Nashville was his ultimate objective, he could adopt either of two routes—the one across the mountains to McMinnville, or the one up the valley to Pikeville, and thence directly to Nashville. If Kentucky was his destination, the latter route would form a portion of it through the valley and out of it.

At this time and for a few days later, General Buell could only act upon probabilities. The peculiar topography of the country gave great advantages to General Bragg, as he could, if he chose, avoid General Buell wherever he might concentrate. Should he throw his army before him at McMinnville, he could on a short line pass to Stevenson by Battle Creek. Should he concentrate against him in the valley, to prevent his taking this direction, there was an open way to him up the valley, and concealing his movements behind the mountains, he could get the start either to Nashville or Kentucky. A

concentration at McMinnville would alone place the national troops before him, against an advance to either Nashville or Kentucky. The condition of resistance at that place, or at any other point on the same side of the valley to the northeast, involved no special risk, as General Buell would have his army near his communications, or on a short line to Nashville, should General Bragg be able to press him back. The only risk would have been in giving him the route into Northern Alabama, through Battle Creek and Stevenson.

On the 22d, General Buell established his headquarters at Decherd, to await the developments of the enemy. About the same time it was ascertained that General Bragg's whole army was on the north bank of the Tennessee. General Buell now fully abandoned his long-meditated advance against Chattanooga, and in manifest recognition of his defensive attitude, removed his depot of supplies from Stevenson to Decherd. General Bragg's ultimate objective was the fact of paramount importance to General Buell, but it was studiously concealed. In failing to perceive the intended direct co-operation of the Chattanooga and Knoxville columns, General Buell regarded Nashville as the paramount objective. In view of the past, this was bold; but it fell far short of his actual daring, and in keeping General Buell in the dark with regard to his proximate and remote movements, he gave actuality to the conditions of their success.

General Thomas differed from General Buell with regard to General Bragg's destination. On the 22d he said: "I have believed for a day or two that the demonstration in this direction is intended to cover the advance of his army toward Kentucky;" and recommended a concentration of the Army of the Ohio at McMinnville. He reconnoitered very thoroughly to the east and south of his position, sending parties to Altamont, Beersheba Springs, Dunlap, Spence, Pikeville, Sparta, and other less important points, and thus ascertained that the enemy was not in force near him, nor even in the Sequatchie Valley, and then advised that Wood's division should be sent forward to Sparta, to intercept the advance of the main army; that another division should be left at Decherd, on the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, and that the

remaining forces should be concentrated at McMinnville, prepared to offer battle should General Bragg advance on that place, or meet him at Sparta or Allen's Ford should he pass by McMinnville. The movement of the enemy upon either Nashville or Louisville required that he should pass through McMinnville or Sparta, and General Thomas advised that provision be made to defeat him, whichever of these cities might be his objective. Even if Decherd should be his proximate aim, defense could be made by the army from McMinnville; and if matters should so eventuate as to permit a return to the original plan of invading East Tennessee, the proposed concentration would be a step toward it. In making these suggestions, General Thomas repeatedly expressed the opinion that General Bragg had no thought of moving into Northern Alabama.

On the 23d, believing that the enemy would advance on the Therman road, General Buell ordered the concentration of five divisions at Altamont, that he might there offer battle. He ordered Generals McCook and Crittenden to move up the Battle Creek road over the mountain, and onward through Pelham; General Schoepf, commanding the First division, to march from Elk river through Pelham, and General Thomas, with Ammen's division (the Fourth) and Wood's, to advance from McMinnville, on the Therman road. The day following, General Thomas received more explicit instructions with regard to the concentration, attack, route, and manner of retreat, should retreat become necessary. If the enemy was found in superior force at Altamont, he was to force his way to Hillsboro, and if not in such force as to forbid success, he was to attack him and drive him back, and in the event of any reverse, rendering it necessary for his whole command to fall back, he should retreat through Manchester and Beech Grove, neglecting no opportunity to embarrass or check the enemy.

General Thomas reached Altamont on the 25th, but found no enemy there, and none nearer than Dunlap and Pikeville, a brigade being reported at each place. General Bragg was still struggling slowly over Waldron's Ridge, and General Thomas, deeming it improbable that he would attempt the

passage of the mountain by way of Altamont, on account of the difficulties of the road and scarcity of water and forage, returned to McMinnville with the Fourth and Sixth divisions. General McCook's division reached Altamont on the 29th, and the day following moved to Hubbard's Cove, where his advance met and routed Forrest's cavalry,\* endeavoring to join General Bragg by that route. The First division halted at Pelham, and the Fifth (Crittenden's) at Hillsboro. These movements developed the fact that General Bragg was not yet in threatening nearness, and that his purpose in advancing was not indicated fully. His dispatch of the 27th to his lieutenant-general, Van Dorn, in Mississippi, made known his purpose, and his assurance that General Buell was falling back. This purpose was to advance in four columns—one through Eastern Kentucky, a second by Cumberland Gap, another through Sequatchie valley to Kentucky, and the fourth against General Grant. And the recession of General Buell's forces from the line of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, invited him to move rapidly forward with his whole army.

General Buell did not start toward Nashville, as General Bragg supposed, on the 27th; but on the 30th he gave orders

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\* He had been repulsed the day before, in an attack upon Colonel Grose, near Woodbury. Forrest was defeated again, on the 29th, by a detachment under Captain H. R. Miller, of the Eighteenth Ohio, at "Short Mountain Cross-roads." The enclosure of a stockade had been completed, and the men were at dinner, a hundred yards from it, when Forrest fell upon them. It was then a question which party should reach the stockade first. Miller, however, by fighting as he ran, got into the stockade with a portion of his men, and with these he repulsed an assault, led by Forrest himself, with several hundred dismounted men. The men, cut off in the race, fought from the woods near by, and reached the stockade in safety, after the enemy withdrew. Forrest left behind him twelve dead, forty-one wounded, eight horses, and thirty guns.

On the 30th, he suffered a fourth defeat. Passing to the left of General Wood's camp toward Woodbury, after leaving Captain Miller, he was soon after roughly handled by Colonel E. P. Fyffe, whom General Wood had sent with his regiment, the Twenty-sixth Ohio, to meet him. Colonel Fyffe attacked him when in line of battle, at the intersection of two roads, nine miles west of McMinnville, and by the suddenness and impetuosity of his attack, routed him without losing a man.

for the movement of his whole army to Murfreesboro, assuming, in advance of actual developments, or even a threatening approach of the enemy in any direction, that Nashville was the objective. After giving a lengthy order, defining the route and marching order of each division, and all the trains, he still hesitated with regard to the movement, and asked the advice of General Thomas with respect to it, on the 31st. His latest advices left him in doubt with regard to the strength and movements of the enemy. Heavy infantry forces had not yet been certainly discovered. General Thomas advised that as the movement had been begun, it would be best to continue it; but suggested a plan of operations from Murfreesboro, to attack and rout Bragg's army, giving in outline the various movements by which it could be accomplished. General Bragg had but five divisions of infantry, and General Buell had five before him, without dependence upon the forces on the Nashville and Decatur road, those in his immediate rear toward Nashville, or the two divisions approaching from General Grant's army.

As ordered, the several divisions and all detachments on the railroads were put in motion during the first three days of September, and united at Murfreesboro on the 5th. The troops of General Rousseau's division, posted on the Nashville and Decatur railroad, followed that road to Nashville. Two divisions from General Grant's army were on the march to join the retreating forces, as, in response to General Buell's call for troops, Brigadier-General J. C. Davis' division, General R. B. Mitchell commanding, and General Paine's division, General J. M. Palmer commanding, had been dispatched from Mississippi. The former reached Murfreesboro about the 1st, and the latter arrived at Nashville about the 12th.

General Buell made no halt at Murfreesboro, but ordered the movement of all his forces to Nashville. This action, supplementing the withdrawal from McMinnville and adjacent points, gave General Bragg free motion over the mountains and through the valleys and out of them, and the undisturbed choice of routes to Nashville or Kentucky. He chose the shorter line, to invade Kentucky, down the Cumberland

river to Carthage, and thence through Scottsville and Glasgow to the Louisville and Nashville railroad.

At Murfreesboro, General Buell learned of the defeat of General Nelson's troops at Richmond, Kentucky, and also that General Bragg was moving so far to the East as to indicate a purpose to invade Kentucky. The danger northward was now fully apparent. The problem to solve was fraught with issues of stupendous importance. The only condition of favorable solution was the rapid advance of the Army of the Ohio to Louisville upon the demonstration that General Bragg was moving thither, and either beat him in the race, or move so close to his rear as to paralyze his offensive force northward. He therefore, on reaching Nashville, crossed the Cumberland, with McCook's, Crittenden's, Ammen's, Wood's, Rousseau's, and Mitchell's divisions, and pushed on toward Louisville, having assigned General Thomas to the command of Nashville, with his own, and Negley's and Palmer's divisions, by order issued September 7th.

In the meantime, General Bragg had crossed the Cumberland river at Carthage, and was moving rapidly toward Louisville, with a good start in the race, having left General Breckinridge behind, with a heavy force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, to operate against Nashville and invest the place.

On the 12th, General Thomas was notified, by General Buell's chief of staff, that General Mitchell's division had been ordered to return to Nashville and report to him. The same day, General Bragg's troops tore up the railroad track between Franklin and Bowling Green, and on the day following, the head of his army, a brigade of cavalry, under Colonel Scott, appeared at Munfordsville, north of Green river. The railroad bridge over Salt river had been burned on the 9th. These developments induced General Buell to countermand the order sending Mitchell's division back to Nashville, and to order General Thomas, with his own and Paine's divisions, to leave Nashville early on the 15th, and join the main army by way of Bowling Green, but giving him permission to leave the latter division at Nashville, if he should not deem it safe to withdraw it.

The garrison at Munfordsville had been reinforced, from the

North, as early as the 8th, by the Seventeenth Indiana Infantry, under Colonel J. T. Wilder. At 8 p. m. on the 13th, Colonel Wilder declined to surrender upon the demand of the enemy. Early the next morning an assault was made upon him, which was repulsed with loss to the enemy. During the day the garrison was reinforced by seven companies of infantry, under Colonel Dunham, from Louisville, and about one thousand men and Konkle's battery, under Colonel Owen, from Lebanon Junction. The demand for surrender was repeated on the 14th, at 9 a. m., by General Chalmers, who represented that he had six regiments of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, a battalion of sharpshooters, and two batteries of artillery. The garrison again refused to surrender, when the enemy withdrew and moved north. On the morning of the 16th, the enemy again appeared, and an attack was made. The fighting became general on the south line of defense, but no effort was made to carry the position by storm. Late in the afternoon a flag of truce was received covering a note from General Bragg, which stated that the place was surrounded by overwhelming numbers, that reinforcements could not come, and then demanded the surrender of the post and garrison to save further loss of blood. Colonel Dunham, then in command, by virtue of superior rank, sent his refusal by Colonel Wilder, who, from personal observations, learned that the force of the enemy was indeed overwhelming. Having reported this fact on his return, a council of war was held, and General Bragg was requested to suspend hostilities until a decision was reached. The council having decided that upon the verification of the assumed strength of the enemy the surrender should be made, and the fact of an immense force having been subsequently ascertained, the capitulation was made at 2 a. m. the 17th. The terms permitted the garrison to leave with the honors of war, the retention of side-arms, private property, and four days' rations. The officers and men were at once paroled. The reluctance of General Bragg to assault, and the liberality of the terms, indicated that he did not consider the post worth the cost of carrying it by storm, while the proximity of General Buell's army forbade the hope of its reduction in any other way. Besides, he could not have held the

position, except upon the condition of a general engagement, and whatever might have been his expectations in the invasion of Kentucky, he certainly, from first to last, avoided this issue. He therefore disposed of Munfordsville as quickly and easily as possible, so as to give freedom of motion to his army, and put it out of the power of the garrison to reinforce General Buell, who might yet be able to force a general battle upon him.

General Thomas left Nashville on the 15th, with his own division, not considering it safe to withdraw Paine's, and on the 20th joined General Buell at Prewitt's Knob. At the time, General Bragg was here confronting General Buell, having for two or three days shown some disposition to deliver battle. His belligerent attitude, though involving skirmishing between the armies, may only have been a feint, as on the 21st he declined an engagement when formally offered by General Buell. It may have been that the arrival of General Thomas, with his division, changed a positive plan involving battle. On the 21st, while General Thomas, under instructions from General Buell, was disposing Crittenden's and Wood's divisions in order of battle, it was ascertained that the enemy was retreating. General Bragg not only left General Buell's immediate presence, but he deflected to the east of the Louisville and Nashville railroad, and gave an open way for the march of the Army of the Ohio to Louisville. To this city General Buell put his army in rapid motion, leaving General Thomas, for a day with his division, to protect the convalescent troops and stores until they could be sent to Bowling Green, held at the time by Colonel Bruce's brigade. On the 29th, the last portion of the army reached Louisville. General Bragg moved to Bardstown. Then both armies, in defiant attitude, took rest while preparing for impending hostilities.

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*Major-General Buell, Huntsville:*

The President telegraphs that your progress is not satisfactory, and that you should move more rapidly. The long time taken by you to

CORINTH, July 8, 1862.

reach Chattanooga, will enable the enemy to anticipate you by concentrating a larger force to meet you. I communicate his views, hoping that your movements hereafter will be so rapid as to remove all causes of complaint, whether well founded or not.

H. W. HALLECK.

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HEADQUARTERS, HUNTSVILLE, July 11, 1862.

*Major-General H. W. Halleck:*

I appreciate the importance of moving promptly, though it is idle to suppose that the enemy, with his railroad communications complete, and our lines difficult and broken, will not always be able to anticipate us at any important point. I regret that it is necessary to explain the circumstances which make my progress seem slow, though perhaps it is not to be expected that they should otherwise be understood. I understand what you have given me to do, and if permitted, I expect to accomplish it without any unnecessary delay, and in such a manner as to neither jeopardize my army or its honor, nor trifle with loyal citizens betrayed to the vengeance of their enemies by a promised protection and a hurried abandonment. The advance on Chattanooga must be made with the means of acting in force; otherwise it will either fail or prove a profitless and transient prize. The railroad communication as far as Stevenson must be securely established. From that point the transportation must at first be by wagons for twenty-five miles. The river must be crossed by a pontoon bridge, which I am now preparing. It is not possible to establish the requisite communication by any means of ferrying which we can provide. These arrangements are being pushed forward as industriously as possible. The troops are moving forward to the terminus of the railroad without unnecessary delay, and one division has already arrived there. It ought to be borne in mind that they have had a march of about two hundred miles to make, with a large train, in hot weather, crossing a wide river by a ferry. The report of General Mitchell led me to expect that the Chattanooga road would be completed by the first of this month. I do not censure him for being mistaken. I have since doubled the force upon it, and it can not be finished before next Monday. The gap of twenty-two miles on the Decatur road, the one we are dependent upon for supplies, has, from the character of the road, made it more expeditions to take another route forty miles long; and it requires every wagon that can possibly be spared to keep the troops from starving, and at that we are living from day to day. We consume of provisions alone about one hundred thousand pounds daily, which, with our animals in their present condition, it requires about sixty wagons to carry. The trip, coming and going, can not be made in less than five days. Three hundred and fifty wagons are required to haul provisions alone over this gap. To haul forage over the same distance, even at half rations, would require seven hundred wagons more. We are running about five hundred wagons, managing, with great difficulty, to subsist our animals mainly upon the country, already nearly exhausted of supplies. It will be seen

that we can not advance beyond Stevenson until the road is completed, so as to release wagons now absolutely required in the rear. Three mills are getting out lumber for boats, which will be furnished as soon as possible. These are matters of fact which can not be got rid of by sophistry or fair promises, however gratifying. The dissatisfaction pains me exceedingly. I request that this dispatch may be communicated to him.

D. C. BUELL.

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HEADQUARTERS, HUNTSVILLE, *July 23, 1862.*

*General Halleck or General Thomas, Washington, D. C.*

I can not err in repeating to you the urgent importance of a larger cavalry force in this district. The enemy is throwing an immense cavalry force on the four hundred miles of railroad communication upon which this army is dependent for its supplies. I am building stockades to hold from thirty to one hundred men at all bridges; but such guards, at least, only give security to certain points and against a small force. There can be no safety without cavalry enough to pursue the enemy in large bodies. Twice already our roads have been broken up by these formidable raids, causing great delays and embarrassment, so that we are scarcely able to subsist from day to day. I am concentrating all the cavalry I can spare, to operate actively in force. I do not pretend to know whether you have cavalry that you can spare elsewhere, but if so, it can find abundant and very important service here.

D. C. BUELL.

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HUNTSVILLE, *August 19, 1862.*

*General Thomas, McMinnville:*

The enemy crossed three hundred cavalry and three thousand infantry at Chattanooga yesterday. This may be for the purpose of foraging in Sequatchie Valley, but we must be prepared for more than that. Hold your command in readiness to march at the shortest notice. You will probably march on the Therman road or the Dunlap road; but you should be provided with capable and reliable guides in all directions. General Schoepf's scouts also report the enemy in the mountains twenty-one miles beyond him, in quite a large force. That is not very definite in any respect. You should, by means of spies and scouts, keep yourself thoroughly informed of what is going on between you and Chattanooga. There is a road leading along the mountains, from Spencer to Pikeville and other points, by which an enemy could penetrate. You should also look well in the direction of Sparta and Smithville, both for the purpose of detecting any advance upon you, and any attempt to pass you toward Nashville. Collect in a day or two all the forage, flour, and beef you can, and then send your supply trains to Murfreesboro to be fed until required. The McMinnville railroad will be open Thursday, and at any rate, you should not keep on hand more supplies than you can carry away in your baggage-wagons and haversacks. The great problem with us is supplies, and that we must solve by management and starving, if necessary. It

will be quite as difficult for the enemy. I shall concentrate your division and McCook's at Tracy City or near there, and send Crittenden up the Sequatchie Valley to about Anderson road. We must be prepared either to fight in detachments or concentrate rapidly, according to circumstances. I have prepared a code of signals by which to control our movements and communicate information; study it carefully. Call Wood's division up to you, or at least have him within a few hours' march, which, for the sake of supplies, will be better, as well as to give some protection to the road.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
McMINNVILLE, TENN., August 22, 1862.

*Major-General Buell, Decherd:*

I have believed, for a day or two, that the demonstration in this direction is intended to cover the advance of the enemy toward Kentucky. Forrest and Scott are said to be near Crossville. I have been reliably informed that forage is being collected there in large quantities. My scouts report no force of the enemy on Cumberland Mountains this side of Sequatchie. Morgan, day before yesterday, was at Hartsville. Johnson is this side of the Cumberland, near Carthage. The troops I sent to his assistance are now at Smithville. Colonel Grose reports that Morgan is trying to get east, probably to join Forrest; but to do so, he will have to march by Johnson or Grose. We have captured two or three small droves of cattle going east. Two men came in yesterday from near Crossville, who report that the enemy's cavalry and some infantry, probably the advance guard, are at Jamestown, Fentress county. The citizens here think that they will advance into Kentucky.

G. H. THOMAS,  
*Major-General U. S. V.*

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DECHERD, August 22, 1862.

*General Thomas, McMinnville:*

From General McCook's information this morning, it seems almost certain that Bragg is marching on McMinnville. His advance was at the top of Waldron's Ridge last night. McCoun is said to be crossing at Kingston, and Withers at Harrison. Of course, they will expect to unite. What sort of ground can we take by concentrating at McMinnville? How would it do to fight at Altamont? Is the ground such as to give us the advantage of our artillery? How many days' rations have you? Are you provided with ammunition? Be ready to march immediately.

BUELL,  
*Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, ARMY OF OHIO,  
McMINNVILLE, *August 22, 1862.*

*Major-General Buell, Decherd:*

By all means concentrate here. The enemy can not reach Nashville by any other route across the mountains, unless by Sparta. At Altamont, I am positively informed that the enemy would have an equal advantage with ourselves. Here we will have a most decided advantage, and by being here, should he march by Sparta, we can meet him either there or at Allen's Ford, across the Caney Fork. He is obliged to pass this place or Sparta to reach Nashville. I have six days' rations and plenty of ammunition. Did you get my dispatch of to-day? I can not think that Bragg is coming here either by the hill or Therman road. My reconnoitering party went into Dunlap yesterday.

G. H. THOMAS,  
*Major-General U. S. V.*

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DECHERD, *August 22, 1862.*

*General Thomas, McMinnville:*

Of course, you will instantly recall your absent troops. I will probably bring Second Kentucky by rail, to march from here—that is, on the supposition that we will advance to attack in Sequatchie Valley. I can hardly think the enemy will attempt the march across to McMinnville—at least not immediately. It appears to me that he will rather endeavor to get into North Alabama, and perhaps strike across to Decherd. If we advance to Altamont, we may thwart him in both, and preserve our communication with Decherd and Nashville. If we concentrate at McMinnville, we lose North Alabama and Decherd. What think you? The great difficulty is in moving in the mountains with our trains. Of course, we must cut loose from everything but our ammunition train and subsistence for six days, most of it in haversacks.

D. C. BUELL.

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, ARMY OF OHIO,  
McMINNVILLE, TENN., *August 22, 1862.*

*Major-General Buell, Decherd:*

We can get neither forage nor water at Altamont. It will be as difficult for us to march across the mountains to Sequatchie Valley, as for the enemy to come either to Altamont or this place. I would not advise concentrating here, except for battle or for an advance into East Tennessee. I think our connection with Nashville will be better preserved by holding Decherd with a division, to enable us to concentrate either there, if threatened, or at this place. I have also learned that Tupelo, Mississippi, has been abandoned, and most of the enemy at that place have been sent to Chattanooga. I therefore do not apprehend any attempt to seize North Alabama.

G. H. THOMAS,  
*Major-General U. S. V.*

DECHERD, August 23, 1862.

*General Thomas, McMinnville:*

There is no possibility of our concentrating at McMinnville. We must concentrate in advance and assume the offensive, or fall back at least to Murfreesboro. I deem the former the surest, and we will act accordingly. I wish you, therefore, to move by a forced march to Altamont, there to form a junction with McCook, and Crittenden, and Schoepf. McCook and Crittenden started for Tracy City yesterday, from Jasper. I presume they are now at Tracy City, though possibly not. Schoepf will march at once. The junction must be formed to-morrow, and any division meeting the head of the enemy's column first, must at least hold it in check until a larger force arrives. One battery to a division would, I think, be ample in the mountains. McCook and Crittenden have with them six batteries; leave all of yours, therefore—at least, do n't take more than one. It will be necessary to leave some force with them—at least two regiments; and they should be put in a strong position and covered by breastworks to-night without fail. I shall order Schoepf's batteries here, to be similarly disposed of. There must be no delay or failure. The enemy's advance was at the top of Waldron's Ridge, ten miles from Chattanooga night before last, and talked of being at McMinnville to-morrow. That is hardly possible; but they must be met at the earliest possible moment. Communicate with McCook to-night, by a trusty scout—the distance is thirty-two miles. He may possibly not be at Tracy City; if not, look for him on the road to Battle Creek. If you think best, you may send your artillery to this place, which will relieve the force that would be required to protect them there, though if they will be safe, there is some advantage in having a force at McMinnville. Take no wagons except what will be necessary to carry rations and cooking-utensils. I shall probably leave here with Sill's brigade to-morrow for Tracy City. Communicate always in cipher, by telegraph, to this place, and by courier, through Tracy City. Schoepf sends a report that Hardee is advancing on the Dunlap road. Answer that I may know exactly what you do. Your staff officer makes mistakes in the use of the cipher.

D. C. BUELL.

DECHERD, August 24, 1862.

*General Thomas, McMinnville:*

In advancing to Altamont, take the Hickory Creek road instead of the Therman road. That will put you on a shorter line of retreat on Murfreesboro by the way of Manchester, and brings us nearer together. Start your trains for Murfreesboro at once, with the least escort that will possibly suffice—say, one regiment and a battery—and let it go through in thirty-six hours. In the event of any reverse which makes it necessary for the whole force to fall back, do so by Manchester and Beach Grove, making a stand to check the enemy whenever it can be done with advantage. Keep your telegraph open until the last minute, and after that, communicate frequently by couriers. McCook can, I think, get there by twelve o'clock day after to-morrow.

D. C. BUELL.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, ARMY OF OHIO,  
McMINNVILLE, TENN., August 24, 1862.

*Major-General Buell, Decherd:*

A reconnoitering party under Major Loughlin, First Ohio Cavalry, sent by me toward Pikeville day before yesterday, has just returned. Major Loughlin reports that he reconnoitered (?) the enemy's advance scouts at Spencer, and gained reliable intelligence from one or two citizens that a force of two or three thousand infantry and some artillery was then at Pikeville, and that the enemy intended advancing on this place by two or three routes. A party sent out last night on the Chattanooga road reports the enemy's pickets at Beersheba, and a force behind in Sequatchie Valley. I have been delayed until this time, waiting for the return of these parties. Will move this afternoon on the Hickory Creek road, in compliance with your last orders. General Wood's division will be at the foot of the mountains, if not the pass, to-night.

G. H. THOMAS,  
*Major-General U. S. V.*

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, ARMY OF OHIO,  
ALTAMONT, TENN., August 25, 5 P. M.

*Major-General Buell, Decherd:*

The enemy no nearer than Dunlap. It is reported there is one brigade there, and one at Pikeville. This I learn here, and which confirms the report of Major Loughlin, First Ohio Cavalry. . . .

Water scarce—only one spring here; and not forage enough in the neighborhood to last for one day. The road up the mountain is almost impassable. General Wood has been from six o'clock till now, and has not succeeded, in getting his artillery up the road. I deem it next to impossible to march a large army across the mountains by Altamont, on account of scarcity of water and forage, and the extreme difficulty of passing over the road. I will therefore return to McMinnville and await further orders. As I mentioned in one of my dispatches, I regard McMinnville as the most important point for occupation of any. The occupation of McMinnville, Sparta, and Murfreesboro will, in my opinion, secure the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad. I have sent out Smith to put in operation a system of couriers, by which, I believe, we can get reliable information.

Very respectfully,  
GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major-General U. S. V.*

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DECHERD, August 26, 1862.

*General Thomas, McMinnville:*

Keep your position at McMinnville, but make nothing like a permanent establishment. Be always ready to move at a moment's notice. That Bragg is this side of the river with a large force, is beyond all question. It is hardly probable that it is merely for the purpose of demon-

stration, and we must be prepared to concentrate promptly. Of course, the passage of so large a force across the mountains is difficult, but not so much so as you would suppose from the road you took. The Therman road is very good, and the mountain quite easy of ascent. The descent on this side is easy enough by four roads, all diverging from Altamont—the first going by Beersheba to McMinnville; the second by Hickory creek to McMinnville, or toward Manchester; the third also to Manchester and to Decherd by Pelham; and the fourth by Cowan. The Beersheba road is excellent for a mountain road. The question is, how to meet an advance which may take either of these routes through Altamont. The best position we could take would be McMinnville, Altamont, and on the Therman road, just this side of Sequatchie Valley. We should not only be able to concentrate against an advance on that road or the Sparta road, but also threaten his flank if he should attempt to go into North Alabama by Battle Creek—a not improbable thing on many accounts. The difficulty of supplying ourselves on the mountains is, I think, the only objection to the disposition I mention. Did you leave any force at Altamont? McCook, Crittenden, and Schoepf are at Pelham. I have ordered the railroad and telegraph re-established immediately. Be sure to be informed the moment the enemy enters Sequatchie Valley, and which direction he takes. Forrest and Morgan are reported at Lebanon, to attack Murfreesboro or Nashville. Give all the information you can obtain. . . . Davis' division crossed at Eastport four days ago, and Paine is across, crossing at Lamb's Ferry and Hood's.

Do you know a colonel fit to command a light brigade of cavalry, artillery, and infantry to operate against Forrest? McCook, Crittenden, and Schoepf are at Pelham.

D. C. BUELL.

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF OHIO,  
McMINNVILLE, August 28, 1862.

*Major-General Buell, Decherd:*

Saturday, three regiments of cavalry were at Pikeville, but fell back to Robinson Cross-roads, hearing that I was advancing on that road. About one regiment was reported to be at Dunlap, but since learned from a brother of Smith that there were no troops there; he went to Dunlap on Saturday. It was reported to him that Bragg was at the foot of Waldron's ridge, in the valley of the Tennessee, with forty thousand men, awaiting rain to cross the mountain. Smith will send or bring me information by to-morrow of the truth of Bragg's position. He then proposes to go toward Pikeville, and endeavor to establish an express line to convey information. I have sent a brigade of infantry on the Murfreesboro road after Forrest, who is at Woodbury with something over one thousand men. I have also directed the commanding officer to escort a train of provisions through to this place from Murfreesboro. Our provisions will be out in three days, and none to be had in this region. Will you order supplies here immediately by the cars? We can get fodder here, but no

corn. Troops at this place can watch the direct Chattanooga road, the Dunlap and the Harrison and Pikeville roads, and by the system of expresses to be established by Smith, I think I can give you intelligence of the enemy before he can cross Sequatchie Valley. Would not Colonel Harker be a good light brigade commander? I was favorably impressed with him. Please send the First Ohio Cavalry here. It is very much needed.

G. H. THOMAS,  
*Major-General U. S. V*

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
McMINNVILLE, August 30, 1862.

*Major-General Buell, Decherd:*

A citizen of Livingston came in this morning. He reports that he saw a large force coming from Knoxville, six miles the other side of Sparta. They told him they were on their way to Dickson Springs, near Hartsville, on the road from that place to Smithville. A citizen of Sparta told him that provisions were being hauled from Sparta and neighborhood to Marmaduke's brigade in the mountains southwest of Spencer. He also saw six or eight pieces of cannon with the cavalry. They told him they were going to Smithville to get on my flank and rear, ready to attack me from that direction as soon as Bragg and Marmaduke attacked me in front. He saw them on last Thursday. He was a Mexican war pensioner before this rebellion broke out; belonged to James Thomas' regiment of Tennessee cavalry. His name is J. W. Hall. His story seems truthful. Will send dispatch again to-day.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major-General U. S. V.*

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
McMINNVILLE, August 30, 1862.

*Major-General Buell, Decherd:*

Sent report of citizen from Livingston at 12 m. to-day. Received dispatch from Captain Miller about 11 o'clock last night, from the railroad bridge eight miles from McMinnville. He was attacked by Forrest's cavalry, one thousand five hundred strong, men dismounted. They were handsomely repulsed and fled, leaving fifteen dead on the ground. Sent General Wood with a brigade and some cavalry on the Chattanooga road. He sent cavalry, under Major Foster, to within five miles of Dunlap. Reports that he encountered the enemy's pickets eight miles this side of Dunlap, which he drove in for three miles, coming in succession upon different outposts. Learned that General Bragg was there with three brigades, encamped up and down the Sequatchie. There is also another force some seven miles higher up the valley. People with whom Major Foster conversed thought the enemy was marching up the valley. These reports of citizens not known are good for naught. Major Foster also reports no water from the foot of the mountain this side to the foot on the other

side, a distance of fifteen miles. A small party was sent to Beersheba Springs. Were told by citizens that a rebel force, fifteen hundred strong (cavalry), were encamped yesterday on Big creek, six or seven miles from Altamont, toward Dunlap. Heard from General McCook at Altamont last night; has captured two of Bragg's body-guard, who report that he has a large force, but not yet in the Sequatchie Valley. His cavalry think he has a division there. News from all sources seem to confirm the report of the citizen from Livingston, Tennessee, that the enemy will move his main force by Sparta. If he is moving on Murfreesboro by Sparta, I think the sooner we concentrate to meet him and drive him back the better, and Murfreesboro seems to be the point from which we should operate. It would be very advantageous if one brigade was stationed at Smithville to watch any movement of the enemy on our left flank, as there seems to be some probability of a movement on my left and rear, if the enemy can assemble force enough for that purpose.

G. H. THOMAS,  
*Major-General U. S. V.*

HEADQUARTERS, *August 31, 1862.*

*General Thomas:*

The general purpose of my order is to concentrate at Murfreesboro. The rearmost detachments can not get up in there until the 5th instant. Your movements should be to Clarmont on the 3d, and to Readyville on the 4th, and to Murfreesboro on the 5th, and it is of course highly important that you should conform to the movements of other columns; but it is also important that you should not risk a battle. You should, if possible, keep a day's march between you and the enemy. It will not answer to trust detachments. All must be left to your judgment.

BUELL.

TULLAHOMA, *August 31, 1862.*

*General Thomas:*

I do not know what to make of information we get in regard to the strength and movements of the enemy. Have you arrived at any conclusion about it? Answer at once. I once thought our information tolerably definite as to his force; but he seems to have vanished. I hear of nothing now but small cavalry guards.

D. C. BUELL.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
McMINNVILLE, TENN., *August 31, 1862.*

*Major-General Buell, Tullahoma:*

Dispatch received. All that I know of the enemy's forces number about five hundred on the Chattanooga road, about the same number near Sparta, a small force near Pikeville, and Forrest's cavalry, said to number about fifteen hundred strong. The general impression is that the

enemy is advancing, but I have yet to see the person who has seen any of the Chattanooga forces proper.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major-General U. S. V.*

TULLAHOMA, *September 1, 1862.*

*General Thomas:*

Do any circumstances present themselves which would make a change in our movements advisable? Answer quickly; I will be here a few minutes.

D. C. BUELL.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
McMINNVILLE, *September 1, 1862.*

*General Buell, Tullahoma:*

My dispatch last night gives all the information I can obtain. I think as the movement has commenced, that it had better be executed.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major-General U. S. V.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
McMINNVILLE, *September 1, 1862.*

*General Buell, Murfreesboro:*

Smith has returned from Dunlap. He saw four regiments of infantry, and four pieces of artillery—12-pounders—march up the Sequatchie valley toward Pikeville, Saturday afternoon, three regiments of cavalry and two small pieces of artillery having previously marched for Pikeville. He was told that this was the advance of a force of forty-five thousand, which was to march on this place by the Dunlap and Therman roads; also by Spencer and Sparta. He was also told that they were on their way to Kentucky. From what he could see, these troops were not well provided with provisions. Their arms seem to be good, but many had shot-guns. They appeared to be in low spirits. Cheatham was in command. Hardee was there; his troops were expected next day. Smith heard drums beating below Dunlap, Sunday morning, before he left home, but did not see any troops. He met the same cavalry force on the mountain which has so often been reported to you. He was informed that Bragg had two steamers and one horse-boat at Chattanooga constantly engaged in crossing troops, and that they would bring with them fifty pieces of artillery.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major-General U. S. V.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
McMINNVILLE, TENN., *September 2, 1862.*

*General Buell, Murfreesboro:*

I will start to-morrow. I have heard again that the enemy intends advancing on this place by the Therman, Dunlap, and Sparta roads. By concentrating at Murfreesboro, we shall be within striking distance of this place. By convenient roads our main force can be thrown upon the enemy between this and Decherd, or Hillsboro, overcome him, and drive him toward Sparta, his longest line of retreat. A larger force of cavalry and light infantry can be pushed across the mountain to Dunlap, by the Dunlap and Therman road, attack him in rear, and completely rout his whole force. I have studied the roads, and am now convinced that this is our best plan of attack.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major-General U. S. V.*

*September 11, 1862—11 p. m.*

*General Thomas, Nashville:*

Orders have been sent Mitchell to-night, to march to-morrow to Tyree Springs, and to Mitchellville next day, and thence to Bowling Green, unless otherwise ordered. Send him at once an order to this effect, to provide against the accident of my note not reaching him. If he should not be required, he will be sent back with a train of supplies. You will understand from the movements of the enemy, that a battle is possible near Mitchellville or Franklin, or in the vicinity of Bowling Green, and you must be in readiness and act according to circumstances.

FRY.

MITCHELLVILLE, *September 12, 1862—8 p. m.*

*Major-General Thomas, Nashville:*

Mitchell's division is ordered to return and report to you, and to get within five miles of Nashville to-morrow. The railroad was torn up to-day between Franklin and Bowling Green, and it is not possible to send a wagon train to you without bringing Mitchell up to escort it, and that might endanger him. So you must depend upon yourself for supplies for the present. Forrest, with his cavalry, is near here, moving to the north. All well here.

FRY.

*September 13, 1862.*

*Major-General Thomas, Nashville:*

General Mitchell is ordered to proceed on to Bowling Green, and will not return to you. The indications are too strong that the enemy will move the greater part of his force into Kentucky, to try to save the troops he now has there, that this order is deemed best.

FRY.

September 13, 1862—8 p. m.

*Major-General Thomas:*

March with your own and Paine's division for Bowling Green on the receipt of this order. You must reach Bowling Green in three days and a half at most, and will march directly on from there. You must march by 3 o'clock on the morning of the 15th, day after to-morrow, and earlier if possible. Leave the siege artillery and most of the cavalry with Negley. It seems quite certain that the whole of Bragg's army is in, or marching to Kentucky, and that it will be concentrated at Glasgow to-morrow, if not sooner. If, however, you have positive information that as much as two divisions of Bragg's army are near Nashville, or not marching to cross the Cumberland, you may, if you deem it advisable, leave Paine's division and bring only your own. Post Negley at the defensible works and position, and at the capitol and at the bridge, and direct him to leave twenty days' rations at each point for its garrison. He must defend his position to the last extremity. Bring only wagons enough to carry your ammunition and four days' rations, and cooking-utensils, not exceeding five loaded wagons to each regiment, exclusive of ammunition. You may, however, act at your own discretion, and unknown to the troops, bring fifty wagons to each division, to carry men who give out on the march. You must, however, start with none but able-bodied men. You will find the best watering-places at Tyree Springs, and at a creek five miles north of Mitchellville, and a cave spring three miles south of Bowling Green, and it is expected you will be able to make these marches. Explain the urgency of the matter to Governor Johnson. If Bragg's army is defeated, Nashville is safe; if not, it is lost. At any rate, bring forage for your command on the march for three days.

FRY.

HEADQUARTERS, DRIPPING SPRINGS, September 18, 1862.

*General Thomas:*

Push your division forward at the earliest possible hour. I shall expect you at Green river by day after to-morrow morning; bring the reserved artillery ammunition with you; put your trains across the river to-night if possible, and guard it well on the march. Forrest is said to be about Brownsville with a large cavalry force. The garrison of Munfordsville surrendered yesterday morning, and I learn that Bragg, hearing that I was close upon him, immediately threw his whole force across the river. I expect to be there early to-morrow. Bring no train, except enough to carry reserve ammunition, provisions, and cooking-utensils, and leave that, excepting ammunition, at whatever point on the road you may find the other trains picketed. Tell Colonel Bruce to be industrious in collecting supplies; to keep himself and me fully informed of the movements of the enemy about him, and protect his supplies and defend his post to the last extremity.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE OHIO,

*September 14, 1862—7 a. m.**General Buell:*

Received your order of Tuesday, 8 o'clock p. m. It is certain that a large force of the enemy is near Nashville, awaiting an opportunity to attack it. I shall therefore leave Paine's division here. Will march with my division at the time ordered, and reach Bowling Green as soon as possible.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major-General U. S. V.*

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EXTRACT FROM GENERAL BRAGG'S INSTRUCTIONS TO MAJOR-GENERAL E. VAN DORN, OF AUGUST 11, 1862, FROM CHATANOOGA.

In view of the operations from here it is very desirable to press the enemy closely in West Tennessee. We learn their forces there are being rapidly reduced, and when our movements become known, it is certain they must throw forces into Middle Tennessee and Kentucky or lose those regions. If you hold them in check, we are sure of success here; but should they reinforce here so as to defy us, then you may redeem West Tennessee, and probably aid us by crossing the enemy's rear.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT No. 2,

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., *August 27, 1862.**Major-General Earl Van Dorn, Commanding District of the Mississippi, Jackson, Miss.*

GENERAL:—We move from here immediately—later by some days than expected; but in time, we hope, for a successful campaign. Buell has certainly fallen back from the Memphis and Charleston railroad, and will probably not make a stand this side of Nashville, if there. He is now fortifying that place.

General E. K. Smith, reinforced by two brigades from this army has turned Cumberland Gap, and is now marching on Lexington, Kentucky. General Morgan (Yankee) is thus cut off from all supplies. General Humphrey Marshall is to enter Eastern Kentucky from Western Virginia. We shall thus have Buell pretty well disposed of.

Sherman and Rosecrans we leave to you and Price, satisfied you can dispose of them, and we confidently hope to meet you upon the Ohio.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

BRAXTON BRAGG,

M. M. KIMMEL.

*General Commanding.*

SEQUATCHIE VALLEY, August 29.

*To General Sterling Price:*

Buell's force is in full retreat upon Nashville, destroying their stores. Watch Rosecrans and prevent a junction, or if he escapes, you follow him closely.

BRAXTON BRAGG.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT No. 2,  
BARDSTOWN, KY., September 25, 1862.

*Major-General Van Dorn.*

GENERAL:—We have driven and drawn the enemy back to the Ohio. Push your columns to our support, and arouse the people to reinforce us. We have thousands of arms without men to handle them.

Nashville is defended by only a weak brigade; Bowling Green by only a weak regiment. Sweep them off and push up to the Ohio. Secure the heavy guns at these places, and we will secure the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. All depends on rapid movements.

Trusting to your energy and zeal we shall confidently expect a diversion in our favor against the overwhelming force now concentrating in our front.

BRAXTON BRAGG,  
*General Commanding.*

M. M. KIMMEL,

*Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.*

## CHAPTER XIV.

### OPERATIONS OF GENERALS G. W. MORGAN AND WM. NELSON, IN KENTUCKY.

SOON after the occupation of Cumberland Gap by General Morgan, First Lieutenant W. P. Craighill of the engineers, under the general instructions of the President and Secretary of War, commenced the construction of such defensive works as would assure the safety of the position with the least possible number of men, making them formidable only against attacks from the south, while they should be so situated that should they again fall into the hands of the enemy, they might present no barrier to an attack from the north to regain them. The great obstacles to the retention of this important position were its distance from supplies and the character of the roads leading to it from Kentucky, and to overcome them, General Morgan proposed the construction of a military road to Crab Orchard, and Lieutenant Craighill was sent to Washington to lay the proposition before the Secretary of War. The project was approved, but the movements of the enemy rendered its execution impracticable.

In the general effort to drive the national armies from Southern soil and invade the North, the plan of the enemy compassed the invasion of Kentucky and the pillage of Cincinnati, by an army from East Tennessee, and indications of the movement soon became apparent. General Smith did not withdraw his forces from the vicinity of Cumberland Gap after its loss. General Stevenson's division remained in proximity, and other detachments were stationed at various points more or less remote. The enemy, for some time, made demon-

strations against General Morgan, but he was prompt to resist all aggressions.

On the 5th of August, General Morgan sent Colonel De Courcy, with his brigade and a battery of artillery, to capture supplies collected by the enemy at Tazewell. Colonel De Courcy succeeded in seizing a large amount of forage, and some mules, horses, and tobacco, but was soon after attacked by Stevenson's division. A sharp conflict ensued, resulting in victory to De Courcy, with a reputed loss to the enemy of about two hundred in killed and wounded, but only a slight loss to himself, mostly in prisoners, who were captured on picket duty.

About the middle of August, the enemy began to reveal his purpose of invasion. On the 16th, General Stevenson presented himself before Cumberland Gap. Presuming that there would be co-operate movements, General Morgan sent Captain Martin's company of cavalry, with orders to move with the greatest speed possible, and observe the enemy at Rogers' and Big Creek Gaps. When within eighteen miles of the former, Captain Martin met the vanguard of General Smith's army advancing toward Kentucky. General Smith at once established himself at Barboursville, and sent General McCown, with a strong force, to Cumberland Ford. These dispositions of the enemy nearly enveloped Morgan's position, and positively cut him off from supplies. Anticipating the total exhaustion of his supplies on hand, before his communications could be restored, he put his troops on half rations at once, and made preparations to hold out to the last extremity. Although circumstances forbade hope of success, he nevertheless made effort to open the way for relief. He mounted about four hundred men of the Third Kentucky Infantry, under Colonel Garrard, on artillery, wagon, and extra cavalry horses, and sent them into Kentucky with Colonel Mundy's cavalry, to join a column organizing for the relief of his command. He afterward sent Colonel Childs with a battalion of the Third Tennessee Cavalry for the same purpose. Another battalion of this regiment, dispatched to the

rear, was attacked by a superior force at London, and forced to return.

General Smith did not wait for the reduction of Morgan's position, as his strength enabled him to turn it with ease. He therefore left Stevenson's division to threaten from the south, and calling together his other forces, advanced into Central Kentucky. He thus advanced toward his objective, and at the same time barred the passage of reinforcements and supplies to Cumberland Gap. After the departure of the main army, General Morgan endeavored to provoke General Stevenson to give battle, but without success. He advanced to his position, repeatedly surprised and captured his outposts, watched the gaps, but could not bring on an engagement. These maneuvers resulted in a loss to the enemy, in the aggregate, of about one hundred men killed and wounded, but in no respect changed the situation. All the while, despite the issue of half rations and all efforts to draw supplies from the country, their diminution was rapid. The grain soon gave out, and it was apparent that the retention of the place could not last beyond the consumption of a few days' rations. It was not probable that the enemy would attack, and to hold out much longer, he would have no mules or horses to haul off his munitions. To wait for starvation to force surrender, would give the enemy ten thousand prisoners, twenty-two cannon, fourteen thousand small arms, and a large amount of ammunition. Influenced by these facts, it was decided, at a council of war held on the 14th, that the evacuation of the position was advisable. Accordingly, the next day, preparations were made for a safe retreat. The roads and mountain cliffs were mined to prevent pursuit, and the siege guns were disabled and hurled over the cliff. In the evening a large wagon-train, under escort of infantry and artillery, was started on the Manchester road, and on the following day and evening, the whole force was quietly withdrawn on the same road. What property could not be transported was destroyed, and the usual conflagration and explosions which herald an accomplished evacuation of a fortress, made known to the enemy that Cumberland Gap had again been vacated without an engagement or surrender. The enemy's pickets advanced, but

having been repulsed, the army made the descent of the mountain in safety and even without molestation.

To avoid the enemy, known to be in force on the direct line to the Ohio river, General Morgan deflected to the north and east through Manchester, Booneville, Hazel Green, West Liberty, Grayson, and Greenupsburg. En route, he encountered General Morgan's cavalry, and was annoyed by them for several days, but suffered no check or serious loss. From Greenupsburg General Morgan moved through Gallipolis, Ohio, to the mouth of the Kanawha river, then up that river to Charleston, and after a short stay in Western Virginia, his command embarked for Vicksburg.

Two days after General Buell had ordered General Nelson from McMinnville, to take charge of affairs in Kentucky, the Department of the Ohio was reconstituted by general orders No. 112, war department, so as to embrace the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, and a portion of Kentucky, and placed under the command of Major-General H. G. Wright. On reaching Kentucky, General Nelson was ordered by General Wright to proceed to Lexington and assume command of all the troops at that place and Lebanon, and all in the vicinity of those places. These troops mostly comprised new regiments, which had been hastily thrown into Kentucky from the adjoining states, principally from Ohio and Indiana. Many of the regiments had never been drilled as such, and officers and men were in a great measure without military training and experience. They were concentrated at Lexington, and formed into a division, with Brigadier-Generals M. D. Manson, Charles Cruft, and J. F. Jackson as commanders of brigades. Soon after assuming command at Lexington, General Nelson, knowing that the enemy was approaching in force from East Tennessee, sent forward Colonel Metcalfe, of the Seventh Kentucky Cavalry, with about four hundred men from his own regiment, and Colonel Childs' battalion, recently from Cumberland Gap, to take post at Big Hill and oppose the advance of the enemy. On the 23d of August, Colonel Metcalfe engaged a superior force, and at the beginning of the conflict the troops of his regiment became confused, and three-fourths of them fled. The other fourth, and the Tennessee

battalion, however, fought bravely, and after repulsing the enemy, retired to the foot of the hill. Here Colonel Metcalfie rallied a large portion of his men, but upon the approach of the enemy they again fled, and the Tennesseeans, as before, stood firm, and so far restrained the enemy as to effect a safe retirement to Richmond. The enemy followed, and demanded the surrender of the town, but upon learning that Colonel Linck, from General Cruft's brigade, had arrived with reinforcements, withdrew. Soon after this occurrence General Nelson ordered General Manson, with his own brigade and General Cruft's, to march to Richmond, who, on arriving, established his camps two miles south of the town, and sent a portion of his cavalry forward to observe the enemy.

On the 29th, Lieutenant-Colonel Mundy, while scouting with a detachment of cavalry in the vicinity of Kingston, learned that the enemy was advancing in considerable force, and immediately informed General Manson of the fact, and the latter in turn forwarded the information to General Nelson at Lexington. General Manson then directed Colonel Mundy to make effort to hold the enemy in check, and ascertain his position and strength. He at the same time reinforced his pickets and prepared his brigade to advance at a moment's warning. At 2 p. m. he received information that his cavalry and infantry pickets were receding before a force estimated at five thousand men. General Manson then advanced with his brigade, leaving General Cruft's at Richmond. Having moved forward about a mile and a half, and dispersed the enemy's cavalry and artillery with his own artillery, he took possession of a high ridge, and formed his troops in line of battle on each side of the road, placing his artillery on the flanks, so as to command the road and the open country as far south as Rogersville. The enemy soon appeared with infantry, cavalry, and artillery, but after a sharp skirmish of an hour's duration, with a loss of one cannon and several men captured, he withdrew. General Manson then advanced to Rogersville, placed his command in bivouac, and sent Colonel Metcalfie in pursuit of the enemy, under instructions to ascertain his strength. He also directed General Cruft to post strong guards on the Lancaster turnpike, and on the road entering

the town from the east, and hold the remainder of his brigade in readiness to move at notice. Colonel Metcalfe encountered the enemy six miles out, and after a slight skirmish fell back to Rogersville.

At 6 a. m. the next day, General Manson ordered General Crunt to his support, having learned that the enemy was again advancing. He then moved forward and met the enemy's vanguard about a half mile south of Rogersville, and taking position on a wooded elevation formed a line of battle, with the Fifty-fifth Indiana on the left of the road behind a fence, the Sixty-ninth Indiana on the right, the artillery on high ground to the left, and the Seventy-first Indiana in reserve. The skirmishers on the left opened the battle, and simultaneously the Sixteenth Indiana coming up took position in the woods on the left of the Fifty-fifth. After the fighting had continued for an hour, the enemy made a fierce assault upon the left, and the Seventy-first Indiana was ordered to its support. While executing this movement, the regiment was subjected to a galling fire, and Lieutenant-Colonel Topping and Major Conkling fell, the former mortally wounded and the latter killed. This reinforcement of the left did not relieve it from severe pressure, and seven companies of the Sixty-ninth Indiana from the right were also directed to its support. At this juncture, General Crunt reached the field with the advance of his brigade—the Ninety-fifth Ohio and a section of artillery. The Ninety-fifth was placed on the right behind the three companies of the Sixty-ninth, then warmly engaged, and were ordered to charge a battery which was posted on an eminence a short distance to the front. In making this charge, the regiment was thrown into disorder by the severe fire to which it was exposed, and then the enemy pressed the right from position. The left also was turned by a flank movement under cover of the woods, and driven back in disorder. Just as the rout became general, the remainder of General Crunt's brigade appeared. The Eighteenth Kentucky at once formed in line, and in a few minutes was compelled to fall back with heavy loss. The other two regiments of the brigade, the Twelfth and Sixty-sixth, were formed in line on a high position near Rogersville, a mile to the rear of the first line,

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and upon them the fragments of the routed troops were rallied. The ground here, however, not being considered favorable for defense, General Manson posted his cavalry and one gun on an eminence to check the enemy and withdrew to his position of the previous evening, and then formed again as in the morning, with his troops as much as possible under cover and his artillery on the flanks. As the enemy was advancing upon this new position, General Manson received an order from General Nelson, of August 30th, directing him to retire by the Lancaster road should the enemy approach in force. It was then too late for obedience, as a few minutes later the enemy attacked his whole line with great energy, and though his right was at first pressed back by artillery fire, he finally, though checked repeatedly, pressed General Cruft's troops back in great disorder. The left was then withdrawn and the whole force fell back to its camps in front of Richmond, the enemy pursuing closely. Here General Manson endeavored again to reform his command, and had partially succeeded, when General Nelson appeared and directed that a line should be formed near the town and cemetery. The troops had barely reached the position designated and formed in line before the enemy assaulted in overwhelming force. Resisting for a few minutes, the whole line crumbled, and its fragments drifted through Richmond and on to Louisville.

General Nelson's command consisted almost entirely of new regiments, and did not exceed six thousand five hundred. He lost two hundred killed, seven hundred wounded, and two thousand captured, and nine guns. The enemy's strength was twelve thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and fifteen guns. He lost two hundred and fifty killed and about five hundred wounded.

There was now no well-organized force to meet General Smith's army, and the excitement in Louisville and Cincinnati was intense. General Nelson took command at Louisville, and attempted to organize the new troops and the citizens who volunteered for the defense of the city. Multitudes from the adjacent populous regions hastened to Cincinnati to save the city from pillage.

After the battle of Richmond, General E. K. Smith moved

northward, with General Heath's division in advance, in boldest menace to Covington and Cincinnati. To defend these cities, new troops and citizens gathered in great numbers at Cincinnati, and an army had been formed of such proportions under Generals A. J. Smith, L. Wallace, and Gordon Granger, and though having approached very near to Covington, the Confederate general refrained from attack, and contented himself with distributing his forces in the eastern portion of Central Kentucky, to gather supplies and recruits, and there await the results of the movement of the armies of Generals Bragg and Buell toward Louisville.

## CHAPTER XV.

### CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY.

GENERAL BUELL found at Louisville a large force of new troops, comprising the remnant of General Nelson's division, and regiments that had been hurriedly thrown into the city for its defense against the two Confederate armies in the state. He at once commenced the reorganization and re-equipment of his army. The new troops were mingled with his veterans, clothing was issued to all, and full preparations made for an active campaign against General Bragg. Three corps, each comprising three divisions, designated as First, Second, and Third, were formed, and Major-Generals A. McD. McCook and T. L. Crittenden and Brigadier-General C. C. Gilbert were announced as corps commanders.

On the 29th of September, Major-General Thomas received an order at the hands of Colonel McGibbon, aid-de-camp to Major-General Halleck, commander-in-chief, assigning him to the command of the Army of the Ohio, but at his request General Buell was retained. The day following, General Thomas was announced as second in command.

General Buell, having completed his preparations for his movement against General Bragg, commenced his advance on the 1st day of October. General Sill's division, of General McCook's or the left corps, and General Dumont's, which had not been assigned to a corps, moved on the left toward Frankfort, to hold in check the army of General Kirby Smith. The remainder of the army moved directly on General Bragg's position at Bardstown. General McCook's corps advanced through Taylorsville, General Gilbert's through Shepherdsville, and General Crittenden's through Mount Washington, upon

roads converging upon Bardstown from those places. Soon after leaving Louisville the head of each column engaged in skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry and artillery, the resistance constantly increasing as the army approached Bardstown. This was done to give time for General Bragg to withdraw his army, and this he accomplished a few hours before the heads of column approached the town. He retreated toward Springfield, and so close a pursuit was maintained that skirmishing with his rear-guard was not unfrequent. Inferring from information received, that the two Confederate armies would unite at Danville, General Buell directed General McCook, whose corps had arrived at Bloomfield, to march on Harrodsburg; he instructed General Thomas to move with Crittenden's corps on the Lebanon and Danville road, which passes four miles east of Perryville, with a branch road leading to that place, and in person proceeded with Gilbert's corps on the direct road to Perryville. Having learned soon afterward, that Smith's army had crossed to the west side of the Kentucky river near Salvisa, and was marching to form a junction with General Bragg at Harrodsburg or Perryville, he ordered General McCook to bear to the right and march on the latter place.

General Buell, with the central corps, arrived at a point within three and one-half miles of Perryville on the evening of the 7th, and having ascertained that the enemy held the place in force, directed that the corps should be disposed in order of battle. In compliance, General Mitchell's division was formed across the road, General Sheridan's on an elevation to the left, and General Schoepf's was held in reserve. In the meantime, the vanguard, under Captain Gay, consisting of cavalry and artillery, reinforced by two regiments, had, after heavy skirmishing, pressed the enemy's rear-guard a mile farther toward the town, and it was discovered that the enemy was concentrating for battle. General Buell at once dispatched orders for the other two corps to march at 3 o'clock the next morning and form on the right and left of the corps already in position. His orders required that each corps commander, upon the attainment of position on the field, should report to

him in person, and expressed the expectation of attacking and carrying the enemy's position at Perryville the next day.

General McCook received his orders at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  o'clock the next morning, and had his column on the march at 5 o'clock. He reached his designated position at  $10\frac{1}{2}$  A. M., and formed his two divisions, Generals Rousseau's and Jackson's, on the left of General Gilbert's corps, connecting Rousseau's division with Gilbert's left. The order requiring an early movement of the troops and prescribing the preliminary arrangements for battle, did not reach General Thomas as soon as anticipated, in consequence of the fact that he had been compelled the night before to diverge from his direct line of march to obtain water for his command; his cavalry, nevertheless, was in front of the position to which he had been assigned, at daylight, and pushed back the pickets of the enemy. General Crittenden's corps came up later even than General McCook's, but two divisions were in position before noon. Upon being informed, early in the morning, that the enemy was in front of his position, General Thomas went forward to arrange for the formation of Crittenden's corps, and at noon sent an officer of his staff, Captain Mack, to inform General Buell of his arrival and position, and requesting instructions through him, assigning the presence of the enemy in his front as an excuse for not reporting in person. As soon as General Crittenden reached his assigned position, he sent a staff officer to General Gilbert to make inquiries with regard to his formation, and General Gilbert states in his official report that he went to General Crittenden's position to give the information in person.

The roads over which the army had advanced the preceding day were very dusty, and owing to this and the hot dry weather and scarcity of water, the troops had suffered exceedingly. During the night, Colonel Daniel McCook's brigade of Sheridan's division had been thrown forward from the center, to occupy the heights in front of Doctor's creek, a tributary of Chaplin creek, and about two and a half miles from Perryville. After a sharp skirmish, Colonel McCook succeeded at daylight in gaining the heights, and secured some pools of water in the bed of the stream, which afforded poor water for the thirsty troops. About two hours after the

heights had been occupied, the enemy in considerable force advanced through the woods on the eastern slope and endeavored to regain the position. General Sheridan then ordered forward Laiboldt's brigade and Hescock's battery, instructing Colonel Laiboldt to advance two regiments and drive back the enemy. Stubborn resistance was offered, but after a severe conflict, in which both sides lost quite heavily, the enemy was forced across Chaplin river. In this action, Captain Barnett, with a section of his battery, and Lieutenant Taliaferro, with a section of Hescock's, forced the guns of the enemy from position.

The noise of this action incited McCook's corps to haste in gaining position, and near its close it arrived on the field, and General McCook at once directed General Rousseau to throw forward a line of skirmishers to examine the woods on the left and in front. He ordered Captain Wiekiffe's company of cavalry to reconnoiter the ground to the left of the skirmishers, as acting Brigadier-General Gay was at the time making a reconnaissance in front and toward Perryville; directed General Jackson to post his two brigades on commanding ground, immediately to the right of the Maxville and Perryville road, and to hold them in column ready to move in whatever direction occasion might require; and ordered that Captain Loomis' battery should be posted on high ground, near Russell's house, to the left. He then indicated his line of battle, and directed General Rousseau to form it. Following these dispositions and the conflict in the center, there was a period of quietness, during which General McCook reported in person to General Buell, some distance in the rear, and General Gilbert went to General Crittenden's position. The force which had engaged General Gilbert's left had retired, and there were no other troops in view.

General McCook was instructed by General Buell to make a reconnaissance to Chaplin river, upon his return to his command; but during his absence, the troops were suffering so severely for water that General Rousseau ordered the right of his line forward a half mile to obtain a supply. Soon after, the enemy appeared in force, and having placed three batteries in position, opened fire. General Rousseau then moved his

other two brigades abreast of his right, and responded to the enemy's artillery with Loomis' and Simonson's batteries. At this juncture, General McCook returned, and seeing no infantry, he directed that the batteries should cease firing and economize their ammunition. Learning that commanding ground for a portion of his line could be obtained a short distance to the left of the Perryville road (the one leading from Maxville), he ordered a portion of the Thirty-third Ohio into the woods in front to ascertain if the enemy was present in that vicinity, within a distance of six hundred yards from Chaplin river. Having gone forward himself, he called to him Generals Jackson and Terrell, "showed them the water, marked their line of battle," and ordered a battery to be posted on the line with strong supports. He further directed General Terrell "to advance a line of skirmishers cautiously down the slopes of the hill to the water, as soon as his line was formed," that the so much needed water might be obtained. The execution of this movement developed no enemy, except a body of cavalry, which appeared on the hills across the river, and fled upon receiving the fire of Stone's battery, posted to the left and rear of the position.

At half-past 1 o'clock, General McCook, not anticipating an attack, as no strong force of the enemy had been in view in his front, rode to the right of the line. But at 2 p. m. the enemy attacked the skirmishers of the Thirty-third Ohio, and then he ordered the remainder of the regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Moore commanding, and the Second Ohio to their support. At this juncture, his line was formed, with Rousseau's right, near a barn on the right of the Maxville and Perryville road, and extending to the left on a ridge through a corn-field (the corn being cut and shocked), to the skirt of woods occupied by the Second and Thirty-third Ohio regiments; while the right of Terrell's brigade of Jackson's division held a wooded elevation running along to the left, overlooking a portion of Chaplin river, and his left formed a crotchet to the rear, in order to occupy the high ground to the left and rear. Starkweather's brigade and Stone's and Bush's batteries of Rousseau's division were posted to the left and rear of Jackson's left, on high ground, and Webster's brigade of Jackson's

division was placed to the left of Russell's house and in the rear of the center of Rousseau's line.

Very soon after, the enemy fell upon the skirmishers of the Thirty-second Ohio. McCook's whole line became hotly engaged, while the chief force of the enemy was directed against his left. General Jackson was killed by the first fire, and by 2½ p. m. General Terrell's brigade, composed of new troops, under an exceedingly heavy pressure by superior numbers, was forced back in confusion. General Terrell showed great bravery, and exerted himself to the utmost to hold his troops firm, but in vain. It was the traditional method of the enemy—an attack by a massed force on the end of a line—and an inferior force of raw troops soon gave way before it. Perceiving that his left had been turned, General McCook sent Lieutenant Hosea, of his staff, to request General Sheridan to secure his right. A half hour later, 2½ p. m., he dispatched Captain Fisher to the nearest commander of troops for assistance. This officer met General Schoepf, who was advancing to the front with his division, who referred him to General Gilbert, who was with the column. He reported to General Gilbert that "McCook's whole command was engaged, his reserves being all in line, and that the safety of his corps was compromised." General Gilbert referred Captain Fisher to General Buell, but afforded no assistance. General McCook sent a third staff officer, Captain Hoblitzell, at 3 p. m., to General Schoepf, or the commander of the nearest troops, to ask for help. Having thus made effort to obtain reinforcements, he remained with his left until the enemy had been repulsed by Starkweather's brigade and the cross fire of Stone's and Bush's batteries, all suitably posted to secure this result, after Terrell's brigade had been driven back and the enemy had swung round in pursuit. The batteries alone held the enemy in check for some time. When having received reinforcements, he assaulted with great fury. The Twenty-first Wisconsin, lying in front of the batteries, then opened a destructive fire, but were forced back. The batteries and the remainder of the brigade were then assaulted, but here the enemy was repulsed again. He repeated his assaults with fresh troops, but was driven back each time with heavy loss,

until the brigade and batteries having exhausted their ammunition, quietly retired to the line first selected, where, having obtained ammunition, they renewed the conflict.

Having witnessed the repulse of the enemy on his left, General McCook proceeded to his right, concerning which he had hitherto felt no uneasiness, to witness the issue of a terrible conflict there. While the battle had been raging on the left, General Rousseau's right and center brigades, commanded respectively by Colonels Lytle and Harris, had been hotly engaged, and had repeatedly repulsed the enemy, although his attacks had been made by superior numbers. Colonel Harris' brigade held its position against every assault, inflicting severe punishment upon the enemy, and presenting an unbroken front, even after its ammunition had been exhausted. It was finally withdrawn to the original line simultaneously with Starkweather's brigade. There was now an opening between Lytle's right and the central corps, while his left flank was exposed. General McCook ordered Colonel Webster to oppose the enemy, and in the vain effort he fell, mortally wounded. The enemy, in the meantime, having posted a battery in a favorable position, opened a destructive fire upon Lytle's right flank, and he too fell back. Even then the right, near Russell's house, could not be held, owing to the destructive fire of artillery and the heat of a burning barn in proximity. The enemy, with its recession, swung round in Lytle's rear. Fortunately, Loomis' battery, which, having previously exhausted its long-range ammunition, had been retired to a commanding ridge, about one hundred and fifty yards in the rear of Russell's house, under instructions to reserve its canister for close work, was now in readiness for such a fire as checked the enemy's advance. Soon after, Colonel Gooding's brigade, with Pinney's battery (Fifth Wisconsin), from Mitchell's division of the central corps, was near, and by the spirited action of infantry and artillery, the enemy was driven back and the position at Russell's was regained. This brigade lost four hundred and ninety men—nearly one-fourth of its effective strength. General Steedman's brigade, from Schoepf's division, followed Gooding's closely, and these reinforcements and night arrested the battle at this point. When

General Terrell's brigade gave way in the first onset, a portion of it fell back to the position of Stone's and Bush's batteries; and there, in the effort to rally his troops, this gallant commander fell, mortally wounded, and died a few hours later.

In the recession of the left, seven pieces of Parsons' eight-gun battery fell into the hands of the enemy, and at 6 p. m. four guns of Harris' Indiana battery were also lost.

About the time that General McCook was first attacked, General Sheridan advanced Captain Hescock's battery to a good position in front of a belt of woods, where he had an enfilading fire on the enemy's batteries on the opposite side of the valley of Chaplin river, and advanced six regiments to support it. The fire of this battery was severe, and the enemy attempted to dislodge it by establishing a battery at short range. But Hescock's shots were so well directed and effective, that the enemy abandoned this advanced position in a few minutes. The enemy then posted two batteries on Sheridan's right flank with infantry behind them, when General Sheridan, in obedience to orders, occupied the hill from which he had previously driven the enemy. The enemy again assaulted the position and advanced close to Sheridan's line, although suffering fearful losses from canister. Being now greatly pressed, General Sheridan called upon General Gilbert for reinforcements, and the latter ordered Schoepf's and Mitchell's divisions to close to the left and support him. Arriving at the scene of conflict, General Mitchell threw forward Colonel Carlin's brigade to relieve Sheridan's right from pressure. As Colonel Carlin ascended to the brow of the hill, he observed the enemy advancing in strong force, and he immediately charged, broke his line, and drove him beyond Perryville. Near the town, the Thirty-eighth Illinois, in the advance, captured three officers, one hundred and thirty men, some wagons, and two caissons with horses attached. Seeing that he was not supported on either flank, Carlin took advantage of the confusion of the enemy and safely withdrew. General Sheridan also drove the enemy for some distance, but having perceived that General McCook's right, having been left without support, had been turned, deemed it unsafe to advance far, and

therefore turned his artillery upon the enemy across the valley, and thus relieved the pressure upon the left wing.

Though General Thomas had found the enemy in his front early in the morning, and had reported his presence as his excuse for not reporting to the commanding general in person, and although General Gilbert's corps had been engaged more or less from the earlier hours of the morning, and General McCook's corps had been struggling against overwhelming numbers, Gen. Thomas received no orders from Gen. Buell until 4 p. m., upon the return of Captain Mack. The verbal instructions through this officer were, that he should hold a division in readiness to reinforce the center if necessary, to reconnoiter his front to ascertain if the enemy had reinforced his left or was withdrawing, and report all information obtained. In compliance, the reconnaissance was made immediately, and developed the enemy; but though the fact was reported, no further orders respecting operations for that day were received. Owing to the absence of instructions requiring the advance of the right corps, it was not engaged during the day, excepting the cavalry in the morning, in the front, and Wagner's brigade of Wood's division, which became involved with General Mitchell's right, late in the evening.

In compliance with orders from General Buell, Generals Thomas, McCook, and Gilbert reported at his headquarters at night, to receive instructions for the next day. General McCook was directed to move his corps during the night and close up on General Gilbert's left, to hold this position and take advantage of any opportunity that the events of the day might present. Generals Thomas and Gilbert were ordered to make preparations to advance on Perryville at daylight the next morning, and attack the enemy's front and left flank, keeping their adjacent flanks well connected. The movements, as ordered, were made during the night and morning; but the advance troops in the morning discovered that the enemy had retired during the night, and was falling back to Harrodsburg, but had left no evidence of haste or disorder, save that his dead and wounded remained on the field.

General Buell reported his loss in this battle at nine hundred and sixteen killed, two thousand nine hundred and forty-three

wounded, and four hundred and eighty-nine missing; total, four thousand three hundred and forty-eight. An exceedingly large number for the troops severely engaged, but one that attests their valor. Nearly all the losses were from McCook's two divisions, and the brigade sent from the center to his support.

The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded is not known. General Buell claims that from first to last, he captured from four to five thousand men, including the sick and wounded.

This battle, in some of its features at least, was the result of the mutual misconception of the situation by the commanding generals, and its initiation was palpably owing to the ignorance of General Bragg with regard to the actual concentration of eight divisions of the Army of the Ohio before him. General Bragg did not know this when he made an attack upon its left and center with three divisions. He had not, previous to the 7th, intended to give battle at Perryville, but owing to the pressure upon his rear, which arrested two of his divisions, Buckner's and Anderson's,\* under General Hardee, he at that time determined to concentrate three divisions, Cheatham's and the two others mentioned of General Polk's command, and give battle before that town. On the 7th, Cheatham moved from Harrodsburg, General Bragg having sent Withers' division the day before to support Smith against the column formed of Sill's and Dumont's divisions advancing against him. Having learned subsequently that this force was retreating, he then proceeded to Perryville, and was present at the battle, though disclaiming the conduct of it beyond suggesting some changes in General Polk's dispositions. These facts, mentioned officially by General Bragg, indicate clearly that he expected to fight at Perryville only the more advanced portions of General Buell's army. He states explicitly in his report, that he declined battle on the 9th, because General Buell had received reinforcements during the previous day and night. With regard to the opening of the

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\* This was probably Hardee's division, in temporary command of Anderson; at least, the division which General Hardee had previously commanded.

battle, he made the following statements: "The action opened at half-past 12 p. m., between skirmishers and artillery on both sides. Finding the enemy indisposed to advance against us, and knowing that he was receiving heavy reinforcements, I deemed it best to assail him vigorously, and so directed."

On the other hand, General Buell did not seem to know that before General McCook became seriously engaged, General Crittenden's corps was in line of battle on General Gilbert's right. General Gilbert had been with General Crittenden while aligning his corps, and returned to his own before the action commenced, as he states in his official report. General Thomas' statement does not give the exact time when his line of battle was formed, but the fact of his own early presence on the field, and his early report of this fact to General Buell, through a staff officer, which report by order was contingent upon the assumption of position by Crittenden's corps, leaves no room to doubt that this corps was in readiness to participate in the action soon after 12 m. At this hour two of Crittenden's divisions, Smith's and Van Cleve's, were in position, and Wood's was two miles in the rear marching to the front. About 4 p. m. General Buell first learned that McCook's corps was seriously engaged and heavily pressed. He then ordered General Gilbert to send a division to its support, and directed General Thomas to hold one division in readiness to support the left. The execution of the order to General Gilbert gave two additional brigades to the support of General McCook near the close of the action. It does not appear, from any of the official reports from which this narrative has been drawn, that the order, announcing the intention to give battle on the 8th, and enforcing preparations for it, had been revoked, and from this fact, and the noise of musketry as well as artillery, which had announced the beginning and progress of a battle involving the center and left, there was a general expectation throughout Crittenden's corps that it too would participate in the action.

The testimony is very explicit from General Gilbert that General McCook called upon him for help (as his corps was upon the point of being compromised), when he was returning from General Crittenden's position, and that upon his

second call he sent him one brigade and a battery, before he received an order from General Buell, through Major Wright, to send two brigades to his support. Thus the suddenness and impetuosity of the attack upon McCook did not permit him to delay for a moment in asking aid from the nearest troops, and it was General Gilbert who sent one of McCook's staff officers to General Buell, as he could not at first give him reinforcements. Thus, these two corps commanders conducted the engagement from their respective positions, to meet the attacks of the enemy, without orders from General Buell, and without any recognized plan of battle, or any apparent object, except to maintain their ground by repulsing the enemy.

Though General Bragg had withdrawn his army, General Buell still believed that he would deliver battle, and that Smith's army had joined him for that purpose. He therefore determined, that as the two Confederate columns had formed a junction, to await the arrival of General Sill's division, which he had ordered forward from Frankfort. In the meantime, he placed his army in position, his right four miles from Danville, his center on the Perryville and Harrodsburg turnpike, and his left near Duckville, on the roads converging to Harrodsburg. On the march from Frankfort, General Sill was attacked near Lawrenceburg by a portion of General Smith's army, but he repulsed the attack, and arrived at Perryville on the 11th. General Dumont's division remained at Frankfort.

On the morning of the 11th, a reconnoissance was made by three brigades of infantry from Crittenden's and Gilbert's corps, and by McCook's and Gay's cavalry, and discovered the enemy in force about three miles south of Harrodsburg, but he retired during the day, and his rear-guard was driven out of the town in the evening, with the loss of some stores, and about twelve hundred prisoners, mostly sick and wounded. The next day, General Buell ordered General McCook's corps to Harrodsburg, General Crittenden's to the left and rear of Danville, and General Gilbert's to a point midway between these towns, on the road connecting them, while a strong reconnoitering force advanced to the crossing of Dick's river, and ascertained that the enemy had crossed his entire army.

Two days later, it was known that the enemy was retreating south, and pursuit was at once ordered. General Wood's division marched at 12 o'clock that night, and engaged the enemy's artillery and cavalry at Stanford the next morning at daylight. The remainder of General Crittenden's corps, and all of General McCook's, followed General Wood through Danville and Stanford to Crab Orchard, and General Gilbert's corps reached the same point through Lancaster. The enemy resisted the head of each column with cavalry and artillery whenever he could find favorable positions, but he was steadily followed, and often attacked, as he moved on toward Cumberland Gap.

From Crab Orchard southward, the country is barren and rough, affording only meager supplies, and as there was now no prospects of forcing General Bragg to an engagement, McCook's and Gilbert's corps were halted at Crab Orchard, while Crittenden's, with W. S. Smith's division leading, followed on to London, on the direct road, and to Manchester, on the branch road. But nothing was effected beyond successful skirmishing with the enemy's rear-guard, and the capture of some prisoners and cattle. There being no promise of further advantage, the pursuit was not continued beyond London, and the Army of the Ohio turned toward Bowling Green and Glasgow, preparatory to a movement to Nashville. General Buell retired to Louisville, leaving General Thomas in chief command.

On the 26th of October, General Buell directed General Thomas by telegraph to concentrate the corps of Generals McCook and Gilbert at Bowling Green, and that of General Crittenden at Glasgow. In compliance, Generals McCook and Gilbert moved from Crab Orchard to Bowling Green—the former through Stanford, Lebanon, Somerville, and Cave City, and the latter on the same route, excepting through Campbellsville instead of Somerville. General Crittenden marched from London to Glasgow through Somerset, Columbia, and Edmonton. The cavalry remained at Lebanon to refit and otherwise prepare for active service.

It was not certainly known at this time what General Bragg's next movement would be. His successful retreat

from Perryville proved the easy mobility of his army, and the direction of it warranted the fear that he would endeavor to attack Nashville before its feeble garrison could be reinforced. This was the expectation of General Buell when he turned his columns toward Bowling Green, but the authorities at Washington not only suggested, but ordered that his army should enter East Tennessee. This difference of opinion elicited a lengthy discussion, which terminated in the removal of General Buell from the command of the Army of the Ohio on the 30th of October.

The operations of Generals Johnston and Lee in Virginia and Maryland, and of General Bragg in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky, during the summer and autumn of 1862, compassed the broadest, if not the boldest, aggression of the Confederate armies during the war, and perhaps were expressive of their greatest actual strength, and freighted with the strongest hopes which the Southern people ever entertained subsequent to their first great defeats. In the forecast of these campaigns, it was assumed that General Bragg would unite the standards of four victorious columns at Louisville or Cincinnati, and that the commander of the eastern Confederate army should raise the symbol of their declared nationality on the dome of the national capitol. Then, should the fugitive or captive representatives of the national government refuse to recognize the independence of the Southern Confederacy, the two victorious armies were to co-operate in the invasion of the Northern States to compel an unwilling people to acknowledge its independence. While the murmurs of the people and the official complaints of the authorities at Washington were often repeated as General Buell advanced slowly toward Chattanooga and General McClellan halted before Richmond, the resources of the South were strained in preparation for the accomplishment of these grand objects. At this time, the national armies were holding the peninsula of Virginia in the East, and on the West, Cumberland Gap—a position of great strategic importance in both Northern and Southern regard—all Middle and West Tennessee, portions of Northern Mississippi and Alabama, commanding the resources, the rivers, and railroads

of the vast region which had been wrested from the enemy, and their attitude was still one of absolute aggression. Suddenly they were thrown upon the defensive. The Army of the Potomac was defeated and withdrawn to Washington, the second battle was lost at Bull Run, and General Lee crossed the Potomac with his victorious legions. Then Kirby Smith turned Cumberland Gap, and soon after defeated at Richmond, Kentucky, the troops that had been improvised for the defense of Cincinnati and Louisville. Soon General Bragg, after sending hortatory orders to his lieutenants in Northern Mississippi to brush General Grant from their front and join him on the Ohio, sealed Waldron's ridge with his central column, and, finding an open way, hurried into Kentucky, proclaiming his advent as the redemption of the state from the despotism of the national government. These successes gave the brightest hour of the war to the South and the gloomiest one to the North—intensifying the opposition to it in the latter section, and imposing upon the government the most perplexing embarrassments. The conditions of the struggle seemed to have been changed entirely.

But promising as was the beginning of these campaigns to the South, like all others of similar character throughout the war, they resulted in failure, at least in respect to their dominant objects. When it was that General Bragg lost heart completely is not revealed, but he certainly gave evidence of some miscalculation, miscarriage, or waning hope, when he declined battle at Prewitt's Knob. He had previously moved in apparent disregard of the greater army which he had thrown to his rear, by leaping upon its communications, and yet his operations at the very moment of their seeming culmination lost their bold aspect, and thereafter the boastful commander of the western Confederate armies drifted about in Kentucky, neither in spirit or maneuver justifying the assumptions of his proclamations. His offensive campaign, a failure in its ruling objects,\* was nevertheless successful in many subordinate ones.

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\* One of these objects, doubtless, was the permanent occupancy of Kentucky, and to give public expression to it, he went through the pretense of inaugurating a Confederate provisional governor in room of Mr. Johnson, killed at the battle of Shiloh. The representation of the state in

He gained territory of vast extent with its ungarnered corn, and military advantages which were only overcome by a campaign of nearly a year's duration, a great battle, and a vast expenditure of war material. He also made a heavy draft upon the resources of Kentucky. Her granaries supplied his armies while in the state, and doubtless for a time after they left it. Kentucky stores and looms provided clothing for his needy soldiers; the farms and stables of rich Kentuckians furnished his troopers with the best horses in the land. These were no inconsiderable results, and some were compensative, but after all they did not give cheer and hope to the Southern people as the only consequences of a campaign which, in its inception and primal progress, promised the recognition of the Southern Confederacy by foreign nations and even by the United States. Actual accomplishment fell far below Southern expectation, east and west. And when General Lee retreated from the battle-field of Antietam, General Bragg from Perryville, and General Van Dorn from Corinth, the Southern people saw plainly that the war was still to bring desolation to their section, and that the boldest strategy and the exertion of their full strength could only press back, temporarily, the national armies.

The general offensive attitude of the insurgents, their unexpected revelation of great strength, and the defeats of the summer, forced upon the government and the loyal people the alternative of the abandonment of the conflict or the enlargement of the national armies, first to repel invasion and then reassume the offensive with augmented vigor. There was too much at stake to yield to the claims of the insurgents, and the government and the people, under the pressure of a necessity which involved the life of the nation, made a draft for men and means proportionate to the compass of the emergency. During September and October, as the narrative has disclosed, the invading armies were all repelled and new offensive campaigns were projected. The main one in the West, looking to the reoccupancy of Middle Tennessee and Northern Alabama,

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the Confederate congress required that there should at least be the semblance of a state government in alliance with the government at Richmond, and this object was attained by the same measure

and an advance into East Tennessee and Georgia, found official expression in the order of the war department, recreating the Department of the Cumberland.

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LOUISVILLE, KY., *Scptember 29, 1862—2.30 p. m.*

*Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief:*

I have received your orders of the 24th inst., requiring me to turn over my command to Major-General G. H. Thomas. I have accordingly turned over the command to him, and in further obedience to your instructions, I shall repair to Indianapolis and await further orders.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Major-General.*

Received, Washington, September 30th.

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LOUISVILLE, KY., *September 30, 1862—1 p. m.*

*General Halleck:*

I received last evening your dispatch, suspending my removal from command. Out of a sense of public duty, I shall continue to discharge the duties of my command to the best of my ability, until otherwise ordered.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Major-General.*

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*October 7—7 p. m.*

GENERAL:—The Third Corps (Gilbert's) is within three and one-half miles of Perryville, the cavalry being nearer, perhaps two and a half miles. From all information received to-day, it is thought the enemy will resist our advance into Perryville. They are said to have a strong force in and around the place. We expect to attack and carry the place to-morrow. March at 3 o'clock precisely to-morrow morning without fail, and if possible, get all the canteens filled, and have the men cautioned to use water in the most sparing manner. Every officer must caution his men on this point. Send back every team and animal that is not absolutely necessary with the troops, as they will suffer for water. All the wagons that can must move in the rear of your troops.

The right of Gilbert's rests opposite to Gordon's place, which is on the Lebanon pike, and from Gordon's to Gilbert's right is about two to two and a quarter miles. When the two corps get up to that vicinity—that is to say, three or three and a half miles from town—let the front be halted and put in order of battle, and the whole column closed up, and the men allowed to rest in position, and made as comfortable as possible, but not allowed to scatter. The commander of the corps must then immediately have the front reconnoitered, and gain all the information he

can of the position of the enemy, and also of the nature of the country in his front. This must be done by inquiry of the inhabitants, and by personal examination of officers, and by reconnoisance.

When the column has got into position, you will please report at these headquarters with all the information you may have been able to obtain, and instructions for further movements will be given. Send orderlies back with bearer to learn where our headquarters are. All the usual precautions must be taken, and preparations made for action. There is no water near us, and we expect but little, if any, until we get it at Perryville. Nothing has been heard of you since we parted this morning.

Respectfully, etc.,

JAMES B. FRY,

*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

GENERAL THOMAS, *Second in Command.*

An order nearly similar was sent to General McCook.

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#### GENERAL BUELL'S FIRST BRIEF REPORT.

PERRYVILLE, Ky., via Bardstown, October 10\*, 1862.

To Major-General H. W. Halleck, Commander-in-Chief:

I have already advised you of the movement of the army under my command, from Louisville. More or less skirmishing occurred daily with the enemy's cavalry since then, and it was supposed that the enemy would give battle at Bardstown.

My troops reached that point on the 4th, driving the enemy's rear-guard of cavalry and artillery of the main body to Springfield, whither pursuit was continued. The center corps, under General Gilbert, moved in the direct road from Springfield to Perryville, and arrived on the 7th one mile from town, where the enemy was found to be in force. The left column, under General McCook, came upon the Maxville road yesterday about 10 o'clock (the 8th). It was ordered into position to attack, and a strong reconnaissance directed.

At 4 o'clock I received a request from General McCook for reinforcements, and learned that the left had been seriously engaged for several hours, and that the right and left of that corps were being turned and severely pressed. Reinforcements were immediately sent forward from the center. Orders were issued to the right column under General Crittenden, which was advancing by the Lebanon road, to push forward and attack the enemy's left, but it was impossible for it to get into position in time to produce any decisive results.

The action continued till dark. Some sharp fighting also occurred in the center. The enemy was everywhere repulsed, but not without some momentary advantage on the left. The several corps were put in position during the night, and moved to the attack.

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\*Should be 9.

At 6 o'clock this morning, Thursday, some sharp skirmishing occurred with the enemy's rear-guard. The main body has fallen back in the direction of Harrodsburg. I have no accurate report of our loss yet. It is probably heavy, including several valuable officers. Generals Jackson and Terrell, I regret to say, are among the killed.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

EXTRACT FROM MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS' REPORT  
TO THE "COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS ON THE CONDUCT OF  
THE WAR."

At daylight on the morning of the 8th of October, the cavalry, under the command of Colonel Ed. McCook, in advance of the right wing, had reached the point indicated in the foregoing communication (reference is made to General Buell's order of October 7th, 7 p. m.), on the Lebanon and Perryville road. Upon his arrival, Colonel McCook sent me a message that he had encountered the enemy's pickets, and had driven them a mile beyond in the direction of Perryville. I immediately rode to the front, and gave directions for the formation of Crittenden's corps, sending my aid, Captain O. A. Mack, Fourth United States Artillery, to General Buell, reporting my position and requesting him to send orders by Captain Mack, the enemy being reported immediately in my front, for which reason I did not like to leave my troops. About 4 p. m. Captain Mack returned with verbal orders from General Buell, to hold one division in readiness to reinforce the center, if necessary, and also to reconnoiter my front to see if the enemy had reinforced his left, or was withdrawing, which information was to be reported to him immediately. Notwithstanding my reconnoissance developed the enemy still in my front, I had no orders to advance. After sundown, I received the following communication:

*October 8—6.30 p. m.*

GENERAL:—The First Corps (McCook's) on our left, has been very heavily engaged. The left and center of this corps gained ground, but the right yielded a little. Press your lines forward as far as possible to-night, and get in position to make a vigorous attack in the morning at daylight. If you have got your troops into a position which you deem advantageous, it will not be advisable to make a change for the purpose of complying with the general's instructions for you, sent by Captain Mack. It may be as well to have the division ordered to the center, and let it wait where it is for further orders. The general desires to see you in person as soon to-night as your duties will permit you to come over.

J. B. FRY,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

GENERAL THOMAS, *Second in Command.*

## EXTRACT FROM GENERAL GILBERT'S REPORT.

Pending these movements, the arrival of the First Corps (Major-General McCook's) was announced on my left, and the sound of artillery indicated that its appearance had attracted the serious attention of the enemy. I also received an officer from Major-General Crittenden, who had been dispatched to seek out my lines, that he might make a junction with me. I gave him the position, and being near the general's headquarters, I repaired to them, and made a report in person of the disposition of my forces and of the operations of the day, and then returned to my headquarters, near the crossing of Doctor's creek. On my way hither I was met by a messenger from Major-General McCook, to the effect that his corps was upon the point of being compromised, the enemy having attacked him in overwhelming numbers. About the same time, I received from General Sheridan warning that he could not hold his position if not supported with reinforcements, and confirming the unfavorable intelligence respecting the First Corps. I at once ordered Schoepf's division to close more to the left to support Sheridan, and also to cover the movement of the First Corps, which was gradually swinging around to our rear, under strong pressure brought to bear upon it. To support Sheridan's right, I ordered Mitchell to close to the left and co-operate closely with him. These orders being given, I continued on toward the left, and was shortly met by Captain Hoblitzell, with an urgent demand for support for the First Corps. He was furnished with a brigade and battery from Mitchell's division, though at the time my own lines were assailed in the most lively and vigorous manner. Shortly after, Major Wright brought an order to send two brigades from Schoepf's division to support the First Corps; but as one brigade had already gone, and my own lines were undergoing a dangerous assault, I dispatched only one of Schoepf's brigades.

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## EXTRACT FROM GENERAL McCOOK'S REPORT.

At this juncture—half-past 2 p. m.—seeing that I was assailed by at least three times my number, I despatched my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant L. M. Hosea, Sixteenth United States Infantry, to General Sheridan, commanding General Gilbert's left division, to request him to look to my right, to see that it was not turned. At 3 p. m. I dispatched Captain Horace M. Fisher, of my staff, to the nearest commander of troops, for assistance. He first met General Schoepf, marching at the head of his division, and reported my condition to him. General Schoepf expressed a desire to come up, and stated that he was moving to the front for some purpose, and requested Captain Fisher to see General Gilbert, who was riding with the column. Captain Fisher then reported to General Gilbert that my entire command was engaged, that the reserves were all in, and the safety of my corps was compromised. General Gilbert referred him to General Buell, to whom this officer reported.

At 3 p. m. I also dispatched another aid, Captain W. F. Hoblitzell, to General Schoepf, commanding the First division and reserve in Gilbert's corps, or the commander of the nearest troops in rear, to inform him of my condition, and ask for troops.

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## EXTRACT FROM GENERAL BRAGG'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT No. 2,  
BRYANSVILLE, KY., October 12.

SIR:—Finding the enemy pressing heavily in his rear near Perryville, Major-General Hardee, of Polk's command, was obliged to halt and check him at that point. Having arrived at Harrodsburgh from Frankfort, I determined to give him battle there, and accordingly concentrated three divisions of my old command—the Army of the Mississippi, now under command of Major-General Polk—Cheatham's, Buckner's, and Anderson's and directed General Polk to take command on the 7th and attack the enemy the next morning. Withers' division had gone the day before to support Smith. Hearing, on the night of the 7th, that the force in front of Smith had rapidly retreated, I moved early next morning to be present at the operations of Polk's command.

The two armies were formed confronting each other, on opposite sides of the town of Perryville. After consulting the General and reconnoitering the ground, and examining his dispositions, I declined to assume command, but suggested some change and modifications of his arrangements, which he promptly adopted.

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[BY TELEGRAPH FROM LOUISVILLE, OCTOBER 26TH.]

To General Thomas:

Crittenden's corps will proceed to Glasgow as fast as it reaches Columbia. If its baggage should not arrive, it will follow. It must be at Glasgow entire, by the 31st.

Put McCook's division in motion by way of Somerville, Horse Hill, and Bowling Green. It must reach Bowling Green by the 31st. Rations will meet it at Bell's.

Crittenden's division will draw rations from Cave City or Munfordsville.

Direct the First and Third divisions (Schoepf's and Rousseau's) to march for Bowling Green, by Campbellsville, Greensburg, and Glasgow. They must reach Bowling Green by the 1st proximo, and Glasgow by the 29th. Rations for them will be at Cave City.

J. B. FRY,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1862—1.30 p. m.

*General Buell, Mount Vernon:*

Your telegram of the 17th received this morning, and has been laid before the President who concurs in my telegram to you yesterday. The capture of East Tennessee should be the main object of your campaign. You say it is the heart of the enemy's resources. Make it the heart of yours. Your army can live there if the enemy can. You must in a great measure live upon the country, paying for your supplies when proper, and levying contributions when necessary. I am directed by the President to say to you that your army must enter East Tennessee this fall, and that it ought to move there while the roads are passable. Once between the enemy and Nashville, there will be no serious difficulty in re-opening your communications with that place. He does not understand why we can not march as the enemy marches, live as he lives, and fight as he fights, unless we admit the inferiority of our troops and our generals. Once hold the valley of the Upper Tennessee, and the operations in that state and in Kentucky will soon cease.

H. W. HALLECK.

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*[Extract from General Buell's Reply.]*

If the enemy puts himself on the defensive in East Tennessee, it will require an available force of eighty thousand men to take and hold it. If our army can subsist on the country, so much the better; but it will not do to rely solely on that source. If we can obtain even one-half our breadstuffs, that, for the present, is as much as we can do. Everything else must be hauled. Nashville is essential as a depot, afterward McMinnville. Gainesboro may be an important point for us as soon as the navigation of the Cumberland opens, which may not be for two months. We can procure all of our forage and breadstuffs and some meat from Middle Tennessee, but Nashville and the vicinity must be rid of the enemy, in any considerable force—we can not otherwise collect supplies. The enemy has repaired, and is now using the Chattanooga railroad to Murfreesboro, and is threatening Nashville somewhat seriously, as appears from a dispatch received to-day from General Negley, which I send you. This danger has no reference to Bragg's movements. If the enemy should not be there in full force, it would not be necessary to go there in full force, we could cross the Cumberland at various points above, and go in by Jamestown, Montgomery, Clinton, or Kingston, and there is no shorter way; that by Cumberland Gap being out of the question.

The railroad to Nashville must be opened and rendered secure, because, until navigation opens, that is the only channel of supplies.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C.,  
*October 24, 1862.*

*Major-General D. C. Buell, Commanding, etc.*

GENERAL:—The President directs, that on the presentation of this order, you will turn over your command to Major-General W. S. Rosecrans, and repair to Indianapolis, Indiana, reporting from that place to the adjutant-general of the army, for further orders.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

*General-in-Chief.*

## CHAPTER XVI.

### THE CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, AND SUBORDINATE CONTINGENT OPERATIONS.

WHILE General Buell's army was concentrating at Bowling Green and Glasgow, he was relieved of command by Major-General W. S. Rosecrans. This change occurred October 30th, in compliance with general orders No. 168, war department, dated October 24, 1862. This order gave General Rosecrans the command of the "Department of the Cumberland," which embraced that portion of Tennessee lying east of the Tennessee river, with a prospective enlargement from such portions of Alabama and Georgia as his army might gain. By the same order the troops of the department were designated as the "Fourteenth Army Corps." This designation soon gave place to the more appropriate and popular one, "Army of the Cumberland,"—the name which the original portions bore under Generals Anderson and Sherman.

In a day or two after General Rosecrans assumed command, the concentration ordered by his predecessor was effected. The commands of Generals McCook and Gilbert, each consisting of three divisions, were at Bowling Green. The three divisions under General Crittenden, with the exception of Hazen's brigade, which had not returned from the pursuit of the enemy, reached Glasgow on the 3d of November. The cavalry had also arrived at Bowling Green.

The question of an objective, unsettled by previous discussions, was inherited by General Rosecrans. For a time, he was urged\* to advance directly into East Tennessee; but the dan-

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\*See his testimony before the "Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War."

ger to Nashville, which, having been held against Breckinridge's command by Negley's and Palmer's divisions, was now the objective of a new combination, and the importance of this city as a secondary base of supplies, induced him to make preparations to concentrate his forces there. The veteran portion of his army needed rest and re-equipment, and the new regiments needed discipline; but the activity of the enemy gave no time for the recuperation of the one portion or the training of the other. The purposes of General Bragg were not at once revealed, but the conjectured advance of his army toward Nashville was almost immediately indicated with certainty by the appearance of his forces at Murfreesboro. As, therefore, Nashville was in danger from the advance of the army withdrawn from Kentucky, conjoined with Breckinridge's force, there was reason to fear that General Negley would be compelled to surrender, unless speedily reinforced. To prevent this, General Rosecrans ordered an advance to that city on the 4th of November. General McCook then moved from Bowling Green through Franklin, Mitchellsville, and Tyree Springs, and having posted Carlin's brigade at Edgefield Junction, to keep the communications open and protect supply trains, reached Nashville with the remainder of his command on the morning of the 9th, thus accomplishing a march of seventy-two miles in about three days. General Crittenden, leaving Smith's division temporarily at Glasgow, proceeded, with Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions, through Scottsville to Gallatin. Here he was joined by Colonel Kennett, in command of the cavalry, who had advanced from Bowling Green through Franklin, Mitchellsville, and Fountain Head. Colonel Zahn's brigade leading, the cavalry entered Gallatin simultaneously with Harker's brigade of Wood's division. These two brigades, acting in conjunction, drove out of the town the rear-guard of Morgan's cavalry, capturing twenty men with their horses. Morgan had just returned from the vicinity of Nashville, having unsuccessfully assaulted Colonel Smith at Edgefield on the 5th, losing five killed and nineteen wounded.

Early in the morning of the 5th, Forrest had also provoked an engagement on the other side of Nashville, having attacked

General Negley's pickets, who were withdrawn under the guns of Fort Negley. Immediately after their withdrawal, General Negley advanced against Forrest and drove him seven miles, and returning, foiled an attempt of the enemy to cut him off.

The advance of McCook and Crittenden relieved Nashville from siege, to the great disappointment of the enemy, who had several times, during September and October, arrogantly demanded its surrender.

General Breckinridge did not have a sufficient force to reduce the city, and General Thomas had left a second division to defend it. With two divisions as a garrison, it was no easy matter to hold the place and gather supplies from the country; but this was successfully accomplished. Supplies could not be sent from the North after the army entered Kentucky in pursuit of General Bragg, as his cavalry held the road in General Buell's rear; but the garrison was maintained through a general system of foraging,\* with large trains and strong detachments. Had General Breckinridge had a sufficient force to invest the town, he might have accomplished its reduction by starving the garrison. As it was, he could not get near, as the fortifications commenced by General Nelson, during the summer, and enlarged by General Negley, enabled the troops to keep him at a distance; and he had to content himself with feints, demands for surrender, and watching for opportunities to cut off foraging parties. General Bragg could not really spare Breckinridge's command from his main column, and had he not hoped that his Mississippi forces would be able to join him, bringing Breckinridge's troops with them, he would not perhaps have detached them to demonstrate against a place which would inevitably fall into his hands if he should succeed in defeating General Buell and establishing himself in Kentucky. When he began to despair of his ability to meet General Buell, he had changed the tone of his orders to his Mississippi generals, and presented the absolute necessity of their support, and urged them to free West Ten-

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\* The garrison was partly supplied by farmers living in the vicinity, who willingly fed their enemies at good prices and prompt payment.

nessee and hasten to him, putting their hands upon Nashville as they came. This was impracticable, without them, as General Breckinridge had no reinforcements, and the active garrison was ever ready for defense and almost ubiquitous in its foraging operations.

General Negley did not confine himself altogether to the defensive, but made at least one offensive dash, with very favorable results. Learning, early in October, that the enemy was concentrating at La Vergne, fifteen miles south, he sent out General Palmer, with eight hundred men—infantry and cavalry in equal strength, and four guns—on the direct road, and Colonel Miller, with eighteen hundred infantry, by a circuitous route, to the south of La Vergne. General Palmer skirmished with the enemy as he advanced, and having provoked him to make a stand, after a fight of thirty minutes he was routed, with a loss of eighty killed and wounded, one hundred and seventy-five captured, with three guns and the colors of a regiment.

The system of pickets adopted by Lieutenant-Colonel Von Schrader was so complete, that during a nominal siege of two months, there were no surprises.

With Nashville gained, General Rosecrans turned his attention to the equipment and discipline of his army, and the establishment of railroad communications with Louisville, and demanded the earnest co-operation of his officers of every grade, in the accomplishment of these objects.

On the 7th of November, General Rosecrans announced, in general order No. 8, the reorganization of his army, assigning Major-General Thomas to the command of the "Center," comprising the divisions of Rousseau, Negley, Dumont, Fry, and Palmer; Major-General McCook to the command of the "Right Wing," and Major-General Crittenden to that of the "Left Wing." Soon after he gave the divisions of Sheridan, Sill, and Woodruff\* to General McCook, and those of Wood, Smith, and Van Cleve to General Crittenden.

The Louisville and Nashville railroad having been opened

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\*Generals R. W. Johnson and J. C. Davis subsequently commanded in room of General Sill and Colonel Woodruff, and General J. M. Palmer in room of General Smith.

to Mitchellsville, a point a few miles north of the south tunnel, which Morgan had greatly injured, a temporary depot of supplies was there established. The enemy had so damaged the road at the tunnel and between it and Nashville, that it required a period of several weeks to put it in running order. Until its completion, supplies for all the troops south of Mitchellsville were transported in wagons.

The completion and protection of the railroad, and the transportation of supplies, were intrusted to General Thomas, whose headquarters were established at Gallatin. Pursuant to orders, General Thomas relieved General Smith's division, at Glasgow, with Colonel Scott's brigade of General Dumont's division; sent Dumont with his other two brigades to Scottsville; occupied Gallatin with General Fry's division, for the protection of the railroad, and employed General Rousseau's division to forward supplies and assist in the maintenance of communications with Nashville. The divisions of Generals Negley and Palmer remained at Nashville.

While the command of General Thomas was thus located and employed, General Crittenden crossed the Cumberland river and disposed his troops at Silver Springs, and was there joined by General Smith, who had moved his division from Glasgow by way of Gallatin.

On the 9th, General Rosecrans established his headquarters at Nashville, an event which indicated the concentration of his army, and preparations for an advance. The enemy was active near his army, in efforts to intercept supply trains, annoy and capture outposts, and overwhelm feeble detachments, but as yet it was not known where General Bragg would concentrate his forces. Being superior in cavalry, his sporadic operations were often successful, and he succeeded, too, until late in the month, in veiling his grander objects. But ignorance of the ulterior designs of his antagonist did not prevent General Rosecrans from accomplishing his own, and gradually his forces were moved toward Nashville, even before railroad communications were established between that city and Louisville. General Crittenden moved on the 18th from Silver Springs, and leisurely concentrated his force at Nashville. General Dumont, with two brigades, advanced to Gallatin.

Scott's brigade moved first from Glasgow to Tompkinsville, and subsequently to Hartsville. Harlan's brigade was posted at Castalian Springs, and Colonel Hall was ordered forward from Munfordsville to Glasgow. General Paine reported to General Thomas, to take command of the troops guarding the railroad, and established his headquarters at Gallatin.

During the month of November the enemy had no marked success, even in his chosen mode of warfare. In most cases he was foiled in attempting to capture supply trains and outposts, and in several aggressive enterprises the national troops gained decided advantages. Several of these minor actions deserve mention.

November 12th, Colonel S. D. Bruce, with seventeen companies of infantry and about nine hundred cavalry, was ordered from Bowling Green to Russellville to clear that section of guerrillas. He marched from Russellville on the 29th, and routed about eight hundred of the enemy's irregular troops, and drove them beyond Clarksville, toward Charlotte.

About the 16th, Colonel Carlin sent a detachment, under Colonel McKee, from Edgefield, across the Cumberland river, into Cheatham county, to give attention to guerrillas. Colonel McKee captured forty-six men and thirty horses and mules, and returned to Edgefield on the 20th.

Two days later, General Morgan attacked Lieutenant-Colonel Lister, commanding the Thirty-first Ohio, at Cage's ford of the Cumberland river, and was handsomely repulsed. Colonel Lister had been posted there several days before by direction of General Thomas. Just before the attack, Morgan, in person, as it was afterward ascertained, and several of his staff, all in disguise, approached under a flag of truce. As they revealed no purpose which justified the use of this flag, Colonel Lister inferred that their real object was a reconnoissance with a view to capture his command. As the river was between him and support, he crossed over soon after Morgan left, and from the safer side awaited his coming. Morgan soon appeared again, and anticipating an easy capture, rushed upon Lister's vacant position, and was severely punished by the volleys of his intended captives from the opposite bank of the stream.

Colonel Kennett, acting chief of cavalry, left Hartsville on the 17th, and joined General Crittenden at Silver Springs. He subsequently took position in his front south of Nashville. On the 27th, he routed a large body of the enemy on the Franklin turnpike, and drove them fifteen miles.

The same day, General Kirk, with a portion of his brigade, drove Wheeler from La Vergne, capturing a small number of prisoners. From them, definite information concerning General Bragg's position, strength, and purposes was obtained. From this time General Rosecrans' plans had reference to a probable battle near Murfreesboro.

In the evening of the 27th, Colonel Roberts, of the Forty-second Illinois, captured a captain and squad of Morgan's men, with their equipments and horses; and about the same time, Major Hill, with a squadron of the Second Indiana Cavalry, recaptured a forage train, releasing the prisoners taken with it, and killing twenty of the force that had made the capture, by suddenly crossing the Cumberland river near Hartsville.

A few days later, Hartsville was made memorable by a serious disaster to the national arms. December 2d, Colonel Scott, of the Nineteenth Illinois, had been relieved of the command of the Thirty-ninth brigade by Colonel A. B. Moore, of the One Hundred and Fourth Illinois. This brigade had been stationed at Hartsville, by General Thomas, to guard a ford and observe the enemy on the Lebanon road. The position was elevated, and regarded as susceptible of easy defense. The brigade comprised the One Hundred and Sixth and One Hundred and Eighth Ohio Infantry, the One Hundred and Fourth Illinois, about two hundred and fifty men of the Second Indiana Cavalry, and one company of Kentucky cavalry, in all, about eighteen hundred men. The effective force, however, was twelve hundred, as two hundred had been sent to Gallatin, and four hundred were unfit for duty.

On the 6th, General Morgan, with a strong force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, left Prairie Mills, eight miles south of Lebanon and twenty-five from Hartsville, and encamped the following night within five miles of the latter place. Morgan's strength has been variously estimated. Colonel Moore

placed it at four thousand cavalry and two regiments of infantry. In "Morgan and his Captors," his strength is estimated at fifteen hundred men. General Bragg, in his congratulatory order after the engagement, states that he had twelve hundred men in action.

Morgan planned a complete surprise. He crossed the Cumberland and encamped so quietly the night of the 6th, and approached and formed his lines so adroitly the next morning, that he was almost in Moore's camps before it was known that he was near. The reports of his advance are so conflicting that it can not be ascertained with certainty how Morgan's proximity became known. Colonel Moore's videttes and pickets, from his fault in posting them, or their own in the performance of their duty, did not give warning of his approach. Still the surprise was not absolute. The "pickets" or "camp guard," or some frightened "negro," certainly made known that he was coming, but not in time for the formation of suitable plans to resist him. At the time he was discovered, he was marching toward a ravine at the base of the hill upon which Moore's command was posted. A frail skirmish line opposed his advance, and gave time for the hasty formation of a line of battle on the top of the hill. Morgan formed a compact line with his infantry and a portion of his cavalry dismounted, and moved steadily to the ravine, there securing a somewhat sheltered position, from which his fire was so effective that Colonel Moore deemed his position untenable, and approved of a movement to the rear. In effecting this, the command was thrown into confusion. Colonel Tafel, of the One Hundred and Sixth Ohio, assumed a position of his own selection, without orders. The One Hundred and Fourth Illinois, a portion of the One Hundred and Eighth Ohio, and the cavalry, resisted the enemy for a short time, and then Colonel Moore surrendered. Colonel Tafel and the commanders of isolated companies surrendered subsequently. The contest lasted an hour and a half. Colonel Moore lost fifty killed and one hundred wounded—the remaining fourteen hundred and fifty, two pieces of artillery, and arms, camp equipage and trains, corresponding to the strength of his command. General Bragg himself reported Morgan's loss at one hundred and twenty-

five killed and wounded. A careful comparison of the conflicting reports of this action warrants the following conclusions: That Colonel Moore's outlook was at fault; that nothing had been done to strengthen his position; that there was confusion and absence of plan in the effort to resist the enemy, and that a portion of the troops failed to exhibit that subordination and bravery which characterized them in subsequent battles.

Another engagement occurred on the 9th, with different conduct on the part of officers and men, and consequently with different issue. On that day, Colonel Stanley Matthews, of the Fifty-seventh Ohio, with his brigade, composed of his own regiment, the Thirty-fifth Indiana, the Eighth and Twenty-first Kentucky, and a section of Swallow's battery, moved out upon the Murfreesboro road, with a large train, in quest of forage. Leaving the road, he passed to Stone river, and filled his wagons in a bend of the river, and just as the full train was ready to move toward Nashville, the sharp report of musketry was heard in his rear. This was the first intimation to Colonel Matthews that General Wheeler, with a force of cavalry, mounted infantry, and artillery, was between him and Nashville, and advancing to cut him off. The warning volley came from a few men of the Twenty-first Kentucky, who were guarding the wagons. He at once threw forward the Fifty-seventh Ohio and Thirty-fifth Indiana, and after a severe encounter with the foe, drove him so far as to admit the movement of his train toward Nashville, with his command so formed as to protect it; the Ohio and Indiana regiments were in front, and the Kentuckians on the flanks and in the rear. He ordered a brisk homeward movement, and as it progressed, Wheeler twice attacked the Kentuckians, but recoiled from their fire. He then advanced more cautiously upon the flanks of the command—a movement that involved the whole command in action, but resulted in the failure of the fourth attack. Wheeler then withdrew. Colonel Matthews lost five men killed, over thirty wounded, and six missing. Wheeler's loss was probably greater.

On the 11th, Brigadier-General D. S. Stanley, recently transferred from the Army of the Tennessee, and assigned

as chief of cavalry in the Army of the Cumberland, moved upon the Franklin road with a strong force, encamping at night within four miles of Franklin. The next morning he engaged the enemy vigorously, and drove him from the place, killing five men, including a lieutenant, capturing twelve, and a large number of horses and valuable property, and losing but one man. He also destroyed mills and other property valuable to the enemy, and returned to his camp on the 13th. His men had in this operation their first experience with revolving rifles.

Late in December, General Morgan moved into Kentucky with a strong force, to destroy General Rosecrans' communications. On the 25th, Colonel Hobson, commanding at Muncie, attacked him six miles from that place and inflicted a loss of over fifty men. Moving north, Morgan captured the stockade at Bacon creek. At Muldraugh's Hill, he attacked and captured the Seventy-first Indiana. The fight here lasted ten hours, though the parties to it were unequal. At Elizabethtown, he captured the Ninety-first Illinois, surrounding the town and firing upon it, without giving warning or an opportunity to escape. He destroyed a large amount of property, in part belonging to his friends, and appropriated bountifully for his command. On the 26th, General J. J. Reynolds, commanding in room of General Dumont, moved in pursuit from Gallatin, by Scottsville and Glasgow, while Colonel Harlan proceeded with his brigade by rail. The latter overtook Morgan at the Rolling fork of Salt river, and defeating him, drove him toward Bardstown. Colonel Hoskins fell upon him as he was passing near Lebanon, capturing from his force one hundred and fifty men.

Morgan wrought great damage and suffered heavy losses. The most serious injury to the railroad was the destruction of the bridges at Bacon creek and Nolin, and the trestles at Elizabethtown and Muldraugh's Hill.

Meanwhile a counter raid was in progress. On the 21st, General Carter, with the Ninth Pennsylvania, Second Michigan, and part of the Eighth Ohio Cavalry, moved from Lebanon, Kentucky, toward East Tennessee, to injure the Tennessee and Virginia railroad. He advanced through Nicholas-

ville, Big Hill, and Pine Mountain; crossed the Cumberland Mountain, forty miles northeast of Cumberland Gap, and moved thence through Southwestern Virginia and Jonesboro, Tennessee, to Carter's Station. He destroyed the bridges over the Watauga and Holston rivers and the railroad for several miles, on the 28th, and then returned to Kentucky, mainly on the route of his advance. While these subordinate operations were in progress, preparations for an offensive campaign were completed. The Louisville and Nashville railroad having been opened, and sufficient supplies having been accumulated to warrant an advance against General Bragg, at Murfreesboro, General Thomas moved to Nashville on the 22d of December, and concentrated there Rousseau's and Negley's divisions, and Walker's brigade of Fry's division, leaving the remaining two brigades of the latter and Reynolds' division on the line of the Louisville and Nashville railroad. General Rosecrans had previously placed the post of Nashville under Brigadier-General R. B. Mitchell, with Morgan's and McCook's brigades as garrison.

During the first two months of his command, General Rosecrans had been untiring in his efforts to assimilate with his army the fresh troops that had been attached, and had obtained from Washington power to make summary disposition of all officers who failed in duty from incompetency or other causes. And to simplify the designation of divisions and brigades, he changed the consecutive numbering throughout his army, and numbered the divisions as First, Second, and Third, in each grand unit, and the brigades in the same way in each division. He required that brigades in divisions, and divisions in the larger organizations, should be numbered from right to left, but that in reports they should be designated by the names of their respective commanders.

The department commander also instituted new measures in dealing with the non-military enemies within his lines—measures which impressed this troublesome class of persons with the power of the national government, and restricted them in aiding the enemy in arms with information or supplies.

It is probable that General Bragg did not anticipate an advance against his position at Murfreesboro, as he sent, at the

same time, General Morgan into Kentucky, and General Wheeler into West Tennessee, thus depriving himself of the greater portions of his cavalry. Their absence and the fact indicated by their absence, induced General Rosecrans to make an early movement. On the evening of the 25th of December, he gave orders for his army to march the next morning.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN.

WHEN General Rosecrans ordered the advance of his army, the dispositions of his antagonist were well known. Generals Polk's and Kirby Smith's corps were at Murfreesboro, with an advance at Stewart's creek and La Vergne; and General Hardee's corps was on the turnpike road between Triune and Eagleville, with detachments thrown forward to Knob's Gap and Nolensville. As it was the prerogative of the enemy on the defensive to choose his battle-field, General Rosecrans gave positive and contingent orders to the commanders of his "Right Wing," "Center," and "Left Wing." He directed General McCook to move with his three divisions—Johnson's, Davis', and Sheridan's—by the Nolensville turnpike to Triune; General Thomas, with Rousseau's and Negley's divisions, and Walker's brigade, to march on the Franklin and Wilson turnpikes to threaten Hardee's left, and then to cross by county roads to Nolensville; and General Crittenden to advance on the direct road to Murfreesboro. At Nolensville, General Thomas would be in position to support either wing, and General McCook was ordered to attack Hardee at Triune, as soon as the commander of the "Center" should reach Nolensville. Should General Bragg reinforce Hardee against McCook, then Thomas was to move to his support. If Hardee should retreat, and the enemy meet Crittenden in force, then Thomas was to reinforce the "Left Wing," and move upon the enemy's left flank, and McCook, after detaching a division to pursue Hardee or observe him, should then move to the rear of Thomas and Crittenden.

The movements ordered were begun on the morning of the  
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26th of December, 1862. The advance of the right wing was given to General Davis, who moved from camp at 6 a. m. toward Nolensville, on the Edmonson turnpike, to Prim's blacksmith-shop, where he diverged on a common road leading through a broken country, rendered unfriendly to the comfort and celerity of his command by the rain which fell in torrents during the forenoon. General Davis' cavalry escort, Captain Sheerer's company of the Thirty-sixth Illinois, developed the enemy's pickets a few miles from camp—a fact which showed plainly that though General Bragg may not have anticipated the advance of the Army of the Cumberland, he had made provision to gain early knowledge of all movements in his front. Only slight resistance, however, was offered until the head of the column reached the vicinity of Nolensville, where it became necessary to form the division to dislodge the enemy. Post's brigade was deployed in line of battle, and Pinney's battery so posted as to command the town and the approaches from the southwest. At this juncture, the enemy's cavalry was observed to be assuming position, and a battery opened fire, which Pinney's response soon silenced. Woodruff's brigade then formed on the right to prevent a flank attack, and Carlin advanced and dislodged the enemy.

General Davis here learned that he would be more strongly opposed at Knob's Gap, and he at once disposed his weary troops to carry that point also. The enemy's lines were soon discerned, extending upon a range of high rocky hills through which the Nolensville and Triune turnpike passes in a depression known as "Knob's Gap." The position was favorable for defense and well guarded by artillery, which opened upon Davis at long range, who put Hotchkiss' and Pinney's batteries in action as speedily as possible. Carlin's brigade then charged the enemy's battery, captured two guns, and carried the heights on the right. Post's brigade carried the hills on the left, and Woodruff's drove the enemy's pickets on the extreme right. Night came with the termination of the conflict. Johnson's and Sheridan's divisions, having followed in supporting distance all day, came up, and the whole command bivouacked for the night.

The "Left Wing" advanced on the Murfreesboro road, Palmer's division leading, and encountered the enemy a short distance beyond the former outposts. Spirited skirmishing was maintained all day, the obstinacy of the enemy increasing as the head of the column steadily advanced. At night, this wing bivouacked four miles north of La Vergne.

General Thomas' command advanced, with Negley's division in front. At Owen's store, Negley moved hurriedly to the left to support General Davis at Nolensville. At night, the troops were scattered from Brentwood to Nolensville.

The cavalry moved in three columns. Colonel Minty's brigade, under Colonel Kennett, the division commander, accompanied the left wing. Colonel Zahm's brigade proceeded on the Franklin road, as a protection to General McCook's right flank, and General Stanley, with the reserve brigade, also accompanied the right wing.

A dense fog, on the morning of the 27th, prevented the right wing from advancing to Triune as early as had been expected. A forward movement was attempted early in the morning, but the enemy having been encountered in apparent strength by General Johnson, General McCook deemed it hazardous to press an engagement on unknown ground, in fog so thick as to forbid the distinction of friend from foe, at the ordinary interval between opposing lines of battle. Heavy skirmishing and artillery action were maintained during the forenoon. At 1 p. m. the fog lifted, and Johnson, with Sheridan in immediate support, advanced to the town, where Hardee's corps had been in line of battle during the preceding night and morning. Later he had burned the bridge over Wilson's creek, and leaving some cavalry and a battery to contest the crossing, retired his main force. Upon Johnson's approach, his rear-guard fled, after the feeblest resistance to a line of skirmishers. Johnson then moved south a mile, and stopped for the night; the other two divisions were close in his rear.

As it was proposed that the wings of the army should advance without offering either to the enemy, in the absence of the support of the other and the center, General McCook's delay prevented the early movement of General Crittenden.

At 11 a. m., however, he moved forward—Wood's division in the advance, Palmer and Van Cleve following. General Has-call's brigade of the leading division drove the enemy from La Vergne, and the adjacent hills, and, supported by the other brigades of the division, forced the enemy over Stuart's creek, five miles beyond. Colonel McKee, of the Third Kentucky Infantry, saved the bridge, which had been fired by the retreating foe. Has-call also repulsed an attack of cavalry on his left flank, capturing twenty-five prisoners. From La Vergne, Colonel Hazen's brigade of Palmer's division moved on the Jefferson turnpike, and seized the bridge over Stuart's creek, and drove the enemy beyond. Van Cleve's division, after countermarching on the main road, followed, and encamped north of the creek. Wood's and Palmer's divisions passed the night at Stewartsboro, on the direct road.

During the day, General Thomas advanced Negley's division from Nolensville to Crittenden's right at Stewartsboro, and moved Rousseau's division to Nolensville, leaving Walker's brigade at Brentwood. The marching on the turnpikes was greatly retarded by the rain which fell on the 26th and 27th, but on the common cross-roads it was exceedingly laborious. Therefore the troops and trains of this command changed positions slowly.

The 28th being the Sabbath, there was no general advance. General McCook sent forward General Willich's brigade on a reconnoissance, to ascertain the direction of General Hardee's retreat. General Willich advanced seven miles on the Shelbyville road, and learned that he had retired to Murfreesboro. General Crittenden only deployed a few troops to guard against the onsets of cavalry, which were threatened during the day. General Thomas advanced Rousseau's division to Stewartsboro, and Walker's brigade to the Nolensville turnpike. General Stanley made a reconnoissance to College Hill, and confirmed the retreat of General Hardee to Murfreesboro.

General Stanley moved in advance of the right wing, on the 29th. The Anderson cavalry, the Fifteenth Pennsylvania, pushed the enemy, at full charge, for six miles. A heavy loss was suffered, however, late in the evening, in an unfortunate attack upon two regiments of infantry lying in concealment.

Major Rosengarten and six men were killed, and Major Ward and five men wounded. Colonel Zahm's brigade advanced on the Franklin road, and joined the reserve brigade at the crossing of Stewart's creek. The enemy's cavalry were met during the day in strong force, at Wilkinson's Cross-roads, and were driven across Overall's creek to the immediate front of General Bragg's line of battle before Murfreesboro. General Davis followed the cavalry, and bivouacked at Overall's creek; Johnson and Sheridan at Wilkinson's Cross-roads.

General Crittenden advanced with Wood's division on the left of the Murfreesboro road, and Palmer's on the right of it. Wagner's brigade of the former, and Grose's of the latter, were deployed in front, and drove the enemy's skirmishers before them upon their main line of battle. Late in the afternoon, these divisions halted about two and a half miles from Murfreesboro, their commanders having observed indications of an army in position in their immediate front. They at once deployed their troops in line of battle, and informed General Crittenden of their action and the probable situation. Up to this time the opinion had obtained in the national army that General Bragg would not accept battle at Murfreesboro. Acting upon this supposition, General Rosecrans ordered General Crittenden to occupy the town that night with one of his divisions, and encamp the other two miles outside. This order reached General Crittenden at dark, just as he reached the front. He at once made dispositions for its prompt execution, designating Wood's division for the advance. General Wood, believing that as this movement was to be made at night over unknown ground and against an army in position, it would result in total failure and heavy loss, earnestly protested against it. At first, General Crittenden refused to suspend his order to General Wood, and required his immediate advance, as he considered the order of his superior too positive to admit discretion. Subsequently, however, General Palmer having supported General Wood in a second protest, he suspended his order for an hour, and dispatched to General Rosecrans for instructions in the premises. Before the hour had passed, General Rosecrans came up and countermanded his own order, and recalled the troops to their

former position. Even this movement was critical, as Colonel Harker's brigade had crossed Stone river, and had driven Breckinridge's advance upon his main line, and Hascall's brigade and Bradley's battery were in the river, advaneing in rear. However, Colonel Harker's adroitness and the veil of darkness secured their withdrawal with only slight loss.

In the meantime General Van Cleve's division, which had moved from the Jefferson turnpike to the Murfreesboro road, came up and was posted in rear of General Wood's position. Colonel Hazen also came up from Stewart's creek, and was placed in line with his division. General Negley, who had marched from Stewartsboro on the right of Crittenden's command, went into position on General Palmer's right. Thus four divisions were in line of battle before the enemy.

General Rousseau remained at Stewartsboro, but detached Colonel Starkweather's brigade to the Jefferson turnpike bridge over Stone river. At night Colonel Walker reached Stewartsboro.

Very early in the morning of the 30th, General McCook was ordered to move forward and take position in line of battle on the right of General Negley. In compliance, Sheridan's division, preceded by General Stanley, with a regiment of cavalry, moved on the Wilkinson turnpike, closely followed by Johnson and Davis. As General Sheridan approached the enemy's position he was more and more obstinately opposed, and when his head of column had reached a point within two and a quarter miles of Murfreesboro, it became necessary that he and General Davis should deploy their divisions in line of battle. The left of Sheridan's division, when in line, rested on the Wilkinson turnpike. General Davis formed his division on Sheridan's right, and General Johnson held his in reserve. The direction of the line was such as to refuse Sheridan's right and Davis' whole front, and yet the latter was stubbornly resisted—a fact that revealed General Bragg's care of his left flank at this early stage of the conflict. As the line wheeled into position, Carlin's brigade of Davis' division had a severe conflict with the enemy, in which the eagerness of Colonel J. W. S. Alexander, commanding the Twenty-first Illinois, led him to charge a battery, which, when abandoned

by its cannoneers, was successfully defended by supporting infantry. This attack served to fix definitely the troops in opposition at this point. In the attainment of position, General Sheridan lost seventy-five men, and General Davis nearly two hundred.

The left wing during the day maintained essentially the position assumed the previous evening. There was a slight change in Palmer's division, which was advanced a short distance, against spirited opposition. The pioneer brigade, under Captain Morton, was posted on Stone river to prepare fords.

In the center, General Thomas brought up three brigades of Rousseau's division, and stationed them in rear of Negley's line. Colonel Starkweather was left to guard a bridge on the Jefferson turnpike, and repulsed an attack by cavalry. Colonel Walker moved from Stewart's creek to La Vergne, and routed a portion of General Wheeler's cavalry, that had captured General McCook's train. He recaptured about eight hundred men, and all the train animals, the wagons having been burned by the enemy.

In the afternoon, General Stanley, with a portion of his cavalry, returned to La Vergne. The remaining portions of his command were posted on the flanks of the army.

It was now evident that the two armies were in close proximity, in readiness for battle. During the day there had been heavy skirmishing in front of the troops in position, and the right wing had met strong resistance in advancing to its assigned place, abreast the center. At intervals, from flank to flank, batteries had responded to batteries, and where the main lines were parallel, or nearly so, they had reciprocally felt the fire of musketry.

On the general battle front of the national army, Wood's division was next Stone river, Hascall's brigade forming the extreme left, Harker's the center, and Wagner's connecting with Palmer's left at the Nashville turnpike. Palmer's division was formed with Grose's brigade on the left, Cruff's on the right connecting with Negley, and Hazen's in reserve. Miller's brigade of Negley's division connected with Cruff,

and Stanley's with Sheridan's left on the Wilkinson turnpike. Roberts' brigade of the latter division was on the left, Sill's on the right, and Schaefer's in reserve. Sill's brigade touched Woodruff's brigade on the left of Davis' line. Carlin's formed his center, and Post's his right. The formation of these two divisions of the right wing conformed to the general type, and had at least average strength. At first Johnson's division was wholly in reserve.

During the afternoon of the 30th, General McCook was informed by a citizen that the right of Davis' division, resting near the Franklin turnpike, was opposite the center of General Bragg's battle front, which fact he communicated to General Rosecrans; and to provide as far as possible against the palpable danger, he threw Johnson's division in position on the right of Davis. Kirk's brigade was formed on the right of Post, but thrown forward so as to hold the front edge of the woods, which gave strength to the position, and also to command the open ground between the opposing lines of battle. Willich's brigade was refused to the right and rear of Kirk, with a line facing south, and Baldwin's was entirely in reserve, near division headquarters, a mile or more distant.

General McCook's corps was now formed in a line broken at several points. General Davis' line formed a right angle with General Sheridan's, and faced the south very nearly. The trend of Kirk's line was more toward the east, and then Willich's stretched westward, facing south; and although Kirk was thrown forward to secure all the advantages of the position, the two divisions on the right, as a whole, formed a refused flank. General Rosecrans' report indicates his belief that his right did not trend in a proper direction, in facing "strongly toward the east, and that his own disadvantages of position and maneuver were fatally enhanced by the 'faulty position'" of his right wing. The general trend of this wing, however, conformed to that of the enemy's line in its front, the latter leaning forward from the point opposite Sheridan's right, and the former bending back in correspondence. The enemy's line, from the river to the Franklin road, had been located for defense, and rested as far as practicable in woods, with open ground in front; and as the right wing of the

national army, according to the plan of battle, was to await attack, its division commanders observed similar prudence in establishing their lines.

As General Bragg believed that his army was inferior in numbers to that of General Rosecrans, his first policy was to await an attack. He therefore formed his army with his left wing, composed of Withers' and Cheatham's divisions, under General Polk, in front of Stone river, covering the direct roads leading from Murfreesboro to Nashville and Franklin, and his right wing embracing Breckinridge's and Cleburne's divisions, across the river on Polk's right. He posted McCown's division, as the main reserve, in rear of his center, and a free brigade, under General Jackson, on his extreme right flank. In this formation, Withers' division occupied the space from Stone river to the Franklin turnpike, or the whole front of the national army. Cheatham's division formed a line of the same length, directly in the rear. The right wing was similarly formed, with Breckinridge's division in front and Cleburne's in rear.

With his forces thus disposed, General Bragg awaited General Rosecrans' approach, until the evening of the 29th, then, apprehending from General McCook's advance on the Wilkinson turnpike that he would be flanked on his left, he transferred McCown's division from reserve across the river, to General Polk's left, with its right resting on the Franklin road. In not receiving an attack on the 30th, the Confederate general was disappointed, and in the evening resolved to assail from his left the next day, and for this purpose moved Cleburne's division from the rear of Breckinridge to the rear of McCown, and gave the command of these two divisions to General Hardee. He had then four divisions in double formation, in front of Stone river, their right resting on the river bank and their center on the Franklin turnpike, near which rested the right of McCook's corps. He had no reserve but Breckinridge's command on the east side of the river, but considered this force available for support at any point in his line, as there were no indications of an attack upon his right.

General Polk was evidently in error in his official report, respecting the exact positions of the three divisions of the

right wing of the national army, though correct as to the order of their alignment. He supposed, and so stated, that the left of Withers' division, resting on the Franklin turnpike, was opposite the right of Sheridan, whom he located "on a ridge of rocks, with chasms intervening, and covered with a dense growth of rough cedars"—the exact description of Davis' position—while Sheridan only touched the cedars with his right. As further proof of this misapprehension, General Polk stated that Alexander's assault in the evening of the 30th, was an attempt to capture a battery on the left of Withers' line, and hence opposite Davis, not Sheridan.

The battle front of each army was now continuous, save the separation of Breckinridge by the river. But such was the topography of the field, that the trend of the main lines was curved and broken in turn. Between the two armies there was open ground almost continuously. Some portions of the national line rested in strong defensive positions, as in the case of Davis' division and Kirk's brigade; but much of the line was on open ground. Sheridan's division was on open ground, except where its right touched Davis. Negley's division was uncovered, but had woods in rear. Palmer's was somewhat embowered by an oak grove.

General Rosecrans' plan of battle, as revealed in his official report and by his orders on the field, was as follows: General McCook was instructed to take an advantageous position on the right, and hold the enemy in check, if attacked; but if overpowered, to fall back slowly, refusing his right. If not attacked, he was to engage the enemy sufficiently to hold him in his front. Generals Thomas and Palmer were to open with skirmishing, and gain the enemy's center and left as far as the river. General Crittenden was to throw Van Cleve's division across the river, at the lower ford, to advance against Breckinridge, and to cross Wood's division by brigades at the upper fords, and support Van Cleve's right. If successful in driving back the enemy's right, General Wood was to place his batteries on the heights east of the river, and open on his center and left in reverse. Then General Palmer should press the enemy in his front, and General Thomas should sustain the movement in the center.

Each army commander, on the night of the 30th, was therefore equally intent upon executing an essentially identical plan of battle, with an initiative by each from his left flank. General Bragg proposed that Hardee should attack at daylight the left of the national army, and then he would bring his whole army into action from this initiative by a right wheel on Polk's right flank, at Stone river, as a pivot. To mask his movement from his left, General Rosecrans ordered that fires should be built for two miles beyond McCook's right flank. This expedient was adopted to make the impression that the national forces were massing on that flank, to throw General Bragg off his guard at the opposite extremity of his line, and thus assure the success of the movement against it, proposed for Crittenden the next morning. General McCook had previously felt uneasy in regard to his right flank, believing that it was greatly overlapped by the enemy, and had given stringent orders to his subordinate commanders to watch against surprise; and any invitation to increase the strength of General Bragg's left, magnified his fear for his right.

Early in the morning of the last day of the year 1862, the commanders of the confronting armies, of nearly equal proportions, put upon trial a common plan of battle, with the contingency to each of miscarriage in the event of being too late in initial offense. The advantage of this dominant contingency was gained by General Bragg, and General Rosecrans was thrown upon the defensive at the opening of the battle.

Soon after dawn, General Hardee, with two-fifths of General Bragg's infantry, wheeled in long circuit upon the right of the national army. When he first moved from position, McCown's division deflected to the left, opening an interval to the left of Withers' flank, which was quickly filled by Cleburne's line; then the two divisions wheeled upon McCook's right flank. Kirk's brigade first felt the shock of battle, as it was in proximity to the pivot of the column in motion. His line had been attenuated to secure a good position for a battery, and one of his regiments was in the rear. The enemy's onset was furious, expressing alike the importance of the movement and the initial courage and spirit of the Southern

armies. Unfortunately for the national army, this flank of three brigades, when receiving an attack from two divisions of four brigades each, was not in ordinary condition for battle. The division commander was not on the line, nor near enough to give orders, and General Willich, commanding the brigade which had been posted for lateral defense, was absent from his command. This position of affairs forbade unity of action; in fact, these brave troops were thrown into confusion by circumstances over which they had no control. Generals Bragg and Polk claimed pretentiously, in their official reports, that these troops were surprised; and to some of them, no doubt, the blow was unexpected, at least from the quarter whence it came. Still the usual provision against surprise had been made. Skirmish lines were well offered to the enemy, and when General Kirk perceived the advancing column, he threw forward the Thirty-fourth Illinois to check it. This commander, who was mortally wounded, but lived to make a report, claimed that when he saw the strength of the column hurrying upon him, he called for help from Willich's brigade, which at that time was without a recognized commander. This brigade had been on the lookout for the enemy from an early hour, but had been ordered to breakfast by General Willich at the time of his starting to visit division headquarters. It does not appear from the reports that all the guns near the salient angle of this flank were in battery. In some cases the horses were detached. These circumstances, and the manifestly overwhelming strength of the enemy's lines, rendered the conflict exceedingly unequal. The reports of the commanders who battled upon these unequal conditions are so inharmonious that it is impossible to determine the order of the recession of these two brigades. It is, however, demonstrable that neither held position long, and that both in the sharp conflict suffered such losses as prove severe fighting or the maintenance of position, until withdrawal was impossible without great waste of life. Kirk lost five hundred men killed and wounded, and three hundred and fifty by capture. Willich lost a few less in killed and wounded, and more than double as many men by capture. General Willich was captured in an effort to join his brigade. Captain Edgar-

ton was captured with his battery located near the salient angle of the line, and three guns were lost from Goodspeed's battery, posted to the right of Willich's brigade. So quickly were these two brigades dislodged, that Colonel Baldwin was informed of the fact by stragglers from their ranks, and had barely time, in conjunction with General Johnson, to form his troops and make a slight advance before the enemy was upon him.

The recession of Kirk's and Willich's brigades exposed General Davis' right flank to the enveloping lines of the enemy, and he at once ordered Colonel Post to change the front of his brigade nearly perpendicularly to the rear, and to dispose his regiments and battery to repel a flank attack. Pinney's battery was moved one-fourth of a mile to the right, and the Fifty-ninth Illinois sent with it for support; the Seventy-fourth and Seventy-fifth Illinois were posted in the edge of the woods behind a fence, and when the enemy revealed his overlapping lines far to the right, the Twenty-second Indiana was deployed beyond the battery.

Colonel Baldwin's position was at least one-fourth of a mile to the right of Post. His brigade was posted behind a fence on the margin of wooded ground lying in front, and presented four regiments and a battery in line, with one regiment in reserve.

These dispositions had hardly been made, before the enemy advanced against Baldwin and Post on the flank, and against Carlin, Woodruff, and Sill on the main battle front. The consequent action was the second distinct stage of the battle and was one of the fiercest of the day. The forces which had driven Kirk's and Willich's brigades from position, attacked Baldwin and Post; while the brigades of Loomis and Maniguault, of Withers' division of General Polk's front line, fell upon Carlin, Woodruff, and Sill. Baldwin maintained his ground for a short time, but he was soon flanked on his right and compelled to withdraw; but Post repulsed the enemy, and Carlin, Woodruff, and Sill hurled back the columns assaulting them. This repulse was so emphatic that General Polk threw forward the reserve brigades on his left to renew the attack, his first line having been so broken as to need radical readjustment.

In repelling the attack upon Sheridan's right, General Sill had the support of a portion of Schaefer's brigade, but with this additional strength he was barely able to drive back the foe.

General Sheridan's line compassed four regimental intervals and was consequently a strong one, or this first attack would have pressed back his right brigade, at least that portion which was on open ground. The lines of the two divisions being perpendicular to each other, the right angle formed by Sill's and Woodruff's brigades and prominently offered to the enemy, made that point exceedingly critical, as a direct attack upon either would enfilade the line of the other, and the withdrawal of either of the connecting flanks would greatly expose the other. In the subsequent attacks, therefore, the enemy made special efforts to break these lines at the point of connection.

Having formed Vaughn's and Maney's brigades in room of Loomis' and Manigualt's, General Polk soon made a second attempt to carry this position, but the issue was the same as before—a complete repulse. In conjunction with this assault in front, Cleburne's division fell again upon Post's line and was also repulsed. Some previous success of this division had been regarded by General Polk as the dislodgment of Davis' division, and he now referred the fire of Pinney's battery to one of Sheridan's, wheeled to the right, but this division was still before him. Its left flank was now slightly bent back in consequence of the turning of Sill's brigade on its left. In the first attack upon General Sill, the enemy had made effort to capture Bush's battery, which had been posted considerably in advance of Hiscock's and Houghtaling's, and in the second assault this object was manifest. General Sill was killed between the guns of this battery, and soon after his fall, the right of the brigade having been turned, it was retired to the position of the other batteries, and Colonel Grensel, commanding in room of General Sill, sent the Twenty-first Michigan to support Hiscock's, now in the front.

As soon as practicable after the repulse of Vaughn's and Maney's brigades, General Cheatham reorganized his shattered troops, and with four brigades made a third attack upon Davis and Sheridan. In the formation of Polk's corps in two lines,

by divisions, the four brigades forming the left half of his corps, were under the command of General Cheatham, and the other four on the right were under General Withers. In this third attack Post's brigade was enveloped by General Hardee's victorious forces and was compelled to withdraw with the loss of one gun. His retirement exposed Carlin's right flank and rear, while resisting the enemy in his front. The flanks of both Woodruff's and Carlin's brigades were so bent that each commander thought himself isolated and entirely without support on either flank. The reports are not concurrent as to the order of the withdrawal of Carlin's and Woodruff's brigades, and Davis' and Sheridan's divisions, from the original battle line. The weight of testimony supports the hypothesis that Sheridan's right brigade was shattered and divided, while Woodruff was unmoved by the assaults upon him, except that his left was bent back for lateral defense, and that his brigade was the last of Davis' division to leave position. The conditions of the battle and the circumstances of withdrawal were such as to give different views to the several commanders, and their conflicting reports embarrass him who attempts to determine the exact order of events.

The regimental commanders of General Sill's brigade mention that they gave ground repeatedly on the right of the brigade, and assign as a reason that they were unsupported on their right. The reports from Woodruff's brigade claim that this brigade was unsupported on its left. The only fact which can explain this contradiction, and others occurring under similar circumstances, without impeaching the veracity of commanders, is, that under the pressure of attack covering the connecting points of regiments, brigades, or even larger organizations, the flanks naturally bend backward and inward toward their respective centers, and there is partial isolation at least, without an absolute loss of position.

There is the most positive testimony from the enemy, that the troops of Davis' division held their position in the cedar woods with great persistency. General Polk mentioned in his report that Vaughn lost one-third of his troops and every horse in the brigade but three, and that other brigades lost heavily. He claimed the capture of two guns from Sheridan, but these

were from Carpenter's battery of Davis' division, and this fact is decisive of General Polk's mistake in reference to the position of General Davis. General Sheridan lost no guns from his first position.

Whatever may have been the exact order of the recession of Davis and Sheridan, it is certain that neither held position long after the third assault of the enemy. The conditions of their retreat, however, were different, though the cause of it was common—the battle line on the left of Sheridan was intact, while the brigades of Davis' division were exposed on all sides. Colonel Post, under the pressure of Cleburne's division, moved directly to the Nashville turnpike, in rear of the army. Colonel Carlin held his ground until the destruction of his brigade was imminent, when his regiments broke to the rear from his left flank. Hotchkiss' battery moved across open fields to wooded ground, where General Davis attempted to form a new line. As Carlin's broken regiments reached this position, they were disposed to support this battery. Woodruff retreated through the woods in his rear, and then turned and charged the pursuing enemy with such force that he regained his original position, but being entirely unsupported, could not hold it. Through false information as to the purpose of General Davis, and danger from the overlapping lines of the enemy, Carlin abandoned the new line before Woodruff reached it, and both brigades crossed the Wilkinson turnpike and joined a portion of Johnson's division, which, having made repeated efforts to withstand the enemy, had fallen back to the right of General Rousseau's division.

When General Sill's brigade yielded its position, General Sheridan changed the front of Roberts' to the right, to cover its retreat, and ordered its commander to charge the enemy. In obedience, Colonel Roberts advanced, but the enemy did not await his approach. This movement was doubtless coincident with Woodruff's charge, when he regained his position, and the action of these brigades expressed such positive offense, that the advance of the enemy was greatly retarded.

Having recalled Colonel Roberts to a new line trending across his first line of battle, General Sheridan soon found

that this new position was untenable, and then he fell back to the Wilkinson turnpike, where he re-established his connection with Negley's right, and bending back his line twice at right angles, formed a new flank and covered Negley's rear.

General McCook's corps was driven from position after hard fighting against three-fifths of the Confederate army, eager to give complete success to the ruling movement of General Bragg's aggressive plan. General Hardee overlapped every flank offered to him, and yet his losses were so heavy that early in the day he asked for reinforcements, and did not press rapidly nor with remarkable power upon any of the improvised lines, and never so far gained the rear of a single brigade as to prevent an easy escape, and at last felt his way with great caution across the Wilkinson turnpike. General McCook gave personal attention to the maneuvers of Sheridan's division, and had his horse shot under him in proximity to his lines. As his other troops reached the right of General Rousseau, he made dispositions for their reorganization and alignment, so as to cover the communications of the army.

The third distinct stage of the battle involved a new disposition of all troops not on the battle front, and the fiercest fighting of Rousseau's, Sheridan's, Negley's, and Palmer's divisions—such fighting as palpably involved a crisis of the battle. The Confederate army continued to wheel, even to its pivot on the bank of Stone river, and the wave of battle was rapidly transmitted to that point.

Negley's and Palmer's divisions had made a slight advance early in the morning to feel the enemy, and to be in readiness to rush through his lines to the river, should General Crittenden's movement against Breckinridge across the stream prove successful. At 8 a. m., Crittenden's advance—Van Cleve's division—was in motion, and its leading brigades had crossed the river, while General Wood had withdrawn two brigades from position in preparation to follow. The noise of battle on the right had been heard all the morning, but as yet there had been no such indications of disaster to McCook as precluded the possibility of offense from the left flank, although it was probable that the right wing was severely engaged. When positive intelligence that the right had been turned was

received, Beatty's and Price's brigade of Van Cleve's division were in line before Breckinridge, and Fyffe's brigade was in the act of fording. Immediately, General Rosecrans recalled this offensive movement, that he might reinforce his right. He moved Fyffe's brigade rapidly to the rear on the Nashville road to repel the enemy's cavalry that had fallen upon the trains and captured men and wagons. He sent Beatty's brigade to the right of Rousseau, and soon ordered to the same point Harker's, from Wood's division, which had been withdrawn from position in conjunction with Hascall's, in preparation to follow Van Cleve. Price's brigade, of Van Cleve's division, was left to hold the ford, and General Wood was allowed to hold Hascall's brigade as a mobile column. These dispositions were ordered about the time that the enemy moved against Negley.

When General Thomas perceived that General Sheridan had changed position, and knew that this change was the prophecy of unexpected conditions of battle for his command, he ordered General Rousseau to move two brigades to the right and rear of Sheridan, whose right flank was then exposed, though bent far back toward Negley's rear. Hardee's corps was now entirely upon the broken flank, which had been bereft of two divisions, and was moving with his divisions in eschelon to overlap Sheridan and take Thomas in reverse. Cheatham was wheeling upon his front with his four brigades, and Withers, with an equal force, was advancing against Negley and Palmer in front. This combination involved the action of the entire Confederate army, save the force under Breckinridge across the river. The object of Thomas in moving Rousseau to Sheridan's right was to support him should he be able to hold his ground, and cover his retreat should he be compelled to fall back. For a time, these dispositions checked the advance and success of the enemy, but they provoked a conflict which palpably brought on another crisis of the battle.

Three of the five divisions of the national army forming the battle front had been displaced, and the attack upon Negley was intended to dislodge another, and was consequently made with a fury and persistence born of such a purpose. Had

there been immediate success, the center of the national army would have been broken at a time when the new dispositions of troops to restore the right were incomplete, and in all probability, total defeat would have ensued.

The first attacks upon Negley and Sheridan, involving Rousseau also, were repulsed. Negley had three batteries (Marshall's, Ellsworth's, and Schultz's), which were well posted, contributing largely to the defensive strength of this division. The brigades of Anderson and Stewart, under General Withers, assaulted Negley; while General Cheatham, with the left half of Polk's corps, moved repeatedly upon Sheridan, pressing his left especially, as its displacement would be fatal to Negley. Roberts' brigade, supported by Houghtaling's battery and a section from each of the other batteries, Bush's and Hiscock's, occupied a position south of the Wilkinson road. At the termination of this attack, General Sheridan having nearly exhausted his supply of ammunition, and Colonel Roberts having been killed, ordered his division to fall back, leaving Houghtaling's battery and two guns from Bush's in the hands of the enemy. This withdrawal opened a gap between Negley's and Rousseau's divisions, exposing the right flank of the former and the left flank of the latter. Into this space the enemy rushed, closely following Sheridan's retiring troops, and reaching the rear of these divisions. The condition of Negley and Rousseau was now exceedingly critical, exposed on flank and rear, and subjected to a cross fire of musketry and artillery at short range. While it was utterly impossible for them to maintain their positions, it verged closely upon an impossibility for them to secure new ones with safety to themselves and the army. In the emergency, General Thomas ordered both Negley and Rousseau to withdraw to form a new line. Each was covered at first by cedars. But the enemy was in their rear as well as front, and it was impracticable to give mutual support, as their insulation was too positive and the necessity of rapid movement too imperative. It was necessary also to form a temporary line to save the artillery, before a permanent one could be established. General Thomas, therefore, first directed that a new line should be taken running along a depression in the open ground in rear of the

cedar woods, to be held until the artillery could be retired to the high ground near the Nashville turnpike, where the permanent line was to be established. Rousseau's division, leaving its position under a heavy fire, drew back to this depression, having first posted its batteries on the high ground farther to the rear. The exultant enemy soon emerged from the cedar woods, but then fell under the musketry of Rousseau's division at short range. Colonel Shepherd's brigade of regulars quivered under the onset of the enemy, now fully hopeful of an immediate and decisive victory; but this brigade, by the efficient support and co-operation of Scribner's and Colonel John Beatty's brigades, Loomis' and Guenther's batteries, and the pioneer brigade with Stokes' battery, withstood the attack. This short and decisive conflict saved the center and the army, but it cost Shepherd's brigade alone twenty-two officers and five hundred and eighteen men killed and wounded. When the enemy was here repulsed and driven back to the woods, the formation of a new line on higher ground was practicable.

General Negley was so completely unsupported on his right when Sheridan had withdrawn, that the safety of his division was compromised. The massed forces that had assaulted Sheridan were in his rear, and his division having been well offered to the enemy in the original formation, was now almost completely enveloped. To prevent capture he ordered his troops to cut their way through the enemy's lines to the ground designated for the realignment of the center. In passing Rousseau's division, he was partially relieved from pressure by the prompt action of Colonel Scribner, who wheeled the Thirty-eighth Indiana and Tenth Wisconsin so as to receive and repulse the force that was pressing Negley, and then covered his formation in the rear. In this dash to the rear through the enemy's enveloping lines, General Negley lost six guns. This hazardous change of position by General Thomas' command also received support from Colonel Samuel Beatty's brigade of Van Cleve's division, which, with the division commander, reached the right of Rousseau at the moment the latter was forming his temporary line. This brigade engaged the enemy at the time of his severest attack upon Rousseau's division, and clung to its right during the day.

The withdrawal of Negley's division from the front line involved Palmer's division in a conflict, whose conditions were identical with those of the divisions to its right. Hazen's brigade, which had exchanged places, from reserve, with Grose's, as the last brigade on the left of the continuous line of battle, was now in air, with almost a division interval between it and Wagner's brigade of Wood's division, which still held position on the river bank, which having been designated to form the rear of Crittenden's offensive column, was the only one that maintained original position. This flank had been hypothetically secured, in the plan of aggressive battle, by the anticipated enfilading fire of Wood's and Van Cleve's musketry and artillery from the east side of the river, but in actual defense it was vulnerable to an attack from Breckinridge, who could have crossed the river at any time, and the space between Hazen's left and the river gave an invitation to General Polk to wheel his right upon it. Perceiving this exposure of Palmer's left in defensive battle, General Wood had left Wagner's brigade on the river bank, and had held Hascall's, though once in motion to the right, in reserve opposite the space between Wagner's right and Hazen's left. The safety of this flank during the first half of the day was doubtless owing to the fact that General Bragg's plan restrained his right until the issue of his continuous attack from his left should be fully developed.

The attack upon Palmer was made with great fury, especially upon Cruft's brigade, which was in advance of Hazen. General Cruft was unable to withstand the enemy, in the open space to which he had advanced, and was pressed back to the woods. Here he fought desperately and successfully, until Negley dashed to the rear, in the emergency at the center. Then Cruft's right was in air, and though he repulsed Chalmers in front, he was soon enveloped by that brigade and Donelson's, and the forces which following Negley reached his rear. So complete was the insulation of Palmer at this juncture, that Colonel Grose, in reserve, changed front to the rear, and forcing back the enemy, made it possible for Cruft to draw back toward the new position assumed by General Thomas' corps. The fighting here, as along the whole line,

was exceedingly severe. Hazen alone now held position, and even he was forced to change slightly to conform to the changes on his right. He moved a short distance to the left, until his left flank rested on the left of the railroad, and his whole brigade was in a strong position in woods, on high ground. As Cruft moved to the rear, he became hotly engaged, and Grose, who had fought facing the rear, again changed front, and supported Cruft and Hazen. Cruft's brigade lost heavily in maintaining position in great exposure, and in gaining connection with the center. The batteries of the division—Standardt's, "H" and "M" Fourth United States Artillery, under Lieutenant Parsons, and Cockerell's—rendered efficient service during this conflict.

Every brigade of General Bragg's four divisions on the west side of the river had been severely engaged, many of them in repeated assaults, and his losses had been very heavy. He had yet five brigades of infantry across the river, under General Breckinridge, and with these as his resource for farther aggression, he made a fourth and final combination, the object of which was to turn General Rosecrans' left as he had turned his right, and upon this contingency the success of his plan manifestly hinged, though he had not yet abandoned all aggression with his left.

General Breckinridge had hitherto been comparatively inactive, although he had been under orders for action. As early as 10 o'clock a. m., General Bragg had ordered him to send one brigade, and soon after a second, to reinforce or act as a reserve to General Hardee. Instead of prompt obedience, General Breckinridge informed his chief, first, that the national troops, in heavy force, were in the act of crossing the river, and then that they had crossed and were advancing against him. Simultaneously, General Bragg received intelligence of the advance of another strong force of infantry on the Lebanon road. To provide against this seeming aggression, the army commander directed General Breckinridge not to await an attack, but to advance, and ordered General Pegram, in command of cavalry, to develop the movement on the Lebanon road. When the report was received that there were no national troops on that side of the river, it was too

late to reinforce Hardee from his extreme right, and besides by this time his left was too much exhausted to promise much by further aggression. Thus, the incipient offense from General Rosecrans' left flank, though seemingly a total failure, was not without very important results, as thereby Breckinridge was kept on the east side at a time when his help on the left might have enabled Hardee to reach the center and left of the national army. And this attempted transfer of troops from the right to the left of the Confederate army may be accepted as evidence that General Hardee had met stronger opposition from Generals McCook and Thomas than had been anticipated, and that at 10 o'clock the success of the ruling movement was doubtful.

The repulse of the enemy by General Thomas, and his successful establishment of a new line, had greatly changed the conditions of the conflict on the right. Recoiling from Thomas, Hardee could not safely overlap the new right flank of the army, now held by Beatty's brigade of Van Cleve's division. This gave time for the reformation of McCook's forces and the alignment of Crittenden's reinforcing troops. Fyffe's brigade of Van Cleve's division formed on the right of Beatty's, and then Harker's, of Wood's division, and beyond were portions of the three divisions of the right wing.

While General Breckinridge was transferring his first two brigades across the river, commanded respectively by Generals Adams and Jackson, there was a lull in the action on the left. During this quiet the enemy made his second combination to turn General Rosecrans' left, and counter preparation was made to hold it. General Wood now threw Hascall's brigade on the right of Wagner's and placed Cox's battery in Wagner's rear, to respond to the enemy's batteries across the river, and to repel attacks from that quarter, and posted Estep's battery in rear of Hascall. The high wooded ground at the railroad was regarded by the enemy as the key-point, and designated by him as the "Round Forest." Upon this spot he converged his lines, and made repeated assaults to carry it, resistance to which not only involved Hazen's brigade, which rested upon it, but those on Hazen's right and left. Colonel

Hazen had at that point the Forty-first Ohio, Ninth Indiana, and One Hundred and Tenth Illinois; his remaining regiment, the Sixth Kentucky, was engaged farther to the right. This was a small force to hold the key-point, when converging columns were directed upon it, even though well supported. While, however, this position was the main objective of the enemy, the adjacent forces were also heavily pressed. And General Palmer's first call for help from General Wood was to give support to troops to the right of Hazen. In response, the Third Kentucky was sent, and was soon terribly mangled, losing its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel McKee. General Polk repeated his assaults with great fury, and even desperation, as success at this point was now plainly the condition of victory. General Rosecrans, in his frequent rapid passage along his lines, was an observer of this conflict, and gave directions concerning it, and General Crittenden, with his division commanders, Generals Wood and Palmer, gave it the closest attention, throwing together all the available troops and batteries of the left wing to maintain this vital point.

The new dispositions in the center and on the right had now fully arrested Hardee's turning movement, and he had been forced to take the defensive by Rousseau and Van Cleve. The troops of the latter, pressing forward too eagerly under the emphatic order of General Rosecrans, had exposed a flank, and severe loss and a repulse had resulted. In this, Fyffe's brigade had been the greatest sufferer, but saved its battery (Swallow's), and was soon reformed for action. About the same time Harker's brigade was hotly engaged, and also some portions of the right wing on the right of Crittenden's troops.

By this time, General Bragg had abandoned all purpose of aggression, except from his right flank; and here the brigades of Jackson and Adams had been repulsed and shattered, and now two more, Preston's and Palmer's, were moved across the river and directed against the "Round Forest."

When the pressure of the first new combination fell upon Hazen, at his call, General Wood sent the Twenty-fourth Ohio, of Hascall's brigade. Hazen used the railroad cut for a rampart, and with the aid afforded maintained his position. To repel the later assaults, additional troops were concentrated.

In response to a second request for help from General Palmer, General Wood sent the Fifty-eighth Indiana, which relieved the Third Kentucky on the right of the railroad, its left resting on that road. The One Hundredth Illinois, from the same brigade, was sent to Hazen, and formed the right of his line, its right resting on the railroad. Colonel Hazen had called the Sixth Kentucky to the left of this road, and the Second Missouri, from Schaefer's brigade of Sheridan's, which, with the brigade, was in the rear of the "Round Forest," was associated with the One Hundredth Illinois in holding Hazen's right. The Fortieth and Ninety-seventh Ohio, of Wagner's brigade, were in position also, on the right of the railroad, in conjunction with the Sixth and Twenty-sixth Ohio, of Grose's brigade. In connection with these regiments, Estep's battery rendered efficient service, and afterward joined Cox's battery on the extreme left, where these batteries were supported by Wagner and the Twenty-sixth Ohio regiment, of Hascall's brigade. Having been bereft of half his brigade, Wagner became severely engaged in the extreme left, on the bank of the river. Not waiting for an assault, which was palpably foreshadowed, Wagner charged the enemy with great energy. The Fifteenth and Fifty-seventh Indiana regiments dashed against the enemy far in advance of our main line, but though successful against the enemy's infantry, they could not maintain the position under a heavy fire of artillery, and were compelled to fall back. In this charge the Fifteenth Indiana captured nearly all the men of a regiment that were not killed or wounded. The retirement of these troops from their perilous insulation was doubtless covered by the Fifteenth Missouri regiment, of Schaefer's brigade of Sheridan's division. The report of his successor in command, Colonel Laiboldt, declares that Colonel Schaefer was killed when about giving orders to this regiment, which, after deployment in a corn-field, was retreating to the position of the brigade at the railroad; and General Sheridan avers that he lost his last brigade commander when in the act of relieving from the pressure of the enemy Wood's division, which had given way. These were the only troops on the extreme left that gave ground to the

enemy, and these only left an advanced position to resume their original place.

Of the entire battle line of the army in the morning, only Wagner's position at the river and the ground at the railroad were now held; the left of the continuous battle line was now resting much nearer the river than at the opening of the battle. Between the Nashville turnpike and the river were two brigades of Wood's division, Wagner's and Hascall's, and two of Palmer's, the regiments of which had been thrown together as emergencies were developed at different points by the assaults of the enemy, by the exhaustion of troops, or failure of ammunition. Hazen still held the left of the continuous line, but his brigade had been pushed to the left more than its length; its right in the morning rested between the Nashville turnpike and railroad, and at the end of the engagement the One Hundredth Illinois was between its right and the railroad. On the right of the Nashville turnpike, the battle line, bent back with a curve until its trend was nearly perpendicular to its original direction.

The assaults on our left cost the enemy immense losses. Some of the assaulting regiments lost more than half their strength; and none of these attacks were even temporarily successful. General Bragg admitted, in his official report, that General Polk made repeated attempts to turn General Rosecrans' left flank, with utter failure. He attributed his failures to the concentration of artillery of superior range, which seemed to bid him defiance, and which enabled his enemy to maintain the strong position on Stone river. This is strong testimony for the efficiency of the artillery posted on this flank of the national army. The infantry of Wood's and Palmer's divisions, as such, were not less efficient in repelling the enemy.

During the day, the enemy's cavalry passed entirely round General Rosecrans' army, and consequently provoked several conflicts and greatly disturbed the trains in the rear. A portion of Colonel Zahm's brigade rendered good service on the right of the army, in covering the infantry in retreat. In a hand-to-hand conflict, Colonel Minor Milliken, commanding the First Ohio Cavalry, was killed by a pistol shot while using his saber. Colonel Kennett's command first engaged the enemy in the im-

mediate rear of the army, repulsing him and recapturing a train. Finally, there was a concentration of cavalry, under General D. S. Stanley, behind Overall's creek, where successful resistance was offered to a superior force. Here Colonel Walker's brigade, of General Fry's division, approaching from Stewartsboro, supported Stanley. The roar of Church's battery, in this engagement, excited grave apprehension at the front that General Bragg had thrown a strong force upon the communications of the army. Squadrons of troopers were active on the Nashville road, several miles to the rear, but beyond the capture of some stragglers, no injury was done.

After the enemy had been fully checked at all points, General Rosecrans readjusted his line of battle, extending his center and right in a northwesterly direction, nearly at right angles to their original trend, and refusing his extreme right on the left of the Nashville turnpike. In consecutive order, from right to left, were Davis', Sheridan's and Johnson's divisions, Walker's and Harker's brigades, Van Cleve's division, Pioneer brigade, and Rousseau's, Palmer's, and Wood's divisions. Negley's division constituted the reserve of the center, and Starkweather's brigade having reached the battle-field, was placed in reserve, in rear of Sheridan's left. The cavalry remained beyond Overall's creek. The enemy felt this line until late in the evening, when the two armies, after the long, exhaustive conflict, rested on their arms in close proximity.

Neither army commander had fully executed his plan of battle, although General Bragg had approached very nearly the completion of his. He had turned a flank of the national army, bent back the right to the rear of the center, but had failed to turn its left or reach its rear, and hence had not gained the extreme advantages which he had anticipated in assuming the offensive and had seemingly attained at the grand crisis of the battle. He had assaulted boldly and persistently from first to last, but had completely exhausted his army without gaining a decisive victory. General Rosecrans had fought a battle radically different from the one he had proposed for himself. Instead of turning the right of the Confederate army and taking its center in reverse, according to his plan, he had

been forced into the most emphatic straits in maintaining the defensive from flank to flank. Both commanders had lost heavily; General Bragg by continuous assaults with massed forces, and General Rosecrans by resistance at each point to superior numbers, and by frequent recessions under the guns of the enemy. Their respective losses on this day are not given even approximately in official reports, but it may be assumed that the aggregates mentioned for the four days of battle were drawn mainly from the first. A battle whose emergencies of offense and defense involves the use of all reserves, must necessarily be a bloody one.

It is seldom that an engagement of such dimensions has left two commanding generals so much in doubt as to the course that either would adopt, and hence each determined to await developments, and each was ignorant of the purpose of the other. Of the two, General Bragg was the more hopeful; not because he had strength for further offense, but from his belief that such was the condition of the opposing army that its retreat was a necessity. And the question of retreat was doubtless at first an open one with General Rosecrans and his subordinate commanders.

General Rosecrans' report indicates that he was at first in doubt as to the propriety of attempting to remain on the field. He did not certainly know that the opposing army had been so reduced in strength and spirit as to have abandoned the offensive, and being aware of his own heavy losses in men and material—such material, too, as the defensive demands—and having his right flank bent back upon his line of communications after a battle which he had provoked by positive offense, he could hardly avoid hesitation in maintaining the defensive in that position. He thus mentioned his action and decision in his official report: "After a careful examination and free consultation with corps commanders, followed by a personal examination of the ground in rear as far as Overall's creek, it was determined to await the enemy's attack in that position, to send for the provision train, and order up fresh supplies of ammunition, on the arrival of which, should the enemy not attack, offensive operations were to be resumed."

During the night, Van Cleve's division, under command of

Colonel Samuel Beatty, General Van Cleve having been wounded early in the day, resumed its connection with the left wing; and a little before daylight, on January 1st, General Crittenden, with permission of General Rosecrans, retired his line a few hundred yards to higher ground. General Palmer then took the left, with Wood's division on his right. At this time the latter division was commanded by General Hascall, General Wood having been wounded on the 31st.

At noon on the 1st, Negley's division was moved to General McCook's support, in expectation of a second effort of the enemy to turn his right. General Bragg demonstrated heavily against the center, and right at several points with artillery and a show of infantry. This action, however, was only tentative, as he was still in doubt as to General Rosecrans' intentions, though expecting his retreat. In the afternoon, General Crittenden moved Beatty's division, supported by Grose's brigade, across the river, and formed a line of battle in front of Breckinridge, who had resumed his position on that side.

During the day the enemy's cavalry, under Generals Wheeler and Wharton, were busy in the rear to embarrass the passage of trains to and from Nashville, and to watch carefully for indications of the retreat of the army. A heavy force appeared at 2 p. m., in the vicinity of La Vergne, captured a portion of a train, dispersing the remainder, and then attacked Colonel Innis, commanding the First Regiment Michigan engineers and mechanics, holding a stockade on the hill south of the town. Colonel Innis twice refused to surrender upon formal demand, and successfully repelled every attack, although his little stockade was bombarded. At his call, Lieutenant-Colonel Burke of the Tenth Ohio first sent a detachment of cavalry to his support from Stewart's creek, and upon the failure of this force to give aid, he made a rapid march to La Vergne, arriving, however, after the withdrawal of the enemy. This conflict, the presence of the enemy's cavalry in heavy force on the communications of the army, attacking train guards and destroying wagons, and a multitude of frightened teamsters and demoralized soldiers straggling to the rear, produced the wildest confusion from Stewart's creek to the vicinity of Nashville. This excitement in the

rear was in striking contrast with the comparative quietness reigning over the field, where each army was awaiting the action of the other, harmonizing in purpose now as fully as when opening battle upon the same plan.

During the forenoon of the 2d, there were indications that General Bragg would renew the offensive this time from his right. The movement of infantry and artillery was plainly visible from Beatty's position. Skirmishing was maintained between the two lines across the river, with occasional cannon shots. Colonel Beatty's line in front of General Breckinridge was formed with Price's brigade on the right, next the river; Fyffe's on the left; Grider's, formerly Beatty's, supporting Price, and Grose's supporting Fyffe. Drury's battery, Lieutenant Livingston commanding, was posted in the rear. At 3 o'clock p. m., the advance of strong columns following skirmish lines, revealed fully the purpose of the enemy.

This aggression had really a defensive object, as General Bragg had concluded that he must dislodge the force in front of his right, or he would be compelled to withdraw Polk's right across the river, since it was exposed to an enfilading fire from Beatty's position.

His hope of the retreat of General Rosecrans had been strengthened by the return of Wheeler and Wharton from the rear, with information indicating this movement. The former of these commanders was again in the rear of the national army, under instructions to ascertain definitely "whether a retrograde movement was being made." While there was any doubt respecting this expected and greatly desired withdrawal, it was imperative that General Polk's position should be maintained, and the condition of its accomplishment was the dislodgment of Beatty. He therefore formed as strong a combination as practicable, giving Breckinridge two thousand cavalry under Wharton and Pegram for his right, and added ten Napoleon guns to his artillery. This movement then was the expression of a vital object, involving even the stability of his main lines on the left side of the river. To veil his purpose as much as possible, General Bragg had opened his artillery upon General Rosecrans' center and right at noon, which had become quiet after a vigorous response in semblance

of a tentative demonstration. His real object, doubtless, was to draw attention to his own center and left, that he might throw Breckinridge suddenly against Beatty, and gain the heights he deemed necessary for the defense of General Polk's right flank.

Impressed with the importance of his movement, General Breckinridge advanced with his forces massed and with great vigor. Artillery, in active contests on the other side of the river, had heralded an engagement considered by the enemy as decisive of the general conflict, and Breckinridge's onset was in correspondence with the magnitude of the interests compassed by his adventure. He received and disregarded the fire of Beatty's skirmishers, his first and second lines and artillery, and wheeling upon Price's and Grider's brigades, broke their lines and followed the retreating fragments to the river.

In the quiet that prevailed on the other side of the river, this contest drew upon it the attention of both armies. On the high ground on the opposite bank, were massed two brigades, Hazen's and Cruft's, of Palmer's division, and Negley's division, with their batteries. And when General Crittenden perceived that his left, across the river, was under great pressure, he asked Major John Mendenhall, his chief of artillery, what he could do with his guns to relieve Beatty, and the latter hurriedly massed all the guns of the left wing, except Drury's, and with them Negley's guns and Stokes' battery. This battery had been sent with the pioneer brigade to the left by General Rosecrans, when he first heard the noise of battle from that direction. As the engagement across the river progressed, Major Mendenhall, in the presence of Generals Rosecrans and Crittenden, posted battery after battery, until fifty-eight guns were ready to bear upon the enemy. At the culmination of the conflict, on the dislodgment of Price and Grider, these guns were opened upon the enemy, who in his eagerness of pursuit followed to the river, losing heavily under such a fire at every step, and finally receiving, in addition, volleys from the supporting infantry. At the river, Breckinridge recoiled and drew back his rapidly diminishing forces. At this juncture, Colonel John F. Miller, followed by a por-

tion of Stanley's brigade, charged with his brigade across the river. Disregarding an order from a general officer, not his immediate commander, to desist from so hazardous an adventure, he dashed over and fell furiously upon the foe, already in rapid retreat. The right of Miller's line was supported by the Eighteenth Ohio, and portions of the Thirty-seventh Indiana and Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania, of Stanley's brigade. Moving on the opposite bank his left, by Grose's brigade, which had changed front and resisted the enemy, when Price and Grider gave ground, and in his rear were Hazen's brigade and portions of Beatty's division. Miller reached a battery in position, and charging with the Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania, Sixty-ninth and Seventy-fourth Ohio, and Nineteenth Illinois, the Twenty-first Ohio striking opportunely on the left, captured four guns, and the colors of the Twenty-sixth Tennessee regiment. The Twenty-first Ohio seized the guns and drew them off, and the Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania gained the colors. Miller's hurried movement having disordered his lines, he here halted to readjust them, and was almost immediately relieved from position by Hazen's and Grose's brigades, and Davis' division. General Davis had first thrown one brigade from his position on the extreme right of the army, across the river, and afterward, having obtained permission from General Rosecrans, had followed with two brigades. General Davis, being the ranking officer on that side of the river, assumed command of all the forces nearly equal to a full corps in number. He assumed command just after Colonel Miller, under orders, passed to the rear with his brigade, and recrossed the river. General Davis at once threw forward skirmish lines. These soon encountered the enemy, who had somewhat recovered from his panic, and a sharp engagement ensued, in which artillery was freely used. During the night General Davis fortified his line and intrenched a battery.

Colonel Miller's movement had great prominence, in utterly defeating General Bragg's object in this engagement, which was to secure the heights commanding his lines across the river. General Rosecrans, being as yet on the defensive, had no thought of aggression from any point of his line, and

hence it is not improbable that, had not Miller moved promptly to charge Breckinridge's forces, and had he not followed them in rapid pursuit, they might have reformed upon their objective, and held it. As it was, Miller drew after him such a combination as prevented Breckinridge from holding the coveted heights, who having been carried beyond the hills, by his success at first, lost them altogether, his failure costing, in the various forms of casualty, an aggregate of two thousand men.

The weather on the 3d was unfavorable to active operations against the enemy, and as General Bragg declined the offensive altogether, after the repulse of the preceding evening, there was quietness throughout the day. At 6 p. m., General Thomas interrupted the reigning stillness, by throwing forward Colonels Beatty's and Spear's brigades—the latter having come up during the battle—and driving the enemy from the woods in his front and his intrenchments beyond, severed his line in the center. During the night, General Bragg retreated, as he stated in his official report, in consequence of his knowledge of reinforcements to General Rosecrans. His information was incorrect, or else the coming of Spear's brigade was considered as giving a dangerous preponderance to the national army, or became an excuse for an act that other circumstances made imperative. The 4th was spent in burying the dead, and on the 5th the army occupied Murfreesboro.

General Rosecrans moved from Nashville with about forty-seven thousand men. He fought the battle with an aggregate of forty-three thousand four hundred—thirty-seven thousand nine hundred and seventy-seven infantry, three thousand two hundred cavalry, and two thousand two hundred and twenty-three artillery. He lost ninety-two officers killed, and three hundred and eighty-four wounded; one thousand four hundred and forty-one enlisted men killed, and six thousand eight hundred and sixty wounded, and about two thousand eight hundred missing. Lieutenant-Colonel Garesche, his chief of staff, was killed by his side. In addition to the field officers already mentioned as killed, eight colonels, five lieutenant-colonels, and five majors fell in immediate death, or died from

wounds. The aggregate loss was over twenty per cent. The enemy gained about thirty guns, and lost three.\*

General Bragg reported his strength at less than thirty-five thousand men, of whom thirty thousand were infantry and artillery. His losses, in the aggregate, including four general officers, two of whom were killed, were nine thousand killed and wounded, and one thousand missing.

General Rosecrans estimated the opposing army at over sixty thousand men, and General Bragg, in reciprocal error, conjectured that he fought an army of seventy thousand. The latter was superior in cavalry, while the former had five more brigades of infantry in action from first to last, but only two more seriously engaged on the 31st, and only three more on the field until late in the day.

A victory had been gained by the Army of the Cumberland, and in view of the primal success of the enemy, a great victory, but in respect to the broadest possibilities of battle, it was not emphatically decisive. The national army held the field, and had made an advance of thirty miles toward Chattanooga, with good ground for encamping, and a good depot for supplies at Murfreesboro; but General Bragg, though compelled to abandon the field after an initiative of battle which promised complete victory, had withdrawn his army in good order and fair condition, with freedom to retire at leisure to his next defensive line, that of Duck river, as the last of the advantages which he had gained by his advance from Chattanooga, in August, 1862. The victory, then, was simply the

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\*The colonels were Frederick C. Schaefer, commanding a brigade under General Sheridan, who fell near the railroad, in rear of the left; James Forman, Fifteenth Kentucky; Leander Stern, One Hundred and First Ohio; T. D. Williams, Twenty-fifth Illinois; S. P. Reed, Seventy-ninth Illinois; F. C. Jones, Twenty-fourth Ohio; J. G. Hawkins, Thirteenth Ohio, and F. A. Harrington, Twenty-seventh Illinois. Lieutenant-Colonels: John Kell, Second Ohio; M. F. Wooster, One Hundred and First Ohio; David McKee, Fifteenth Wisconsin; L. Drake, Forty-ninth Ohio, and P. B. Houssem, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania. The Majors: S. D. Carpenter, Nineteenth United States Infantry; Henry Terry, Twenty-fourth Ohio; Adolph G. Rosengarten, and F. B. Ward, Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry; and D. A. B. Moore, First Ohio Cavalry.

expression of a long stride toward the restoration of the status of the preceding summer, in Middle Tennessee.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
STEWART'S CREEK, MURFREESBORO PIKE, December 29—P. M.

*To General McCook.*

GENERAL:—Your dispatch, 12.30 p. m., just received. Palmer's division is within three miles of Murfreesboro. No firing since early this morning. Crittenden's corps has crossed Stewart's creek. His trains are following. Your conjectures are probably correct. There is no necessity of your going into Murfreesboro to-night, if that is the case. Come on until you reach the Wilkinson pike, wherever you can find forage. Should it prove, as we now believe, that the enemy have made a precipitate retreat from Murfreesboro, you had better move on Salem, where you will probably find forage, and where you can receive your supplies by Murfreesboro pike. If you can find forage, push a reconnoitering force of two brigades down the road toward Shelbyville to Middleton. If you see General Stanley, tell him to direct his cavalry to look out particularly for forage west of Salem, and push on down to Shelbyville. Negley is moving on Wilkinson's Cross-roads.

By order of Major-General Rosecrans.

C. GODDARD,  
*Major and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
STEWARTSBORO, December 29—P. M.

*Major-General A. McD. McCook, Commanding Right Wing:*

Report from Crittenden's advance, 3.45 p. m., says the enemy is in line of battle on the east side of Stone river—infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Crittenden has been ordered to form in order of battle out of cannon range, covering his flank down Stone river to Jefferson pike; two divisions in front across Murfreesboro road, one in reserve; Negley to come in on his right. Place your left facing a little more to the south, I should judge, from what I know of the country, and then reconnoiter in force south toward Franklin road. Send cavalry to the west down toward Salem, the main point being to cover your right against a possibility of an enterprise, and to ascertain if the enemy intend to fight altogether behind Stone river. Establish signal stations, if you can, to communicate. I expect to be down at the front.

By order Major-General Rosecrans.

C. GODDARD,  
*Major and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS,\* 1862—3.35 p. m.

*Major-General McCook, Commanding Right Wing:*

Have received Mr. Fisher's report. Take a strong position, and prepare to fight a heavy battle to-morrow; or, if you are ready, commence it now, and the left wing will simultaneously go into Murfreesboro.

Since writing above, received your dispatch by courier. If you need help, will send you Rousseau, but would rather reserve him to take Murfreesboro. And if they retreat, you can let them drive you, inch by inch, making them fight, as they have made you fight.

By command of Major-General W. S. Rosecrans.

J. P. GARESCHE,

*Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS,\* 1862—4 p. m.

*Major-General McCook, Commanding Right Wing:*

If you are too hard pressed, fall back slowly; draw them in. Pass the word along your line to that effect.

By command of Major-General W. S. Rosecrans.

J. P. GARESCHE,

*Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS, December 30, 1862—5.35 p. m.

*Major-General McCook, Commanding Right Wing:*

Take up strong position. Let the men refresh themselves well. Extend a line of fires to your right so as to deceive the enemy with the belief that we are massing troops there. In the morning refuse your right, so as to draw them on in that direction. Crittenden will cross, and, with God's help, take Murfreesboro. His movement will be so timed and managed, however, as to give it the appearance of a feint. Meantime, do you hold them in check if they attack you; or, if they don't, do you attack them not vigorously, but warily. Rousseau is almost within supporting distance of you. All the troops will be moved up to-morrow.

By command of Major-General W. S. Rosecrans.

J. P. GARESCHE,

*Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, December 31, 1862—7.45 a. m.

*General McCook, Commanding Right:*

A report from General Crittenden this morning is that the enemy has been moving some of his forces toward his left—that is, toward you. Report is too vague to determine what it amounts to. Rousseau has been moved to the front; will be held in reserve. Thomas has gone there. Rousseau, Negley, and Palmer will operate in the center, and try to break their center and force the passage of the ford, giving six divisions on this

\*30th.

side. I have been waiting to hear the report from your lines, which I should never fail to receive, and render to me. Let me hear from you soon.

By order of Major-General Rosecrans.

C. GODDARD,  
*Major and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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#### EXTRACT FROM GENERAL ROSECRANS' REPORT.

At 9 p. m. the corps commanders met at the headquarters of the general commanding, who explained to them the following plan of battle:

McCook was to occupy the most advantageous position, refusing his right as much as practicable and necessary to secure it, to receive the attack of the enemy, or if that did not come, to attack himself sufficient to hold all the force on his front.

Thomas and Palmer to open with skirmishing, and gain the enemy's center and left as far as the river.

Crittenden to cross Van Cleve's division at the lower ford, covered and supported by the sappers and miners, and to advance on Breckinridge.

Wood's division to follow by brigades, crossing at the upper ford and moving on Van Cleve's right; to carry everything before them into Murfreesboro. This would have given us two divisions against one; and as soon as Breckinridge had been dislodged from position, the batteries of Wood's division taking position on the heights east of Stone river, in advance, would see the enemy's works in reverse; would dislodge them, and enable Palmer's division to press them back, and drive them westward across the river or through the woods; while Thomas, sustaining the movement on the center, would advance on the right of Palmer, crushing their right; and Crittenden's corps advancing, would take Murfreesboro, and then moving westward on the Franklin road, get in their flank and rear, and drive them into the country toward Salem, with the prospect of cutting off their retreat, and probably destroying their army.

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On the whole, it is evident that we fought superior numbers, on unknown ground, inflicting more injury than we suffered; were always superior on equal ground with equal numbers, and failed of a most crushing victory on Wednesday by the extension and direction of our right wing.

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#### EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL BRAGG'S REPORT.

Late on Monday, December 29th, it became apparent that the enemy was extending to the right, to flank us on the left. McCown's division in reserve was promptly thrown to that flank, and added to the command of Lieutenant-General Polk. The enemy not meeting our expectations of making an attack on Tuesday—which was consumed in artillery firing and heavy skirmishing—with the exception of a dash late in the evening on the left of Withers' division, which was repulsed and severely pun-

ished, it was determined to assail him on Wednesday morning, the 31st.

For this purpose, Cleburne's division was removed from the second line on the right to the corresponding position on the left, and Lieutenant-General Hardee was ordered to that point, and assigned to the command of that and McCown's division.

This disposition—the result of necessity—left me no reserve; but Breckinridge's command on the right, not now threatened, was regarded as a source of supply for any reinforcements absolutely necessary to other parts of the field. Stone river, at its low stage, was fordable at almost every point for infantry, and at short intervals perfectly practicable for artillery.

This disposition completed, Lieutenant-General Hardee was ordered to assail the enemy at daylight, on Wednesday, the 31st, the attack to be taken up by General Polk's command in succession to the right flank—the move to be made by a constant wheel to the right, on Polk's right flank as a pivot—the object being to force the enemy back on Stone river, and, if practicable, by the aid of cavalry, cut him off from his base of operations and supplies by the Nashville pike.

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The failure of General McCown to execute during the night, an order for a slight change in the line of his division, and which had to be done the next morning, caused some delay in the general and vigorous assault by Lieutenant-General Hardee. But about 7 o'clock, the rattle of musketry and the roar of artillery announced the beginning of the conflict. The enemy was taken completely by surprise—artillery horses not hitched, and infantry not formed. A hot and inviting breakfast of coffee, and other luxuries to which our gallant and hardy men had long been strangers, was found upon the fire, unserved, and was left, whilst we pushed on to the enjoyment of a more inviting feast, that of captured artillery, flying battalions, and hosts of craven prisoners, begging for the lives they had forfeited by their acts of brutality and atrocity.

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Whilst thus routing and pushing the enemy on his front, Lieutenant-General Hardee announced to me by a messenger that the movement was not being as promptly executed by Major-General Cheatham's command on his right, the left of General Polk's corps, as he expected, and that his line was completely exposed to an enfilade fire from the enemy's artillery in that point. The necessary instructions for prompt movement at that point were immediately dispatched, and in a short time our whole line, except Breckinridge's command, was warmly engaged. From this time, we continued to drive the enemy more or less rapidly, until his line was thrown entirely back at right angles to his first position, and occupied the railroad, along which he had massed his reserves and posted very strong batteries. . . .

We succeeded in driving him from every position except the strong one held by his extreme left flank, resting on Stone river, and carried

(covered?) by a concentration of artillery of superior range and caliber, which seemed to bid us defiance. . . .

As early as ten o'clock a. m., Major-General Breckinridge was called on for one brigade, and soon after, a second, to reinforce or act as a reserve to Lieutenant-General Hardee. His reply to the first call represented the enemy crossing Stone river in heavy force, in his immediate front, and on receiving the second order, he informed me that he had already crossed in heavy force, and was advancing to attack his lines. He was immediately ordered not to wait attack, but to advance and meet him. About the same time, a report reached me that a heavy force of the enemy's infantry was advancing on the Lebanon road, about five miles from Breckinridge's front. Brigadier-General Pegram, who had been sent to that road to cover the flank of the infantry with his cavalry brigade, two regiments detached, with Wheeler and Wharton, was ordered forward immediately to develop any such movement.

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By the time this could be accomplished, it was too late to send this force to Lieutenant-General Hardee's support, who was unable to make further progress, and he was directed to maintain his position. Lieutenant-General Polk was directed with these reinforcements to throw all the force he could collect upon the enemy's extreme left and thereby either carry that strong position which had so far resisted us so successfully, or, failing in that, at least to draw off from Hardee's front the formidable opposition there concentrated. . . .

Upon this flank, their strongest defensive position, resting on the river bank, the enemy had concentrated not less than twenty pieces of artillery, masked almost from view, but covering an open space in front of several hundred yards, supported right, left, and rear by heavy masses of infantry. This position proved impracticable, and after two unsuccessful efforts, the attempt to carry it by infantry was abandoned. Our heaviest batteries of artillery and rifled guns of long range were now concentrated in front, and their fires opened upon this position. . . .

The dislodgment of this force (Beatty's), or the withdrawal of Polk's line, was an evident necessity. The latter involved consequences not to be entertained. . . . Major-General Breckinridge was sent for and advised of the movement and its objects—the securing and holding the position which protected Polk's flank and gave us command of the enemy's, by which to enfilade him. He was informed of the forces placed at his disposal, and instructed with them to drive back the enemy, cover the hill, intrench his artillery, and hold the position.

To distract their attention from our real object, a heavy artillery fire was ordered from Polk's front at the exact hour at which the movement was to begin. At other points throughout both lines all was quiet.

Late on Friday night I had received the captured papers of Major-General McCook, commanding one *corps d'armée* of the enemy, showing their effective strength to have been nearly, if not quite, twenty thousand

men. Before noon, reports from Brigadier-General Wheeler satisfied me that the enemy, instead of retiring, was receiving reinforcements.

Common prudence and the safety of my army, upon which even the safety of our cause depended, left no doubt in my mind as to the necessity of my withdrawal from so unequal a contest. My orders were accordingly given about noon for the movement of the train, and for the necessary preparations of troops.

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#### EXTRACT FROM GENERAL POLK'S REPORT.

As the brigades composing the division of Major-General Withers had not been engaged in any heavy battle since Shiloh, I placed them in the first line. They extended from the river near the intersection of the Nashville turnpike and railroad, southward across the Wilkinson pike to Triune or Franklin road, in a line irregular, but adapted to the topography.

The division of Major-General Cheatham was posted in the rear of that of Major-General Withers, as a supporting force. The division of Major-General McCown, of Lieutenant-General Kirby Smith's army corps, was in prolongation of that of Major-General Cleburne, of Lieutenant-General Hardee's corps, as its supporting force. Major-General Breckinridge's division, of Lieutenant-General Hardee's corps, occupied the ground on the east side of the river, in the line of Major-General Withers, on the right.

The enemy moved forward, and our outposts went back slowly, and took their place in the line of battle on the 29th.

On the 30th, in order to discover the situation at which we proposed to offer battle, he moved up cautiously, shelling his front heavily as he advanced.

The cannonading was responded to along our line, and the theater of the impending conflict was speedily determined.

On the left of my line, the skirmishing became very active, and my left brigade's front and rear became hotly engaged with the line which was being formed immediately before them. The enemy pressed forward very heavily with both artillery and infantry, and a sharp contest ensued in which he attempted, with several regiments, to take one of my batteries by assault, but was repulsed in the most decisive manner,

In this preliminary onset, many lives were lost on both sides. It was, from its severity, an introduction to the great battle of the ensuing day, and prepared our troops for the work before them. Twilight following soon after, the enemy settled around his bivouac-fires for the night.

Orders were issued by the general commanding to attack in the morning at daybreak. The attack was to be made by the extreme left, and the whole was ordered to swing around from left to right upon my right brigade as a pivot. Major-General Breckinridge, on the extreme right across the river, was to hold the enemy in observation on that flank.

At the appointed time, opened to the surprise evidently of the oppo-

ing army, Major-General McCown, who was acting under the orders of Lieutenant-General Hardee, was upon them before they were prepared to receive him. He captured several batteries and one brigadier-general, and wounded another, and drove three brigades—those composing the division of Brigadier-General Johnson—in confusion before him.

He was followed quickly by Major-General Cleburne, as a supporting force, who occupied the space left vacant by the forward movement of McCown, between the left of my line and McCown's right. Opposing him in that space was the second division of Major-General McCook's corps, under command of Brigadier-General Jeff. C. Davis, as the right of General McCook's corps, was slightly advanced. Cleburne's attack following soon on that of McCown, caught the force in his front, also not altogether prepared, and the vigor of the assault was so intense, that they too yielded and were driven.

Major-General Withers' left was opposed to the right of Sheridan, commanding the third and remaining division of General McCook's corps. The enemy's right was strongly posted on a ridge of rocks, with chasms intervening, and covered with a dense growth of rough cedars. Being advised of the attack he was to expect by the fierce contest which was being waged on his right, he was fully prepared for the onset, and this notice and the strength of his position enabled him to offer a strong resistance to Withers, whose duty it was to move next.

Colonel Loomis, who commanded the left brigade, moved up with energy and spirit to the attack. He was wounded, and was succeeded by Colonel Coltart. The enemy met the advance with firmness, but was forced to yield. An accession of force aided him to recover his position, and its great strength enabled him to hold it. Coltart, after a gallant charge and a sharp contest, fell back, and was replaced by Colonel Vaughn, of Major-General Cheatham's command of the rear line. Vaughn, notwithstanding the difficulties of the ground, charged the position with great energy, but the enemy intrenched behind stones and thick woods, could not be moved, and Vaughn also was repulsed.

This caused a loss of time, and Cleburne's division, pressing Davis, reached a point where Sheridan's batteries still unmoved, by wheeling to the left, enfiladed it. Colonel Vaughn was speedily reorganized, and returned to the assaults, and in conjunction with Colonel Coltart, drove at the position with resistless courage and energy; and although their losses were heavy, the enemy could not bear up against the onset. He was dislodged and driven with the rest of the flying battalions to McCook's corps.

In this charge, the horses of every officer on the field and staff of Vaughn's brigade, except one, and the horses of all the officers of the field and staff of every regiment, except two were killed. The brigade loss also one-third of all its forces. It captured two of the enemy's field guns.

The brigade of Colonel Maingault, which was immediately on the right of Colonel Coltart, followed the movement of the latter, according to in-

structions. But as Colart failed in the onset to drive Sheridan's right, Maingault, after dashing forward and pressing the enemy's line in his front, back upon his second line, was brought under a heavy fire of artillery from two batteries on his right, supported by a heavy force of infantry. He was therefore compelled to fall back.

In this charge, the brigade suffered severely, sustaining a very heavy loss in officers and men; but the gallant South Carolinians returned to the charge a second time and a third time, and being aided by the brigade of Major-General Maney of the second line, which came to his relief with his heavy Napoleon guns and a deadly fire of musketry, the enemy gave way, and joined his comrades on the right in their precipitate retreat across the Wilkinson pike. This movement dislodged and drove the residue of Sheridan's division, and completed the forcing of the whole of McCook's corps out of its line of battle, and placed it in full retreat. The enemy left one of his batteries of four guns on the field, which fell into the hands of Maney's brigade. The front of Maingault and Maney being free, they swung round with our lines on the left, and joined in pressing the enemy and his reinforcements into the cedar brake.

At 9 a. m., Brigadier-General Patton Anderson, on Maingault's right, moved in conjunction with its left brigade formed upon the line in its front. The line rested with its right near the Wilkinson pike, and is understood to have been General Negley's division, of General Thomas' corps, which constituted the center of the enemy's line of battle. . . .

The supporting brigade of Anderson, commanded by Brigadier-General A. P. Stewart, moved with that of Anderson. It was ordered by the division commander, Major-General Withers, who was in command of Major-General Cheatham's two right brigades, as Major-General Cheatham was of his two left—to move to the support of the left regiments of Anderson, which were pressed.

\* \* \* \* \*

Brigadier-General Chalmers' brigade, the remaining one of those constituting my front line whose right flank rested on the river, was the last to move. This brigade, owing to its position in the line, was called on to encounter a measure of personal suffering from exposure beyond that of any other in my corps. . . .

In its front, lay the right of Brigadier-General Palmer's division, of Major-General Crittenden's corps, which constituted the left wing of the enemy's line of battle. The general movement from the left having reached Chalmers' brigade, it was ordered to attack, and its reserve, under Brigadier-General Donelson, was directed to move forward to its support. . . .

All the line in their front was carried, except the extreme right. This point, which was the key to the enemy's position, and which was known as the Round Forrest, was attacked by the right of the brigade. It was met by a fire from artillery and musketry, which mowed down more than one-half its number.

The enemy was now driven from the field at all points occupied by him in the morning, along his whole line from his right to the extreme left, and was pressed back until our line occupied a position at right angles to that which we held at the opening of the battle. After passing the Nashville and Murfreesboro turnpike, his flight was covered by large bodies of fresh troops and numerous batteries of artillery, and the advance of our exhausted columns was checked.

His extreme left alone held its position. This occupied a piece of ground well chosen and defended, the river being on the one hand and a deep railroad cut on the other. It was held by a strong force of artillery and infantry, well supported by a reserve, composed of Brigadier-General Wood's division.

My last reserve having been exhausted, the brigades of Major-General Breckinridge's division, and a small brigade of General J. K. Jackson's posted to guard our right flank, were the only troops left that had not been engaged. Four of these were ordered to report to me. They came in detachments of two brigades each, the first arriving near two hours after Donelson's attack, the other about an hour after the first. The commanders of these detachments, the first composed of the brigades of Generals Adams and Jackson, the second under General Breckinridge in person, consisting of the brigades of General Preston and Colonel Palmer, had pointed out to them the particular object to be accomplished, to wit, to drive in the enemy's left, and especially to dislodge him from his position in the Round Forest. Unfortunately the opportune moment for putting in these detachments had passed.

Could they have been thrown upon the enemy's left immediately after Chalmers' and Donelson's assaults, in quick succession, the extraordinary strength of his position would have availed him nothing. That point would have been carried, and his left been driven back on his panic-stricken right, would have completed his confusion and insured an utter rout. It was, however, otherwise, and the time lost between Donelson's attack and the coming up of these detachments in succession, enabled the enemy to recover his self-possession, to mass a number of heavy batteries, and concentrate a strong infantry force on the position, and thus make a successful attack very difficult. Nevertheless the brigades of Adams and Jackson assailed the enemy's line with energy, and after a severe contest were compelled to fall back. They were promptly rallied by General Breckinridge, who, having pressed his other brigades, reached the ground at the moment, but as they were much cut up they were not required to renew the attack.

The brigades of Preston and Palmer, on arriving, renewed the assault with the same undaunted determination; but as another battery had been added since the previous attack, to a position already strong and difficult of access, this assault was alike ineffectual. The enemy, though not driven from his position, was severely punished, and as the day was far spent, it was not deemed anywise to renew the attack that evening, and the troops held the line they occupied for the night.

## EXTRACT FROM GENERAL McCOOK'S REPORT.

At 2 o'clock p. m., December 30th, a citizen residing on the Franklin road, and about half a mile in front of the enemy's line of battle, was put under guard by General Stanley. He reported as follows:

"I was up to the enemy's line of battle twice yesterday, and once this morning, to get some stock taken from me. The enemy's troops are posted in the following manner: The right of Cheatham's division rests on the Wilkinson pike; Withers is on Cheatham's left, with his left on the Franklin road; Hardee's corps is entirely beyond that road, his right resting on that road, and his left extending toward the Salem pike." . . .

I also sent a report to the general commanding, by my aid-de-camp, Horace N. Fisher, that the right of my line rested directly in front of the enemy's center. This made me anxious for my right. All my division commanders were immediately informed of this fact, and two brigades of the reserve division, commanded respectively by Generals Willich and Kirk, two of the best and most experienced brigadiers in the army, were ordered to the right of the line to protect the right flank, and guard against surprise there.

At 6 o'clock p. m. I received an order from the general commanding to have large and extended camp-fires built on my right to deceive the enemy, making them believe we were massing troops there. This order was communicated to General Stanley commanding cavalry, and carried into execution by Major R. H. Nodine, Twenty-fifth Illinois, engineer officer on my staff.

On the morning of the 30th, the order of battle was nearly parallel with that of the enemy, my right slightly refused, and the line of battle in two lines. . . .

On the evening of the 30th, Sheridan's left rested on the Wilkinson road, and on the right of Negley's division, and the line ran in a south-easterly direction, through a cedar thicket, until General Davis' right rested near the Franklin road. Kirk's brigade was on Davis' right. Willich's brigade flanked on a line nearly perpendicular to the main line, forming a crook to the rear, to avoid the possibilities of my right being turned by anything like an equal force. My line was a strong one, open ground in front for a short distance. My instructions for the following day were received at about 6½ o'clock, p. m. on the 30th, and were as follows:

"Take strong position; if the enemy attack you, fall back slowly, refusing your right, contesting the ground inch by inch. If the enemy do not attack you, you will attack them, not vigorously, but warily—the time of attack by you to be designated by the general commanding."

I was also informed that Crittenden's corps would move simultaneously with my attack, into Murfreesboro.

Written instructions were sent to each division commander, on the night of the 30th, explaining to each what would be required of them on the 31st.

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In a strict compliance with my orders, and the knowledge I possessed of the position of the enemy, which was communicated to my superior, and the generals under my command, I could not have made a better disposition of my troops.

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#### EXTRACT FROM GENERAL R. W. JOHNSON'S REPORT.

About 2 o'clock p. m. I received an order from Major-General McCook to look well to my right, as General Hardee (rebel) with his corps was on the right flank of our column. I ordered the Second brigade, Brigadier-General Kirk commanding, to take position with his brigade, his left resting against the right of General Davis, his right refused so as to cover our right flank. About dark, I placed General Willich's brigade on the right of Kirk's, refusing his right, and directing a heavy line of skirmishers to be thrown forward, connecting on the left with those of General Davis, and extending to the right and rear, near the Wilkinson pike. This line of skirmishers was thrown forward about six hundred yards, and near those of the enemy. My third brigade, Colonel Baldwin commanding, was held in reserve. . . .

In consultation with General McCook late in the afternoon of December 30th, he informed me that he had reliable information to the effect that the center of the rebel line of battle was opposite to our extreme right, and that we would probably be attacked by the entire rebel army early on the following morning. His prediction proved true. He also informed me that he had communicated this information to the commanding general. I expected a change in the programme for the following day, but none was made. My brigade commanders were called together, and the operations of the following day fully explained to them. Every arrangement was made for an attack. Two gallant and experienced officers commanded my advanced brigades, and every precaution taken against surprise. At 6:22 on the morning of the 31st, the outposts in front of my division were driven in by an overwhelming force of infantry, outnumbering my forces greatly, and known to contain about thirty-five thousand men. At the same time my extreme right was attacked by the enemy's cavalry.

The gallant Willich and Kirk soon opened a heavy fire of musketry and artillery upon the advancing columns, causing wavering of the ranks, but fresh columns would soon replace them, and it was apparent that to fall back was "a military necessity." Edgerton's battery, after firing three rounds, had so many of his horses killed as to render it unmanageable. He, however, remained with it, and continued to fire until he fell by a severe wound, and he and his battery fell into the hands of the enemy. . . .

Seeing the pressure upon my lines, I ordered up my reserve brigade, under the gallant Baldwin. The troops of this brigade advanced promptly and delivered their fire, holding their ground for some time, but they, too, were compelled to fall back.

## EXTRACT FROM COLONEL W. H. GIBSON, COMMANDING WILLICH'S BRIGADE.

These dispositions had been made and these precautions adopted by General Willich. At dawn of day, orders were received to build fires and make coffee. In a few moments after, I met General Willich, who remarked that he would be absent a few moments at the headquarters of General Johnson, and in case anything occurred in front of our pickets, he directed me to rally the Thirty-ninth and Thirty-second (Indiana) to their support. At twenty-five minutes past six, and soon after meeting the general, firing was heard on General Kirk's right. The brigade was instantly ordered to take arms, and Lieutenant Miles of the staff was dispatched for General Willich. He was found, and started for his command, but his horse was shot under him, and he was made a prisoner before giving an order. The enemy advanced upon our position with four heavy lines of battle, with a strong reserve held in mass. All these were in full view before the lines of General Kirk gave way. His left extended a great distance beyond our extreme right, and was thrown forward so that his lines were to some extent oblique to ours. To the right of our position, and near the Franklin road, he took position with an immense force of cavalry. In fact, the center of Hardee's corps attacked our right. His lines were advanced with great rapidity, and his force could not have been less than thirty-five thousand, besides cavalry. Portions of Polk's and Smith's corps were engaged. The lines of General Kirk soon yielded to an assault which no troops in the world could have withstood. The Thirty-second and Thirty-ninth moved promptly, but were embarrassed by the retiring forces, and their safety endangered by an assault in overwhelming numbers upon front and flanks. . . . The Forty-ninth remained in position until ordered to retire, and fought desparately at every rod. The Fifteenth Ohio, Colonel Wallace, delivered six rounds before falling back, whilst the Thirty-second and Thirty-ninth Indiana bravely contested the ground on the right. . . . The Fifteenth Ohio, Colonel Wallace, had got into position, and under cover of its fire the Forty-ninth Ohio and Eighty-ninth Illinois were directed to retire by the flank. The Thirty-second and Thirty-ninth were now retiring in good order. At this juncture, learning nothing of General Willich, I felt it my duty to exert myself as far as possible to save the command.

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EXTRACT FROM COLONEL BALDWIN'S REPORT.

The brigade returned to the woods, near the headquarters of the division, after dark, and bivouacked there.

At daybreak the next morning, I was informed by stragglers who were running across the field in my front, of the attack on General Willich's and Kirk's brigades.

I immediately ordered the brigade under arms, and proceeded to form

a line of battle in the edge of timber, facing the large open fields, over which I knew the enemy must come to attack me.

I deployed the Louisville legion on the right, and was proceeding to post the First Ohio in the center, and the Sixth Ohio, holding the Ninety-third Ohio in reserve to protect either flank, when you (General Johnson) ordered me to move the First Ohio across the open field, and post it at the fence. The Sixth Indiana was moved forward and posted on the edge of a skirt of timber to the left of the First Ohio, the Thirtieth Indiana and Seventy-ninth Illinois being posted on the right, and a section of the Fifth Indiana battery was posted between the First Ohio and Sixth Indiana. . . .

These dispositions were scarcely made when the enemy in immense masses appeared in my front at short range, their left extending far beyond the extreme right of my line. My infantry and artillery poured a destructive fire into their dense masses, checking them in front; but their left continued to advance against my right. . . . Had my line stood a moment longer, it would have been entirely surrounded and captured.

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#### EXTRACT FROM GENERAL KIRK'S REPORT.

At 5 a. m. I had the entire brigade under arms ready for action, in which state of readiness they continued until something over an hour later, when the engagement commenced. The enemy attacked our lines at daylight. We could see them advancing over the open country for about a half a mile in front of our lines. They moved in heavy masses, apparently six lines deep. Their left extended far beyond our right, so as to completely flank us. They moved up steadily and in good order, without music or noise of any kind. They had no artillery in sight. Having early notice of the enemy's advance, I sent a staff officer to General Johnson to advise him of it, and then I passed to the extreme right of my line, where the attack would commence, and where my artillery was posted. Seeing the exposed condition from the enemy's fire, I ordered the Thirty-fourth Illinois to advance to meet the enemy, at the same time ordering the battery to commence firing, which it did with excellent effect. With my line extended as it was, I should think the enemy outnumbered me here at least five to one, perhaps double that proportion, but this solitary regiment never wavered, but steadily advanced until they closed with the enemy, and it became almost a hand-to-hand fight. The balance of my line now became engaged, and fought most bravely against this fearful odds. No other proof is needed of the fierceness of the conflict at this point, and the stubborn tenacity with which our men fought, than the fact that considerably more than one-half of some of these regiments were shot down before they yielded an inch of ground, and the effectiveness of their fire is evidenced by the piles of the rebel dead along their lines. Seeing the contest was so unequal, and that I could not long sustain it, I sought General Willich, with a view of asking

his immediate active support. He had gone to division headquarters. He was expected back every moment. His brigade had not yet learned that he was captured. No other officer had assumed command. I appealed personally to two of the regiments to come to my support, but they declined moving without orders from their commander. This brigade and the Third are mostly old troops, and among the bravest veterans in the service; and I do not censure them or question their bravery, when I say that bewildered and confused, without a division or brigade commander, outflanked and nearly surrounded by a force vastly outnumbering us all, they fell back without at that time coming into the action, and left me alone with my four small regiments, already badly cut to pieces, and without a solitary support. There is a limit to human endurance. No troops on earth could sustain themselves circumstanced as mine were.

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#### EXTRACT FROM GENERAL DAVIS' REPORT.

The night (the 30th) passed off quietly until about daylight, when the enemy's forces were observed by our pickets to be in motion. Their object could not, however, with certainty be determined until near sunrise, when a vigorous attack was made upon Willich's and Kirk's brigades. These troops seemed not to have been fully prepared for the assault, and with little or no resistance retreated from their position, leaving their artillery in the hands of the enemy. This left my right brigade exposed to a flank movement, which the enemy was now rapidly executing, and compelled me to order Post's brigade to fall back and partly change its front. Simultaneous with this movement, the enemy commenced a heavy and very determined attack on both Carlin's and Woodruff's brigades.

These brigades were fully prepared for the attack, and received it with veteran courage. The conflict was fierce in the extreme on both sides. Our loss was heavy, and that of the enemy no less. It was, according to my observations, the best contested point of the day, and would have been held, but for the overwhelming force moving so persistently against my right. Carlin, finding his right flank being so severely pressed and threatened with being turned, ordered his troops to retire.

Woodruff's brigade succeeded in repulsing the enemy and holding its position, until the withdrawal of the troops on both its flanks compelled it to retire.

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#### EXTRACT FROM COLONEL POST'S REPORT.

The right of the brigade extended into a dense and almost impenetrable thicket of cedars, connecting there with the left of General Kirk's brigade, and in that direction nothing could be seen on account of the thicket. For more than half an hour the enemy's dark columns flowed toward our right, where the volleys of musketry and their advancing cheers from that direction assured me that they had driven the brigades

of the right from their position, and were already in our rear, and I accordingly changed front nearly perpendicularly to the rear to meet them. . .

Captain Pinney opened upon the advancing line with all his guns and when they came within range of his canister, and the fire of the supporting regiment, the execution was so great that the entire line recoiled before it, but after temporary confusion they were rallied and lay down. The enemy opened a battery upon the hill and advanced a second line.

. . . For about thirty minutes this fierce contest continued while the enemy on our right advanced so as again to endanger our rear.

As those in front rallied and charged upon the battery on the double-quick, the Fifty-ninth Illinois regiment fixed bayonets to receive them, but with the large force unopposed on our right, the position was already untenable, even though that in front were repulsed, and I ordered the battery withdrawn.

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#### EXTRACT FROM COLONEL CARLIN'S REPORT.

My men were falling rapidly on the front line, and to increase the fire on the enemy, I sent an order to Colonel Alexander to advance and form on the right of the One Hundred and First Ohio Volunteers, and to Colonel Heg, Fifteenth Wisconsin Volunteers, to form on the left of the Thirty-eighth Illinois, and to my battery to retire. To my surprise, I received in reply from Colonel Alexander, that he was already so hotly engaged that he could not come forward. The startling intelligence was also at this moment communicated to me, by one of my orderlies, that all our forces on our right had left the ground. Immediately afterward a heavy fire of musketry and artillery from the enemy from my right flank and rear, unmistakably announced that I was also attacked from that direction.

On my left Woodruff's brigade had left the ground. My command was thus exposed to fire from all points, excepting the left of my rear. When too late to retire in good order, I found that I was overpowered, and but a moment was wanting to place my brigade in the hands of the foe.

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#### EXTRACT FROM COLONEL WOODRUFF'S REPORT.

As soon as the battle became general, the Twenty-fourth Wisconsin,\* which joined my left, gave way, leaving my battery and left flank exposed to an enfilading fire. I finally succeeded in rallying them as a reserve. At this moment the right of General Sill's brigade commenced to swing to the rear, and Colonel Carlin's was observed steadily falling back. I then received orders to take position to the rear some 300 yards, in the belt of timber.

\* From Sill's Brigade.

## EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL SHERIDAN'S REPORT.

At sundown I had taken up my position—my right resting in the timber, my left on the Wilkinson pike, my reserve brigade of four regiments to the rear and opposite the center. The killed and wounded during the day was seventy-five men. General Davis' left closed in on my right, and his line thrown to the rear so that it formed nearly a right angle with me. General Negley's division of Thomas' corps was immediately on my left, his right resting on the left-hand side of the Wilkinson pike.

\* \* \* \* \*

About fifteen minutes after 7 in the morning, the enemy advanced to the attack across an open cotton-field in Sill's front. This column was opened upon by Bush's battery of Sill's brigade, which had a direct fire on its front; also by Hiscock's and Houghtaling's batteries, which had an oblique fire on its front, from a commanding position near the center of my line. The effect of this fire upon the enemy's columns was terrible. The enemy, however, continued to advance until they had reached nearly the edge of the timber, when they were opened upon by Sill's infantry, at a range of not over fifty yards. The destruction to the enemy's columns which was closed in mass, being several regiments in depth, was terrible. For a short time they withstood this fire, maneuvered, then broke and ran, Sill directing his troops to charge, which was gallantly responded to, and the enemy driven back across the valley and behind their intrenchments. In this charge I had the misfortune to lose General Sill, who was killed. The brigade then fell back in good order and resumed its original lines. Here, unfortunately, the brigade of Colonel Woodruff gave way, also one regiment of Sill's brigade which was in the second line. This regiment fell back some distance into an open field and then rallied, its place being supplied by a third regiment of reserve. At this time, the enemy, who had attacked on the extreme right of our wing against Johnson, and also on Davis' front, had been successful, and two divisions on my right were retiring in great confusion, closely followed by the enemy, completely turning my position and exposing my line to a fire from the rear. I hastily withdrew the whole of Sill's brigade, and the three regiments sent to support it at the same time directing Colonel Roberts of the left brigade, who had changed front and formed in column of regiments, to charge the enemy in the timber from which I had withdrawn those regiments. This was very gallantly done by Colonel Roberts, who captured one piece of the enemy's artillery, which had to be abandoned.

In the meantime I had formed Sill's brigade and Schaefer's on a line at right angles to my first line and behind the three batteries of artillery, which were placed in a fine position, directing Colonel Roberts to return and form on this new line.

I then made an unavailing attempt to form the troops on my right on this front line, in front of which were open fields, through which the

enemy was approaching, under a heavy fire from Hiscock's, Houghtaling's, and Bush's batteries.

After the attempt had proved entirely unsuccessful, and my right was again turned, General McCook directed me to advance to the front and form on the right of Negley. This movement was successfully accomplished under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, every regiment of mine remaining unbroken. I took position on Negley's right, Roberts' brigade having been placed in position at right angles to Negley's line facing to the south, the other two brigades being placed to the rear and at right angles with Roberts', and facing the west, covering the rear of Negley's lines.

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General Cheatham's division advanced on Roberts' brigade, and heavy masses of the enemy, with three batteries of artillery, advanced over the open ground which I had occupied in the previous part of the engagement, at the same time the enemy opening from their intrenchments in the direction of Murfreesboro.

The contest then became terrible; the enemy made three attacks, and were three times repulsed, the artillery range of the respective batteries being not over two hundred yards. In these attacks Roberts' brigade lost its gallant commander, who was killed.

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Schaefer's brigade being entirely out of ammunition, I directed them to fix bayonets and await the enemy. Roberts' brigade, which was nearly out of ammunition, I directed to fall back, resisting the enemy.

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The difficulty of withdrawing the artillery here became very great, the ground being rocky and covered with a dense growth of cedar. Houghtaling's battery had to be abandoned, also two pieces of Bush's battery.

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These regiments of Schaefer's brigade, having supplied themselves with ammunition, I put into action, by direction of General Rosecrans, directly to the front and right of General Wood's division, on the left-hand side of the railroad.

The brigade advanced through a clump of timber, and took position on the edge of a cotton-field, close upon the enemy's lines, relieving the division of General Wood, which was falling back under heavy pressure of the enemy. At this point I lost my third and last brigade commander, who was killed.

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EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF COLONEL GRENSEL, WHO ASSUMED COMMAND OF THE BRIGADE AFTER THE DEATH OF GENERAL SILL.

About this time, 7 o'clock a. m., while directing the movements of the brigade, our brave general, Sill, was struck in the face by a musket-ball, and instantly killed. I then received your order to take command of the brigade. The enemy having turned our right, and again advancing

in force, I moved to the rear, with the Twenty-fourth Wisconsin and Eighty-eighth Illinois, and across the road, where I formed on the left of the Eighty-eighth Indiana, of Woodruff's brigade, leaving the Twenty-first Michigan to support Hiscock's battery, where they were assailed by great numbers of the enemy, but held their ground until the battery was moved, when they retired in good order, losing heavily in killed and wounded. Having expended all the ammunition of the two regiments with me, I retired to, and got a supply from the train of General Rousseau, ours having been cut off.

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EXTRACT FROM COLONEL LAIBOLDT'S REPORT, COMMANDING  
IN ROOM OF COLONEL SCHAEFER.

After the lapse of an hour, the brigade was enabled to receive ammunition, and had a new position assigned to them on the Chattanooga railroad. Colonel Schaefer ordered the Fifteenth Missouri Volunteers to deploy in a cornfield, whilst the balance of the brigade held the railroad, and kept up such a galling and well-aimed fire that the enemy, though of a strength to which our force was hardly comparable, and fighting with the utmost desperation, was again and again repulsed. The Fifteenth Missouri Volunteers being in danger of being outflanked, retreated toward the position of the brigade, and it was at that moment, when about giving orders to said regiment, that the true soldier and brave man, my lamented predecessor, Colonel Fred. Schaefer fell. By order of General Sheridan, I assumed forthwith the command of the brigade, the Thirty-sixth Illinois Volunteers, commanded by Captain Olsen, having been detached to it; and after taking up another favorable position on the line of the railroad, I was enabled to hold the enemy in check, in spite of his desperate endeavors, until night broke in, and the bloody drama of that day was ended.

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EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF COLONEL L. P. BRADLEY,  
COMMANDING IN ROOM OF COLONEL ROBERTS.

About 8½ a. m., Colonel Roberts commanded the Twenty-second, Forty-second, and Fifty-first Illinois to charge the enemy's columns, and gallantly led them in person. The Forty-second and Fifty-first charged in line, with the Twenty-second in rear of the Forty-second, at battalion distance. These regiments went forward at the double-quick, and cleared the wood in front of our lines, the enemy giving way before we reached him. The line was halted, and opened fire in the timber. After some ten minutes, the line on right giving way, we were ordered to retire to the lane leading at nearly right angles with the pike, and take a new position. Very soon the whole brigade was moved to the left and rear, and formed in the cedar woods, on the pike, and east of the hospital. Houghtaling's battery was posted so as to sweep the open ground and timber the brigade had lately occupied. The Forty-second and Twenty-

second were thrown to the left and rear of the battery, and the Twenty-seventh and Fifty-first formed on the pike fronting south. The whole command was soon hotly engaged with the enemy advancing on the east and south.

There the brigade met its chief loss—four hundred killed or wounded in two hours. Colonels Roberts and Harrington fell about quarter before 11 o'clock. At this time the ammunition of the battery and of the infantry was nearly exhausted. Being hard pressed by a superior force, and nearly surrounded, it was thought necessary to retire. At about 11 o'clock, I withdrew the Fifty-first in concert with the Twenty-seventh, under Major Smith, both regiments moving by the right flank in good order. Houghtaling's battery was left upon the field after firing the last round of ammunition and losing more than half the horses; being outflanked on both sides, it was impossible to bring it off in its crippled condition. I was not informed of the fall of Colonels Roberts and Harrington until after the Forty-second and Twenty-second had moved. These regiments, after suffering a loss of half their numbers, retired toward the Nashville pike, striking it near the grounds held by General Palmer's division, and being separated from the brigade, reported to him.

The Twenty-seventh and Fifty-first were the last regiments to leave the ground, the regiments under General Negley's command having already retired. As soon as I was informed that the command of the brigade devolved on me, I sent Captain Rose, of Colonel Roberts' staff, to report to General Sheridan for orders, and fell back through the timber toward the pike.

Not being able to find General Sheridan, I reported to General Davis, who ordered me to reinforce Colonel Harker's brigade, then engaged with the enemy, who was endeavoring to turn our extreme right and get possession of the road. I took in the Twenty-seventh and Fifty-first, in line of battle, just as our troops were falling back in some disorder, and after firing a volley or two, charged a rebel brigade of five regiments, routing them completely, and taking some two hundred prisoners.

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EXTRACT FROM CAPTAIN HISCOCK'S REPORT, CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, OF SHERIDAN'S DIVISION.

The events of the 31st relative to the batteries of this division are difficult to detail, but may be made intelligible to any one conversant with the ground or taking any part in the action. The battle opened in the division by an attempt to carry Bush's battery. It was gallantly defended by General Sill until his brigade was completely turned. The brave general fell dead between the guns. The battery then fell back to the position occupied by the other batteries of the division. In the meantime, Houghtaling's and the Missouri, firing into the enemy's ranks and batteries that were engaging General Sill and General Davis, continued to do fearful execution among them until the enemy, who were pursuing

General Johnson's surprised and defeated division, gained the rear of the division, when all the batteries moved to the front, to the position just held by the enemy, and from which the division had driven him.

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#### EXTRACT FROM MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS' REPORT.

Between 6 and 7 a. m., the enemy having massed a heavy force on McCook's right during the night of the 30th, attacked and drove it back, pushing his division in pursuit in *echelon* and in supporting distance, until he had gained sufficient ground to our rear to wheel his masses to the right, and throw them upon the right flank of the center, at the same moment attacking Negley and Palmer in front, with a greatly superior force. To counteract the movements, I had ordered Rousseau to place two brigades with a battery to the right and rear of Sheridan's division, facing toward the west, so as to support Sheridan should he be able to hold his ground, or to cover him should he be compelled to fall back. About 11 o'clock, General Sheridan reported to me that his ammunition was entirely out, and he would be compelled to fall back to get more. As it became necessary for General Sheridan to fall, the enemy pressed on still further to our rear, and soon took up a position which gave them a concentrated cross-fire of musketry and cannon on Negley's and Rousseau's troops at short range. This compelled me to fall back out of the cedar woods, and take up a line along a depression in the open ground, within good musket range of the edge of the woods, whilst the artillery was retired to the high ground to the right of the turnpike. From this last position we were enabled to drive back the enemy, cover the formation of our troops, and secure the center on high ground.

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#### EXTRACT FROM GENERAL ROUSSEAU'S REPORT.

Our lines were hardly formed before a dropping fire from the enemy announced his approach. General McCook's troops, in a good deal of confusion, retired through our lines and around our right, under a most terrific fire. The enemy in pursuit furiously assailed our front, and greatly outflanking us, passed around to our right and rear. By General Thomas' direction, I had already ordered the artillery—Loomis' and Guenther's batteries—to the open field in the rear. Seeing that my command was outflanked on the right, I sent orders to the brigade commanders to retire at once also to this field, and riding back myself, I posted the batteries on a ridge, with open ground parallel with our line of battle; and as my men emerged from the woods, they were ordered to take position on the right, in support of these batteries, which was promptly done. We had perhaps four or five hundred yards of open ground in our front. While the batteries were unlimbering, seeing General Van Cleve close by, I rode up and asked him if he would move his command to the right, and aid in checking up the enemy by forming on

my right. . . . As the enemy emerged from the woods in great force, shouting and cheering, the batteries of Guenther and Loomis, double shotted with canister, opened upon them. They moved straight ahead for a while, but were finally driven back with immense loss. . . . Four deliberate and fiercely sustained assaults were made upon our position, and repulsed.

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#### EXTRACT FROM GENERAL NEGLEY'S REPORT.

By 11 o'clock, Sheridan's men, with their ammunition exhausted, were falling back. General Rousseau's reserve and General Palmer's division had retired in rear of the cedars to form a new line. The artillery ammunition was expended; that of the infantry reduced to a few rounds; the artillery horses were nearly all killed or wounded. My ammunition train had been sent back to avoid capture. A heavy column of the enemy was marching directly to our rear through the cedars. Communication with General Rosecrans and Thomas was entirely cut off, and it was manifestly impossible for my command to hold position without eventually making a hopeless, fruitless sacrifice of the whole division. To retire was but to cut our way through the ranks of the enemy.

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#### EXTRACT FROM COLONEL T. R. STANLEY'S REPORT.

At night we lay on our arms, and early on the morning of the 31st December, our skirmishers advanced and drove the enemy's skirmishers partly through the woods on our front, and General McCook engaged them on our right, but eventually fell back; and then a very heavy force was precipitated on our front and right, and on the Seventh brigade (Miller's) to my left. This infantry force was supported by a battery on our front, and one in intrenchments on our left, and the fire was very severe; but the brigade (as also did the Seventh brigade on my left) sustained the fire without falling back, and poured such a well-directed fire upon the enemy, that they faltered, and their ranks were thinned and stayed; but the troops on our right and left had fallen back so far as to bring the enemy on three sides of us, and fast closing on our rear. At this time, General Negley directed the division to cut its way through to join our other troops in the rear. This we did in good order, halting at two points, and checking the enemy by a well-directed fire, which, by this time, they had learned to fear.

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#### EXTRACT FROM COLONEL JNO. F. MILLER'S REPORT.

The batteries were worked with admirable skill, and the firing along our whole line was executed with creditable precision. The enemy halted, but did not abate his fire. The roar of musketry and artillery

now became almost deafening, and as the unequal contest progressed, it became more terrible. Once the strong force in the open field in front of my left wing, attempted a bayonet charge on the Twenty-first Ohio, but were gallantly met and repulsed with great slaughter. On one of the flags was inscribed, "Rock City Guards." The battle continued with unabating fierceness on both sides, until the sixty rounds of ammunition with which my men were supplied, was nearly exhausted. . . .

Soon after this, a heavy force was observed to advance on General Palmer's right brigade. General Palmer's right brigade held their ground for a short time, and then began to retire. Just at this time I received orders from General Negley to retire slowly with my command into the woods. My troops were nearly out of ammunition. The enemy was advancing on my right flank and on my left. The fire in front was no less destructive than it had been during the engagement. . . .

While in the woods, being closely pressed in the rear, the enemy in strong force was encountered on the line of retreat, when a destructive fire was opened upon my column, which caused them to break to the right. My men did not run, but marched to the pike, carrying many of our wounded.

About 4 o'clock p. m. (January 2d), a furious attack was made by the enemy upon General Beatty's (or Van Cleve's) division, then across the river. The fire of the enemy was returned with spirit for a time, when that division retired across the river, and retreated through my lines, which were then formed near the bank of the river, my men laying down partly concealed behind the crest of a small hill in the open field. . . .

My troops opened fire from the crest of the hill, the enemy halted and began to waver. I then ordered the men forward to a rail-fence on the bank of the river. Here a heavy fire was directed upon the enemy with fierce effect, and although in strong force, and supported by the fire of two batteries in the rear, he began to retreat. Believing this an opportune moment for crossing the river, I ordered the troops to cross rapidly, which they did with great gallantry, under fire from front and right flank. . . . The enemy's batteries were posted on an eminence in the woods near a corn-field in our front, and all this time kept up a brisk fire, but without much effect. His infantry retreated in great disorder, leaving the ground covered with his dead and wounded.

When within one hundred and fifty yards of the first battery, I ordered the Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers to charge the battery, which was immediately done by the men of that regiment, and the Nineteenth Illinois, Sixty-ninth Ohio, and perhaps others. The Twenty-first Ohio coming opportunely on the left, the battery consisting of four guns was taken and hauled off by the men.

## EXTRACT FROM GENERAL CRITTENDEN'S REPORT.

It was about dusk, and just at the moment when Generals Wood and Palmer had halted to gather up their troops, that I reached the head of my command. These two generals had their divisions in line of battle, General Wood on the left and General Palmer on the right; the enemy in sight and evidently in heavier force than we had yet encountered them. It was evident they intended to dispute the passage of the river, and to fight a battle at or near Murfreesboro.

At this moment I received an order to occupy Murfreesboro with one division, camping the other two outside.

I immediately gave the order to advance, and the movement was commenced. General Wood was ordered to occupy the place—General Palmer being ordered, at General Wood's suggestion, to keep in line with Wood's division, and advance with him, until he had forced the passage of the river. At this time it was dark. General Wood had declared, when he received the order, that it was hazarding a great deal for very little, to move over unknown ground in the night instead of awaiting for daylight, and that I ought to take the responsibility of disobeying the order. I thought the movement hazardous, but as the success of the whole army might depend upon the prompt execution of orders by every officer, it was my duty to advance. After General Wood had issued the order to advance, and General Palmer had received his also, they both came to see me, and insisted that the order should not be carried out. I refused to rescind the order, but consented to suspend it for an hour, as General Rosecrans could be heard from in that time. During the interval, the General himself came to the front, and approved of what I had done.

In the meantime, Colonel Harker, after a sharp skirmish, gallantly crossed the river with his brigade and Bradley's battery, and Hascall was already in the river advancing, when the order to suspend the movement was received. As soon as possible, I recalled Harker, and to my great satisfaction, this able officer, with consummate address, withdrew from the actual presence of a vastly superior force his artillery and troops, and recrossed the river without any serious loss. . . .

When the troops composing the center and right wing of our army had been driven by the enemy from our original line of battle to a line almost perpendicular to it, the First and Second divisions of the left wing still nobly maintained their position. Though several times assaulted by the enemy with great force, it was evident that it was vital to us that this position should be held, at least until our troops, who had been driven back, could establish themselves on their new line. The country is deeply indebted to Generals Wood and Palmer for the sound judgment, skill, and courage with which they managed their commands at this important crisis of the battle.

## EXTRACT FROM GENERAL WOOD'S REPORT.

Again the enemy were seen concentrating large masses of troops in the fields to the front and right, and soon these masses moved to the attack. Estep's battery was now moved to the front to join Hascall's brigade. The artillery in the front lines, as well as those placed in the rear of the center and left, poured a destructive fire on the advancing foe, but on he came until within small-arm range, when he was repulsed and driven back. . . .

During this attack the Fifteenth Indiana, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, countercharged on one of the enemy's regiments and captured one hundred and seventy-five prisoners. The capture was from the Twentieth Louisiana. While this attack was in progress, I received a message from General Palmer, commanding the second division of the left wing, that he was sorely pressed, and desired that I would send him a regiment if I could possibly spare one. I sent an order to General Hascall to send a regiment to General Palmer's assistance, if his situation would warrant it. He dispatched the Fifty-eighth Indiana, Colonel G. P. Buell's regiment, to report to General Palmer. The regiment got into position, reserved its fire until the enemy was in close range, and then poured in a withering discharge, from which the foe recoiled in disorder. Our extreme left next became the object of the enemy's attention. Skirmishers were soon descending the slope on the opposite side of the river, as also working their way down the stream, for the purpose, apparently, of gaining our left flank and rear. A few well-directed charges of grape and canister from Cox's battery drove them back.

## EXTRACT FROM GENERAL PALMER'S REPORT.

In the meantime, General Negley's command had, to some extent, become compromised by the confusion on the right, and my first brigade was exposed in front and flank to a severe attack which also now extended along my whole front. Orders were sent to Colonel Hazen to fall back from the open cotton-field into which he had moved. He fell back a short distance, and a regiment from Wood's division, which had occupied the crest of a low wooded hill, between the pike and the railroad, having been removed, he took possession of that and there resisted the enemy. Hazen, on the railroad, one or two regiments to the right, some troops in the point of woods south of the cotton-field, and a short distance in advance of the general line, among whom I was only able to distinguish the gallant Colonel Whittaker and his Sixth Kentucky; still further to the right, Cruff was fighting, aided by Standart's guns, and to the rear, Grose was fighting with apparently great odds against him. All were acquitting themselves nobly, and all were hard pressed. I could see that Grose was losing a great many men, but the importance of Hazen's position determined me, if necessary, to expend the last man in holding it. I gave my attention from that time chiefly to that point.

The One Hundredth Illinois came up on the left of the railroad and fought steadily. As soon as Colonel Grose was relieved of the enemy in his rear, he again changed front, moved to the left, and co-operated with Colonel Hazen. One regiment was sent to my support from General Wood's command, and which behaved splendidly. I regret my inability either to name the regiment or its officers. Again and again the attack was renewed by the enemy and each time repulsed, and the gallant men who had so gallantly struggled to hold the position, occupied it during the night.

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#### EXTRACT FROM GENERAL CRUFT'S REPORT.

The rear line (now front) was soon actively engaged. I attempted with it to assail the enemy, and ordered an advance. The First Kentucky, Colonel Engart on the right of the line, made a gallant charge and drove the enemy before it, rushing to the crest of the hill, clear beyond and to the right of the burnt house. The fire was so severe from the enemy's force at the burnt house on the left, that the order to move up the Ninetieth Ohio was countermanded, not, however, until many of the officers and men of this gallant regiment had pressed forward over the fence in line with the "Old" First Kentucky. The sad list of the killed and wounded of the Ninetieth and First regiments speaks loudly of the courage and manhood they evinced in this charge. Standart, with his gallant gunners, was throwing in grape and canister from the flanks as my men ran forward to the charge, and thinning the enemy's ranks. He was too strong for us, however, and soon my gallant advance was beaten back to the point of woods. This point was still held. The brigade on the left (Hazen's) was never pressed up to my front and left me exposed from this quarter. General Negley's brigade on the right first advanced with me, but yielding to the impulsive charge of the enemy, broke up and a portion of it drifted in disorder immediately to my rear, and left me exposed to the cross-fire of the enemy from the woods on the right. We were soon completely flanked; our own troops impeded my retreat. . . . The enemy's fire was upon three sides of my position, and apparently exactly to the rear in the woods. It was impossible to get ammunition up, to communicate with the general commanding the division, or to obtain reinforcements. In this condition the ground was still held for some forty (40) minutes longer than seemed right or proper.

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#### EXTRACT FROM COLONEL HAZEN'S REPORT.

The enemy now took cover in the wood, keeping up so destructive a fire as to make it necessary to retire behind the embankments of the railroad, which only necessitated the swinging to the rear of my right, the left having been posted on it when the action commenced in the morning. A sharp fight was kept up from this position till 2 p. m., when another assault in regular lines, supported by artillery, was made upon

this position in force. This assault was resisted much more easily than the previous ones, there being now a large force of our artillery bearing upon this point. The enemy also extended his lines much farther to the left, causing something of a diversion of our troops in that direction. The One Hundredth Illinois, Colonel Bartleson, was sent to me by the General commanding the army, which was posted with the One Hundred and Tenth Illinois and Ninth Indiana, in line to the front with the right resting on the railroad. Here, with a German regiment (I think the Second Missouri),\* these regiments fought the remainder of the day, the troops previously occupying this position retiring on the last approach of the enemy. A period of about an hour ensued, with but little infantry firing, but a murderous shower of shot and shell was rained from several directions upon this position, which was covered by a thick growth of timber. A portion of Wood's division, now commanded by General Hascall, was also posted in these woods, in rear of my troops.

At about 4 p. m. the enemy again advanced upon my front in two lines. The battle had hushed, and the dreadful splendor of this advance can only be conceived, as all description must fall vastly short. His right was even with my left, and his left was lost in the distance. He advanced steadily, and as it seemed, certainly to victory. I sent back all of my remaining staff successively, to ask for support, and braced my own lines as perfectly as possible. The Sixth Kentucky had joined me from the other side some time previously, and was posted just over the embankment of the railroad. They were strengthened by such fragments of troops as I could pick up until a good line was formed along the track. A portion of Sheridan's division was also but a few hundred yards in the rear, replenishing their boxes. A portion of General Hascall's troops was also on the right of the railroad.

The fire of the troops was held until the enemy's right flank came in close range, when a single fire from my men was sufficient to disperse this portion of his lines, his left passing far round to our right. This virtually ended the fight of the day. My brigade rested where it had fought, not a stone's throw from where it was posted in the morning, till withdrawn at dawn of next day.

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#### EXTRACT FROM GENERAL HASCALL'S REPORT.

I now took a survey of the situation, and found that along the entire line to the right and left of the railroad, which had not yet been carried by the enemy, I was the only general officer present, and was therefore in command, and responsible for the conduct of affairs. Colonel Hazen, commanding a brigade in General Palmer's division, was present with his brigade to the left of the railroad, and Colonel Grose, commanding another brigade in the same division, was also present with what there was left of his brigade, and most nobly did he co-operate with me, with

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\*This regiment belonged to Schaefer's brigade of Sheridan's division.

the Sixth and Twenty-fourth Ohio, to the right of the railroad; while Colonel Wagner, commanding the Second brigade in the First division (Wood's), left wing, nobly sustained his front, assisted by Colonel Hazen, to the left of the railroad. I now relieved the Third Kentucky regiment, who were nearly annihilated and out of ammunition, with the Fifty-eighth Indiana regiment of my brigade, commanded by Colonel George P. Buell; and this being a much larger regiment than the Third Kentucky, filled up the entire space from where the right of the Third Kentucky rested to the railroad. I then threw forward the right of the Sixth Ohio regiment, of Colonel Grose's brigade, which was on the right of Twenty-sixth Ohio, so that its line of battle was more nearly perpendicular to the railroad, and so its fire would sweep the front of the Twenty-sixth Ohio and Fifty-eighth Indiana, and supported the Sixth Ohio with Estep's battery on a little eminence to its right, and brought up the Ninety-seventh Ohio (Colonel Lane) from Wagner's brigade, to still further strengthen the right. This disposition being made, I galloped a little to the rear, and found General Rosecrans, and called his attention to the importance of the position I was holding, and the necessity of keeping it supported. He rode to the front with me, approved the disposition I had made, spoke a few words of encouragement to the men, cautioning them to hold their fire till the enemy got well up, and had no sooner retired than the enemy emerged from the woods and over the hill, and were moving upon us again in splendid style and in immense force.

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#### EXTRACT FROM COLONEL WAGNER'S REPORT.

Learning that General Hascall, on the right of the road, was hard pressed, I sent the Ninety-seventh Ohio to reinforce him, which did good service, as they took position on the flank, and were sheltered by the nature of the ground from the fire of the enemy, and which prevented the enemy from raking our lines from the woods on the right. Colonel Lane maintained this position throughout the day. The enemy, at this time, had gained the woods on this side of the river, and I ordered the Fifteenth Indiana, supported by the Fifty-seventh Indiana, to advance to meet them. . . . I preferred making the attack myself rather than waiting an assault from them. I ordered forward the Fifteenth Indiana, supported by the Fifty-seventh Indiana, being all the troops I had on hand, the Fortieth Indiana being engaged on the right of the railroad, with the left resting on the river, so as to completely enfilade the enemy's line. At this time, Colonel Hines and Lieutenant-Colonel Leonard, of the Fifty-seventh Indiana, were severely wounded, and had to leave the field. From this position, I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, commanding Fifteenth Indiana Volunteers, to charge the enemy at a double-quick, and nobly did his men execute the order, killing, wounding, and capturing nearly one entire regiment, and driving two others in utter rout from the field, and nobly was the movement seconded by the Fifty-seventh Indiana. Although they had lost all their field officers, they poured vol-

ley after volley into the enemy, thereby aiding greatly to the success of the movement. Captain Cox's battery gave them the last shot in the locker, thereby making the rout complete. The Fifteenth Indiana lost in this charge about thirty killed and near one hundred wounded; but the rebels were not yet whipped, as they returned again in force, my infantry slowly retiring, and fighting their way back. By this time, we were prepared for their reception, as Captain Cox had procured some ammunition, and I had ordered Lieutenant Estep's battery into position with four guns. When the enemy came within canister range, they were literally swept away, and driven back in confusion.

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#### EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF CAPTAIN JNO. MENDEN HALL, CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, TO GENERAL CRITTENDEN.

About 4 p. m., whilst riding along the pike with General Crittenden, we heard heavy firing of artillery and musketry on the left. We at once rode briskly over, and arriving upon the hill near the ford, saw our infantry retiring before the enemy. The general asked me if I could not do something to relieve Colonel Beatty with my guns. Captain Swallow had already opened with his battery. I ordered Lieutenant Parsons to move a little forward, and open with his guns, then rode back to Lieutenant Estep, with his Eighth Indiana battery. Meeting Captain Morton with his brigade of pioneers, he asked for advice, and I told him to move briskly forward with his brigade, and send his battery to the crest of the hill near the batteries already engaged. The Eighth Indiana battery took position to the right of Lieutenant Parsons. Seeing that Lieutenant Osborn was in position (between Lieutenants Parsons and Estep), I rode to Lieutenant Stevens (Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania battery), and directed him to change front, to file to the left with his pieces. He took position covering the ford. I found that Captain Bradley had anticipated my wishes, and had changed front to fire to the left, and opened upon the enemy. This battery was near the railroad. Lieutenant Livingston's Third Wisconsin battery, which was across the river, opened upon the advancing enemy, and continued to fire till he thought he could no longer maintain his position, when he crossed over, one section at a time, and opened fire again. The firing ceased about dark.

During this terrible encounter of little more than an hour in duration, forty-three pieces of artillery belonging to the left wing, the Board of Trade battery of six guns, and the batteries of General Negley's division, about nine guns, making a total of about fifty-eight pieces, opened fire upon the enemy. The enemy soon retired, our troops following. Three batteries of the left wing, besides those of General Davis, crossed the river in pursuit.

Roster of the Fourteenth Army Corps, or Army of the Cumberland,  
MAJOR-GENERAL W. S. ROSECRANS commanding, at the Battle  
of Stone River.

10th Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Burke commanding, Headquarters  
Guard.

*Right Wing.*

MAJOR-GENERAL A. McD. McCOOK COMMANDING.

*First Division.*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL JEFF. C. DAVIS *commanding.*

*First Brigade.*

COLONEL S. POST *commanding.*

59th Illinois Regiment, Captain H. E. Paine commanding.

22d Indiana Regiment, Colonel Gooding, Commanding.

74th Illinois Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Marsh commanding.

75th Illinois Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Bennett commanding.

5th Wisconsin Battery, Captain O. F. Pinney commanding.

*Second Brigade.*

COLONEL W. P. CARLIN *commanding.*

21st Illinois Regiment, Colonel W. S. Alexander commanding.

38th Illinois Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel D. H. Gilmer commanding.

15th Wisconsin Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel David McKee commanding.

101st Ohio Regiment, Colonel L. Stern commanding.

2d Minnesota Battery, Captain W. A. Hotchkiss commanding.

*Third Brigade.*

COLONEL W. E. WOODRUFF *commanding*

25th Illinois Regiment, Colonel T. D. Williams commanding.

35th Illinois Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel W. P. Chandler commanding.

81st Indiana Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel John Timberlake commanding.

8th Wisconsin Battery, Captain S. J. Carpenter commanding.

*Second Division.*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. W. JOHNSON *commanding.*

*First Brigade.*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. WILLICH *commanding.*

49th Ohio Regiment, Colonel W. H. Gibson commanding.

15th Ohio Regiment, Colonel Wm. Wallace commanding.

39th Indiana Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Jones commanding.

32d Indiana Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Erdelmeyer commanding.

89th Illinois Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Hotchkiss commanding.

"A" 1st Ohio Battery, Captain W. F. Goodspeed commanding.

*Second Brigade.*BRIGADIER-GENERAL E. N. KIRK *commanding.*

77th Pennsylvania Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel P. B. Houssum commanding.  
 29th Indiana Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel D. M. Dunn commanding.  
 30th Indiana Regiment, Colonel J. B. Dodge commanding.  
 79th Illinois Regiment, Major Allen Buckner commanding.  
 34th Illinois Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel H. W. Bristol commanding.  
 20th Ohio Battery Captain W. P. Edgerton commanding.

*Third Brigade.*COLONEL P. P. BALDWIN *commanding.*

6th Indiana Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Tripp commanding.  
 1st Ohio Regiment, Major J. A. Stafford commanding.  
 93d Ohio Regiment, Colonel Charles Anderson commanding.  
 5th Kentucky Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. W. Berry commanding.  
 5th Indiana Battery, Captain P. Simonson commanding.

*Third Division.*BRIGADIER-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN *commanding**First Brigade.*BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. W. SILL *commanding.*

36th Illinois Regiment, Colonel N. Grensel commanding.  
 88th Illinois Regiment, Colonel F. T. Sherman commanding.  
 24th Wisconsin Regiment, Major E. C. Hibbard commanding.  
 21st Michigan Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel W. B. McCreary commanding.  
 "G" Battery, 1st Missouri, Captain H. Hescock commanding.

*Second Brigade.*COLONEL F. SCHAEFER *commanding.*

2d Missouri Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel B. Laiboldt commanding.  
 15th Missouri Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel John Weber commanding.  
 44th Illinois Regiment, Captain W. W. Barrett commanding.  
 73d Illinois Regiment, Major W. A. Pressen commanding.  
 "C" Battery, 1st Illinois, Captain C. Houghtaling commanding.

*Third Brigade.*COLONEL G. W. ROBERTS *commanding.*

22d Illinois Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Swanwick commanding.  
 27th Illinois Regiment, Colonel F. A. Harrington commanding.  
 42d Illinois Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel N. H. Walworth commanding.  
 51st Illinois Regiment, Colonel L. P. Bradley commanding.  
 4th Indiana Battery, Captain A. K. Bush commanding.

*Center.*MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS *COMMANDING.*

9th Michigan Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel T. G. Parkhurst commanding, Headquarters and Provost Guard.

*First Division.***BRIGADIER-GENERAL L. H. ROUSSEAU** commanding.*First Brigade.***COLONEL B. F. SCRIBNER** commanding.

38th Indiana Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel D. F. Griffin commanding.  
 94th Ohio Regiment, Colonel J. W. Frizell commanding.  
 2d Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel John Kell commanding.  
 33d Ohio Regiment, Captain E. J. Ellis commanding.  
 10th Wisconsin, Colonel A. R. Chapin commanding.

*Second Brigade.***COLONEL JOHN BEATTY** commanding.

15th Kentucky Regiment, Colonel J. B. Foreman commanding.  
 3d Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel O. A. Lawson commanding.  
 10th Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Burke commanding.  
 42d Indiana Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Shanklin commanding.  
 88th Indiana Regiment, Colonel George Humphrey commanding.  
 1st Michigan Battery, Lieutenant G. W. Van Pelt commanding.

*Third Brigade.***COLONEL J. C. STARKWEATHER** commanding.

79th Pennsylvania Regiment, Colonel H. A. Hambright commanding.  
 1st Wisconsin Regiment, Colonel G. B. Bingham commanding.  
 21st Wisconsin Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Hobart commanding.  
 24th Illinois Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Mihalotzy commanding.

*Fourth Brigade.***LIEUTENANT-COLONEL O. L. SHEPHERD** commanding.

1st Bat., 15th U. S. Infantry, Major J. F. King commanding.  
 1st Bat., 16th U. S. Infantry, Major A. J. Slemmer commanding.  
 1st Bat., 18th U. S. Infantry, Major Fred. Townsend commanding.  
 2d Bat., 18th U. S. Infantry, Major J. N. Caldwell commanding.  
 1st. Bat., 19th U. S. Infantry, Major D. D. Carpenter commanding.  
 Co. "H" Battery, 5th U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant F. L. Guenther commanding.

*Second Division.***BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. S. NEGLEY** commanding.*First Brigade.***BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. G. SPEARS** commanding.

1st East Tennessee Regiment, Colonel R. K. Byrd commanding.  
 2d East Tennessee Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Melton commanding.  
 85th Illinois Regiment, Colonel R. S. Moore commanding.  
 14th Michigan Regiment, Colonel H. K. Mizner commanding.  
 10th Wisconsin Battery (two sections), Captain Y. V. Beebe commanding.

*Second Brigade.***COLONEL T. R. STANLEY** commanding.

18th Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Given commanding.  
69th Ohio Regiment, Colonel W. B. Cassilly commanding.  
19th Ohio Regiment, Colonel J. R. Scott commanding.  
11th Michigan Regiment, Colonel W. L. Stoughton commanding.  
Battery "M," 1st Ohio, Captain F. Schultz commanding.

*Third Brigade.***COLONEL J. F. MILLER** commanding.

78th Pennsylvania Regiment, Colonel W. Sirwell commanding.  
21st Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Neibling commanding.  
74th Ohio Regiment, Colonel G. Moody commanding.  
37th Indiana Regiment, Colonel J. S. Hull commanding.  
1st Kentucky Battery, Lieutenant A. A. Ellsworth commanding.  
Battery "G," 1st Ohio, Lieutenant A. Marshall commanding.

*Third Division.***BRIGADIER-GENERAL S. S. FRY** commanding.*First Brigade.***COLONEL M. B. WALKER** commanding.

17th Ohio Regiment, Colonel J. M. Connell commanding.  
31st Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Lister commanding.  
38th Ohio Regiment, Colonel E. H. Phelps commanding.  
82d Indiana Regiment, Colonel M. C. Hunter commanding.  
4th Michigan Battery, Captain J. W. Church commanding.

*Third Brigade.***COLONEL C. G. HARKER commanding.**

51st Indiana Regiment, Colonel A. D. Streight commanding.  
 13th Michigan Regiment, Colonel M. Shoemaker commanding.  
 73d Indiana Regiment, Colonel G. Hathaway commanding.  
 64th Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel A. McIlvaine commanding.  
 65th Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Cassil commanding.  
 6th Ohio Battery, Captain C. Bradley commanding.

*Second Division.***BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. M. PALMER commanding.***First Brigade.***BRIGADIER-GENERAL CHARLES CRUFT commanding.**

1st Kentucky Regiment, Colonel D. A. Enyart commanding.  
 2d Kentucky Regiment, Colonel T. G. Sedgwick commanding.  
 31st Indiana Regiment, Colonel J. Osborne commanding.  
 90th Ohio Regiment, Colonel I. N. Ross commanding.  
 Battery "B," 1st Ohio, Captain W. E. Standart commanding.

*Second Brigade.***COLONEL W. B. HAZEN commanding.**

41st Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wiley commanding.  
 6th Kentucky Regiment, Colonel W. C. Whitaker commanding.  
 9th Indiana Regiment, Colonel W. H. Lake commanding.  
 110th Illinois Regiment, Colonel T. S. Casey commanding.  
 Battery "F," 1st Ohio, Captain G. J. Cockerill commanding.

*Third Brigade.***COLONEL W. GROSE commanding.**

86th Indiana Regiment, Major Kinley commanding.  
 6th Ohio Regiment, Colonel N. L. Anderson commanding.  
 24th Ohio Regiment, Colonel F. C. Jones commanding.  
 84th Illinois Regiment, Colonel L. H. Waters commanding.  
 23d Kentucky Regiment, Major T. H. Hannick commanding.  
 Batteries "H" and "M," 4th U. S. Artillery, forming battalion; Lieutenants H. C. Cushing and H. A. Huntington commanding batteries; Lieutenant C. C. Parsons commanding battalion.

*Third Division.***BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. P. VAN CLEVE commanding.***First Brigade.***COLONEL SAMUEL BEATTY commanding.**

19th Ohio Regiment, Major C. F. Manderson commanding.  
 9th Kentucky Regiment, Colonel B. C. Grider commanding.  
 11th Kentucky Regiment, Major E. L. Moutley commanding.  
 79th Indiana Regiment, Colonel Fred. Knefler commanding.  
 26th Pennsylvania Battery, Lieutenant A. J. Stevens commanding.

*Second Brigade.***COLONEL J. P. FYFFE commanding.**

44th Indiana Regiment, Colonel W. C. Williams commanding.  
 86th Indiana Regiment, Colonel A. S. Hamilton commanding.  
 13th Ohio Regiment, Colonel J. G. Hawkins commanding.  
 59th Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. Howard commanding.  
 7th Indiana Battery, Captain G. R. Swallow commanding.

*Third Brigade.***COLONEL S. W. PRICE commanding.**

51st Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. McClain commanding.  
 99th Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Cummins commanding.  
 35th Indiana Regiment, Colonel B. F. Mullen commanding.  
 8th Kentucky Regiment, Major G. B. Broddus commanding.  
 21st Kentucky Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Evans commanding.  
 3d Wisconsin Battery, Lieutenant C. Livingston commanding.

*Cavalry.***BRIGADIER-GENERAL D. S. STANLEY COMMANDING.****COLONEL JNO. KENNEDY commanding First Division.***First Brigade.***COLONEL R. H. G. MINTY commanding.**

3d Kentucky Cavalry, Colonel E. H. Murray commanding.  
 4th Michigan Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Dickinsen commanding.  
 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Major Jno. E. Wynkoop commanding.

*Second Brigade.***COLONEL LEWIS ZAHM commanding.**

1st Ohio Cavalry, Colonel Minor Milliken commanding.  
 3d Ohio Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel D. A. Murray commanding.  
 4th Ohio Cavalry, Major J. L. Pugh commanding.

*The Reserve.***GENERAL STANLEY, commanding in person.**

15th Pennsylvania, Anderson Troop, Colonel Wm. J. Palmer commanding.  
 1st Middle Tennessee Cavalry, Colonel W. B. Stokes commanding.  
 2d East Tennessee Cavalry, Colonel J. P. T. Carter Commanding  
 Battalion of 3d Indiana Cavalry, Major R. Kline commanding.  
 Battery "D," 1st Ohio Artillery, Lieutenant N. W. Newell commanding.  
 4th U. S. Cavalry, Captain Elmer Otis commanding, Body-guard to the General commanding the Army.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### OPERATIONS DURING THE ARMY'S ENCAMPMENT OF SIX MONTHS AT MURFREESBORO.

On the 5th of January, the Army of the Cumberland went into position in the vicinity of Murfreesboro. General Thomas, by direction, placed his divisions on the Woodbury, Bradyville, Manchester, and Shelbyville turnpikes; General McCook posted his forces from the Shelbyville road across the Salem turnpike to Stone river, where his right rested, and General Crittenden disposed his command from General Thomas' left so as to cover the Liberty and Lebanon turnpikes, resting his left on Stone river.

Thus located, attention was first given to the recuperation and reinforcement of the army. The slightly wounded were sent to Nashville and farther north as fast as possible, while the severely wounded were placed in the public buildings of Murfreesboro not occupied by the enemy as hospitals, and in large field hospitals in the vicinity of the town.

Until the railroad to Nashville was put in running order, wagon trains were the sole dependence for supplies. The contingencies of bad weather and bad roads, and the vastness of the daily demand, forbade a full commissariat or the rapid reclothing of the troops.

By authority of general order No. 9, war department, January 9, 1863, the troops of the Army of the Cumberland were organized into three corps d'armée, designated the Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first, corresponding in the main to the former grand divisions of "Center," Right and Left Wings, without change of commanders. During the month of January, General Steedman's division, formerly under com-

mand of General Fry, moved from Gallatin and took post at Antioch Church on Mill creek, near Nashville, and at La Vergne, and General Reynolds' division advanced from the same place to Murfreesboro.

The objects proposed for attainment, while the army was in camp at Murfreesboro, were the fortification of the place, the complete re-equipment and reorganization of the troops, general preparation for a summer campaign, the greatest possible restraint to the enemy north of Duck river, and the greatest possible injury to him south of that stream.

Soon after the occupation of Murfreesboro, the most elaborate fortifications were projected, and their construction commenced, and were completed during the six months of comparative inactivity which followed. Earthworks of the strongest type were thrown up on the high ground between the town and Stone river, on each side of the railroad and Nashville turnpike, and on the elevated ground north of the river. These heavy works were commanded in turn by a succession of forts which offered vulnerable sides to the great central fortress. And besides the heavy forts and intrenchments, there was a circumvallation in front of the extended camps of the army. These defenses subsequently furnished refuge for troops stationed for the protection of communications and the depot of supplies at Murfreesboro, but no great army ever had an opportunity of repelling a greater army through their friendly help.

January 25th, by order of the war department, Forts Henry and Donelson were transferred from General Grant to General Rosecrans, and subsequently the order was amended to include Fort Heiman. This change placed the Cumberland river in the care of General Rosecrans (being one of the two channels of supply connecting his primary and proximate depots) and appropriately threw upon him the responsibility of maintaining the open navigation of this river.

No general engagement being imminent, the enemy's cavalry was exceedingly active in embarrassing the concentration of divisions, and in expeditions against the communications of the army. About the last of January, General Wheeler having under his command his own cavalry and the troopers

of Forrest and Wharton, appeared at Triune, in rear of the army. Having received early intelligence of his movement, General Rosecrans directed General Davis, with his division and two brigades of cavalry, under Colonel Minty, to move by the Versailles turnpike to the rear of Wheeler. He also directed General Steedman to keep watch toward Triune. General Davis, upon arrival at the junction of the Versailles and Eagleville roads, dispatched Colonel Minty to move round by way of Unionville and Rover, while he advanced directly to Eagleville, reaching there on the evening of the 31st. At Rover, Colonel Minty captured a regiment numbering three hundred and fifty men. Afterward, the pursuing forces concentrated at Franklin to intercept the enemy. General Davis divided his command and moved upon different routes, and General Steedman advanced to Nolensville and thence to Franklin. But Wheeler eluded the infantry and cavalry, and appeared before Fort Donelson on the 3d of February. This post was held by seven hundred men under Colonel A. C. Harding, Eighty-third Illinois. Wheeler made repeated attacks, but was as often repulsed, with a total loss of two hundred men killed, six hundred wounded, and one hundred captured. Colonel Harding had thirteen killed, fifty wounded, and twenty captured. Shortly after dark, several gunboats convoying a large fleet of transports laden with troops on their way to reinforce General Rosecrans, arrived at Fort Donelson, when Wheeler at once retreated. Before morning, Colonel Lowe arrived from Fort Henry, and from all quarters efforts were made to intercept the enemy. Colonel Lowe sent his cavalry in direct pursuit, and General Davis, at Franklin, having been reinforced by five hundred cavalry, under General Morgan, made effort to cut him off in his retreat. He gave chase with Morgan's and Minty's cavalry, but Wheeler moved far to the west and avoided him altogether, crossing Duck river at Centerville. All the troops that had been directed against Wheeler resumed their previous stations, except General Steedman's command, which remained at the front.

The troops that reached Fort Donelson, February 3d, comprised eighteen regiments of infantry and four batteries of ar-

tillery, having recently been designated the "Army of Kentucky," under the immediate command of Brigadier-Generals C. C. Gilbert, A. Baird, and George Crook, but under the general command of Major-General Gordon Granger, who was still at Louisville. From Fort Donelson they steamed to Nashville. These forces, with two regiments of infantry and four of cavalry, which soon after joined them by rail and boat at Nashville, numbered in the aggregate about fourteen thousand men. The appearance of the fleet approaching Nashville was exceedingly imposing. The river below the city is tortuous, and the line of gunboats and steamboats, whose decks were covered with troops with arms and banners, revealing its winding length, formed a pageant of wonderful grandeur. The unfriendly citizens of Nashville were forced to contrast this revelation of power and splendor with the confusion and dismay which reigned when the retreat of Johnston's army through their streets left them defenseless.

The reinforcements gradually took position in the front. February 12th, General Gilbert moved with his brigade to Franklin; on the 24th, General Crook embarked with his and proceeded up the Cumberland to Carthage, Tennessee, where he debarked and took position, and on the 3d of March, General G. C. Smith advanced from Nashville to Brentwood with the cavalry of General Granger's command.

March 4th, General Rosecrans ordered a general reconnaissance to ascertain the strength of the enemy in his front. General Sheridan, with four brigades of infantry and Minty's cavalry, moved from Murfreesboro toward Rover. When near the latter place he turned toward Eagleville with the infantry, giving the direct road to the cavalry. Colonel Minty found four hundred of the enemy's cavalry at Rover; drove them upon another force of six hundred at Unionville, and having routed the whole, pushed them to Shelbyville, capturing fifty-two prisoners, some wagons and mules. He then joined Sheridan at Eagleville. General Steedman, with his entire command, moved from Nolensville, through Triune and Harpeth, toward Chapel Hill, meeting and driving back Roddy's cavalry.

The same day (March 4th), General Gilbert sent an expedition under Colonel John Coburn, of the Thirty-third Indi-

ana, south from Franklin. The objects were to form a junction with a column moving toward Columbia from Murfreesboro, and the collection of forage to fill a train of eighty wagons. Colonel Coburn's command embraced his own regiment, the Thirty-third Indiana; the Eighty-fifth Indiana; the Nineteenth and Twenty-second Michigan; six hundred cavalry under Colonel Thomas J. Jordan, comprising a detachment from his own regiment, the Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry, one from the Second Michigan, and another from the Fourth Kentucky; and Aleshire's Eighteenth Ohio battery. The total strength of the force was two thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven.

Colonel Coburn was directed by General Gilbert to advance the first day to Spring Hill, and divide his force on the second, sending one fraction to Rally Hill to meet the column from Murfreesboro, and the other toward Columbia, each to return to Spring Hill at night, unless the former should meet the expected column.

Colonel Jordan moved in advance of the infantry, and met the enemy about three miles from Franklin, moving north. Both forces quickly formed lines of battle, but Colonel Jordan was first in readiness for action, and Aleshire opened with his guns. After a sharp conflict for some hours, the enemy withdrew and retreated toward Spring Hill. The next morning the column advanced, but before reaching Thompson's Station the enemy was again found, and this time in position. There were rumors of other forces on the left flank, and some troops were in sight on high ground in proximity, in that direction. Colonel Jordan charged the enemy on a line of hills in front of the station, with his men dismounted, when a new position was taken on another range of hills beyond the station. Colonel Coburn pursued to the vicinity of the station, where the column was arrested by shells from a battery on a hill to the left, and soon by the fire of another on the right, which, from the direction of the advance, enfiladed the line. Colonel Coburn had, the day before and that morning, advised Gen. Gilbert of these indications and of direct information that he was meeting the enemy in strong force; yet, as his orders had not been modified, he determined to advance and charge the annoying battery on the right. He placed his own

battery by sections on opposite sides of the turnpike and railroad, which are separated by a narrow space; placed the cavalry in immediate support, and disposed three regiments for the attack—his fourth, the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio, being in the rear to guard the train. The line advanced under the fire of both batteries, when suddenly they ceased firing, and the enemy's infantry was seen in motion to attack. The situation was now fully developed. There was infantry with the two batteries, while cavalry was reported on the left and rear. Colonel Coburn now resolved to retreat; but it was necessary first to repel the enemy. After some sharp fighting in front, the retrograde movement was commenced from the midst of large forces of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Colonel Jordan was directed to collect his command and cover the retreat, who, soon seeing the infantry of the enemy moving to his rear to cut him off, ordered the battery to move to the rear, and dismounted the detachments of Majors Scranton and Jones to hold the enemy in check to enable Captain Aleshire to save his battery, and then effect a junction with the infantry regiments to the east. But the cavalry and infantry were here separated. The infantry regiments, by changing front to resist attacks from various directions, moved backward and to the east. The cavalry, artillery, and the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio, which, upon being threatened by the enemy, retreated with the train, followed the turnpike road. Colonel Jordan deemed it vain to attempt to resist the heavy masses of the enemy, and Colonel Coburn finding himself in a short time surrounded, surrendered the three regiments with him. The other forces escaped. His loss was forty killed, one hundred and fifty wounded, and thirteen hundred surrendered, including his wounded. The reported loss of the enemy was one hundred and fifty killed and four hundred and fifty wounded.

The enemy's force, under Generals Van Dorn and Wheeler, was fourteen or fifteen thousand strong; and the surrender, after Colonel Coburn had gone into the midst of this army and had been turned to the east of the road, was doubtless a necessity. He went forward against his own convictions, be-

cause his orders were not changed. An earlier retreat might have saved his command.

The reports of Colonels Coburn and Jordan are conflicting as to the exact situation when the latter commenced to retreat. Colonel Jordan asserted that his retreat was necessary to save himself from being cut off by a force moving to his rear, west of the road, which was the direct line for the retrograde movement, and that the situation was then hopeless, as it was vain to resist an army. Colonel Coburn had hope of saving his whole force if its unity had not been broken.

In the meanwhile, General Sheridan had taken position at the junction of the Chapel Hill and Shelbyville turnpikes, and General Steedman had pushed the enemy's cavalry, under Roddy, south through Chapel Hill and across Duck river, capturing sixty men and eighty horses. General Steedman then intrenched himself at Triune.

Upon receiving information of Colonel Coburn's defeat and surrender, General Granger threw General Baird's brigade into Franklin from Nashville by rail, and followed in person.

March 6th, Colonel Jones' brigade, supported by Colonel Heg's, drove the enemy out of Middleton, when both brigades returned to Murfreesboro.

The same day, General Granger brought forward his cavalry, under General Smith, from Brentwood, to join a co-operative movement against General Van Dorn. The next day, General Sheridan closed up on Franklin, and a brigade arrived from Nashville. General Steedman was now threatened by some six thousand cavalry, but upon the arrival of two regiments from La Vergne, the enemy retired toward College Grove. Two days later, Colonel Minty moved to Franklin, and the day following, General Granger, with his own and Sheridan's and Minty's troops, advanced from Franklin and drove Van Dorn from Spring Hill. At the same time, General Davis was thrown forward from Salem to Eagleville, to relieve General Steedman's front, and General R. S. Granger was posted at Versailles, in his support. On the 10th, General Davis closed upon General Steedman at Triune, and General Gordon Granger drove Van Dorn across Rutherford's creek, near Columbia. The day following, General Granger's cavalry hav-

ing crossed the stream several miles above, advanced almost to Columbia, but the high water prevented the passage of the infantry and artillery. This movement terminated this general and complicated reconnoissance, when all the various commands engaged in it returned to their former respective positions. It was developed that the enemy was in strong resisting force at various points, but no special knowledge of General Bragg's aggregate strength was gained.

March 5th, General Rosecrans ordered Colonel H. P. Lyon to abandon Fort Henry and transfer the garrison to Fort Donelson. A few days later, Fort Heiman was also abandoned, and its garrison, under Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick, was withdrawn to Fort Donelson. The latter fort was strengthened to give greater security to the navigation of the Cumberland river.

During the spring and early summer, the Confederate generals, Morgan and Forrest, were very active, the former operating to the east of Murfreesboro and the latter to the west. Their frequent appearance in the vicinity of outposts of the army provoked several efforts to punish them for their audacity.

March 18th, Colonel A. S. Hall was sent from Murfreesboro, with the second brigade of General Reynolds' division, to look after Morgan to the northeast. He advanced beyond Statesville, and learning that Morgan was preparing to attack him he retreated to Milton, and posting his brigade on a hill in the vicinity, awaited his assault. Morgan's superior numbers gave him strong assurance of success, and though meeting a more stubborn resistance than he anticipated, assaulted Hall's command first on both flanks, and then in turn on left, right, and rear, but was repulsed throughout the engagement, which lasted three and a half hours. Morgan left four hundred men on the field, of whom over sixty had been killed. Colonel Hall had six men killed and forty wounded. This was the most decided failure that Morgan had yet made. His policy, always, was to attack only when he had such advantage as to assure his success, and he no doubt supposed, as the usual condition was palpable, he would attain the common result.

On the 1st of April, General Morgan was driven from his stronghold at Snow Hill by General Stanley. He left his dead

on the field and fled toward McMinnville. General Stanley returned to Murfreesboro with forty prisoners and three hundred horses and mules.

On the 25th of March, General Forrest captured at Brentwood, after a short engagement, about four hundred men of the Twenty-second Wisconsin regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bloodgood. He also captured, at a stockade south of Brentwood, a detachment of the Nineteenth Michigan. General Smith at the time was moving with about six hundred cavalry to the support of Colonel Bloodgood, and pursued the enemy. He overtook Colonel Biffle's regiment four miles from Brentwood, inflicted a severe loss upon it, and recaptured considerable property, but was compelled to retreat before Forrest's whole command.

April 7th, General Rosecrans organized a provisional brigade of seventeen hundred men for independent service, and assigned Colonel A. D. Streight to its command, with instructions to repair to Nashville and prepare to make an expedition into Alabama and Georgia to interrupt communications and destroy property of all kinds useful to the enemy. Having obtained a partial supply of unserviceable mules, Colonel Streight proceeded to Palmyra, and thence across to Fort Henry, gathering on the way as many serviceable animals as possible. At Fort Henry he embarked for Eastport, Mississippi. He left that point on the 21st, reached Tuscumbia on the 24th, and moved thence on the 26th for Moulton. Leaving that place at midnight on the 28th, he pressed forward through Day's Gap toward Blountsville. While passing through the Gap, his rear-guard was attacked by Forrest's cavalry. The enemy followed him through Blountsville, Gadsden, and on toward Rome. He defeated Forrest repeatedly, but his men and his animals becoming jaded, he lost heavily by capture. With diminished ranks and in almost utter destitution of serviceable ammunition,\* he moved on, and crossed the Chattooga river, in hope of destroying the bridge at Rome. But in this he failed, as the enemy pressed upon him so closely that his men became exhausted, and many having been already killed and captured,

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\* His ammunition had been injured by fording streams.

and there being no hope of accomplishing the object of his expedition, he surrendered to Forrest on the 3d of May. This enterprise was boldly conceived, and there was no lack of bravery and energy in its conduct, but the contingencies were not clearly apprehended, and the actual results did not compensate for the loss of so many men and so much material. But failure though it was, it was the type of enterprises which, undertaken under better conditions, resulted in brilliant success. It was a mistake to start with a half supply of poor animals, depending mainly upon captures to mount half his command at the start. This plan caused delay in starting, and the result was that the enemy was encountered in superior numbers soon after Colonel Streight had passed beyond the reach of support. The enemy's partisan leaders in their raids in Tennessee and Kentucky had citizens of these states for soldiers, could always depend upon the friendship and assistance of a large portion of the inhabitants, and, besides, were themselves thoroughly acquainted with the country, and consequently were hardly ever ignorant of the strength of the forces operating against them, or of the short routes to safety. The conditions of success were very different subsequently, when the national forces undertook to interrupt the enemy's communications and make destructive raids. Such enterprises were given an unheralded start, and were prepared for quick movement, or else had such strength as to defy ordinary opposition. These conditions were wanting in Colonel Streight's adventure.

On the 9th of April, General Stanley moved from Murfreesboro, through Triune, to support General Granger at Franklin, who was threatened by about nine thousand cavalry and two regiments of infantry under General Van Dorn. General Granger's forces numbered about five thousand infantry and two thousand seven hundred cavalry. His infantry were posted on the south bank of the Harpeth river, and General Smith's cavalry had been sent to reinforce the garrison at Brentwood. The enemy suffered severe loss in approaching Franklin, inflicted by the Fortieth Ohio Infantry, which resisted very stubbornly as it slowly retreated. General Stanley crossed the river and struck the enemy in flank, but

was subsequently forced to recross. Having met such opposition before reaching Franklin, General Van Dorn retreated without making a general attack.

April 20th, General Reynolds, with four thousand infantry, and two thousand six hundred cavalry, under Colonel Wilder, made a reconnoissance northeast and southeast from Murfreesboro. He destroyed almost entirely the railroad from Manchester to McMinnville, a cotton-mill and two other mills at McMinnville, a small mill at Liberty, captured a large amount of supplies, one hundred and eighty prisoners, over six hundred animals, and returned to Murfreesboro with the loss of one man wounded.

At 1 A. M., on the 27th, Colonel Watkins moved out of Franklin, between the Columbia and Carter's Creek turnpikes, and surprised the Texas legion encamped within a mile of General Van Dorn's main force. He captured one hundred and twenty-eight prisoners, three hundred horses and mules, eight wagons, and all the camp and garrison equipage without losing a man. Colonel Campbell, with his brigade of cavalry, went out from Franklin on the 30th, to surprise the enemy on the Columbia and Jonesboro turnpikes. He killed fourteen men, wounded twenty-five, and captured thirteen.

May 21st, General Stanley started from Murfreesboro with a portion of General Turchin's cavalry division and one regiment of mounted infantry, to attack a force encamped in the vicinity of Middleton. His advance under Lieutenant O'Connell charged the enemy, and drove him from his camp and from another position, inflicting heavy loss. General Stanley brought in three hundred horses and seven hundred stand of arms, with other less valuable property.

Early in June, there was one of the peculiarly sad occurrences of war at Franklin, Tennessee. Two men, claiming to be officers, and wearing the uniform of a colonel and major, presented themselves to Colonel Baird, commanding the post, and stated that they were Colonel Anton and Major Dunlap, and authorized, by an order from General E. D. Townsend, assistant adjutant-general, at Washington, and another from General Rosecrans, to inspect outposts. Their conduct excited surprise, and Colonel Watkins soon concluded that they were

spies. This supposition proved to be true, as upon inquiry at department headquarters, it was ascertained that there were no such inspectors in the national service. General Rosecrans at once ordered a drum-head court-martial, and their immediate execution, upon conviction, as spies. Learning that such a court had been ordered, they confessed that they were Colonel Lawrence A. Williams and Lieutenant Dunlap, of the Confederate army. The former had been in the army of the United States. They claimed that they were not spies, and solicited clemency. But the proof was positive, and General Rosecrans' order was imperative, and they were consequently hung June 9th, the day after their arrest.

The conduct of these men was somewhat inexplicable. It was supposed that it was their object to gain such knowledge of the post as would enable Forrest to dash on it and capture it. But Franklin was not an exceedingly important place, not being on the direct communications of the army, and one that could not be held by the enemy except with a large army. Why they should make such a venture to gain knowledge of its strength and defense, is incomprehensible; and if they had an ulterior object, it was not apparent.

During the six months of the army's encampment at Murfreesboro, which were filled up with numerous reconnoissances and "affairs of outposts," there was an earnest and protracted discussion between General Halleck, commander-in-chief, and General Rosecrans, with regard to an aggressive campaign, and from the first months of the year the latter was urged to advance against General Bragg, in position on Duck river. After General Grant had commenced his campaign against Vicksburg, General Halleck became more urgent, as he thought that the inactivity of the Army of the Cumberland would permit General Bragg to detach forces to Mississippi, to maintain the enemy's grasp of the Mississippi river. This was considered the more probable, as General Joseph E. Johnston was in command of a large department, including General Bragg's army, as well as the one operating in the State of Mississippi. General Rosecrans was restrained from active operations, as he claimed, first, by the character of the roads in Middle Tennessee in winter, and then by delay in the enlarge-

ment of his cavalry arm, and the lack of animals for transportation, and the want of forage. He also assumed the ground that military considerations forbade his advance while General Grant's campaign was in progress. That, should he force General Bragg to retire behind the mountains, he would give him an opportunity to send reinforcements to General Johnston in Mississippi, which he would not have should he be held on the line of Duck river, with the contingency of battle at any moment, and that, should General Grant fail, there would be a heavy combination against himself in Middle Tennessee, and that for this contingency the reserve army should not be far from its base. General Bragg however, did detach a portion of his troops, but fortunately they did not reach Mississippi until General Grant thrust his army between Generals Johnston and Pemberton, and had shut up the latter to a siege within his intrenchments at Vicksburg, so thoroughly established that no outside relief could reach him.

Thus the spring passed away before General Rosecrans deemed himself prepared to advance. His cavalry horses multiplied slowly, and his trains and forage attained the requisite proportions in the same degree. Still, by the 1st of June, the more special indications of an advance began to appear. General Ward's brigade was ordered forward from Gallatin, to take post at La Vergne. General Gordon Granger moved his command from Franklin to Triune. General Crook's brigade was transferred from Carthage to Murfreesboro, and attached to General Reynolds' division, the Fourth, of the Fourteenth Corps. The former Fourth division of that corps was transferred to General G. Granger, whose forces were constituted as the reserve corps, comprising three divisions, designated as First, Second, and Third, and commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals A. Baird, J. D. Morgan, and R. S. Granger. General Rosecrans, however, still delayed, and about the 10th of June he invited a formal expression of opinion with regard to an advance against the enemy from his corps and division generals. He was sustained in his delay by his subordinates generally, though General Garfield, his chief of staff, urged upon him a speedy movement, for reasons both military and political, and chiefly upon the ground that

he could advance with sixty-five thousand one hundred and thirty-seven bayonets and sabers, against an army of forty-one thousand six hundred and eighty men, as he estimated the strength of General Bragg's army.

By the 23d of June, the question of advance was fully solved, and orders were issued for the movement of the army. By this time the cavalry had been greatly enlarged, through accessions of regular cavalry and mounted infantry, and the grand fortifications at Murfreesboro afforded in their completion protection to General Rosecrans' accumulated supplies.

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No. 7.—HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
MURFREESBORO, June 9—4.40 A. M.

*Colonel J. P. Baird, Franklin:*

The general commanding directs that the two spies, if found guilty, be hung at once, thus placing beyond the possibility of Forrest's profiting by the information they have gained.

FRANK S. BOND,  
*Major and Aid-de-Camp.*

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No. 9.—FRANKLIN, June 9—10.30 A. M.,

*To General Garfield, Chief of Staff:*

The men have been tried, found guilty, and executed in compliance with your order.

I am, ever yours,  
J. P. BAIRD,  
*Colonel Commanding Post.*

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MURFREESBORO, January 14, 1863.

*Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C.:*

I must have cavalry or mounted infantry. I could mount infantry had I horses and saddles. The saddles I had ordered have been delivered so very slowly, that now, after four months, I have only a few hundred more than have been required for the use of the cavalry. With mounted infantry, I can drive the rebel cavalry to the wall, and keep the roads open to my rear. Not so now. I must also have some bullet-proof, light-draught transports for the Cumberland. Will you authorize the purchase of saddles and horses for mounting, when requisite, five thousand more infantry?

W. S. ROSECRANS.  
*Major-General*

MURFREESBORO, February 2, 1863.

*Hon. E. M. Stanton, Washington, D. C.:*

I telegraphed the commander-in-chief that two thousand carbines or rifles were required to arm our cavalry. He replied as if he thought it a complaint. I telegraph you also, to prevent misunderstanding. I speak for the country when I say two thousand effective cavalry will cost the support of nearly four thousand—say, five thousand dollars per day. But this is the smallest part of the trouble. One rebel cavalryman takes, on an average, three of our infantry to watch our communications, while our progress is made slow and cautious, and we command the forage of the country only by sending large train-guards. It is a prime necessity, in every point of view, to master their cavalry. I propose to do this, first, by so arming our cavalry as to give it its maximum strength; second, by having animals and saddles temporarily to mount infantry brigades for marches and enterprises. We have now one thousand cavalry men without horses, and two thousand without arms. We do n't want revolvers so much as light, revolving rifles. The matter is so clearly, in my mind, of paramount public interest, that I blush to think it necessary to seem to apologize for it. I do hope the government will have confidence enough in me to know I never have asked and never will ask anything to increase my personal command. Had this been understood when I went with Blenker's division, this nation might have been saved millions of blood and treasure.

W. S. ROSECRANS,  
*Major-General.*

MURFREESBORO, June 21, 1863.

GENERAL:—In your favor of the 12th inst., you say you do not see how the maxim of not fighting two great battles at the same time applies to the case of this army and Grant's. Looking at the matter practically, we and our opposing forces are so nearly separated, that for Bragg materially to aid Johnston he must abandon our front substantially, and then we can move to an ultimate work with more rapidity and less waste of material or natural obstacles.(?) If General Grant is defeated, both forces will come here, and then we ought to be near our base. The same maxim that forbids, as you take it, a single army fighting two great battles at the same time (by the way, an awkward thing to do), would forbid this nation engaging all its forces in the great West at the same time, so as to leave it without a single reserve to stem the current of possible disaster. This is, I think, sustained by military and political considerations. We ought to fight here, if we have a strong prospect of winning a decisive victory over the opposing force; and upon this ground I shall act. I shall be very careful not to risk our last reserve without a strong ground to expect success.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
W. S. ROSECRANS,  
*Major-General.*

*MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.*

## CHAPTER XIX.

### TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN.

IN June, 1863, General Bragg's army was occupying a strong position north of Duck river. His infantry front extended from Shelbyville to Wartrace, and his cavalry rested at McMinnville, on his right, and Spring Hill and Columbia on his left. General Polk's corps was at Shelbyville, having a redan line covered with abatis in front. A detachment from it was thrown forward to Guy's Gap. General Hardee's corps held Hoover's, Liberty, and Bellbuckle Gaps. Chattanooga was the base, and Tullahoma was the chief depot of supplies.

General Rosecrans determined to concentrate the corps of Generals Thomas, McCook, and Crittenden on the enemy's right, covering this movement by a feint upon his left with General Granger's corps and the main portion of his cavalry. The execution of this plan was commenced on the 23d, by the advance of Granger's corps. The enemy's position was well chosen for either defense or retreat. He had in his front a range of hills rough and rocky, through whose depressions, called gaps, the main roads to the south passed. These gaps were held by strong detachments, with heavy columns within supporting distance. Such was the strength of the position at Shelbyville, that General Rosecrans anticipated stubborn resistance should he attack it, and in the event of success in assault, the enemy could cover his retreat, having a route to his rear, easily defended. He therefore proposed to turn General Bragg's right, and avoiding his intrenchments at Shelbyville altogether, provoke a battle on ground of his own selection, or force him to retreat on a disadvantageous line. This purpose involved the necessity of forcing the advanced forces

from the gaps from the left to the right of the main position.

The movement of troops, in the first place, to Triune had been made to create the belief that a direct attack would be made upon Shelbyville; and now, in the actual advance of his army, he endeavored to keep up this impression. For this object, General R. B. Mitchell, commanding the First cavalry division, moved forward from Triune and drove back the enemy's cavalry upon his infantry line, skirmishing sharply at Eagleville, Rover, and Unionville. General Rosecrans also demonstrated with his cavalry from his left, and sent an infantry force to Woodbury, that the enemy might regard these movements as a feint to divert attention from the direct attack upon Shelbyville. The same day, June 23d, General Granger, with his own corps and General Brannan's division of General Thomas' corps, moved from Triune to Salem.

The next day the whole army was in motion. General McCook advanced toward Liberty Gap. His corps started on the Shelbyville turnpike, but the divisions at different points deflected to Millersburg, where Sheridan's and Davis' divisions bivouacked at night, while Johnston's advanced to the Gap. On approaching the position, Colonel Harrison, with five companies of his mounted infantry, the Thirty-ninth Indiana, was thrown forward to skirmish. Colonel Harrison having provoked resistance in front of the gap, General Willich's brigade was deployed, and advancing pushed the enemy's skirmishers upon their reserves, posted upon the crest of the hills on the opposite sides of the entrance to the gap. A demonstration in front developed the impracticability of carrying the position by a direct attack. Colonel Miller, with a portion of his brigade, was then brought up, and a line having been formed of such length as to envelop both flanks of the enemy, he was driven through the depression a distance of two miles. The whole division bivouacked between the hills to hold one of the gateways through the enemy's natural defenses.

During the day, General Thomas advanced on the Manchester turnpike, Reynolds' division leading, followed by Rousseau's and Negley's divisions. Colonel Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, of Reynolds' division, encountered cavalry

posted seven miles from Murfreesboro, and pressing them upon their reserves, drove the whole force through Hoover's Gap, a defile three miles long, and took position at its southern entrance. He was soon fiercely attacked by a large body of infantry, but held his ground until General Reynolds' joined him with his other two brigades, when the enemy withdrew, and the Fourteenth Corps rested for the night in another of the passes through the hills in front of the enemy.

General Crittenden, having left General Van Cleve's division to garrison Murfreesboro, moved, with Generals Wood's and Palmer's divisions, to Bradyville. General Granger, accompanied by Brannan's division, advanced from Salem to Christiana. General Stanley proceeded from Murfreesboro, on the Woodbury turnpike, to Cripple creek, with General Turchin's division of cavalry, and thence through Salem to reinforce General Mitchell, and formed a junction with him at the intersection of the Salem and Christiana roads. General Mitchell had advanced during the day from Rover through Versailles to Middleton, where he met cavalry, and in an engagement of considerable sharpness killed thirty men and wounded a large number.

The next day, General Crittenden advanced to Holly Springs. General Brannan joined General Thomas, from Christiana, and was placed in position in Hoover's Gap. General Reynolds skirmished all day with the enemy. At night, General Rousseau closed up in his rear, preparatory to an attack upon the enemy the next day at Beech Grove. General Stanley joined General Granger, with Mitchell's division and Minty's brigade, at Christiana, for operations on the right flank, having first driven the enemy's cavalry to Guy's Gap. Colonel Long, with a portion of his brigade, advanced to Lumley's Stand, and scouted to Track's Ford and Pocahontas. The remainder of Turchin's division accompanied General Crittenden.

Late in the afternoon, the enemy made an attack at Liberty Gap, with the evident intention of dislodging Johnson's division. General Johnson did not hold the southern entrance, as did General Thomas at Hoover's Pass, and this fact and the supposition of General Bragg, that General Rosecrans would

throw the main portion of his army through this gap, induced the effort to regain it.

The enemy first attacked the center of Johnson's line, and being repulsed, next attempted to gain the hills, so as to command Johnson's flanks with infantry and artillery; but he was circumvented in his strategy, and repulsed in every attack, withdrawing entirely late in the evening, in the direction of Bellbuckle. The troops engaged were Willich's and Miller's brigades of Johnson's division, supported by Carlin's brigade of Davis' division, and all evinced distinguished gallantry. The losses in this action revealed its character. General Johnson lost two hundred and thirty-one killed and wounded, and the enemy one hundred killed, and seven hundred and fifty wounded.

On the 26th, General Thomas advanced toward Fairfield, and met the enemy in force on the heights north of Garrison creek. He drove him steadily, Generals Rousseau and Brannan operating upon his left flank from the hills north of the road, and General Reynolds against his front and left. Having assumed a new position, he made preparations to resist, and attempted from the hills to enfilade General Thomas' line, but was driven from position by a charge of Walker's brigade and the regular brigade, under Major Coolidge. He then retired before the rapid advance of the Fourteenth Corps, and covered his retreat with heavy skirmish lines, supported by artillery in rear and cavalry on the flanks. After pursuing some distance, General Thomas disposed his divisions so as to offer a battle front, extending from the Fairfield road to a point within five miles of Manchester. During the day, Generals McCook and Granger remained in bivouac, the former at Liberty Gap and the latter at Christiana. General Crittenden struggled on toward Manchester, over almost impassable roads, rendered so by the heavy rains, which had fallen every day since the army left Murfreesboro.

The position of the Fourteenth Corps, far in advance of Hoover's Gap, made practicable the concentration of the whole army on the enemy's left, to force him to fight to resist its further advance, or abandon his position altogether. Accord-

ingly, on the 27th, General McCook withdrew from Liberty Gap, and having passed through Hoover's Gap, marched his corps, in rear of General Thomas, toward Manchester. Early in the day, General Thomas put his corps in motion—Rousseau's and Brannan's divisions to Fairfield, Negley's on their left in support, and Reynolds' directly on Manchester. The latter arrived at Manchester early in the morning, Wilder's brigade surprising the town and capturing forty prisoners. The enemy not having been found at Fairfield, the other divisions turned toward Manchester, where, about midnight, the whole corps was concentrated.

The reserve corps, preceded by the cavalry under General Stanley, advanced from Christiana to Guy's Gap, where the enemy was encountered. Colonel Minty's brigade, supported by Mitchell's division, drove him from the gap and pursued him to his intrenchments, four miles north of Shelbyville, where he again offered resistance. General Wheeler was in command, having with him Martin's division and a portion of Wharton's. Colonel Minty attacked him and forced him out of his intrenchments, and pushed him into Shelbyville. At this juncture, General Mitchell coming up, turned his right flank and cut him off from direct retreat, while Minty charged into the town and completed his total defeat. General Stanley captured Wheeler's artillery and about five hundred of his men, while nearly two hundred were either killed or drowned in attempting to swim Duck river. General Wheeler escaped with the remainder of his command by swimming the river. The movements of the day revealed the fact that General Bragg had withdrawn his army entirely from his first line of defense, and confirmed the success of the first grand feature of General Rosecrans' strategy. It now remained to force him, by battle or strategy, to fall back to his stronghold on the Tennessee river.

While the corps of Generals McCook and Crittenden were concentrating at Manchester, slowly in fact, but as rapidly as the rain and bad roads would permit, General Thomas, in compliance with instruction from General Rosecrans, commenced the movements which were designed to bring the campaign to a decisive issue. Early on the morning of the 28th,

he sent Colonel Wilder with his brigade to break the railroad at some point south of Decherd, and Colonel John Beatty's brigade to Hillsboro, in support of the movement. He also threw forward toward Tullahoma, Rousseau's and Brannan's divisions, with some regiments from Reynolds' and Sheridan's, on their right and left flanks.

Colonel Wilder reached Decherd at 8 p. m., burned the depot and water-tank, and destroyed about three hundred yards of railroad, but retired upon the approach of the enemy's infantry. The next day he moved to the University, broke up the Tracy City railroad, and then dividing his force advanced toward Anderson and Tantallon. The enemy was found at these places in such force as to forbid attack, and the brigade was soon after united at University. On his return, he avoided Forrest at Pelham, and reached Manchester in safety about noon on the 30th.

On the 29th, there was an advance toward Tullahoma until the front of the army was within two miles of the place. Generals Thomas', McCook's, and Crittenden's corps closed in upon it, and General Stanley, with the cavalry, reached Manchester, completing the concentration of the army for the final movement against Tullahoma.

Early in the morning of the 30th, General Thomas learned, through a citizen, that General Bragg had evacuated the position. He at once ordered General Steedman, with his brigade and two additional regiments, to make a cautious reconnaissance and ascertain the truth or falsity of the report. The troops entered the town about noon without opposition, and captured a few prisoners. The fact having been communicated to General Rosecrans, he immediately disposed his troops for pursuit. Rousseau and Negley overtook the enemy's rear-guard at Bethpage bridge, and skirmished sharply. His forces, however, had possession of the heights across the river, and commanded the bridge by artillery protected by epaulements. The swollen streams, especially Elk river, performed a friendly office for General Bragg, as they formed behind him a barrier to a rapid pursuit. The cavalry, in some instances, forced the passage of the bridgeless river at the moment of engaging the enemy, but in the main,

the pursuit, either by cavalry or infantry, was entirely fruitless. It developed the fact, however, that General Bragg had crossed the Cumberland Mountains, and that Middle Tennessee was again in the possession of the Army of the Cumberland.

During this campaign of nine days, the rain fell almost incessantly, and the ground over which the army moved was of such nature that the movement of artillery and trains was exceedingly slow, and the escape of the enemy without battle was mainly owing to this cause.

General Rosecrans lost in the campaign eighty-five men killed, four hundred and eighty-two wounded, and thirteen captured. General Bragg's loss in killed and wounded was not ascertained; but he left behind him as prisoners fifty-nine officers and one thousand five hundred and seventy-five men, eight field pieces, and three rifled siege-guns, besides the usual waste of material in a hasty retreat.

At the conclusion of this short but spirited campaign, the Confederate Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Cumberland resumed in the main the attitude of the preceding summer, when each was gathering forces for aggressive movements. These armies had marched into Northern Kentucky and back again; had fought two battles and skirmished over large portions of Kentucky and Tennessee; and they gave themselves again to preparation for future conflicts, the one at Chattanooga, and the other with its camps disposed as before, from Winchester to McMinnville. In declining battle at Tullahoma, General Bragg invited the renewal of the old plan for the invasion of East Tennessee, and General Rosecrans' acceptance of it brought to his army the old work of repairing roads and building bridges, and the long waiting for the accumulation of supplies. This campaign then terminated with the complete restoration of the status of July, 1862—the Army of the Cumberland in possession of the line of the Tennessee and the railroads in Middle Tennessee, with Chattanooga as its objective. It was then decisive of the complete failure of General Bragg's aggression. While the preparations for another campaign were going on, the remoteness of the enemy precluded the usual infantry skirmishing and reconnoissances, which, in the interval between great battles,

maintain active belligerency; but the cavalry had opportunity to revisit most of the places in Tennessee and Northern Alabama, from which the national forces had been withdrawn the previous summer. And this was done to the intense annoyance of the citizen enemies of the national government, as in the second coming of the Army of the Cumberland supplies were to be drawn from the country, in the absence, too, of the slightest presumption that the government was to be maintained and the Union restored through mere kindness to the people whose property and aid had been freely given to the Confederate armies.

The return of the Army of the Cumberland to Southern Tennessee and Northern Alabama was doubtless as unexpected as its first appearance the previous year. When it moved northward, the farmers of this region had been exhorted to repair their fences and plant their fields under the most positive assurance by the Confederate generals that no second invasion would ever interrupt their ordinary pursuits. But war, with a more dismal front and sterner power, was again at their doors.

During the early part of July, the cavalry was concentrated at Salem, Tennessee, preparatory to a general sweep to Huntsville, Alabama. On the 12th, General Stanley put his cavalry in motion. He sent Colonel Galbraith along the railroad to Fayetteville, to ascertain the condition of the road. He captured some prisoners, and learned that General Forrest's command was north of Elk river, moving south. He moved across to Pulaski, and then pursued a force of cavalry to Lawrenceburg, killing eight men and capturing ninety. The other forces of the cavalry, by various routes, concentrated at Huntsville on the 14th, and soon after diverged widely on their return to the rear of the army, bringing about three hundred prisoners, one thousand six hundred horses and mules, nearly one thousand cattle and sheep, and six hundred negroes. These minor operations were then suspended to enter upon another of the great campaigns of the war.

## CHAPTER XX.

### THE MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY OVER THE MOUNTAINS AND TENNESSEE RIVER, AND BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

UPON the conclusion of the Tullahoma campaign, General Halleck urged General Rosecrans to advance against the enemy south of the Tennessee river. But there were difficulties in the way of an early movement, which General Rosecrans deemed insurmountable. In his judgment, three conditions were essential to the successful advance of his army. These were the repair of the railroad to the Tennessee river, ripe corn in the fields, and support to his flanks. For the actuality of the first, he was himself responsible; the second depended upon time and favorable weather; and the third rested with the military authorities at Washington, and the commanders of the armies east and west of him, on the line of the Tennessee river.

July 13th, the railroad bridge over Elk river was ready for trains, and on the 25th they were running to Bridgeport, Alabama. But corn does not ripen in Tennessee and Georgia in July, and the movement of General Burnside into East Tennessee was long deferred, and no promises had been given that the right flank of the Army of the Cumberland should have protection while advancing against Chattanooga. On the 5th of August, in disregard of General Rosecrans' assigned reasons for not moving his army, General Halleck gave peremptory orders for its advance. The former, however, deferred movement until the middle of the month. By this time his preparations were complete, and the fields promised the forage for which he had been waiting; but no further assurance had been given that he should have supporting forces on right or

left. As a partial protection to his right, he had sent, August 11th, Brigadier-General R. B. Mitchell's cavalry division, Colonel E. M. McCook commanding, from Fayetteville, Tennessee, to Huntsville, Alabama, and thence along the Memphis and Charleston railroad, to protect that road and guard the line of the Tennessee river from Whitesburg to Bridgeport.

At this juncture, the Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first Corps, with the cavalry on the flanks, were mainly disposed on a line from Winchester to McMinnville, in readiness for the various movements involved in the plan of campaign. Sheridan's division, since the opening of the railroad to Bridgeport, had been on that road, with heavy detachments at Stevenson and Bridgeport. A brigade had taken post at Pelham, and a detachment had been sent to Tracy City, on the 13th of August, to protect a depot of supplies established at that point—the terminus of the mountain railroad.

The reserve corps was in the rear, occupying all the country north of Duck river, with garrisons at Fort Donelson, Clarksville, Gallatin, Carthage, Nashville, Murfreesboro, Shelbyville, and Wartrace. The army was dependent for supplies upon the railroad to Louisville, as during the months of summer and autumn the navigation of the Cumberland river is exceedingly precarious. Nashville was a secondary base, and there were surplus supplies nearer the front to meet the wants of the army during any temporary interruption of the railroad. But the assurance of full rations at the front depended primarily upon the maintenance of railroad connection with Louisville. The thorough defense of this road required a force equal, at least, to one-fourth of the offensive strength of the army. Looking to the rear, the problem of supplies demanded most earnest attention and most positive solution, and involved difficulties by no means light; and looking toward the enemy, who was resting in fancied security in a position invested by mountains, the barriers to advance, successful strategy, or attack, seemed exceedingly formidable. General Rosecrans had maneuvered Bragg out of Tullahoma and across the Tennessee river; but as the topography of the region around Chattanooga was very different from the surroundings

of his former position, his antagonist did not anticipate that he should again be compelled to abandon a stronger position by mere strategy. He doubtless felt safe from direct attack, and did not foresee that Rosecrans would throw his army upon his communications. But this bold venture was proposed for the Army of the Cumberland—bold under any circumstances, but especially so, when there were no active campaigns in progress, east or west, to prevent the enemy from concentrating heavy forces at Chattanooga or in Northern Georgia. General Rosecrans was not indifferent to the possibility of overthrow, but his orders deprived him of discretion, except as to the plan of campaign.

Chattanooga had long been the objective of his army, and yet he was under orders to move against it with inadequate forces, and under conditions which involved great peril. The position was too important to the enemy to warrant the hope that he would fail to exhaust his resources to hold it. Under any circumstances, General Bragg could concentrate his own forces, and with timely warning of a movement against him, he could draw reinforcements from remote points. It was impossible for Rosecrans to advance rapidly, and yet the concealment of his ultimate design was a ruling condition of his success. Apart from the exposure of his flanks in moving beyond the Tennessee river, the configuration of the country between him and his objective imposed the alternative of skillful maneuver or failure. The first barrier was the Cumberland range of mountains, which, trending in a southwest-erly direction, touches the Tennessee river a few miles east of Bridgeport, and then stretches westward to Athens. Waldron's ridge, on the east, forms the second barrier on the line of direct approach from McMinnville. This mountain abuts the Tennessee river, nearly half-way from Bridgeport to Chattanooga, and by its abrupt ascent, bars passage on the bank of the stream. These mountains, with subordinate hills, were between Rosecrans and Chattanooga, and were in his way, should he make a direct advance on that place, or move past it on the north to reach the enemy's right flank. He could reach the river, by moving directly south across the Cumberland range, but beyond the river, two other mountain ranges

interposed—Sand Mountain and Lookout Mountain. The northern extremities of these mountains confront each other, from opposite sides of Lookout valley, in the immediate vicinity of Chattanooga. Trending thence to the southwest, they cross all the lines of advance toward the communications of the enemy south of Chattanooga.

In view of the strength of Chattanooga against direct attack, General Rosecrans resorted again to maneuver to dislodge his antagonist. As the route to Bragg's right flank penetrated a mountain region almost destitute of forage and water, and involved a wider separation from his communications, he selected his lines of advance over the river and mountains west and south of his objective. He, however, so directed his first movements as to mislead the enemy with regard to his ultimate design, which was to threaten his communications, and force him to abandon his position, or give battle on equal terms. The movement in this direction compassed another great advantage, as it gave him the railroad to Bridgeport directly in his rear as a channel of supply.

The movement of infantry and artillery across the Cumberland Mountains was commenced on the 16th of August. Two divisions of the Twenty-first Corps—Generals Palmer's and Wood's—marched by different routes over the mountains into the Sequatchie valley. Two brigades of General Van Cleve's division, the third having been left at McMinnville, and Colonel Wilder's brigade of General Reynolds' division of the Fourteenth Corps, moved on the Harrison Trace road to Pikeville; while Colonel Minty's brigade of cavalry diverged to Sparta, to cover the left of the column. This disposition of General Crittenden's Corps was intended to conceal the general movement of the army to the south, by making the impression at Chattanooga that an effort would be made to turn the position from the north. The four divisions of the Fourteenth Corps moved upon Stevenson and the mouth of Battle creek—Generals Baird's and Negley's to the former place, and Generals Brannan's and Reynolds' to the latter. General Davis' division of the Twentieth Corps joined General Sheridan at Stevenson, and General Johnson's passed through Bellefont to Caperton's ferry. General Stanley, with Colonel

Long's brigade of cavalry, advanced to Stevenson. The river having been reached, the pontoons were kept in concealment at Stevenson until the places for crossing had been selected.

Soon after the left had reached the Sequatchie valley, Generals Hazen's and Wagner's brigades were thrown across Waldron's ridge into the valley of the Tennessee, and were there joined by the brigades of Minty and Wilder from Pikeville. These four brigades, numbering in the aggregate between six and seven thousand men, under the command of General Hazen, took position from Williams' island to Kingston, on the north bank of the river, but in heaviest force opposite Chattanooga and the mouth of North Chickamauga creek. The extent of front presented, the show of strength near Chattanooga, the vigorous shelling of the city by Wilder's artillery, the troops at Pikeville and in the Sequatchie valley—in fine, the bold expression of the whole movement—constituted a brilliant feint, and contributed largely to General Bragg's misconception of General Rosecrans' plan of aggression. A wrong interpretation of the meaning of this movement, or some cause not apparent, induced the enemy to offer no resistance to the passage of the river at Bridgeport and other places in the vicinity.

The army commenced crossing the river on the 29th of August, and by the 4th of September, all the troops were across, except those under Hazen, and a few brigades farthest in the rear. General Johnson's and Davis' divisions, and the cavalry, crossed at Caperton's ferry, and advanced over Sand Mountain to the base of Lookout Mountain, at Winston's Gap, where they were joined by Sheridan, who had crossed at Bridgeport. The divisions of the Fourteenth Corps passed over the river at four different points—Caperton's ferry, Bridgeport, mouth of Battle creek, and Shellmound—and crossing Sand Mountain on converging roads, united in Will's or Lookout valley, in the vicinity of Trenton. When General Crittenden had concentrated his corps, it passed down the Sequatchie valley, crossed at Bridgeport and the two points above, and moving up the river to Whitesides, deflected to the right from the direct road to Chattanooga, through a pass into Lookout valley. The cavalry preceded the Twentieth Corps to Win-

ston's Gap, and reconnoitered in various directions, without finding the enemy in force. As the army of offense advanced, the reserve corps, as far as practicable, moved in rear to hold the important positions, and give support in the event of battle.

The passage of Sand Mountain involved the necessity of making and repairing roads; and when this had been done as far as practicable without too much delay, such was the steepness of the ascents on the different routes of advance, that teams were doubled often to move the artillery and wagons.

By the 6th of the month, these movements in the main had been completed, and the army lay along the western base of Lookout Mountain, from Wauhatchie, a point six or seven miles from Chattanooga, to Valley Head, thirty-five miles distant. To dislodge the enemy from Chattanooga, it was now necessary to carry the point of Lookout Mountain where it abuts the Tennessee river, or to cross the mountain through the gaps farther south and endanger his line of communications. The former scheme being considered impracticable, the latter was adopted, and orders were issued to scale the mountain from the center at Trenton, and the right at Valley Head, while the left should demonstrate directly against Chattanooga, until the action of the enemy was revealed.

On the 30th of August, information had been received through a loyal citizen who had been forced to leave Chattanooga, that General Burnside had occupied Knoxville, that the rebel general, S. B. Buckner, and the troops that had held Knoxville, had retreated to Loudon; and that fifteen thousand men were on the way from Mississippi to join General Bragg. And on the day the army reached Lookout valley there came a rumor that Buckner had joined Bragg, and that the latter would abandon Chattanooga. The probability of the truth of this report induced General Rosecrans to continue the movements whose object was the accomplishment of this result. Accordingly, on the 7th, Negley's division of the Fourteenth Corps commenced the ascent of the mountain, and reached the top at four o'clock in the afternoon. During the day, Colonel Harker, of Wood's division, made a bold recon-

noissance under the guns of the enemy, on the front of Lookout Mountain, and found it guarded by a heavy force, which was then covering the withdrawal of the army from Chattanooga. But this fact came to light subsequently. The Twentieth Corps remained in camp on the 7th.

The day following, General McCook, on the right, ordered two brigades of Davis' division to cross the mountain into Broomtown valley to support the cavalry in reconnaissance toward Lafayette and Rome. General Negley seized Cooper's and Stevens' Gaps, the latter having been heavily obstructed, and then bivouacked his main column at the junction of the State road and the one from Cooper's Gap. The operations of the day elicited no opposition—a fact that plainly indicated that the enemy was withdrawing from Chattanooga. Captain Van Buskirk, Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry, advanced with fifty men to within five miles of Summertown without opposition, and discovered that the signal stations of the enemy had been abandoned. Rumors from various sources concurred in supporting the belief that Bragg had retreated. To elicit the truth, General Rosecrans directed General Thomas to send Colonel Atkins, of the Ninety-second Illinois, to make a reconnaissance toward Chattanooga on the mountain road early on the 9th, and instructed General Crittenden to send a brigade up an almost impracticable path, called the Nickajack Trace, to Summertown, a hamlet on the mountain, to reconnoiter the front of the mountain, and to hold the main portions of his corps in readiness to support the troops on reconnaissance, to prevent a sortie of the enemy over the nose of Lookout, or to enter Chattanooga should the enemy evacuate or make feeble resistance. He ordered the cavalry on the right flank to push by way of Broomtown valley, and strike the enemy's railroad communications between the Resaca bridge and Dalton. But the fact of the evacuation was manifest to the troops on the north bank of the river in the evening of the 8th, and at 3:30 a. m., on the 9th, General Rosecrans was so informed. Thus, without a battle or heavy skirmish, the primary objective of the campaign, the "Gateway to Georgia," and the southern entrance to East Tennessee, fell into his hands, as the result of his strategy.

Thus far, this movement, justly considered perilous in view of the possibilities to the enemy, was remarkably successful. During its progress there had been a lull in active operations east and west, which allowed the interest of the government and the loyal people to converge upon the movement in Southern Tennessee and Northern Georgia. When it became known at Washington that Bragg was receiving reinforcements, the necessity of the conjunction of the armies under Generals Rosecrans and Burnside was clearly perceived. But, unfortunately, the perception of this necessity was too late for practical advantage. Burnside's advance was intended to be co-operative with that of Rosecrans, but the accomplishment of his work drove his enemy to the army before Rosecrans, while he was himself too remote and too much engaged with affairs east of Knoxville, to render aid at Chattanooga. The improbability of the union of the two armies in time for battle, intensified the uneasiness that was felt with regard to the advance into Georgia. The evacuation of Chattanooga, therefore, relieved the anxiety of the authorities at Washington and General Rosecrans; and now, all thought of pursuit, rather than of defense, against Bragg's reinforced army.

General Bragg's reasons for the abandonment of Chattanooga, as stated by himself, were these: He estimated the Army of the Cumberland at seventy thousand men, and the one under General Burnside, at twenty-five thousand. He regarded the movement of troops to Pikeville and Kingston as a menace to Buckner's rear, while Burnside was in his front with superior forces. Buckner was therefore first withdrawn to the Hiawassee river, and subsequently to the vicinity of Chattanooga. But with this accession, his army was inferior to the one which he was opposing. So when Rosecrans had crossed the river at Bridgeport, and was as near his main depot of supplies as he was himself, not being able to divide his army on account of its weakness to hold his position and protect his communications and depots, he was compelled to throw himself before Rosecrans to save his line of supply. But he did this with the hope of striking the columns of his enemy as they should separately debouche from the mountain gaps.

To accomplish this, he placed his army between Lee and Gordon's Mills and Lafayette, on the road from Chattanooga to the latter place. He thus faced the eastern slopes of the mountains, directly on the line of advance from Trenton. He claimed that his movements partially accomplished his purpose, as he threw Rosecrans off his guard by his rapid movement, apparently in retreat, but in reality for concentration opposite the center of his army, and that being deceived by the information of deserters and persons sent within his line, he exposed himself in detail.

General Rosecrans states, in his official report, that the receipt of evidence, gathered from all sources, led him to believe that General Bragg was moving on Rome. Accepting his retreat far southward as a fact, he continued the movements of his right and center across Lookout Mountain, as previously ordered, and directed General Crittenden to occupy Chattanooga with a division, and subsequently with a brigade; to call his troops from the north bank of the Tennessee river, and follow the enemy vigorously on the road to Ringgold and Dalton. When over the mountain, General McCook was required to advance rapidly on Alpine, interrupt the retreat of the enemy, and strike him in flank; and General Thomas was instructed to move upon Lafayette.

In obedience to orders, General Crittenden occupied Chattanooga with Wood's division about noon on the 9th, called to him his troops from the opposite bank of the river, and put his corps in motion toward Ringgold, his head of column reaching Rossville, five miles distant, in the evening. The same day, Negley's division, by direction of General Thomas, moved down the eastern slope of the mountain and debouched into McLemore's Cove. This nook is formed by Lookout Mountain and Pigeon Mountain, a spur from Lookout, which curves round at its origin to the east and then trends northward on the east side of Chickamauga river, maintaining parallelism with the stream, Missionary Ridge on the west, and Lookout itself. Negley met the enemy's troopers at the foot of the mountain and drove them several miles with a heavy line of skirmishers. On the right, Carlin's brigade of Davis' division moved upon Alpine, Georgia, and Heg's brigade of the same

division into Broomtown valley, in support of the cavalry. In the evening, General McCook received information of the retreat of the enemy and orders to advance in pursuit.

During the 10th, the three columns moved in pursuance of orders. Crittenden's corps, with the exception of Wagner's brigade of Wood's division, left to garrison Chattanooga, advanced in pursuit of the enemy on the Ringgold road. Palmer's division leading, through deficiency of supplies made a short march, and encamped at the crossing of the Chickamauga; but short as was the advance, the enemy's cavalry annoyed the head of the column, and in a bold dash rode over the front of the First Kentucky regiment and captured two officers and fifty men. The movement on the Ringgold road partially uncovered Chattanooga, by giving open ways to the enemy on the three roads coursing through the valleys between Lookout Mountain and the line of march. This fact, taken with another, that Bragg had retired his forces mainly on the road to Lafayette, induced General Rosecrans to modify his orders to General Crittenden, restricting his advance to Ringgold,\* and requiring him to make a reconnoissance the next day on the route of the enemy's retreat.

The advance of the central column also discovered the enemy, contrary to expectations. Negley moved forward beyond Bailey's Cross-roads and skirmished hotly with the enemy until he reached the opening of Dug Gap, in Pigeon Mountain, through which the direct road to Lafayette passes—the designated route of the Fourteenth Corps. He found the gap obstructed and a line of pickets, indicating the proximity of the enemy in force. Negley was now between the gap in his front and Catlett's Gap in the same mountain, farther to the north, and was exposed to attack in front and on both flanks. His situation, viewed in reference to Bragg's purpose of crushing his enemy in detail, was exceedingly critical. As he had progressed he had received conflicting rumors, but at night he was assured that heavy forces were in proximity to him in the three directions of his exposure. Baird's division had passed the mountain during the day, and was encamped at the

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\* Statement in General Rosecrans' report.

debonche from Stevens' Gap, a few miles in his rear, assuring him support in the morning. The advance of the central column had not been as rapid as General Rosecrans had anticipated, and he expressed his disappointment to General Thomas in terms of implied censure. His impression was that the tardiness of General Thomas in moving toward Lafayette imperiled both flanks; but in the full revelation of the facts, it appeared as saving Negley's and other divisions of the center, and at the same relieving one or the other of the corps on the flanks from exposure to an overwhelming concentration of forces.

In the effort to defeat Rosecrans in detail, Bragg's first combination was directed against Thomas; and this fact doubtless saved Crittenden's corps, which was in air and in no state of preparation to resist the attack of an equal force, much less a great army. McCook's corps was at the same time in complete insulation at Alpine, and not far from Bragg's army. Thus far the movements of the three columns met the expectations and wishes of the rebel commander. Crittenden had diverged to the east on the Ringgold road; McCook had advanced far from support, and Thomas had moved directly toward his army. His army now comprised about fifty thousand men. He had been joined by two divisions from Mississippi, and his own estimate placed his infantry at thirty-five thousand men; and almost into the midst of this vast army Negley had penetrated. As soon as his head of column had appeared at McLemore's Cove, General Bragg had given orders for a movement in great force against him. At midnight on the 9th, he gave orders to General Hindman to advance with his division to Davis' Cross-roads, in Negley's front, to co-operate with Cleburne's division and a force of cavalry from Hill's corps. Cleburne being sick and Dug and Catlett's Gaps being heavily obstructed, General Hill failed in his part of the combination; but Hindman advanced and was at Morgan, three or four miles from Negley, early in the afternoon of the 10th. To prevent a miscarriage of the movement altogether, at 8 a. m. General Bragg ordered Buckner with his corps to join Hindman at Morgan's, three miles from Davis' Cross-roads, and very near to Negley. Bragg was very urgent

in regard to the movement, as he had inferred that the three advancing columns were moving for concentration near his position. To assure success by giving strong support to the forces already in Negley's front, he directed General Polk to send a division of his corps to Anderson's, to cover Hindman during his operations. Fortunately for Negley and the army there was delay. Hindman proposed a change of plan, and in waiting for instructions the day passed away. General Bragg refused to modify his orders, and at midnight repeated them with emphasis. Negley, as has been seen, was still unsupported and in ignorance of the elaborate combination which had been formed to overwhelm and capture him, for in addition to the four divisions at Morgan's and Anderson's, Walker's corps was ordered to support Cleburne at Dug Gap.

The experience of the Twentieth Corps on the 10th was not different from that of the two to its left. Johnson's division crossed the mountain and reached the vicinity of Davis' position, and Sheridan's encamped on the western slope. On reaching Alpine, General McCook ascertained that the enemy had not retreated, as had been anticipated, and that he could not communicate with General Thomas, on the east side of the mountain. He had been ordered to communicate with that commander, on that day, at Lafayette. He had also been directed to advance on Summerville. In this unexpected state of things he abandoned the advance to Summerville to await developments, and sent messengers to General Thomas, by way of Valley Head.

In view of the developments of the day, General Rosecrans made dispositions for the morrow. He ordered General Crittenden to the front, with instructions to advance with his main force to Ringgold, and detach a brigade to reconnoiter toward Lee and Gordon's Mills. Pursuant to these orders, General Crittenden directed Harker's brigade of Wood's division to retire to Rossville, and then move on the line of the enemy's retreat. With Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions he advanced toward Ringgold. Soon after Harker reached the Lafayette road, he became engaged with the outlying guards of the enemy, and upon report of the fact, General Wood, with Buell's

brigade, went to his support. During the afternoon, these brigades advanced to the mills, and at nightfall the camp-fires of the enemy were in view toward Lafayette. Palmer and Van Cleve reached Ringgold early in the day, and there met the brigades of Wilder and Minty, which had driven out the garrison of the place. Hazen, with his brigade, joined the infantry column at Graysville, earlier in the day. These brigades had crossed the Tennessee river at the mouth of the North Chickamauga. In the afternoon, Wilder, supported by infantry, advanced toward Dalton. He drove the rebel cavalry before him to Tunnel Hill, and encamped in front of a heavy force. The enemy gave many indications of concentration, as his outlying forces were formed on all the roads. In fact, Crittenden had passed the right flank of a large army intent upon operations in an opposite direction, or something more than a skirmish might have occurred.

The fact of concentration was revealed with greater emphasis before the Fourteenth Corps. At 8 a. m., Baird reached Negley, and formed his division on his left. Soon after, it was ascertained that the obstructions had been removed from the gaps, and that the enemy was advancing through them in heavy force, while another column was approaching farther to the left. It was then apparent that the trains and even the command would be endangered should battle be accepted without change of position, and General Negley decided to withdraw as speedily as possible. He sent the trains toward the mountain, and followed with his own division, leaving Baird's to check the enemy, until he could assume a new position north of the Chickamauga, and in turn cover the withdrawal of Baird's line, and prevent a flank movement on the left. When Negley's division had gained position and formed in line of battle, Baird withdrew, step by step, first his skirmishers, then his main line, until he too had crossed the stream. The enemy pressed him as he retired, and he was compelled to fight, suffering and inflicting loss. He had hardly crossed the stream before the enemy appeared with heavy lines on the opposite side, and opened with his artillery, while a heavy force formed in line of battle on his left. Negley's artillery responded from a hill to the rear, and Starkweather's and Stanley's brigades

became warmly engaged, and so far checked the enemy, that Baird was able to form a new line behind Negley. When this was done, Stanley retired, and Starkweather, having covered his withdrawal, with quickness and safety moved his troops to the rear of the third covering line. Previously, Negley had sent Beatty's and Scribner's brigades to the rear to protect the trains against the enemy's cavalry. These timely, cautious, and dextrous movements saved these insulated divisions, and their safe retirement from the presence of an army may be regarded as one of the pivotal events of the campaign. Having completely foiled the enemy by their skillful withdrawal, Negley and Baird took a strong position in front of Stevens' Gap, and were soon joined by the divisions of Brannan and Reynolds. These four divisions were disposed for defense by General Thomas: Negley on the right; then, in turn, to the left, Baird, Brannan, and Reynolds—the whole line covering Stevens' and Coopers' Gaps. But these preparations for defense were not necessary, as General Bragg had abandoned his effort against the central column. He had joined Cleburne at Dug Gap, at daylight, to await the noise of Hindman's guns, as the signal for Cleburne's movement upon Negley's flank and rear. During the early hours of the day, in his impatience at Hindman's delay, he had repeated his orders to hasten his movements. But when the signal guns were heard, Cleburne's advance was too late to reach the flank or rear of the force devoted, in orders, to destruction. Chagrined that this combination had failed, General Bragg turned his attention to a movement against Crittenden.

During the 11th, General McCook remained at Alpine, but the cavalry in his front were active in the endeavor to ascertain the movements and purposes of the enemy. Believing that co-operation with General Thomas through Broomtown valley was impracticable, General McCook ordered all his trains and material not necessary for his troops to be retired to the summit of the mountain to await the result of the reconnaissance sent by General Stanley toward Lafayette.

The events of the day made evident the fact that General Bragg had concentrated his army to give battle. Before General Rosecrans had learned the nature and issue of Negley's

engagement he had received information which rendered it probable that a heavy force had been concentrated at Lafayette, and suggested to General Thomas to call General McCook to his support. When the report of the engagement in McLemore's Cove reached him, he emphasized his suggestion that McCook should be called to the center.

Looking to the concentration of his whole army, General Rosecrans directed General Crittenden to move the divisions with him at Ringgold to the Lafayette road, either to join Wood at Lee and Gordon's Mills, or to call Wood's troops to himself at some good defensive position farther north. The orders under which General Crittenden had conducted his movements during the day had not been interpreted as restricting his advance to Ringgold, but as giving him freedom to advance indefinitely, if it was apparent that the enemy had retreated to some remote point. As the head of his column was beyond Ringgold when he received the order requiring the movement of his corps to the Lafayette road, he had to recall Wilder from Tunnel Hill, and the supporting infantry, not far in his rear, before he could withdraw from Ringgold with his remaining forces, and delay was unavoidable. The order in question did not reach him until after night, and this, too, retarded his movement to the northwest.

General McCook remained at Alpine, ignorant of events at McLemore's Cove, but in constant receipt of information making certain the fact of Bragg's concentration at Lafayette. He was consequently uneasy with regard to his own corps, and anxious with regard to the other columns. The concentration of the enemy so near him was suggestive of the fact that his position was a false one, as he could not reach General Thomas should the enemy attack him immediately; neither could he get support from any source should Bragg fall upon him with his whole army. But in the absence of orders he did not deem it legitimate to either advance or retreat.

When General Bragg withdrew his forces from McLemore's Cove, he directed Polk's and Walker's corps to Lee and Gordon's Mills. He made this movement in hope that he could easily defeat Crittenden, whose corps he had learned was di-

vided on the roads to Ringgold and Lafayette. His orders to his corps commanders, and those sent against Crittenden at Ringgold, on the night of the 11th, required that they should move to a common destination. But though brought face to face, two corps against one, no battle resulted. And Crittenden's escape from another combination, seemingly well formed, brings to view another pivot on which the army's safety turned.

Early in the morning of the 12th, Wilder's brigade and the supporting infantry returned to Ringgold, and the whole force was put in motion toward Wood's position. Wilder's brigade was directed to follow on the line of march and cover the left flank of the column. Palmer skirmished with the enemy during the day, and Wilder had a severe engagement at Leet's tanyard, in which the enemy lost fifty men killed and wounded, his own loss being thirty men. His superior guns made the difference, for he had no other advantage. Wilder joined the corps at Lee and Gordon's Mills after dark, where the union of the three divisions had been effected during the afternoon.

Neither General Thomas nor General McCook changed position on the 12th, but each gained additional evidence that the Confederate army was concentrated at Lafayette. The cavalry forces on the right, reconnoitering toward that place, were assured that an army was before them.

On the morning of the 13th, General Crittenden made dispositions for defense. He threw Cruft's brigade and Wilder's on his left to reconnoiter, and the Fourth cavalry, which had that morning reported to him, on his right, toward McLemore's Cove. Ignorant of the fact that two corps were in readiness to attack him, he sent Van Cleve, with one brigade, on a reconnaissance toward Lafayette. Van Cleve met the enemy, with cavalry and artillery, soon after leaving the mills, and skirmishing heavily, drove him three miles. This aggressive attitude disconcerted General Polk, and instead of attacking, as he had been repeatedly ordered, he halted in defense and called for reinforcements. Polk had received three distinct orders to attack at daylight. Three exceedingly important considerations induced General Bragg to press his sub-

ordinate to prompt action. There was opportunity, as he thought, to strike Crittenden "in detail," and he proposed to attack the troops in motion from Ringgold, and then those at the mills. Having crushed Crittenden, he could then give attention a second time to those in the cove. Besides this inviting prospect north and west of his position, the approach of McCook from the south made it important to attack promptly. He promised his lieutenant-general the support of Buckner's corps, and gave personal attention to the movement, accompanying Buckner as he advanced in support. But he was again disappointed. Polk did not attack, as he had ordered; and though there were three corps against one, he abandoned the policy of striking his enemy "exposed in detail," and gave orders for the concentration of his army on the right bank of the Chickamauga, to deliver battle from his right flank.

The proximity of the enemy to the mills excited the gravest apprehensions, although his strength in Crittenden's front was not known. It was known, however, that it was possible for Bragg to throw his whole army against Crittenden, or throw it between him and Thomas. Each possibility was portentious of overthrow. In the emergency, General Crittenden was ordered to move two divisions to the right to cover the Chattanooga road in the valley, immediately east of Lookout, leaving Wood's division at the mills. Wood was instructed to hold his position if possible. At this juncture the advance of the reserve corps—Whittaker's and Mitchell's brigades of Steedman's division, and Daniel McCook's of Morgan's—were expected at Rossville, and Wood was directed to look to these forces for support should the enemy attack him. His division was in great peril in its isolation before the whole rebel army—two brigades opposite the center of an army of nearly sixty thousand men, without direct support on the right, left, or rear, and on the direct road to Chattanooga from Bragg's position. In the event of yielding his position, General Wood was directed to defend the road to Chattanooga, and the one over the "nose" of Lookout Mountain, at all hazards. Into the chasm between Crittenden and Thomas, Wilder was thrown, with instructions to reconnoiter along Chickamauga

and Chattanooga creeks, and join General Thomas with such rapidity as the safety of his brigade would permit.

There was no movement in the center on the 13th, except a slight advance of Reynolds toward Catlett's Gap. General Thomas was now awaiting the approach of McCook before leaving the protection of the mountain.

At midnight of the 12th, General McCook received the first intimation that he was to join General Thomas. During the early part of the day he received other communications, which more fully revealed the necessity of this movement. He at first prepared to send his trains under the protection of three brigades, General Lytle commanding, back on the route of advance, and with the remainder of his corps, to move along the eastern base of Lookout to Dougherty's Gap, the route that had been suggested. Subsequently, this route was abandoned as impracticable, and another was sought on the mountain to Stevens' Gap. But as citizens concurred in denying the existence of such a road, and having no guide, General McCook determined to move by way of Valley Head. He therefore ascended the mountain, through Henderson's Gap, on the night of the 13th. He was now safe from attack; but the problem of his conjunction with General Thomas in time for battle was one involving the fate of the army. The issue was in the balance while he crossed and recrossed the mountain during the next four days.

General Rosecrans now made effort to hold all the roads to Chattanooga east of the mountain, and concentrate his army upon them before the enemy. From the 13th to the 17th, General Thomas advanced his corps slightly from day to day. General Crittenden, with Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions, moved to the Chattanooga valley on the 14th, and counter-marched on the day following, when Van Cleve took position at Crawfish Springs, and Palmer on his right, at Gowen's ford. During the 15th, Minty reconnoitered the front, and reported that the enemy was in force at Dalton, Ringgold, Leet's tan-yard, and Rock Spring Church.

After ascending the mountain at Winston's Gap, General McCook, with Johnson's and Davis' divisions, followed a mountain road to Stevens' Gap, and there descended to Gen-

eral Thomas. Sheridan marched down Lookout valley to Johnson's creek, and crossed over the mountain on the line of the advance of the Fourteenth Corps. The cavalry, under command of Brigadier-General R. B. Mitchell, General Stanley having been relieved on account of sickness, followed the infantry on the mountain road. General Mitchell stationed Crook's division at Dougherty's Gap, and sent McCook's division to McLemore's Cove.

Thus, on the 17th, the three corps were again in supporting distance of each other. When McCook reached the cove, General Thomas closed up on Crittenden, whose right division moved to the left to give room. It had been a matter of life and death to effect the concentration of the army.\* On the 11th, the heads of column had met Bragg's outlying detachments, and from all came the startling announcement that his army was concentrated preparatory to battle. Subsequently, it was ascertained that reinforcements had been drawn from Mississippi, Georgia, and Virginia. General Rosecrans then abandoned the offensive—an attitude which his army had sustained with marked success for nearly a year. The change to the defensive was a sad revelation to the troops that had crossed the lofty Lookout in fancied repetition of their former pursuits of Bragg's army. Happily, however, the compact union of the three corps of the Army of the Cumberland, so long and so perilously insulated, was effected before the enemy was ready to deliver battle. When the necessity of concentration was perceived, the interval between Crittenden and Thomas, and between the latter and McCook, was greater than that between each and Bragg's army. Why, with knowledge of this fact, the Confederate general did not strike either, in its insulation, is not fully explained by the assertion that his subordinate corps and division commanders were slow to do his bidding. Bragg's effort to strike Crittenden was made on the 13th, and yet for four days thereafter, his corps was between him and Chattanooga, in closest proximity and without support. No general perhaps, during the war, had such opportunities, and none so completely failed to avail himself

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\* Statement in General Rosecrans' Report.

of them. In the merest glance at his possibilities, in comparison with his achievements, the utter absence of generalship in the management of his army comes into boldest relief. No excuse or apology can be made for such blunders. There was not so much defect of plan, as unprecedented feebleness of execution. Indeed, his plans were in many respects admirable. They compassed a magnitude of means out of all proportion to the objects proposed, and yet the results were too meager to give praise to the advance of a line of skirmishers. If his corps and division generals would not obey him, he should have drawn their successors from the generals of brigades, rather than have allowed his policy of defeating his enemy "exposed in detail" to fail. But all his blunders had not occurred. When Rosecrans' united army was in defiant attitude across the Chickamauga, on the night of the 17th, having failed to crush either of the three corps of that enemy in their isolation, his plan compassing the leading features of a great battle was yet to fail, through the delay of its initial ruling movement.

The 17th did not close with General Rosecrans in ignorance of the movement of Bragg's army toward his left. The approach of heavy columns from the direction of Dalton had been observed by General Steedman, who had advanced to Ringgold in reconnaissance. The clouds of dust which Steedman saw south of Ringgold, had their counterpart within the range of vision from the signal stations of the national army, and the trending of these clouds told plainly the object of the enemy. General Bragg had been massing his forces on his right, with effort to conceal his purpose by apparent activity and strength on his left. But the coming of his reinforcements from Virginia, through Dalton, revealed his strategy, by the direction of their march.

The night of the 17th, General Bragg announced his plan and prescribed the movements of his army for execution on the following morning. His army comprised five corps, some of them improvised for the occasion. Their order from right to left was: Hood's, Walker's, Buckner's, Polk's, and Hill's. Hood was ordered to cross the Chickamauga at Reed's bridge, and sweep up toward Lee and Gordon's Mills, to reach Rose-

erans' flank and rear ; Walker was directed to cross at Alexander's bridge and join Hood, and Buckner was required to cross at Ledford's ford, and press upon Wood's position in front of Polk's corps ; while the latter was to demonstrate on the line of direct approach, and if not met by too much resistance, to cross and attack any force he might meet. Hill's duty was to cover the left flank of the army, and in the event of the movement of the Union army to Wood's position, he was directed to attack its left flank. The cavalry was stationed at the gaps in Pigeon Mountain, to cover the left and rear of the army.\* Had these movements been executed promptly as ordered, the larger portion of Bragg's army would have been on Rosecrans' left, and in the rear of his left, with a fair prospect of grasping all the roads east of the Chattanooga valley, as at the time fixed for the execution of the movement, General Rosecrans was not prepared to defeat it. It was a repetition of the initiative of the same commander at Perryville and Murfreesboro, only on a grander scale. The conditions here were different, and though he was nearer the rear of his enemy, and had designated heavier columns for his favorite movement, there were obstacles which gave more embarrassment than in his other battles. In preparing for battle on the 18th, he had overlooked causes of detention, and this mistake gave General Rosecrans time to throw his army to the left, between him and Chattanooga, upon the shortest roads thither. The roads designated for his columns were narrow and unsuited for the movement of artillery ; a stream with few bridges and few fords was in his way, and the movement of a large army by the flank on transverse roads involves embarrassments which almost always cause detentions not anticipated. So that, at nightfall on the 18th, Bragg was by no means ready for battle on the 19th, having entirely failed to deliver it on the 18th, as he had planned. But his preparations were in advance of those of General Rosecrans, as he had the initiative and moved on shorter lines. Night marches alone could give partial finish to Rosecrans' provisions for the engagement now plainly imminent.

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\* His plan as given in his official report.

Early in the day, the clouds of dust trending to the north-east had made evident the character and purpose of the movement of the Confederate army by the right flank. At an early hour, there was a demonstration in Palmer's front, to the right of Crawfish Springs, and at noon, Polk slightly threatened Wood. This activity was intended to conceal the heavy movements down the stream. Minty and Wilder were on the watch at Reed's and Alexander's bridges, and it was not until late in the afternoon that the heads of column appeared before them. These two brigades resisted so persistently, that General Bragg mentioned their action as one cause of delay. Wilder inflicted a loss of one hundred and five men to Lid-dell's division, at Alexander's bridge. But he and Minty were finally forced back, and the enemy secured the crossings. The lower one, at Reed's bridge, was wrested from the enemy late in the evening, and burned by Colonel McCook, of the reserve corps. Wilder was driven across the Lafayette road, and neither Minty nor McCook were able to learn what forces crossed the stream late at night. General Bragg held the river from Wood's position to Reed's bridge, and under cover of the night and the forests, his movements were perfectly concealed.

As two corps of the enemy remained in position across the Chickamauga, and his cavalry was on the right bank, far up the stream, it was very critical to move the Army of the Cum-berland by the left flank. Crittenden's corps was compelled to maintain position, both from policy and absolute necessity. And the movement of the infantry, from the right toward Crittenden, was accomplished with great caution and conse-quent slowness during the day, so that at 4 p. m. no troops had reached the rear of Crittenden, though it was well known that the enemy had forces far beyond Wood's position. At this hour, General Thomas was directed to relieve Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions with Negley's, that Crittenden might place Palmer and Van Cleve on Wood's left, and with Baird's, Brannan's, and Reynolds' divisions, to take position at Kelley's, on the Lafayette road. These changes in the main were effected during the night, and at early dawn there were five divisions in front of the enemy, and others were in

motion. McCook's corps bivouacked at Pond Spring, and at daylight resumed motion toward the left. This corps was yet far from the battle-field, but its presence there was practicable, and some of its brigades were to be deployed in line of battle, while subject to the historic fierceness of the primal attacks of Southern armies. McCook was placed in command of all the troops, including the cavalry on the right of Crittenden's corps.

The unexpected slowness of General Bragg's columns on the 18th did not change his plan of attack; and at daylight on the 19th, Buckner's corps and Cheatham's division of Polk's corps crossed the Chickamauga, and joined Hood and Walker, who had crossed during the evening and night previous. General Bragg's line of battle was formed with Walker on the right, Buckner on the left, Hood in the center, and Cheatham, with five brigades, in reserve. Buckner's left rested on the Chickamauga, a mile below Lee and Gordon's Mills, and Walker's right on the road leading west from Alexander's bridge.

At daylight, General Thomas, with Baird's division, reached Kelley's house, Brannan's following closely. The two divisions were immediately formed so as to cover the roads to Reed's and Alexander's bridges. Wilder's brigade had taken position the night before, on the west of the Lafayette road, some distance south from Kelley's, and General Thomas proposed to place the two remaining brigades of Reynolds' division, Turchin's and King's, between Baird, who was on the right of Brannan and Wilder, when they should reach the field. While these dispositions were being made on the left, General McCook reached Crawfish Springs with his head of column, and received orders from the general commanding to mass his corps at that point, and await further directions. The enemy was not demonstrative in any direction at the time, and the Twentieth Corps was held for direction to any part of the field, as emergencies should arise. Crittenden had been charged by General Rosecrans to hold his position with persistent firmness in the event of attack, as upon his retention of position, the success of the movement of the other two corps to the left depended. The quietness in his front was to him prophetic of danger. His fear of attack had also been induced by information which Minty had given him

as he passed his front with his brigade early in the morning, that the enemy was in front of the left of his line. It was not yet known that General Bragg's army was west of the Chickamauga, forming for battle, and to relieve the doubtfulness of the situation, General Crittenden directed General Palmer on his left to send a brigade to reconnoiter the road to the north. Colonel Grose was sent on this reconnaissance, but, before he could return and report, the suspense was relieved by the noise of battle on the left.

Soon after General Thomas had taken position before Kelley's house, he was informed by Colonel McCook, who had bivouacked on the road to Reed's bridge, that he had succeeded, the night before, in burning the bridge after a brigade had crossed. Believing this brigade to be isolated, Colonel McCook suggested that an effort should be made to capture it. Deeming the suggestion worthy of experiment, and wishing to explore his front, General Thomas directed General Brannan to leave one brigade within supporting distance of General Baird, and with the other two reconnoiter the road to the burnt bridge, and, if practicable, capture the isolated brigade. General Thomas, sharing the prevailing ignorance of the exact movements of the enemy, had been forming his line in nearness to a heavy force. Although the armies had been maneuvering in closest proximity for twelve days, each army commander was ignorant of the special dispositions of the other, and a merely tentative advance became the initiative of one of the bloodiest battles of the war. General Bragg had hoped to conceal his effort to throw his army between General Rosecrans and Chattanooga. The latter had discerned the movement of troops to his left, but neither he nor any of his officers were aware that seven-tenths of General Bragg's army were on the west bank of the Chickamauga early in the morning of the 19th. Brannan's reconnaissance, however, developed the enemy, and brought on the battle, disturbing General Bragg's combinations and preventing the suddenness of his blow.

In compliance with instructions, General Brannan posted Croxton's brigade on the left of Baird, and with Vanderveer's and Connell's moved forward, diverging to the left

Croxton also advanced and soon encountered the enemy—three brigades of cavalry under Forrest, that were covering General Bragg's right flank. In moving forward, Baird met hostile forces, and captured two hundred prisoners. In the meantime, Croxton had become hotly engaged, as Forrest had called infantry to his aid. When General Thomas first heard the noise of battle in the direction of Croxton's advance, he rode forward to learn the nature of the conflict. He found Croxton very heavily engaged, but holding his ground against superior numbers, and returned to direct General Baird to his support. General Brannan also sent the Thirty-first Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Lister commanding, to Croxton's left. When these dispositions had been made, the two divisions advanced and pressed back the enemy some distance. This done, the line was halted for readjustment, when General Baird learned that there was a large force on his right. He prepared for resistance by ordering King's brigade, on his right, to change front to the south. But before the change could be made, Liddell's division was upon him, and hurled King's and Scribner's brigades from position in disorder and with the loss of ten pieces of artillery. Starkweather's brigade was thrown before the enemy, but it too gave way. Fortunately, reinforcements were near to press back the enemy to the front and right of Baird's position, while General Brannan had been so far relieved from pressure that he could charge the pursuing forces, with portions of Vanderveer's and Connell's brigades. The charge was exceedingly gallant and brilliant—the Ninth Ohio, Colonel Cammerling, recapturing, with the bayonet, Gunther's battery of the Fifth artillery, which King had lost. The capture of these and other guns by the enemy was mainly due to the fact that the conflict occurred on ground thickly covered with forest trees and undergrowth, and consequently unfavorable for the rapid movement of artillery, as also for its effective use. This opening passage of arms was the type of the fighting, in its first stages, from left to right. Excepting a few insignificant fields, the whole region between the Lafayette road and the Chickamauga was thickly wooded, and divisions and brigades from each army were often hotly engaged, while in complete

isolation in the densest woods; for when armies meet unexpectedly on such a field, methodical movements are impracticable, as also continuous lines, until there has been an immense waste of strength.

The reinforcements at hand, to retrieve disaster on the left, had come at the call of General Thomas, and through anticipation of their need by General Rosecrans. When General Thomas was first assured that he had developed the Confederate army in his front, he requested General Crittenden, whose corps was nearest him, and not engaged, to send him support. General Crittenden sent Palmer's division, which reached him almost simultaneously with Johnson's division of General McCook's corps, acting under orders from General Rosecrans. Reynolds' division of the Fourteenth Corps arrived soon after. As yet, General Bragg had not advanced his divisions to the chasm between Thomas and Crittenden. His object had been to swing round his compact lines and envelop Crittenden, supposing that Rosecrans' extreme left rested at Lee and Gordon's Mills. When his cavalry met infantry overlapping his right flank, General Bragg threw Walker's corps against Brannan and Baird, and was compelled subsequently to direct his reserves, and one division from his extreme left, to his right, where Walker's corps had been broken and routed. The time spent in the execution of these movements, and surprise from the unexpected conditions of the engagement, permitted three divisions to secure alignment on the right of Baird. The first movement of Brannan and Baird had been regarded by General Bragg as intended to turn his right flank, and until its security had been attained, other dispositions were suspended. This prevented the advance of his central columns upon the unoccupied ground between Thomas and Crittenden, and robbed him of his greatest advantage.

General Johnson, on arrival at Kelley's, was directed by General Thomas to form his division in line of battle and move forward. The division was formed with Willich's brigade on the right, Baldwin's on the left, and Dodge's in reserve. When the division was in readiness for motion, Palmer's was in proximity on the right. By direction of Gen-

eral Rosecrans, General Palmer had formed his division by brigades in echelon, on the march from the right—Hazen's on the left, then Cruft's and Grose's, the latter well refused. In moving forward, these two divisions met Cheatham's division of five brigades, called from reserve to restore the enemy's right. After an hour of severe fighting, Cheatham yielded ground and fell back some distance. In the meantime, Reynolds had formed to the right and rear of Palmer. Turchin's brigade was posted southeast of Kelley's, and King's brigade, destined for his right, was thrown to his left on Palmer's right, in response to a call for help from Palmer, whose troops had nearly exhausted their ammunition. Reynolds planted his batteries, Harris' and Swallow's, near the road, with the Seventy-fifth Indiana and the Ninety-second Illinois in support.

The line not being continuous between Generals Thomas and Crittenden, there was danger that General Bragg would still interpose a heavy force before reinforcements could arrive. Troops were in motion from the Twentieth Corps, who were to bridge this chasm, but none were yet near. At this juncture, through anxiety for the safety of Palmer's division, General Crittenden sought and obtained permission to send other troops to the left. He at once put Beatty's and Dick's brigades in motion, leaving the third brigade of Van Cleve's division with General Wood, at Lee and Gordon's Mills. General Van Cleve soon found position on the right of Reynolds, and almost simultaneously General Davis arrived with Carlin's and Heg's brigades of his division, and formed them on the right of Van Cleve, extending the line well toward General Wood.

General Davis had been instructed by General Rosecrans to turn the enemy's left flank, and the former, in compliance, formed his brigades, by regiments in echelon, to wheel to the left from General Van Cleve's right. Having first planted his batteries on high ground, in an open field east of the Lafayette road, and posted the Eighty-first Illinois to the right in their support, he commenced his movement to flank the enemy. He, however, advanced only a short distance before he met the foe, and became heavily engaged. At first he drove back the enemy, but soon, little by little, his two brigades gave ground,

specially on the flanks of the line, until his right and left rested upon the road. In this position, supported by Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, he resisted successfully the superior forces of the enemy through several hours of severest fighting.

Generals Van Cleve and Davis were opportunely thrown before an immense concentration of forces formed to separate the two wings of the national army, and upon the latter especially the enemy's blows fell heavily. After a protracted conflict, Dick's brigade of Van Cleve's division, on his left, gave way, and then he was in isolation, except as supported by Wilder, and for a time severely engaged. His left brigade, with great loss, its commander, Colonel Heg, falling, held position, but the Eighty-first Illinois, on the right of the batteries, was driven back. At this juncture, the enemy was pressing front and flanks, and the unequal contest could not have been maintained, had not reinforcements arrived. Colonel Harker first reported with his brigade, and was placed by General Davis in rear of Heg's brigade, with orders to pass through it and engage the enemy. Soon after, Colonel Bradley's brigade of General Sheridan's division reached the field, and was similarly formed in the rear of Carlin's brigade, to relieve it by passing to its front. Soon after, General Wood, having been relieved by Lytle's brigade, moved, with Buell's brigade of his own division, and Barnes' of Van Cleve's, from Lee and Gordon's Mills to Davis' right, and nearly simultaneously, Laiboldt's brigade of Sheridan's division came also to the relief of Davis. These commanders and troops were in time to defeat an effort of the enemy to pass around Davis' right. Colonel Buell felt the shock of battle as the enemy was pressing back the Eighty-first Illinois, and his brigade was somewhat shattered and driven back, but soon rallied, and with Laiboldt's and Barnes' brigades, forced back the flanking column and maintained the position, the enemy desisting soon after entirely.

The scene of this conflict was Vineyard's farm, extending east and west from the Lafayette road, and skirted on all sides by thick woods. The troops of each army, in the alternations of advance and retreat, found friendly cover in the woods, while the open fields gave such exposure that they were thickly

strewn with the commingled dead and wounded of the two armies. This farm and the surrounding woods was a distinct battle-field. The struggle upon it, though an important element of a great battle upon a vast field, was, during the later hours of its continuance, a separate battle, mapped upon open field and forest, in glaring insulation, by the bodies of the slain.

On the other side of the chasm, on the left of this position, there was the counterpart. The left arm of General Bragg's combination against General Rosecrans' center and right, was laid heavily on Davis' and Van Cleve's divisions; the right arm fell with crushing force upon Reynolds' and Palmer's divisions. The recession of Dick's brigade exposed General Samuel Beatty's right flank, and after a severe conflict, this brigade was overwhelmed and driven from position. There was then a wide breach in the right center of the national army, and General Bragg called troops from the other side of the Chickamauga, to double back the broken line toward each flank.

The previous repulse of the enemy's right wing had been so decisive that a complete lull had succeeded. This quietness permitted the retirement of Brannan's and Baird's divisions on the left of General Thomas' line to a commanding position on the road to Reid's bridge. General Thomas made this change to make his left stronger in anticipation of another assault upon it. On his right, Turchin's brigade of Reynolds' division had relieved Hazen's on Palmer's left, that he might replenish his ammunition. General Palmer had also called away from the support of Reynolds' batteries the Seventy-fifth Indiana. These latter changes left King without immediate support; and when under great pressure he called for help, General Reynolds was compelled to send him the Ninety-second Illinois—the last regiment defending his artillery. When Hazen had secured ammunition he moved his brigade to the left of King's position, holding his left refused upon the Lafayette road. By this time, Van Cleve had been driven from line, and King and Hazen engaged the enemy as he wheeled to double up the flank. As Palmer's division was not heavily engaged at this juncture, Grose's brigade was sent to their support. Scarcely had Grose moved to the right

before the enemy in heavy force fell upon Craft and Turchin. The five brigades stood for a few minutes under a destructive fire, and were then borne back with broken lines. In this threatening emergency, General Thomas moved Brannan's division from his left to his disordered right. This timely reinforcement, the quick reformation of portions of Palmer's and Reynolds' divisions, and the most effective use of several batteries of artillery arrested the disaster. The action of the artillery was especially conspicuous in the repulse of the enemy. Portions of Standart's, Cockerill's, Cushing's, Russell's, Harris', and Swallow's batteries opened upon the enemy with grape from two groups of guns formed respectively from the artillery of Palmer's and Reynolds' divisions. When the enemy was repulsed on the main road, his forces moved through the chasm, and were met and driven back by Negley's division, which had advanced from Widow Glenn's and by Brannan's, which wheeled upon him from the vicinity of Kelley's house. The whole right of General Bragg's army had been broken and repulsed, and his central forces, though more successful in maintaining lines, had suffered equal losses. His left—Polk's and Hill's corps and cavalry—beyond menace to Wood and a dash at Negley, had provoked no conflict. His right had been so disordered by the early assaults, that Johnson's division, though far advanced toward the Chickamauga and entirely unsupported on the right after Palmer had been driven back, was not again attacked until a fresh division could be brought from the right bank of the stream, opposite Lee and Gordon's Mills. At the time that Brannan had been moved to the right in the afternoon, Scribner's and Starkweather's brigades were advanced to Johnson's left in support, while King's regular brigade, the third of Baird's division, was left on the road to Reid's bridge to hold the ground previously occupied by two divisions. These changes were merely provisional, and General Thomas, as night approached, selected ground for a new and more compact line, and designated the respective positions of the five divisions which he had handled during the day. But before Johnson's division and Baird's two brigades could be withdrawn, they were attacked by Cleburne's fresh division, supported by Cheatham's, and a severe

night conflict ensued, lasting for an hour, with heavy losses on both sides and final repulse of the enemy.

The successful defense turned upon the rapid movement of the whole army to the left. General Rosecrans' field position was at Widow Glenn's house, and as he was advised of actual or prospective emergencies, he directed troops to meet them. Early in the day, the enemy made an unsuccessful effort to cross the Chickamauga in Negley's front, when in position west of Crawfish Springs, and late in the day General Lytle's brigade of Sheridan's division posted at Lee and Gordon's Mills, by General McCook, when that point was abandoned by Wood's division, repulsed a similar effort. The movement by the left flank extended to the cavalry; and at night all the fords of the stream above Lee and Gordon's Mills were held by this arm. The field hospitals had been located in the vicinity of Crawfish Springs for the center and right of the army, and for the extreme left on the road to Rossville. The hospitals on the right, though beyond the flank of the infantry line, were covered by the cavalry on the line of the Chickamauga.

Both armies lost heavily during the day. The loss of officers in the Confederate army was exceedingly large. But heavy as were the losses, each army knew that the indecisiveness of the battle involved a renewal of the conflict on the morrow and a repetition of carnage. Neither army was willing to yield without further fighting, and yet to neither was there the assurance of ultimate victory; and as they lay on their arms in close proximity, there was to each the oppression of doubt with regard to the issue. General Bragg, however, had more troops in reserve, available for the next day, than General Rosecrans. Longstreet reached Ringgold in the evening, with several brigades. Breckinridge's division had not been engaged at all, and Hindman's and Preston's only slightly, while nearly all the brigades of the national army on the field had been fully engaged. General Rosecrans being on the defensive, was compelled, moreover, to diffuse his army more widely, not only to cover the two main roads to Chattanooga from the field, but those also in proximity to his flanks. His cavalry was on his right, upon the roads to Chatta-

nooga, through the first valley east of Lookout Mountain, and his reserve corps, represented by three brigades, was before Rossville, guarding the roads which led thither from the south and east. It was not only necessary to watch against a movement toward Chattanooga on the roads converging to Rossville, but also upon the roads farther north; and Minty had been sent with his troopers early in the day to Mission Mills, north of east from Chattanooga.

But notwithstanding General Bragg's reserves, he had cause to feel uneasiness with regard to the work before him. He had been completely foiled in his strategy and tactics. He had expected to find Crittenden's corps on the left of the national army; but his own enveloping lines had been taken in flank, and the right half had been fearfully shattered. He had had marked advantage without marked success. At the opening of the battle, his army had been well in hand for offense or defense, while General Rosecrans had been compelled often to throw forward divisions and brigades without support on right or left; and the national army was now before him, with continuous lines, and having the choice of strong positions in the rear. Besides, this army was yet upon the roads to Chattanooga, which he had expected to grasp after he had doubled its left upon its center and pressed it back upon the mountain passes. In all his special expectations and dominant aims, General Bragg had been disappointed and defeated.

General Rosecrans attained a continuous battle front only at the close of the engagement. The conditions of this attainment, however, had been such as to produce an involution of divisions destructive to the unity of his corps. Such had been the antecedent positions of his three corps, and such the necessary haste of movement to the points most threatened by the enemy, that their organization could not be maintained. Thus, General Thomas had three divisions from his own corps, and one from each of the other two; and on the right center and right of the army, the remaining divisions of McCook's and Crittenden's corps were in regular alternation. This mixing of divisions gave an expression of improvisation to the battle front strongly significant of the emergencies of its formation.

In forming a new line in the evening, General Thomas did not change the order of the divisions, but modified their relations so as to give greater compactness and strength to the front that should be offered to the enemy. The order from left to right, was Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, and Brannan. Baird's division was well refused, facing the east; Brannan's was on the right, in echelon. The battle front coursed round the northeast corner of Kelley's farm, crossed the Lafayette road a little south of his house, and extended thence to the southwest. Baird's, Johnson's, and Palmer's divisions were east of the road, and Reynolds' and Brannan's were west of it. This new line was much shorter than the one maintained during the day, allowing greater strength and heavier reserves. The general formation was two brigades from each division, in double ranks on the battle front, and one brigade from each in reserve.

About midnight, after a conference with his corps commanders and other general officers, General Rosecrans gave orders relative to the battle front for the next day. General Thomas was directed to maintain his line as formed in the evening. General McCook was instructed to leave his grand guard in position until driven in by the enemy, and withdraw Sheridan's and Davis' divisions, and form a new line to extend from the Widow Glenn's to the right of General Thomas' line; and General Crittenden was ordered to leave out his grand guards also, and retire Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions to the rear of the junction of Thomas' right and McCook's left, to be able to direct support to either. It was also arranged that the cavalry should connect with McCook, and receive orders from him, and that Negley's division should be relieved from position on the right of Brannan and transferred to the left of Baird. General Thomas requested the transfer of Negley's division, as he anticipated that the enemy would renew his effort to turn his left flank.

Before daylight, the divisions designated for new positions, except Negley's, made the movements required; while those in position, as far as practicable, covered their fronts with barricades of logs and rails. General Rosecrans not having pointed out the exact localities for the divisions of the Twen-

tieth and Twenty-first Corps, Generals McCook and Crittenden made their own selection of positions within the range permitted by their instructions. General McCook placed Lytle's brigade of Sheridan's division to the right and rear of Widow Glenn's, and Laiboldt's and Bradley's, Colonel Walworth commanding, to the rear and right of Lytle, and the two brigades of Davis' division, Carlin's and Heg's, in rear of the line thus formed. Carlin's and Heg's brigades, in withstanding the heavy columns of the enemy the day before, lost two-fifths of their effective strength, and could not now muster more than fourteen hundred men in the aggregate. Wilder's brigade, which reported to General McCook by order of the general commanding, was divided, two regiments being placed on the right and two on the left of Sheridan. General Crittenden posted his two divisions on the eastern slope of Missionary Ridge, in readiness to support to the right or left. Unfortunately, these dispositions did not subsequently command the approval of General Rosecrans, who ordered changes during the morning.

General Bragg received reinforcements during the night, and with them their commander, Lieutenant-General Longstreet. He transferred all his infantry to the west bank of the Chickamauga, divided his army into two wings, and placed General Polk in command on the right and General Longstreet on the left. He ordered the former to attack from his right at daylight, and to bring his divisions into action consecutively to his left, and the latter to await developments on the right, and then attack in similar manner. In giving instructions to General Longstreet, General Bragg conveyed the impression that he had had heavy skirmishing in getting his army into line of battle. It was, however, such skirmishing as had shattered the right half of his army, and reduced the strength of some brigades on his left at least one-fourth.

A heavy fog hung over the battle-field during the early hours of the day, and General Polk did not attack as ordered. General Bragg waited near the center of his army until his patience was exhausted, and then proceeded to his right, to find that the commander of that wing was not on the field, and that the necessary preparation for battle had not been made.

During the progress of preparations, General Bragg ordered a reconnaissance beyond General Thomas' left flank, and was gratified to learn that the Lafayette road was open to his possession. This condition of affairs on the left of the national army was owing to the fact that Negley's division was still in position on the right of Brannan. The continued delay of Negley, caused General Thomas great uneasiness, as he feared the issue of an attack on his left flank, and was assured that it would not be long withheld. Baird's division could not cover all the ground, whose firm defense was essential to the security of the line. The troops had worked vigorously to construct barricades, but the flank could not be strong while the promised division was absent. And yet General Bragg was forming a combination against it, both in pursuance of a general plan and with special reference to its weakness.

Although the troops on the right had been moved to positions in the immediate vicinity of General Rosecrans' headquarters at Glenn's, yet, when he made a special examination of his lines, he decided to change the formation on the right. He wished to hold the space from Widow Glenn's house to Brannan's right with McCook's six brigades, including Wilder's, and keep Crittenden's corps wholly in reserve. He therefore ordered General McCook, early in the morning, to fill the space to be made vacant by the withdrawal of Negley's division, if practicable. But it was not practicable for General McCook to cover the space from Widow Glenn's house to Brannan's right, except with an attenuated line,\* and as his effort to do so was not made as soon as anticipated, General Rosecrans called upon Crittenden to furnish troops to fill the

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\*General Rosecrans stated, in his official report, that McCook "was to close up on Thomas, his right refused, and covering the position at Widow Glenn's house." In his testimony before the court of inquiry, at Louisville, Kentucky, he stated that "the information on which the orders for the 20th were predicated, was that the position at Widow Glenn's house would be amply within the limits of our strength to cover, and keep Crittenden's corps wholly in reserve; but I am satisfied that the distance from that position to the right of Brannan was greater than we at the time supposed, and that the line was therefore attenuated. It was an apprehension that this might be the case, which led me to bring down Davis' division from the left side of the Dry valley, in the morning."

division interval which Negley was holding. In compliance, General Crittenden directed General Wood, with his two brigades, and Barnes', of Van Cleve's division, to relieve Negley, and directed General Van Cleve, with his remaining brigades, to take position in the rear of Wood, in reserve. General Rosecrans ordered General Davis to form his two brigades on the right, some distance to the north, and east of his original position. As this change exposed his right flank, General McCook posted Laiboldt's brigade of Sheridan's division to the right and rear of Davis', and held the remaining brigades in reserve. Other changes were in reserve for this portion of the line, which rendered it too weak to withstand the enemy.

In order to hasten General Negley to his left flank, General Thomas sent Captain Williard of his staff for him. Upon reaching Negley's position, this officer ascertained that two brigades were yet in line, and that the reserve brigade, General John Beatty commanding, alone was free to move. This, Captain Williard conducted to the left of Baird, and one brigade in thin line was the only support to the left flank, in room of a division of the previous day, and in the stead of the whole division promised for the coming battle.

At half-past 8 A. M. the character of the skirmishing in Baird's front plainly indicated that the enemy was preparing for an attack, and within an hour from that time, he made a furious assault upon the left of the general line, which was rapidly extended to the right. Against the left, the assault was made by Breckinridge and Cleburne. The left brigade of the division of the former struck the left of Baird's division, and the other two brigades soon overpowered Beatty's brigade. When this brigade was displaced, General Thomas' left flank was greatly overlapped. Upon the firmness of this flank depended the possession of the road to Rossville, to gain which was the primal object of General Bragg's combination on his right; in fact, it was the dominant object compassed by his general plan of battle for the day. Had General Negley's entire division been in line as contemplated by General Thomas, General Bragg's right could have been turned as on the previous day; for, as it was, Breckinridge's left brigade and Cleburne's division were so shattered, that it was not

deemed safe to swing the overlapping brigades into Baird's rear. This for a time saved General Thomas' left, especially as other divisions on the left of Cleburne were repulsed with equal emphasis, as Generall Bragg's imposing attack swept from his right to his left. For an hour he maintained the conflict with great vigor, in great part with fresh troops, but his whole right was broken as on the previous day. General Cleburne reported the loss of five hundred men in a few minutes, and Breckinridge's left brigade was almost annihilated, having lost its commander, General Helm, and two colonels killed and two colonels wounded. Generals Cleburne and Stewart mentioned in their reports the effect of the national artillery as the most destructive in their experience. Thus this second battle opened auspiciously for the national army. The left in the initial conflict was again triumphantly successful, but disaster on the right, and a second attempt to overwhelm the left, for several hours threatened the complete overthrow of the whole army. In the maintenance of the left, Stanley's brigade of Negley's division rendered timely assistance, after Beatty's was shattered. Although the action on his right had not progressed as General Bragg had anticipated, and General Longstreet had consequently been delayed in movement, yet when the latter did advance to attack, he found only isolated fragments of a battle line before him. This state of things resulted from a combination of circumstances. As the promised division had not been sent to General Thomas, he repeated his requests for reinforcements, especially after the opening of the action. These calls and the quietness of the enemy on the right, induced General Rosecrans to believe that General Bragg was moving his army to his right. So strong was this belief, that he finally decided to withdraw his own right altogether. At 10.10 a. m. he ordered General McCook to make dispositions looking to the movement of his troops to the left, and soon after gave him a specific order to send two brigades of Sheridan's division to General Thomas with all possible dispatch, and the third as soon as the line could be sufficiently withdrawn to permit it. He also directed General Crittenden to send the two reserve brigades of Van Cleve's division to the same destination. These orders put in motion to the left every brigade in reserve except Wilder's.

Another misapprehension was still more favorable to the enemy. General Rosecrans having received information that Brannan's line was refused, on the right of Reynolds, he ordered General Wood to "close up on Reynolds and support him."

Regarding this order as too explicit in requirement, and too imperative in tone to warrant any discretion as to obedience, General Wood withdrew his division with promptness. His left was aligned with Brannan's right, and he saw no way to close upon Reynolds but to withdraw from line and pass to the left, in the rear of Brannan. Having advised General McCook that this change would be made, General Wood moved his division rapidly from line. Brannan was not out of line, Reynolds was not under pressure, and Wood moved from line at the very moment of the enemy's attack. General Davis threw his reserve brigade toward the wide vacant space, but the heavy columns of the enemy were soon upon it, and Davis' two small brigades were speedily enveloped. His troops resisted bravely, but assaulted in front, flank, and rear, they were lifted from position and hurled in fragments toward Missionary Ridge. The attack and issue were too sudden for Lacoboldt to move to his assistance, and the latter was quickly routed. Buell's brigade of Wood's division, the last to leave position, was severed as it retired, and Brannan was struck in flank. Lytle's and Bradley's brigades of Sheridan's division, at the time in quick motion to the left, were halted, and aided by Wilder's brigade, offered gallant but vain resistance, and the vain effort cost, in addition to other losses, the life of the chivalrous Lytle. These brigades, and Beatty's and portions of Dick's, of Van Cleve's division, also in motion to the left, were broken and swept over the ridge to the west. The rapid movement of Brannan's batteries threw General Samuel Beatty's brigade into utter disorder, and in this condition it was involved in the confused retreat of all the troops on the right of Brannan. The suddenness of the displacement of the lines of infantry exposed the artillery in their rear to capture, and many guns fell into the hands of the enemy without dispute. Brannan's right flank, in swinging back under fire,

was thrown into temporary confusion. But his left being secure, order was soon restored, and he was able to maintain position until a lull in the conflict gave him opportunity to gain a new position.

For a time after the disaster on the right, there were but five divisions in line against the whole rebel army. These divisions were all firm, but the enemy was concentrating on both flanks of the line, which lay across the Lafayette and Chattanooga road. And soon, under the inspiration of partial victory, and the hope of complete triumph, most vigorous and persistent assaults were made, whose successful resistance under the circumstance, makes the closing struggle of this great battle one of the most remarkable which has occurred in modern times—one of the grandest which has ever been made for the existence of army or country. From noon till night, the five divisions which had previously constituted “Thomas’ line,” and such other troops as reached him from the right, under orders, or drifted to him after the disaster, and two brigades from the reserve corps, successfully resisted the whole Confederate army. General Wood, with Harker’s and Barnes’ brigades, and the greater portion of Buell’s, reported to General Thomas in due time. The three brigades of Negley’s division, Beatty’s, Stanley’s, and Sirwell’s, reported separately. The Forty-fourth Indiana, from Dick’s brigade, and the Seventeenth Kentucky, from Beatty’s brigade of Van Cleve’s division, were the only regiments that, without orders, diverged from the line of retreat, and reached General Thomas in time to participate in the final conflict.

General Rosecrans, believing that the day was lost, went to Chattanooga “to give orders for the security of the pontoon bridges at Bridgeport and Battle Creek, and to make preliminary dispositions, either to forward ammunitions and supplies, should the army hold its position, or to withdraw the army into good position should it become necessary.”

Entertaining the same opinion as to the issue of the battle, Generals McCook and Crittenden followed the general commanding to Chattanooga, to report for instructions. All communication between General Thomas and the generals and troops in retreat having been cut off for a time, the approach

of hostile columns in the direction of expected reinforcements first revealed to General Thomas the condition of affairs on the right, although he did not learn the extent of the disaster until late in the day.

The issue of the first attack from his right did not deter General Bragg from a renewal of effort to turn General Thomas' left, and gain the Rossville road. His second assault was made with stronger lines and greater impetuosity, and this time with partial success. General Thomas had not yet been reinforced, except by Barnes' brigade, which had been reported by General Wood, and placed in support to General Baird.

In preparation for this new effort, General Bragg moved General Breckinridge farther to the right, and placed Walker's corps between him and Cleburne. In this combination, Breckinridge was to wheel to the left and envelop General Thomas' exposed left flank. His division advanced in co-operation with other divisions on his left, and was soon able to move southward on the Lafayette road, and take in reverse the main line near Kelley's. This movement was well devised, except that no support was provided for Breckinridge in his insulation in the rear of the national army. He advanced boldly, but was met and overwhelmed by the reserve brigades of Johnson's, Palmer's, and Brannan's divisions, Willich's, Grose's, and Vanderveer's, which were in fortunate freedom for this most threatening emergency. His division was driven in route round Baird's left flank, to join the broken ranks of Walker's corps and Cleburne's division, which had been repulsed in every attack upon Baird, Palmer, and Johnson. These assaults were furious and persistent, but without impression upon the firm defensive line. As in the morning a complete cessation of the deadly strife followed these repulses, and none of the divisions on the left were again engaged until late in the evening, when they were withdrawing under orders.

This lull on the left permitted the return of Stanley's and Vanderveer's brigades to the right. Barnes' brigade of Van Cleve's division was posted by General Thomas on the left of Baird, in provision against another effort to turn the left flank.

The transfer of Stanley and Vanderveer to the right was opportune, as a conflict was there imminent, which, for the vigor and frequency of charge and countercharge, and successful resistance to vastly superior numbers, is perhaps without parallel in the war.

Soon after the rupture of the main line on the right of Brannan, which caused him to throw back his right, he found it necessary to change his position altogether. His division had been previously engaged on all parts of the line, having made frequent charges to restore broken columns and turned flanks, and in consequence had been greatly reduced, but its severest fighting was yet to come. In withdrawing from the right of Reynolds, General Brannan selected a position to the right and rear of the one which he abandoned—a strong position of defense, but at the time it was taken was unprotected by troops on the right or left. The position was admirable for defense, and time was given by the enemy for the division to construct barricades. Brannan's withdrawal exposed Reynolds' right flank, and made a broad chasm between the two divisions. Upon this intervening space, General Wood, with Harker's brigade and a portion of Buell's, took position, though not at first in connection with Brannan on the right or Reynolds' on the left. The presence of these troops in this wide interval, well advanced toward the enemy, retarded his movements, and thus gave time for some preparation for the impending conflict,

The position assumed by General Brannan was a high knoll on the curving ridge, trending eastward from the Dry Valley road, and then northward on the east of that road. In harmony with other ridges of the region, its summit was notched by depressions, and its slopes indented by projecting spurs. The position was strong, but easily turned, as on the west there was a depression which afforded easy passage round it. This ridge, from the Dry Valley road to Kelley's or the Lafayette road, was wooded, and every way advantagous for a defensive line whose flanks were secured by reserves.\*

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\* The ridge held by Generals Wood, Brannan, and Steedman, was called by the general officers of the enemy "Horse Shoe Ridge," on account of the circular trend of the crest, and Brannan's rounded summit was called by them "Battery Hill."

While the enemy persisted in his effort to turn the left flank of the army, General Thomas gave attention to that portion of his line; but when Bragg's exhausted right wing was entirely withdrawn from action, he was called to the right by the noise of musketry in that quarter. He had no knowledge, at the time, of the displacement and rout of the right wing of the army, nor of the consequent changes in the positions of his own troops next to the breach. He knew nothing of Brannan's change of position or of the movements of Negley. Two brigades of the latter had been for a time under his own eye (Beatty's and Stanley's), and he had sent orders to the division commander to mass a large number of guns on the eastern slope of Missionary Ridge, to keep the ground to the left and rear of Baird, where the enemy was partially successful in turning his left flank. General Negley had posted his artillery in the rear of Reynolds and Brannan, but had finally drifted to the Dry Valley road, and thence toward Rossville, with his guns and supporting infantry. But all this was unknown to General Thomas, as he rode to the right to ascertain the cause of the firing in the rear of his own line.

As he emerged from the woods bordering the Rossville road, he met Captain Kellogg, of his staff, who informed him that in his effort to reach General Sheridan, to conduct his division to the left, he had been fired upon in the rear of Reynolds' position by a force advancing cautiously, with skirmishers thrown out. This officer reported also that troops had been in view for some time from Wood's position, and that they were supposed to be Sheridan's division. To ascertain the facts in the case, General Thomas proceeded to Harker's brigade, and gave orders that should these troops fire after seeing the flag, that their fire should be returned, and their further advance resisted. Meeting General Wood near by, he was confirmed in the opinion that they were the enemy. But as Harker soon became engaged, all doubt was removed, and it was then evident that the right of the army had been turned, though the extent of the disaster was not foreshadowed, as these troops were not recognized as the representatives of the whole left wing of the Confederate army, which, after rest and reformation, was advancing to renew the

conflict. In the emergency, General Thomas directed General Wood to form his troops on the left of Brannan, of whose position he had been informed, and gave notice to Reynolds that the enemy was in his rear. In compliance, General Wood formed his line slightly in advance of Brannan's, for the sake of a better position, and General Reynolds drew back his right brigade so as to face the force threatening his rear.

There was scarcely time for the execution of these movements before the left wing of the Confederate army fell upon Wood and Brannan. It is impossible to compute with accuracy the number of troops with these generals. Portions of their respective divisions had been previously severed and lost, and there were troops with them representing at least two divisions: General Beatty of Negley's division was acting with a fragmentary force, and a large portion of Stanley's brigade, Colonel Stoughton commanding, Colonel Stanley having been wounded; the Twenty-first Ohio regiment from Sirwell's brigade of the same division; and the Seventeenth Kentucky, Colonel Stout, and the Forty-fourth Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Aldrich, from Van Cleve's division. But this isolated line, composed of the fragments of brigades and regiments, about four thousand men in all, repeatedly repulsed the most furious attacks of Longstreet's massive lines. But its insulation invited the enemy to other than direct assaults; and soon a strong force was seen passing around Brannan's right flank to his rear, to take in reverse the line which had resisted unbroken, every direct attack. The advance of this column evolved the dominant crisis of the battle. Having been repulsed by the left of the national army, even after his success against its right, General Bragg now moved heavy columns to the rear of a slender line of heroes, many of whom had already, in destitution of ammunition, clutched their muskets for the desperate use of the bayonet.

In giving personal direction to the movements on the right, General Thomas took position in the rear of Wood's line. With no line of troops intervening, he now saw the foe advancing in a direction to strike him before he could reach his troops. Fortunately there were reinforcements equally near. The noise of the conflict had penetrated the murky clouds

which overhung the bloody field, and reaching General Granger far to the left and rear, suggested the need of his troops where the battle was so hotly raging. Accordingly he had moved forward rapidly, in disregard of the enemy's effort to arrest his progress, and at the moment of greatest need reported to General Thomas with two brigades. As the enemy moved down the northern slope of the ridge toward the rear of Brannan and Wood, Whittaker's and Mitchell's brigades of Steedman's division, with a fury born of the impending peril, charged the foe and drove him over the ridge, and then formed line of battle from Brannan's right to the hill above Villetoe's, in front of Longstreet's left flank. In gaining this position there was heavy loss; but if the issue of battle has ever given compensation for the loss of valuable lives, it was in this action, for the opportune aid of these two brigades saved the army from defeat and rout.

At 3 p. m., General Longstreet, despairing of carrying the position without reinforcements, called upon General Bragg for assistance from his right. He was informed that the troops of their right wing "had been so badly beaten back" that they would be of no service on the left. Ascertaining thus that the right of his own army was in little better condition than the original right of the national army, Longstreet hesitated to put into the fight his reserve division, and renewed the assault with the troops that had been repeatedly repulsed. In this charge, the rebel General Hindman commanding on the extreme left, gained a temporary advantage, which induced Longstreet to put his reserve division into the action in hope of sweeping the hills before him. But before he could get Preston's large division into line, Hindman was driven from the hill above Villetoe's, upon which he had planted his banners, by Steedman's brigades. The reserve division, however, was not withheld, and Longstreet renewed the action with his whole force. Brannan had with him about twenty-five hundred men, and on his right were the two brigades of Whittaker and Mitchell. And yet from his center to Steedman's right, there were ten brigades of the enemy in line, and Gracie's brigade of Preston's division, on the right, went into action with

two thousand and three effective men. With this immense preponderance of strength, Longstreet assaulted with frequency and vigor, but was continually repulsed. The forces before Wood were relatively as strong as before Brannan and Steedman, and were repulsed in every attack. His position was favorable for defense, as the configuration of the ground was equivalent to a parapet. The troops could advance and deliver a plunging fire from the brow of the hill, and by a slight recession while loading, were entirely covered from the bullets of the enemy. The conflict involved the use of the musket solely. Wood had no artillery, and the enemy could not use his to advantage.

Late in the afternoon there were indications that Longstreet would throw his troops between Wood and Reynolds, and Hazen's brigade of Palmer's division was transferred to the intervening space. Hazen was sent because he had ammunition, and at the time the general destitution created more alarm than the previous assaults of the enemy had done. Some unauthorized person had ordered General Thomas' corps ammunition train to Chattanooga, and many of the division trains had been separated from the troops they were intended to supply, and had gone to the rear. On the whole line, the average to the man was not more than three rounds, and in some commands there was less than this. It was common to search the cartridge-boxes of those who fell. Steedman's train afforded a few rounds in addition, but this was soon exhausted, and his own men were at the last entirely destitute. Whenever ammunition failed entirely, the order was given to fix bayonets and hold the hill with cold steel. When Hazen attained position between Reynolds and Wood, he became engaged in severest conflict, and from Reynolds to Steedman the battle raged with unabated fury; but the enemy was gallantly repulsed at every point until night-fall, and in the final attacks, this was accomplished in no slight measure with the bayonet and clubbed muskets.\*

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\* The Confederate commanders not only admitted the defensive valor of the national troops, but the spirit and rigor of their offensive returns. General Hindman, who commanded ten brigades on the left of the ene

About 4 p. m., General Garfield, in company with Captains Gaw and Barker, whom General Thomas had sent to the rear for ammunition, reached the field from the direction of Rossville. Lieutenant-Colonel Thurston, chief of staff to General McCook, about the same time joined him from the right. From these officers the first definite information concerning it was received, and their arrival attested the possibility of communications with General Thomas from the Dry Valley road. Soon after, General Thomas received a dispatch from General Rosecrans, "directing him to assume command of all the forces, and with Crittenden and McCook to take a strong position and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville," where rations and ammunition would be sent, and that from that point he should send all the unorganized troops to Chattanooga.

Upon the return of the officers sent for the ammunition, the division commanders were notified through Major Lawrence, chief of artillery, that a supply would be distributed; and when this had been accomplished, orders were issued for the withdrawal of the army by divisions. General Reynolds was instructed to commence the movement, and as General Thomas went to meet him to point out where he wished him to form a line to cover the retirement of the troops on the Lafayette road, he met a force that had gained the woods in the rear of Reynolds. As this general's head of column was near, he directed him to form his division at right angles to the road, with his right resting upon it, and charge the enemy in his immediate front, though the rear of the army. The charge was made with great vigor, and the enemy was completely routed. Turchin's brigade drove this daring force entirely beyond Baird's left, capturing more than two hundred prisoners. This brigade, and Colonel E. A. King's, which, after his fall, was commanded by Colonel Robinson, was posted by General Thomas on the road leading through the ridge to the Dry Valley road, to hold the ground while the troops from the right and left passed by. Soon after, Willich's brigade, Johnson's reserve, took position on high ground, near the Trans-

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my's line, with his right resting opposite "Battery Hill," and his left on the Dry Valley road, declared that "he had never seen Federal troops fight as well," while "he had never seen Confederate troops fight better."

verse road. The three divisions on the left, Palmer's, Johnson's, and Baird's, were attacked as they left position; but though the fighting was severe, there was little confusion, and no very serious losses—a result which was due in some measure to the brigades which General Thomas had posted to cover the movement. Wood, Brannan, and Steedman, on the right, withdrew from line without molestation, except an attack on the junction of their lines, so emphatically had the left wing of the Confederate army been repulsed.\*

During the night, General Thomas formed a new line at Rossville, and was joined by Generals McCook and Crittenden, who resumed command of their respective corps. This point was important only as commanding the roads leading from the battle-field, and from Ringgold, to Chattanooga. There was need to check the advance of the enemy, and dispositions were here made to this end. General Thomas placed one brigade of Negley's division in the gap, and the other two on the ridge to the right; Reynolds' division between Negley's right and the Dry Valley road; McCook's corps, between this road and Chattanooga creek; Crittenden's, on the left of Negley, covering the roads from the east; and Granger's troops, Baird's and Brannan's divisions, at various points in rear of the main line. The position was strong against a direct attack, but could be easily turned by a heavy concentration against the right in Chattanooga valley, and General Thomas advised General Rosecrans to withdraw the army to Chattanooga.

The battle of Chickamauga and the movements which preceded it, present features of marked distinctness. This fact is evident from the reports of the generals-in-chief and other gen-

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\* The heaviest losses in the withdrawal of the army were from captures, mainly from Baird's division, which left position, under a heavy assault; from Steedman's division, and the Twenty-first Ohio regiment, the latter being between Brannan and Steedman. This regiment maintained ground, in greatest exposure during the afternoon, and by its revolving rifles and gallant fighting, made the impression upon the enemy that its position was held by a heavy force. At dark, portions of the Twenty-first, the Eighty-ninth Ohio, and Twenty-second Michigan, the latter two from the left of Whitaker's brigade, were captured.

eral officers of the opposing armies; but, nevertheless, the campaign of which the battle itself was the culmination, and the conduct of the battle, have elicited much antagonistic criticism in both sections of the country. Despite, however, all partisan representations, the pivotal events may be clearly apprehended.

General Bragg was compelled to withdraw from Chattanooga, but his reinforcements were so near that he deemed it safe to concentrate his forces at Lafayette. From this point he had command of his communications and lines of retreat, and General Rosecrans could not at once concentrate against him. His plans were elaborate, but he failed in every distinct object, except in making the impression that he was retreating to some remote point, to induce his antagonist to "expose himself in detail." Admitting his failure directly, or by implication, in his official report he made prominent his possession of the battle-field, the number of his prisoners, captured guns and small arms, and the failure of his subordinates to execute the details of his plans as his justification as a strategist and tactician. If Negley's and Baird's divisions had been overwhelmed in McLemore's Cove, or had Crittenden's corps been broken and routed while with attenuated lines it covered Chattanooga, or had Bragg delivered battle from the same position on the 18th, the results of his strategy might have been the total defeat of the Army of the Cumberland and the repossession of Chattanooga. As it was, General Rosecrans "exposed himself in detail" without injury, and threw his army before Chattanooga on ground which General Bragg had selected as an open field for maneuver; and the latter, instead of hurling the national army in disordered mass upon the mountain passes through which it had gained his front, followed that army to Chattanooga with just such speed as it permitted, leaving behind him, from the casualties of battle, two-fifths of his forces. No wonder that his generalship was criticised, and that the Southern people complained that the battle of Chickamauga gave no results commensurate with the resources it represented or the losses it entailed. His strategy failed, and his tactical dispositions by no means compassed the possibilities of the battle-field; but the spirited and persistent assaults

of his troops during two days of conflict have seldom been surpassed.

At the time that it was ascertained that the Confederate army was concentrated at Lafayette, at least forty miles, and mountain ranges, separated the extremes of the Army of the Cumberland. The union of the three corps before battle was a condition of safety. So was the attainment of position for the action of the 19th in the acceptance of battle on the Chickamauga. The conditions of the conflict on the 20th were in no small measure promising to General Rosecrans; but the movements on his right in the morning gave the advantage to the enemy, and so imperiled the army that its salvation was almost miraculous. It was unfortunate that Negley's division was left in line on the right during the night, and until the troops of the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps had taken position, and that he was not sooner relieved in the morning. General Thomas was thus left without his division, upon which he depended for the security of his left flank. The battle having been opened before heavy reinforcements reached him, his previous and subsequent calls for support lost their true significance. Negley's transfer was finally too late for the emergency on the left, and the movement of his division by brigades was fatal to its subsequent unity and efficiency. The motion of the two brigades of Sheridan's division and the two of Van Cleve's to the left, followed by the withdrawal of Wood's division from the line at the very moment of the enemy's attack, exposed equally the troops in motion and the few left in position. The latter were not able to resist the enemy until the former were out of reach of the blow, and then the right was defeated in detail. The recession of the line from Reynolds to Sheridan, and its compact formation on the hills, where General Thomas with a part of the army saved the whole of it, effected at the proper time would have been eminently judicious; but the attempt to make this change so late in the day was perilous in the extreme. The fact that that position was held against all attacks by a slender force, reveals the strong probability, if not certainty, of Bragg's total defeat, had the whole national army stood on the line of final defense. Again, the stability of the right was affected

by the want of co-operation on the part of the cavalry, which resulted in part at least from the indefiniteness of orders.\*

After the troops had been displaced on the right and were in motion toward Chattanooga, it was possible for them to have joined General Thomas in time for participation in the final conflict. Generals Negley, Sheridan, and Davis met on the Dry Valley road, near the northern opening of McFarland's Gap; and there were sufficient troops with them, in all probability, to have changed the issue of the battle had they been thrown against the left flank of the enemy at Villetoe's. Not far from McFarland's house there was a gap opening eastward, through which a road passed to the rear of General Thomas' line, and on this these troops could have passed to his assistance, had they been so directed, if the Dry Valley road, leading directly to General Thomas' right flank, had not been open to the very front and flank of the enemy. Most of the divisions, in the withdrawal in the evening, passed through this lateral gap, which opened the way to the rear of Brannan's position. And yet, after delay in conference, and after Colonel Thruston, of General McCook's staff, had borne a request from General Thomas, that they should move to his right flank, General Negley and General Sheridan proceeded toward Rossville with their troops; while General Davis, accompanied by Colonel Thruston, advanced with a fragmentary force which had been collected, on the Dry Valley road, toward Villetoe's, but was too late for effective service. General Sheridan moved through Rossville, and reached the vicinity of General Thomas' left flank; but he, too, was too late to attack

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\* General Rosecrans, in his testimony before the court of inquiry at Louisville, stated that the cavalry had orders to communicate with General McCook and "close on his right. The senior officer of the cavalry was told that he must take orders from him, though attend to their own business." At General McCook's call, the cavalry did not close on his right. General Mitchell, commanding the cavalry, excused himself for not closing to the left, upon the order of General McCook, in consequence of the fact that he had been directed by General Rosecrans to cover Crawfish Springs with his force. This apparent conflict of orders deprived the infantry forces on the right of the support of the cavalry in their efforts to rally after the line was shattered.

the enemy, and General Thomas was ignorant of his movement. There was no general officer of high rank on the line of retreat to comprehend the situation and provide for its possibilities. The general in command on the extreme left of the rebel army was in constant dread of an attack in flank and rear by infantry and cavalry during the later hours of the day. Fearing this, Longstreet kept troops in reserve as long as possible; and when the brigades of Whittaker and Mitchell hurled his troops from Brannan's rear and flank, he supposed that he was meeting again the troops that he had fought in the morning near Widow Glenn's. These facts show that the enemy not only knew of no bar to the further participation in the battle of those forces that had been displaced on the right, but that their conjunction with those to the left was expected.

The official reports of the two commanding generals do not give the strength of their respective armies, and each claimed that he fought superior numbers. There is, however, no reason to doubt that General Bragg's army was the larger.

General Bragg had on the field eleven divisions of infantry and four of cavalry, comprising thirty-five brigades of infantry and ten or twelve of cavalry. The reported aggregate strength of five divisions of the former, of three brigades each, was twenty-four thousand one hundred men, an average of sixteen hundred and six to each brigade. Giving this strength to the remaining twenty brigades of infantry, would make an infantry aggregate of fifty-six thousand two hundred and ten. The reports of the general officers of the cavalry are too indefinite to furnish a basis for an approximate estimate of the strength of that arm. It is highly probable, however, that the four divisions comprised about fifteen thousand men. And thus, from actual and inferential data, it may be assumed that General Bragg had an army of seventy thousand men.

General Rosecrans had in the action thirty brigades of infantry, five of cavalry, one of mounted infantry, and thirty-three batteries. In all, he had one hundred and thirty-five regiments of infantry, twenty-one of cavalry, and five of mounted infantry. The average of fifteen brigades of infantry

whose strength was reported, representing the four corps, was fifteen hundred and sixty men. If this should be accepted as the average strength of brigades throughout the army, its aggregate was fifty-six thousand one hundred and sixty men. It may then be assumed that General Bragg's army was superior by twelve or fifteen thousand men.

During the afternoon of the 20th, General Bragg must have had more than double as many men as General Thomas. He employed all his infantry and five or six brigades of cavalry, and a large portion of the latter arm was fought as infantry.\* General Thomas had about eighteen brigades of infantry, exclusive of Colonel Daniel McCook's brigade, which resisted the rebel cavalry on the right flank of the Confederate army on the road to Rossville, and formed no part of the battle front. All but two of his brigades had been greatly reduced by hard fighting for a day and a half, and could not have averaged more than one thousand men. His force then did not, on his final line, probably exceed twenty thousand men, allowing four thousand to General Steedman's two fresh brigades.

As the statement appears in many histories of the war, and even in some of recent publication, that General Thomas with his single corps saved the army at Chickamauga, it is imperative to refute this error, as it does great injustice to the officers and men of the other corps. The preceding narrative gives an indirect refutation, but this prevalent mistake should be explicitly corrected. Generals Crittenden and McCook had each eight brigades on the field, and General Granger had three. And of these nineteen brigades, twelve were with General Thomas in the final conflict. Five brigades of McCook's corps were cut off on the right, but not more than two from Crittenden's, counting fragments. Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps, and Johnson's from McCook's, were with General Thomas throughout the battle, and General Wood of the former corps, with two brigades of his own division and one from Van Cleve's, went to him on the second day. Granger's three large brigades constituted nearly one-

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\* Even General Longstreet fought five hundred troopers on foot, on his left, late in the evening, who had come from the cavalry force in rear of their "left wing."

fourth of the entire force on the final line. More men left the field from General Thomas' own corps, the Fourteenth, than from General Crittenden's. Four regiments of Wilder's brigade of Reynolds' division were on the right of the breach; a large portion, more than a moiety, of Negley's division was led or driven from the field (Beatty's brigade, through the emergencies of battle and orders of General Negley's adjutant-general, joined the divisions on the right, and at night were found by General Beatty, at Rossville), and Brannan lost a portion of one of his brigades through orders of a general who left the field before the final crisis of the battle. The glory of the final conflict is then the common inheritance of the army, as it was won by the valor of troops representing the four grand units.

General Bragg's losses were exceedingly heavy. He admitted in his official report a loss of two-fifths of his army. His left wing comprised, on the morning of the 20th, twenty-two thousand eight hundred and eighty-five men, exclusive of cavalry. General Longstreet reported his losses in the aggregate, exclusive of one brigade not reported, at seven thousand eight hundred and fifty-six. Of these, one thousand and eighty were killed, six thousand five hundred and six were wounded, and two hundred and seventy captured. His loss in one day of battle, and chiefly in the afternoon, was thirty-six per cent. This fact justifies General Bragg's admission. A very large number of Confederate officers fell. Two major-generals were wounded, three brigadiers were killed and three were wounded, and one of the latter was captured.

General B. H. Helm's Kentucky brigade went into this fight one thousand seven hundred and sixty-three strong, and came out with four hundred and thirty-two, General Helm being among the killed. Bate's brigade lost six hundred and eight out of one thousand and eighty-five. A Mississippi brigade lost seven hundred and eighty-one, and came out with but two regimental officers uninjured, and several other brigades lost fully half their number.

The reported aggregate loss of the Army of the Cumberland was sixteen thousand three hundred and thirty-six, including one hundred and thirty-two officers killed, five hun-

dred and ninety-two wounded, and two hundred and seventy missing; fifteen hundred and fifty-five enlisted men killed, eight thousand eight hundred and twenty wounded, and four thousand nine hundred and eighty-five missing. As many of those reported as missing were among the slain, the number of the killed exceeded two thousand. The loss from Baird's division was twenty-two hundred and thirteen; from Brannan's, twenty-one hundred and forty-four; from Palmer's, thirteen hundred and forty-nine; from Johnson's, sixteen hundred and twenty-nine; from Steedman's two brigades, seventeen hundred and thirty-two;\* from Wood's two, ten hundred and thirty-five; and from Sheridan's and Davis' divisions, more than forty per cent. The remaining divisions of the army lost less heavily, though none suffered lightly. Among those who fell were Brigadier-General Lytle, Colonels E. A. King, Heg, and Baldwin commanding brigades, and Colonels W. G. Jones, Bartleson, Alexander, Gilmer, and McCleary. The loss in material was immense, fifty-one guns, fifteen thousand small arms, wagons and ambulances in great numbers, and ammunition and stores in large quantities.

On the morning of the 21st, there were indications that the enemy was advancing against the position at Rossville. Colonel Minty having reported the advance of a strong force of infantry and cavalry, General Thomas directed him to withdraw from the front and take position on the left flank of the army. Soon after, the enemy approached cautiously on the direct roads from the battle-field. No purpose however, was revealed, to attack the army, and all the tentative demonstrations were easily repulsed. It being evident to General Thomas that the enemy could easily concentrate on his right flank, and by turning it, could cut him off from Chattanooga, he advised General Rosecrans to concentrate his forces at Chattanooga. Adopting the suggestion, General Rosecrans authorized a withdrawal from Rossville, and General Thomas at once made preparations for its accomplishment. Having called together the corps commanders, he gave them such instructions as would preclude confusion in making the move-

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\*This loss was forty-four per cent. between 2 p. m. and dark.

ment. He first sent all the wagons, ambulances, and surplus artillery carriages forward; then stationed Brannan's division half-way to Chattanooga, to cover the troops on the direct road, and having thrown out toward the enemy strong skirmish lines, supported by Baird's division and Minty's cavalry, he commenced the movement from the left at 9 p. m. It was made by divisions, in supporting distance, one after another from left to right. The withdrawal of the army was effected without the loss of a single man, and at 7 a. m. the next day, the troops were in position around Chattanooga, from the river on the north to the river on the south. General Bragg excused himself for allowing this quiet withdrawal of the national army on the ground that his own army was less than half as strong, and greatly exhausted. This statement may be regarded as proof that his victory was only nominal in his own estimation.

But whatever were the immediate and more local consequences of the battle, in its remoter relations and significance, it has claims to historic grandeur. The Army of the Cumberland, without support on either flank, had leaped across the Tennessee river and the contiguous mountains, and yet escaped destruction, though the armies of the enemy east and west were made tributary to a combination of forces to accomplish this end. Paroled prisoners from Vicksburg, regular troops from Mississippi and Georgia, a veteran corps from Lee's army in Virginia, and Buckner's corps from East Tennessee joined Bragg on the bank of the Chickamauga, not simply to retake Chattanooga, but to annihilate the Army of the Cumberland. Nearly half of Bragg's army consisted of recent reinforcements, sent to Northern Georgia, while the authorities at Washington, perplexed with the military situation, were resting under the delusion that General Bragg was reinforcing Lee. But this heavy draft upon the resources of the Confederacy was burdened with the fatality which clung to all the grander efforts of the insurgents in the West. And General Bragg's broken and exhausted army was a symbol of the fast coming exhaustion of the Confederacy itself. The issue of the battle was not thus defined to the consciousness of the Southern people, but was doubtless one of the most

emphatic disappointments of the struggle, and intensified the gloom produced by previous defeats. A vast army, representing a large fraction of the military strength of the Confederacy, had only gained a barren victory, if a victory at all, in room of anticipated results of widest compass. The utterances of Mr. Davis can not be taken as a just expression of the hopes of the Southern people. They were usually too extravagant to represent the sober thoughts of the people. Still, it can not be doubted that he had general sympathy in the conviction, publicly expressed, that the total overthrow of General Rosecrans, which was regarded as assured, would virtually terminate the war.

Instead of the annihilation of the Army of the Cumberland, the recapture of Chattanooga, and the attainment of far grander ulterior results, which had been anticipated as the fruits of the battle of Chickamauga, General Bragg, with a shattered army, followed slowly and cautiously his retreating foe, to invest, at Chattanooga, the army which he had failed to crush on the field of battle, hoping, through starvation, to wrest from General Rosecrans the original objective of this campaign.

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WASHINGTON, D. C., *July 14, 1863.*

Burnside has been frequently urged to move forward and cover your left in entering East Tennessee. I do not know what he is doing. He seems tied fast to Cincinnati,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Commander-in-Chief.*

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WINCHESTER, *August 4, 1863.*

*Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C.:*

Your dispatch ordering me to move forward without further delay, reporting the movement of each corps until I cross the Tennessee, is received. As I have been determined to cross the river as soon as practicable, and have been making all preparations, and getting such information as may enable me to do so without being driven back like Hooker, I wish to know if your order is intended to take away my discretion, as to the time and manner of moving my troops.

W. S. ROSECRANS,  
*Major-General.*

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WASHINGTON, *August 5, 1863.*

The orders for the advance of your army, and that its progress be reported daily, are peremptory.

H. W. HALLECK.

WASHINGTON, *August 25, 1863.*

Burnside, when last heard from, was at Mount Vernon, moving toward Knoxville. He is directed to move forward as rapidly as possible, and to keep you posted in regard to his operations. Grant's movements at present have no connection with you.

H. W. HALLECK,

*Major-General.*

WASHINGTON, *September 6, 1863.*

You give no information of the position of Bragg and Buckner; if they have united, it is important that you and Burnside unite as quickly as possible, so that the enemy may not attack you separately.

H. W. HALLECK,

*Major-General.*

WASHINGTON, *September 6, 1863.*

I have heard nothing from Burnside since his dispatch of August 31st, the substance of which was sent to you. His instructions were to advise you of his movements, and connect as soon as possible with your left. There is no reason now to suppose that any of Lee's troops have been detached, except perhaps a small force from Charleston.

H. W. HALLECK,

*Major-General.*

WASHINGTON, *September 11, 1863.*

Burnside telegraphs from Cumberland Gap that he holds all East Tennessee above Loudon, and also the gap of the North Carolina mountains. A cavalry force is moving toward Athens, to connect with you. After holding the mountain passes on the west, and Dalton or some other point on the railroad, to prevent the return of Bragg's army, it will be decided whether your army shall move further into Georgia and Alabama. It is reported by deserters that a portion of Bragg's army is reinforcing Lee. It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained as early as possible.

H. W. HALLECK,

*Commander-in-Chief.*

WASHINGTON, *September 12, 1863.*

Following telegram is sent to you for your information by order of the Secretary of War, from Memphis, 5 p. m., September 9:

"A gentleman just in from Mobile, reports that all of Johnston's force has gone to join Bragg at Chattanooga. I think the report true, from the source I received it, and from the fact that the country south of Corinth is full of regular cavalry making some movement.

"S. A. HURLEBUT,

*"Major-General."*

WASHINGTON, *September 13, 1863.*

There is no intention of sending Burnside into North Carolina. He is ordered to move down and connect with you.

Should the enemy attempt to turn your right flank through Alabama, Chattanooga should be turned over to Burnside and given away, or such part of it as may not be required there should move to prevent Bragg from re-entering Middle Tennessee. Hurlbut will aid you all he can, but most of Grant's available force is west of the Mississippi.

HALLECK.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
TRENTON, *Scptember 9, 1863—3.30 a. m.*

*Major-General Thomas, Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps:*

A dispatch is just received from General Wagner, dated 8.30 p. m. yesterday, stating that Chattanooga is evacuated by the rebels, and he will occupy it in the morning. The general commanding desires you to call on him at once to consult in regard to arrangements for the pursuit.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.*

P. S.—The order sending the Ninety-second Indiana to reconnoiter the mountain is revoked. The general commanding directs you to order your whole command in readiness to move at once.

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.*

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TRENTON, Ga., *Scptember 9, 1863—10 a. m.*

*Major-General Thomas, Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps:*

The general commanding has ordered a general pursuit of the enemy by the whole army. General Crittenden has started to occupy Chattanooga, and pursue the line of Bragg's retreat. Our forces across the river from Chattanooga have been ordered to cross and join General Crittenden in the pursuit. General McCook has been ordered to move at once on Alpine and Summerville. The general commanding directs you to move your command as rapidly as possible to Lafayette, and make every exertion to strike the enemy in flank, and if possible cut off his escape. Colonel Wilder's brigade has been ordered to join you at Lafayette.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,  
 WIDOW DAVIS', NEAR CHICKAMAUGA CREEK, *September 10, 1863—9.30 p. m.*  
*Brigadier-General Baird, Commanding First Division, Fourteenth Army Corps.*

GENERAL:—There are indications of a superior force of the enemy being in position near Dug Gap; another column, estimated as a division, with twelve pieces of artillery, near Morgan's Mills, three miles to my left, in the direction of Catlett's Gap; also a cavalry force under Forrest, at Culp's Mills, near the road from Pond Spring to Cooper's Gap—there with the intention (as citizens and deserters report) of attacking our rear in the morning.

My position is somewhat advanced, and exposed to a flank approach by two roads leading from Catlett's Gap, but it is a favorable one to fight the enemy, providing your division is within supporting distance, which I understood from General Thomas would be the case, and that your division would move up to Chickamauga Creek to-night. Please inform me if this will be the case.

Have the kindness to send this information to General Thomas to-night. I have the honor to remain, yours, very truly,

JAS. S. NEGLEY,

*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
 CHATTANOOGA, *September 10, 1863—9.45 p. m.*

*Major-General Thomas, Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps:*

The general commanding directs me to say General Negley's dispatch, forwarded by you at 10 a. m., is received. He is disappointed to learn from it that his forces move to-morrow morning instead of having moved this morning, as they should have done, this delay imperiling both extremes of the army.

Your movement on Lafayette should be made with the utmost promptness.

You ought not to incumber yourself with your main supply train. A brigade or two will be sufficient to protect it.

Your advance ought to have threatened Lafayette yesterday evening.

I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. P. DROUILLARD,

*Captain A. D. C*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
 CHATTANOOGA, *September 10, 1863—10 p. m.*

*Major-General Thomas, Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps:*

In addition to the accompanying dispatch, the general commanding further directs that you open direct communication with General McCook, and take care to hurt the enemy as much as possible.

It is important to know whether he retreats on Rome or Cedar Bluff.

If the enemy has passed Lafayette, toward Rome, he will threaten McCook; if he has not passed this point, he will endanger Crittenden.

Much depends on the promptitude of your movements.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. P. DROUILLARD.

CHATTANOOGA, September 11, 1863.

*Major-General Thomas, Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps:*

Information from many independent sources makes it evident that the enemy has concentrated in very considerable force in the neighborhood of Lafayette. It appears that two brigades of rebel infantry were at Gordon's mill last evening, and one of our scouts reported that a heavy column of infantry and artillery crossed the Chattanooga at Gowen's ford yesterday, moving in the direction of your position.

Crittenden has been ordered to put his corps on the road from Gordonsville to Lafayette, near the northern spur of Pigeon Mountains, with orders to attack any force that should attack you. He was to have got into position to-night. The general commanding is waiting anxiously to hear from you, and know what are the new developments of the day. In case you find the enemy concentrated in heavy force, it will be best to draw General McCook to within supporting distance. It is necessary for the general commanding to know the situation of affairs near you and General McCook before he can determine what disposition to make of General Crittenden's corps. Of course, it is our policy to attack him as soon as we know his position and force.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,

*Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS,

AT FOOT OF MOUNTAIN NEAR ALPINE, September 11—8.30 p. m.

GENERAL:—My corps is concentrated here. I have heard nothing from you. I sent Colonel Harrison at an early hour this morning to open communication with you. He met the enemy's cavalry between here and Lafayette, and drove them to a point within nine miles of that place. A prisoner from the army and citizens report that none of your troops are there, but that the place is occupied by the enemy with cavalry and infantry.

I can scarcely believe this, yet all the cavalry we have driven from this vicinity runs in that direction. Polk's corps is reported at Trion Factory, five and a half miles northeast from Summerville, on the road from that place to Ringgold; also had a courier line on that road to-day.

Colonel Harrison and Colonel Watkins are ordered to go to Lafayette at all hazards, and ascertain this fact.

I casually heard to-day that General Rosecrans' headquarters have been moved to Chattanooga.

I send this by my couriers in Will's valley, with orders that it shall go to you from Trenton, as that may prove the most expeditious way to reach you. Rome has lately been fortified, and is occupied by infantry and artillery. A reconnoissance has been sent to intersect the road between Rome and Summerville, to ascertain what is going on there. I have no further news.

Very respectfully,

A. McD. McCook,

*Major-General Commanding.*

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, *Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps.*

CHATTANOOGA, September 12, 1863—11.15 A. M.

GENERAL:—Your dispatches of 10.30 last night and of 4 o'clock this morning have been received. After maturely weighing the notes, the general commanding is induced to think that General Negley withdrew more through prudence than compulsion. He trusts that our loss is not serious, and that there will be no difficulty in holding the gap. He dispatched you last night to communicate with General McCook, and call him up if you thought necessary. He trusts this has been done; if not, no time should be lost. He should move with two divisions immediately, carrying three days' rations and sixty rounds of ammunition on the persons of the men, leaving the other division to protect the trains. Crittenden was probably at Gordon's Mills by 10 o'clock to-day, and we shall make immediate dispositions to reach the enemy's flank by Davis' Cross-roads. Stanley should send his cavalry on the Bloomtown road, and seize the gap at Dougherty without a moment's delay, and then enter the valley with a portion of his command. Atkins' cavalry will be sent forward at once. It will be desirable for you to use them for communications. It is very important, at this time, for you to communicate promptly, that the general commanding may know how to manage General Crittenden's corps, which will attack the enemy as soon as it can be gotten in position. When a battle does begin, it is desirable that every command should do its best, and push hard, using the bayonet wherever possible.

I am, sir,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

C. GODDARD,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS, *Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

WIDOW GLENN's, September 19—11.45 A. M.

*Major-General McCook, Commanding Twentieth Army Corps:*

The general commanding directs you, as soon as practicable, after the receipt of this order, to post your command so as to form the right of the new battle-front, and hold the same. Leave your outposts and grand-guard where they now are, till they are driven in by the enemy, when they will fall back upon the main body of your command, contesting the ground inch by inch.

Very respectfully,

J. A. GARFIELD,

*Chief of Staff.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

WIDOW GLENN's HOUSE, September 19, 1863—10.20 P. M.

GENERAL:—The general commanding directs me to inform you that General McCook has been ordered to hold this gap to-morrow, covering the Dry Valley road, his right resting near this place, his left connecting with General Thomas' right. The general places your corps in reserve to-morrow, and directs you to post it on the eastern slope of Missionary Ridge to support McCook or Thomas. Leave the grand-guard from your command out, with instructions to hold their ground until driven in, and then to retire slowly, contesting the ground stubbornly.

Very respectfully,

J. A. GARFIELD,

*Chief of Staff.**MAJOR-GENERAL CRITTENDEN, Commanding Twenty-first Army Corps.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

September 20—6.35 A. M.

*Major-General McCook, Commanding Twentieth Army Corps:*

General Negley's division has been ordered to General Thomas' left. The general commanding directs you to fill the space left vacant by his removal, if practicable. The enemy appears to be moving toward our left.

Very respectfully,

J. A. GARFIELD,

*Chief of Staff.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

IN THE FIELD, September 20—10.10 A. M.

*Major-General McCook, Commanding Twentieth Army Corps:*

General Thomas is being heavily pressed on the left. The general commanding directs you to make immediate dispositions to withdraw the right, so as to spare as much force as possible to reinforce Thomas. The

left must be held at all hazards, even if the right is withdrawn back to the present left. Select a good position back this way, and be ready to start reinforcements to Thomas at a moment's warning.

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
IN THE FIELD, *September 20*—10.30 A. M.

*Major-General McCook, Commanding Twentieth Army Corps:*

The general commanding directs you to send two brigades of General Sheridan's division at once, and with all possible dispatch, to support General Thomas, and send the third brigade as soon as the lines can be drawn sufficiently. March them as rapidly as you can without exhausting the men. Report in person to these headquarters as soon as your orders are given in regard to Sheridan's movement.

Have you any news from Colonel Post? J. A. GARFIELD.  
*Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, *September 20*—10.45 A. M.  
*Brigadier-General Wood, Commanding Division:*

The general commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him. Respectfully, etc.,

FRANK S. BOND,  
*Major and Aid-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, *September 19, 1863*—8 P. M.  
*Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C.:*

We have just concluded a terrific day's fighting, and have another in prospect for to-morrow. The enemy attempted to turn our left, but his design was anticipated, and sufficient force placed there to render his attempt abortive. The number of our killed is considerable; that of our wounded very heavy. The enemy was greatly our superior in numbers. Among our prisoners are men from some thirty regiments. We have taken two cannons and lost seven (7). The army is in excellent condition and spirits, and, by the blessing of Providence, the defeat of the enemy will be total to-morrow. The battle-ground was densely wooded, and its surface irregular and difficult. We could make but little use of our artillery.

W. S. ROSECRANS,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

CHICKAMAUGA RIVER, *September 20*; VIA RINGGOLD, *September 21*.  
*Major-General Cooper, Adjutant-General:*

After two day's hard fighting, we have driven the enemy, after a desperate resistance, from several positions, and now hold the field; but he still confronts us. The losses are heavy on both sides, especially of our officers. We have taken over twenty pieces of artillery, and some 2,500 prisoners.

BRAXTON BRAGG.

CHATTANOOGA, September 21, 1863.

*To the President of the United States:*

After two days of the severest fighting I ever witnessed, our right center was beaten. The left held its position until sunset. Our loss is heavy, and our troops worn down. The enemy received heavy reinforcements. Every man of ours was in action on Sunday, and all but one brigade on Saturday. Number of our wounded large, compared with that of the killed. We took prisoners of two divisions of Longstreet. We have no certainty of holding our position. If Burnside could come immediately, it would be well; otherwise he may not be able to join us, unless he comes on the west side of the river.

W. S. ROSECRANS,  
*Major-General.*

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#### STATEMENT OF GENERAL G. P. THRUSTON IN RELATION TO THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

At the time Bragg's left struck the right of our army, while the latter was in motion, on the morning of Sunday, September 20, '63, I happened to be sent by General McCook, commanding Twentieth Army Corps (I was adjutant of that corps and chief of staff), with orders to General Mitchell, at Crawfish Springs, to close up toward "Widow Glenn's House," and support our infantry on the right, which was moving toward our left. Rosecrans was transferring troops from right to left, and this left a gap between our right and our cavalry. During my brief absence, our troops were routed on the right, and on my return to the "Widow Glenn's House," I found our army gone, and the rebels in long lines extending across the open field in front of that house, and far to the south of it, showing that their infantry line extended beyond, or south of our right. As I knew nothing of the general situation of affairs, excepting that the rebel troops were in possession of the whole field occupied by our troops when I left, say a half hour before, I suggested to Colonel T. J. Harrison, who came up on the Crawfish Spring road just behind me, and whose regiment, the Thirty-ninth Indiana, was mounted and armed with Spencer rifles, to attack the enemy, then but three or four hundred yards away, and advancing on us rapidly. His men dismounted, and under his lead and Major Evans' charged the enemy splendidly, and brought back to widow Glenn's house, where I waited, some two hundred prisoners, disarmed them, and left them in charge of about a dozen guards only, and then the regiment turned upon the enemy again.

This single regiment was too small to stay their progress, however, and it was with the utmost difficulty we got away with our prisoners. The latter cheered to the rebels to come on and retake them, and it was only by forcing the prisoners, at the point of the bayonet, to run, and running ourselves, that we got away with them. I took charge of the small guard in charge of the prisoners, and my orderlies assisted, all with drawn swords and pistols, and we ran nearly a half mile in this way (with the

rebels in full sight trying to overtake us), before we got out of their sight, and finally felt that we had our prisoners safe. The prisoners on the run kept laughing very heartily at us, but there was no safety but in a high rate of speed.

I then endeavored to ascertain the situation of affairs. After traveling apparently two or three miles around what seemed to be the left of the enemy's lines, I succeeded in finding Generals Sheridan and Davis. Each had collected about half their divisions in broken and disorganized regiments. The troops were greatly demoralized, and they were slowly retiring along a pathway through the woods and over the hills, which led in the direction of Rossville, and probably some six miles from there.

The battle seemed still raging over on General Thomas' front, and a mile or more east of us. We learned that Generals McCook, Rosecrans, and Crittenden had gone to Chattanooga, and I was desirous that Sheridan and Davis' troops should go to General Thomas' assistance, and volunteered to go myself and see how they could best assist General Thomas.

After agreeing with Sheridan and Davis on a point where I was to find them on my return, I made several attempts to cross to General Thomas, but was prevented by finding the enemy in my front. I finally met General Negley. He said he had been trying to find General Thomas, but was driven back by the enemy, and assured me it was impossible to reach General Thomas; but a short time afterward, I succeeded in reaching him, who was just back of the crest of a hill or rise, in an open field, the battle still raging in his front. I at once informed him of the situation on the right, relating as rapidly as possible the disaster to that part of the army, and the present situation of Sheridan's and Davis' troops, asking him if he wished to use them in any way. I inferred from his conversation that he received from me the first information he had from the right wing of the army after it was routed. I do not know with any precision the time of day when I reached General Thomas. I should say it was about 4 o'clock p. m., but it may have been a little later or some earlier.

The general seemed relieved to know that Sheridan and Davis had some troops within reach, and directed me to bring them up on his right at once, and have them ready to be put in position there or support the right by active operations, if circumstances seemed to demand it. Having changed horse for the third time, I ran my horse back to Sheridan and Davis, but found that during my absence they had moved on nearer to Rossville, and I did not find them for nearly an hour at least. I did reach them along the narrow valley where they were marching, which was much crowded.

Being adjutant and chief of staff of the Twentieth Corps, to which their divisions belonged, I reported to them General Thomas' position and situation, and requested them to return and take position as directed by him. Davis ordered his men to "right about" at once, and marched back under my guidance, some of Negley's and other troops joining us. Gen-

eral Sheridan said he preferred to go to Rossville, and go out on the Lafayette road. I told him it was getting late, and he could scarcely get on the field by that route before night, but he insisted on going that way, which was several miles round.

By the time we reached Thomas' position with Davis' forces, however, General Thomas was withdrawing his troops, the enemy having suspended or given up his attack, and our troops were being withdrawn, so we did not get into the action. By that time our troops had in part recovered their courage and would have done tolerably good service. It was then about dark—6 o'clock p. m., perhaps later. I reported to General Thomas, and remained with him till he went back to Rossville for the night. I followed him there and remained with him all night. I had about half the cavalry escort with me belonging to headquarters Twentieth Corps.

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#### EXTRACT FROM GENERAL SHERIDAN'S REPORT.

After crossing the road, my division was again formed on the ridge which overlooked the ground where this sanguinary contest had taken place, the enemy manifesting no disposition to continue the engagement further. I here learned positively what I had before partially seen, that the division still further on the left had been driven, and I was completely cut off.

I then determined to connect myself with the troops of General Thomas by moving on the arc of a circle until I struck the Dry Creek Valley road, by which I hoped to form the junction.

In the meantime I was joined by a portion of the division of General Davis, under command of General Carlin, and a number of stragglers from other divisions.

On reaching the Dry Creek Valley road, I found that the enemy had moved parallel to me, and had also arrived at the road, thus preventing me joining General Thomas by that route. I then determined to move quickly on Rossville, and form a junction with him on his left flank, via Lafayette road. This was successfully accomplished about 5½ o'clock p. m.

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#### EXTRACT FROM GENERAL DAVIS' REPORT.

General Negley's division at this time passed to the rear, in the direction of Rossville, and, I understood, took position at that place. General Carlin and Colonel Martin had also by this time succeeded in reforming their troops as far as was possible, and reported. Colonel Ward, commanding the Tenth Ohio Infantry, reported to me with his regiment for duty, and after allowing the men a few minutes to procure water, I ordered them again under arms, and moved for the battle-field with a view of supporting General Thomas' corps, which was still maintaining its position. It is proper here to add that several detached battalions and

commands reported to me, and accompanied my command to the battlefield, making in all a force of twenty-five hundred to three thousand men.

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While in the act of forming my lines near General Thomas' right, I received information from General Garfield that Thomas was falling back, and orders to repair to Rossville.

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#### EXTRACT FROM GENERAL NEGLEY'S REPORT.

2 P. M. Finding that our right wing and center had given way before the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, and being hard pressed on my front and right, I sent Lieutenant Moody of my staff to General Rosecrans for a brigade. Upon being applied to, General Rosecrans replied that it was too late: that he could give me no help. At this juncture, General Brannan applied to me for support, and I ordered the Twenty-first Ohio Volunteers, of Sirwell's brigade, to his assistance. I then rode forward to the crest of the ridge over which the left wing and center was retiring, to get a position for artillery, when I was met by a strong column of the enemy, who pressed forward rapidly between me and the troops on my left, leaving me but one whole regiment, the Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and a part of another, organized, with the artillery in my charge with its ammunition nearly exhausted; at the same time my ammunition train had been driven off the field. At this moment reliable information reached me that a force of the enemy's cavalry was moving from our right to our rear, and a column of infantry on our front and left. Finding it impossible to organize any of the passing troops, and unable to communicate with General Thomas, and being informed by a staff-officer that Generals Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden had left the field, I deemed it vitally important to secure the safety of the artillery, which appeared to be threatened with immediate capture by a large force of the enemy, who was pressing forward on my front and right. I immediately took the Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and marched to the mouth of the gap, two miles from Rossville, the first open ground where troops could be collected and reorganized. . . .

As soon as I had cleared the gap of artillery and transportation, which extended back some distance, and in great confusion, and formed the scattered troops into battalions, I learned that General Sheridan was close at hand with some fifteen hundred men. I rode forward and respectfully suggested to General Sheridan to move to the support of General Thomas, stating that I would join him with all the troops I had collected. He stated his object was to march to Rossville. I then rode forward to communicate with General Thomas; found the enemy's cavalry in possession of the road between us, preventing my further passage. I then returned and held a consultation with Generals Davis and Sheridan and Colonel Ducat.

It was determined as advisable to proceed to Rossville, to prevent the enemy from obtaining possession of the cross-roads, and from there

General Sheridan would move to the support of General Thomas, via the Lafayette road.

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#### EXTRACT FROM GENERAL ROSECRANS' REPORT.

The battle in the meanwhile roared with increasing fury and approach from the left to the center. Two aids arrived successively within a few minutes, from General Thomas, asking for reinforcements. The first was directed to say that General Negley had already gone, and should be nearly at hand at that time, and that Brannan's reserve brigade was available. The other was directed to say that General Van Cleve would at once be sent to his assistance, which was accordingly done.

A message from General Thomas soon followed, that he was heavily pressed, Captain Kellogg, A.D.C., the bearer, informing me at the same time that General Brannan was out of line, and General Reynolds' right was exposed. Orders were dispatched to General Wood to close up on Reynolds, and word was sent to General Thomas that he should be supported, even if it took away the whole corps of Crittenden and McCook.

General Davis was ordered to close on General Wood, and General McCook was advised of the state of affairs, and ordered to close his whole command to the left with all dispatch.

General Wood, overlooking the direction to close up on Reynolds, supposed he was to support him by withdrawing from the line and passing to the rear of General Brannan, who, it appears, was not out of line, but was in echelon, and slightly in rear of Reynolds' right. By this unfortunate mistake a gap was opened in the line of battle, of which the enemy took instant advantage, and striking Davis in flank and rear, as well as in front, threw his whole division in confusion.

The same attack shattered the right brigade of Wood before it cleared the space. The right of Brannan was thrown back, and two of his batteries, then in movement to a new position, were taken in flank, and thrown back through two brigades of Van Cleve, then on the march to the left, throwing his division into confusion, from which it never recovered until it reached Rossville.

While the enemy poured in through this breach, a long line stretching beyond Sheridan's right was advancing. Laiboldt's brigade shared in the rout of Davis. Sheridan's other two brigades, in movement toward the left, under orders to support Thomas, made a gallant charge against the enemy's advancing column, but were thrown into confusion by the enemy's line advancing on their flank, and were likewise compelled to fall back, rallying on the Dry Valley road, and repulsing the enemy; but they were again compelled to yield to superior numbers, and retired westward of the Dry Valley road, and by a circuitous route reached Rossville, from which they advanced by the Lafayette road to support our left.

Thus, Davis' two brigades, one of Van Cleve's, and Sheridan's entire division were driven from the field, and the remainder, consisting of the divisions of Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, Brannan, and Wood, two

of Negley's brigades, and one of Van Cleve's, were left to sustain the conflict against the whole power of the rebel army, which, desisting from pursuit on the right, concentrated their whole effort to destroy them.

At the moment of the repulse of Davis' division, I was standing in rear of his right, waiting the completion of the closing of McCook's corps to the left. Seeing confusion among Van Cleve's troops, and the distance Davis' men were falling back, and the tide of battle surging toward us, the urgency for Sheridan's troops to intervene became imminent, and I hastened in person to the extreme right, to direct Sheridan's movement on the flank of the advancing rebels. It was too late. The crowd of returning troops rolled back, and the enemy advanced. Giving the troops directions to rally behind the ridges west of the Dry Valley road, I passed down it, accompanied by General Garfield, Major McMichael, and Major Bond, of my staff, and a few of the escort, under a shower of grape, canister, and musketry, for two or three hundred yards, and attempted to join General Thomas and the troops sent to his support, by passing to the rear of the broken portion of our line, but found the routed troops far toward the left, and hearing the enemy's advancing musketry and cheers, I became doubtful whether the left had held its ground, and started for Rossville. On consultation and further reflection, I determined to send General Garfield there, while I went to Chattanooga, to give orders for the security of the pontoon bridges at Battle Creek and Bridgeport, and to make preliminary disposition either to forward ammunition and supplies, should we hold our ground, or to withdraw the troops into good position.

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*Organization of the Army of the Cumberland before the Battle of "Chickamauga," Georgia, September 19 and 20, 1863.*

*Department Headquarters.*

15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Colonel W. J. Palmer commanding.

10th Ohio Infantry, Colonel J. W. Burke commanding.

Battalion 1st, Ohio Sharpshooters, Captain G. M. Barber commanding.

*Twentieth Army Corps.*

MAJOR-GENERAL A. McD. COOK COMMANDING.

*First Division.*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL JEFF. C. DAVIS commanding.

*First Brigade.**Second Brigade.*

COLONEL P. S. POST commanding. GENERAL W. P. CARLIN commanding.

22d Indiana Infantry. 21st Illinois Infantry.

59th Illinois " " 38th " "

74th " " 15th Wisconsin "

75th " " 101st Ohio "

*Third Brigade.*

COLONEL H. C. HEG commanding.

81st Indiana Infantry.

25th Illinois "

35th " "

8th Kansas "

*Artillery.*

5th Wisconsin Battery. 2d Minnesota Battery.

8th Wisconsin Battery.

*Second Division.*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. W. JOHNSON commanding.

*First Brigade.**Second Brigade.*

GENERAL A. WILICH commanding. COLONEL J. B. DODGE commanding.

49th Ohio Infantry. 77th Pennsylvania Infantry.

39th Indiana Infantry. 29th Indiana "

32d " " 30th " "

15th Ohio " 79th Illinois "

89th Illinois " 34th " "

*Third Brigade.*

COLONEL P. P. BALDWIN commanding.

6th Indiana Infantry.

1st Ohio Infantry.

93d " "

5th Kentucky Cavalry.

*Artillery.*

Battery "A," 1st Ohio Art. 20th Ohio Battery.

5th Indiana Battery.

*Third Division.*

MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN commanding

*First Brigade.**Second Brigade.*

GENERAL W. H. LYTHE commanding. COLONEL B. LAIBOLDT commanding

88th Illinois Infantry. 2d Missouri Infantry.

36th " " 15th " "

24th Wisconsin " 44th Illinois "

21st Michigan " 73d " "

*Third Brigade.***COLONEL L. P. BRADLEY commanding.**

22d Illinois Infantry.

27th " "

42d " "

51st " "

*Artillery.*

Battery "11," 2d Indiana.      Battery "G," 1st Missouri.

Battery "C," 1st Illinois.

*Fourteenth Army Corps.***MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS COMMANDING.**

Company "L," 1st Ohio Cavalry, "Escort." 9th Michigan Infantry, "Provost Guard."

*First Division.***BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. BAIRD commanding.***First Brigade.***COL B. F. SCRIBNER commanding.**

38th Indiana Infantry.

94th Ohio Infantry.

2d Ohio Infantry.

33d " "

10th Wisconsin Infantry.

*Second Brigade.***GEN. J. C. STARKWEATHER commanding.**

1st Wisconsin Infantry.

21st Wisconsin Infantry.

24th Illinois Infantry.

79th Pennsylvania Infantry.

*Third Brigade.***GENERAL J. H. KING commanding.**

15th U. S. Infantry, 1st Battalion.

16th " " " "

18th " " 1st and 2d Battalions.

19th " " 1st Battalion.

*Artillery.*

1st Michigan Battery.      4th Indiana Battery.

Battery "H," 5th U. S. A.

*Second Division.***MAJOR-GENERAL J. S. NEGLEY commanding.***First Brigade.***GENERAL JNO. BEATTY commanding.**

42d Indiana Infantry.

3d Ohio " "

15th Kentucky "

88th Indiana "

104th Illinois "

*Second Brigade.***COLONEL T. R. STANLEY commanding.**

18th Ohio Infantry.

69th " "

19th Illinois "

11th Michigan Infantry.

*Third Brigade.*COLONEL W. SIRWELL *commanding.*

78th Pennsylvania Infantry.

21st Ohio Infantry.

74th " "

37th Indiana "

*Artillery.*

Battery "A," 1st Ohio Art.      Battery "M," 1st Ohio Art.

Illinois Light Artillery (Bridge's Battery).

*Third Division.*BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. M. BRANNAN *commanding.**First Brigade.**Second Brigade.*COLONEL JOHN M. CONNELL.      COLONEL JOHN P. CROXTON *commanding.*

17th Ohio Infantry.

4th Kentucky Infantry.

31st " "

10th " "

38th " "

10th Indiana "

82d Indiana "

74th " "

14th Ohio "

*Third Brigade.*COLONEL F. VANDERVEER *commanding.*

9th Ohio Infantry.

35th " "

2d Minnesota Infantry.

87th Indiana "

*Artillery.*

4th Michigan Battery.      Battery "C," 1st Ohio Art.

Battery "I," 4th U. S. A.

*Fourth Division.*MAJOR-GENERAL J. J. REYNOLDS *commanding.**First Brigade.**Second Brigade.*COLONEL J. T. WILDER *commanding.*      COLONEL E. A. KING *commanding.*

17th Indiana Infantry.

68th Indiana Infantry.

72d " "

75th " "

92d Illinois "

101st " "

98th " "

80th Illinois " (Nashville).

123d " "

105th Ohio "

*Third Brigade.*GENERAL J. B. TURCHIN *commanding.*

11th Ohio Infantry.

36th " "

89th " "

92d " "

*Artillery.*

18th Indiana Battery.	19th Indiana Battery.
	21st Indiana Battery.

*Twenty-First Army Corps.*

MAJOR-GENERAL T. L. CRITTENDEN COMMANDING.

*First Division.*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL T. J. WOOD commanding.

*First Brigade.**Second Brigade.*

**COLONEL** GEO. P. BUELL commanding. **GENERAL** G. D. WAGNER commanding.

26th Ohio Infantry.	15th Indiana Infantry.
58th Indiana "	40th " "
13th Michigan Infantry.	51st " " (Nashville).
100th Illinois "	57th " "
	197th Ohio "

*Third Brigade.*

**COLONEL** C. G. HARKER commanding.

3d Kentucky Infantry.	
64th Ohio "	
65th " "	
125th " "	
73d Indiana "	(Nashville).

*Artillery.*

10th Indiana Battery.	8th Indiana Battery.
	6th Ohio Battery.

*Second Division.*

MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. PALMER commanding.

*First Brigade.**Second Brigade.*

**GEN.** CHARLES CRUFT commanding. **GEN.** W. B. HAZEN commanding.

1st Kentucky Infantry.	41st Ohio Infantry.
2d " "	124th " "
31st Indiana "	6th Kentucky Infantry.
90th Ohio "	9th Indiana "
	110th Illinois " (Battalion).

*Third Brigade.*

**COLONEL** W. GROSE commanding.

36th Indiana Infantry.	
24th Ohio "	
6th " "	
23d Kentucky "	
84th Illinois "	

*Artillery.*

Battery "B," 1st Ohio Art.	Battery "2," 1st Ohio Art.
Battery "M," 4th U. S. Art.	Battery "H," 4th U. S. Art.

*Third Division.*BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. P. VAN CLEVE *commanding.**First Brigade.*GENERAL S. BEATTY *commanding.*

9th Kentucky Infantry.	44th Indiana Infantry.
17th " "	86th " "
19th Ohio " "	13th Ohio " "
79th Indiana " "	59th " "

*Second Brigade.*COLONEL GEO. F. DICK *commanding.**Third Brigade.*COLONEL S. M. BARNES *commanding.*

51st Ohio Infantry.
99th " "
35th Indiana Infantry.
8th Kentucky " "
21st " "

*Artillery.*

26th Pennsylvania Battery.	3d Wisconsin Battery.
7th Indiana Battery.	

*Reserve Corps.*MAJOR-GENERAL G. GRANGER *COMMANDING.*

Company "F," 1st Missouri Cavalry, Escort.

*First Division.*BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAS. B. STEEDMAN *commanding.**First Brigade.**Second Brigade.*GEN. W. C. WHITTAKER *commanding.* COL. J. G. MITCHELL *commanding.*

40th Ohio Infantry.	98th Ohio Infantry.
84th Indiana "	113th " "
96th Illinois "	121st " "
115th " "	78th Illinois "

*Third Brigade.*COLONEL JNO. COBURN *commanding.*

33d Indiana Infantry.
85th " "
22d Wisconsin "
19th Michigan "

*Artillery.*

18th Ohio Battery.	Battery "M," 1st Illinois Art.
9th Ohio Battery.	

*Second Division.*BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. D. MORGAN *commanding.**First Brigade.*COLONEL R. F. SMITH *commanding.* COLONEL D. M. McCOOK *commanding.*

10th Illinois Infantry.	85th Illinois Infantry.
16th " "	86th " "
60th " "	125th " "
10th Michigan "	52d " "
14th " "	

*Third Brigade.*COLONEL C. C. DOOLITTLE *commanding.*

## 18th Michigan Infantry.

22d " "	" "
106th Ohio	"
108th "	"
10th Tennessee	" (detached).

*Artillery.*

10th Wisconsin Battery.	Battery "I," 2d Illinois Art.
	Battery "E," 1st Ohio Art.

*Third Division.*BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. S. GRANGER *commanding.**First Brigade.*COLONEL S. D. BRUCE *commanding.*

83d Illinois Infantry.	
13th Wisconsin Infantry.	
71st Ohio "	
102d "	
28th Kentucky "	

*Second Brigade.*GENERAL T. D. WARD *commanding.*

70th Indiana Infantry.	
79th Ohio "	
102d Illinois "	
105th "	
129th "	

*Third Brigade.*GENERAL J. G. SPEARS *commanding.*

3d Tennessee Infantry.	
5th " "	
6th " "	

*Artillery.*

Battery "H," 2d Illinois Art.	5th Michigan Battery.
	1st Tennessee Battery.

*Cavalry.*MAJOR-GENERAL D. S. STANLEY—*Absent.*BRIGADIER-GENERAL ROBERT B. MITCHELL *commanding.*

*First Division.*COLONEL E. M. McCook *commanding.**First Brigade.*COL. A. P. CAMPBELL *commanding.*

2d Michigan Cavalry.	2d Indiana Cavalry.
9th Pennsylvania Cavalry.	4th Indiana " "
1st Tennessee "	2d Tennessee "
	3d " "
	1st Wisconsin "

*Second Brigade.*COL. O. A. LA GRANGE *commanding.**Third Brigade.*COLONEL L. D. WATKINS *commanding.*

4th Kentucky Cavalry.
5th " "
6th " "
7th " "

Section Battery "D," 1st Ohio Art.

*Second Division.*BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE CROOK *commanding.**First Brigade.*COLONEL R. H. G. MINTY *commanding.*

7th Pennsylvania Cavalry.	1st Ohio Cavalry.
4th Michigan Cavalry.	3d " "
4th U. S. " "	4th " "
3d Indiana Cavalry (Battalion).	2d Kentucky Cavalry.

*Second Brigade.*COLONEL ELI LONG *commanding.**Third Brigade.*COLONEL W. LOWE *commanding.*

5th Iowa Cavalry.
10th Ohio "
5th Tennessee Cavalry.
Chicago "Board of Trade" Battery.

*Unassigned Troops.*

Pioneer Brigade, Brigadier-General J. St. C. Morton commanding (three battalions).

1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, Colonel W. S. Inness commanding.

2d Kentucky Battery, with Michigan Engineers and Mechanics.

1st " " "Fortress Rosecrans," Murfreesboro, Tenn.

12th Indiana Battery, Nashville, Tenn.

13th " " Gallatin, Tenn.

20th " " Nashville, "

Battery "C," 2d Illinois Artillery, "Fort Donelson," Tenn.

4th Tennessee Cavalry, Nashville, Tenn.

Battalion 8th Kentucky Cavalry, Clarksville, Tenn.

## CHAPTER XXI.

### SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA.

THE incipient fortifications left by General Bragg were speedily strengthened by General Rosecrans, as portions of a complete circumvallation. General Rosecrans, however, made no effort to hold Lookout Mountain, the railroad, or river below Chattanooga. His aim was to hold his bridges at the town, and present strong lines to the enemy. For a day or two, General Bragg threatened to attack, but soon posted his forces to besiege and starve the army which he had failed to overwhelm in battle. His lines extended from Lookout Mountain across Chattanooga valley to Missionary Ridge, and along its base and summit to the Tennessee river above the town. General Longstreet insisted upon a flank movement instead of a siege. He suggested to his chief, to cross the river above Chattanooga, and make himself so felt in the rear as to force General Rosecrans to evacuate the position and fall back to Nashville, and then, if not able to continue the northward movement from inadequate transportation, to follow the railroad to Knoxville, destroy Burnside, and from there threaten Rosecrans' communications in the rear of Nashville. General Bragg, however, did not deem this suggestion feasible. His transportation was not considered adequate, and, in his view, purely military considerations forbade the step. He thought that the interruption of Rosecrans' communications with Bridgeport, south of the river, promised better results, and he disposed his army to accomplish this object. He confided the holding of this important route to General Longstreet, and threw his cavalry across the river to operate against the transportation of supplies by

wagons over the mountains from Bridgeport. He judged wisely that his superiority in cavalry, and the length and condition of the roads, rendered wagon transportation a precarious means of supply for the army shut up in Chattanooga. His success was assured, if he could maintain his hold upon the river and the shorter roads to Bridgeport.\*

The situation of the beleaguered army was critical from the first. General Rosecrans expressed his fears to the President, the day after the battle, that he should not be able to hold Chattanooga. Two days later, however, he assured the President that his army could not be dislodged, except by very superior numbers, but requested that his communications should be covered, and that reinforcements should be sent to him. General Halleck had previously ordered General Burnside to move to his support. This had been done before it had been perceived that the enemy was concentrating forces from all quarters in Northern Georgia. The issue of the battle, and the situation at Chattanooga, induced the detachment of troops from the Army of the Potomac, and orders to Generals Hurlbut and Sherman to give assistance. But the movement of troops from points so remote gave no promise of immediate relief, and as the enemy was on the direct line of approach, their passage from Bridgeport to Chattanooga was of itself an intricate problem. It was scarcely less difficult of solution than that of supplying the army at Chattanooga, until the coming of reinforcements and the establishment of adequate means of transportation.

Having attained secure position at Chattanooga, General Rosecrans disposed his cavalry on the north bank of the Tennessee river, from Washington to Caperton's ferry, to observe the enemy and protect trains in passage from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. Crook's division kept watch for fifty miles up the river, while McCook's stood guard at the crossings above and below Bridgeport. General Crook could only watch at the main fords, while the intermediate ones were numerous. At one of the latter, on the 1st of October, Wheeler crossed

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\* These different plans are fully presented in the official reports of the two generals.

with a large force of cavalry, and moved toward the communications of the army. As soon as advised of the fact, General Rosecrans directed General Crook to collect his command and pursue, and ordered Colonel McCook to move from Bridgeport to Anderson's Cross-roads. Wheeler, however, had the start, and intercepted and nearly destroyed a large train of wagons loaded with supplies, near the place to which McCook had been ordered to move. Colonel McCook, upon the reception of the order, sent instructions to Colonel Campbell, commanding his second brigade, to join him at Jasper, and started up the valley, with the troops in hand, the First Wisconsin, and the Second and Fourth Indiana regiments, and a section of artillery. An incessant rain delayed the movement, and as McCook approached Anderson's, on the 2d, he saw the smoke of the burning wagons. He hurried forward, and encountering a portion of Wheeler's troopers, charged with the First Wisconsin and Second Indiana, and drove the force past the burning wagons upon the main body, which was one mile north of the cross-roads, in line of battle. These two regiments dislodged the enemy from several positions, and pursued for two miles, when he was found, in a strong position across a creek, behind a barricade of rails. McCook carried the position by assault, and attacking repeatedly, the enemy was driven across the Sequatchie valley. In this action the saber was freely used. The following morning the pursuit was continued to the top of mountain beyond Dunlap, where the rear-guard of the enemy was again attacked, with successful result. McCook captured, from first to last, twelve commissioned officers, including Major Green of Wheeler's staff, and ninety-three enlisted men, and killed seven officers and several enlisted men. He recaptured eight hundred mules, and saved some of the wagons. The enemy destroyed three hundred wagons and a large number of mules. The force of the enemy engaged was Martin's division, under the personal command of Wheeler. General Wheeler had previously divided his force, and sent Wharton's division to McMinnville, by a detour to the north.

In the meantime, General Crook, with Minty's and Long's brigades, and Colonel Miller's mounted infantry, lately Wilder's,

had ascended the mountain south of Smith's Cross-roads, and was in rapid pursuit toward McMinnville. He overtook Wharton's rear-guard in descending the Cumberland Mountains, on the 3d of October. Pursuing rapidly, he succeeded in surrounding a brigade, but through the coming of reinforcements and darkness, the brigade escaped. In the action, Crook lost forty-six men killed and wounded; the loss of the enemy was not ascertained. Pursuit was resumed the next morning, but Crook could not reach McMinnville in time to save its garrison and stores. The troops holding the place surrendered without offering any resistance, and when General Crook arrived, he found that a large amount of public and private property had been destroyed, and that the enemy was in rapid movement toward Murfreesboro. Pursuing without delay, he overtook Wheeler's rear-guard two miles from the town. Stubborn resistance was offered to give free motion to the main column, but a saber charge by the Second Kentucky, led by Colonel Long, dislodged the force. Pursuing rapidly, General Crook compelled Wheeler to halt and give battle. A spirited engagement ensued lasting until dark, the enemy yielding two positions and suffering loss. Wheeler then moved rapidly toward Murfreesboro to destroy the railroad at that point. He sent squads acquainted with the country, to cut the telegraph wires between Murfreesboro and Nashville, hoping to be able to follow and destroy the railroad also. For the double purpose of avoiding ambush and saving the railroad, General Crook crossed over from Readyville to the Liberty turnpike, to interpose his force north of Murfreesboro. This movement turned Wheeler toward Shelbyville, saved Murfreesboro from pillage, and the railroad at that place and northward, but did not prevent the interruption of telegraphic communications.

On the 6th, the corp-commander, General Mitchell, with McCook's division, reached Murfreesboro, and the following night the whole command bivouacked seven miles from Shelbyville. In moving forward to the town the next morning, it was ascertained that Wheeler had divided his forces into three columns, directed severally to Wartrace, Shelbyville, and Unionville. General Mitchell sent McCook with his division to Unionville, and Crook with his toward Farmington, as the

column which had sacked Shelbyville had moved upon a road leading to that place. General Crook found Davidson's division encamped on Duck river. The mounted infantry were in advance, and as the enemy seemed to be in confusion, they charged without dismounting. Having driven the foe a short distance they dismounted, and Colonel Long's brigade passed to the front. Colonel Long made a furious charge, drove the enemy thirteen miles, killing and capturing large numbers. When Davidson reached a position against which the cavalry could not operate, the infantry drove him in rout toward Farmington. Here resistance was offered, the enemy being in position in a dense cedar thicket. General Crook had with him only Long's and Miller's brigade; Minty's was unexpectedly in the rear. The enemy was greatly superior, and was in a position which could not be attacked by cavalry. Opening with artillery, he attacked the mounted infantry, in effort to turn both flanks. Captain Stokes could find position for only one of his guns, but this he used so effectively that he threw the enemy's artillery into confusion. At this juncture Colonel Miller charged, broke through the enemy's line, and captured four pieces of artillery, but General Crook's force was too small to take advantage of this success, as Wheeler had united his command against him.

On the morning of the 8th, General Crook moved toward Pulaski, having learned from scouts that Wheeler had retreated in that direction. The other division, General Mitchell accompanying, moved on roads to the right. Wheeler's command was at this time greatly disorganized; many of his troops had deserted, others were roaming over the country, and those under their colors were scattered on the lines of retreat. He, however, moved with great speed toward the Tennessee river, and succeeded in crossing not far from Rodgersville. He left two regiments at Sugar creek to cover his retreat. These, Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick, of the Fifth Iowa, charged with the sabre, killed ten, wounded nine, captured seventy, and scattered the remainder in the mountains.

The cavalry divisions were united at Rodgersville, October 9th, where fifty-two thousand dollars' worth of cotton belonging to the Confederate government was destroyed. On the

11th, the command was put in motion toward Stevenson, Alabama. At Huntsville, in the evening, it was ascertained that the rebel general, Roddy, had crossed the river and was moving toward Winchester and Decherd. Pursuit was commenced at daylight on the 12th, via New Market, and late at night the enemy was encountered, but the darkness was too dense for opportunity to press him beyond a skirmish. The next morning the fact was revealed that Roddy had counter-marched, and was hastening to recross the river. He was pursued for a day, but the impossibility of overtaking him being evident, the command was again turned eastward. Roddy's movement was doubtless intended to be co-operative with Wheeler's, and the direction of his march indicated that the quick disposition which had been made of the main column was entirely unexpected. General Bragg had placed his hope of forcing General Rosecrans from Chattanooga upon the possibility of so deranging his communications that his army could not be supplied so far from his base. His plan contemplated the movement of three columns of cavalry upon the long line of railroad, whose maintenance intact was the ruling condition of the continued occupancy of Chattanooga by the national army. Wheeler's defeats, and his hurried re-crossing of the Tennessee river so far to the west, admonished the leaders of the other columns that their co-operation was impracticable. Hence, Roddy sought safety on the southern bank of the river. And General Lee, who, with a large force of cavalry, reached Courtland, Alabama, the day that Wheeler recrossed, learned that his own advance would not be permitted. That Wheeler's raid was disastrous, his own report, which does not compass all the truth, plainly reveals. He put his losses far below the computation made by the general officers who followed him through Tennessee, but spoke in severe terms of the incapacity of many of his officers, and the shameful conduct of a portion of his men. General Crook estimated his losses at two thousand men and six pieces of artillery. He left on the field at Farmington eighty-six dead and one hundred and thirty-seven wounded. One entire regiment deserted, and scattered through the mountains.

General Crook lost fourteen killed and ninety-seven

wounded. Among the slain was the gallant Colonel Monroe, of the One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois, who fell in leading his regiment at Farmington.

In this campaign, marches were made on several days, ranging from forty to fifty-seven miles, the saber was justified as the weapon for cavalry, and a remarkable revelation of endurance was made. Many of the men were in need of clothing, and they had but three days' rations in twenty of almost incessant rain, hard marching, and frequent fighting.

Meanwhile, the situation of the army at Chattanooga became exceedingly critical. At the commencement of the occupation, there were large trains in good condition, and the prospect of transporting supplies was somewhat promising. But early in October the rain began to fall. With its continuance, the roads became almost impassable. The destruction of hundreds of wagons and animals by Wheeler was nearly fatal to the army. The remaining animals, from necessity, were pressed beyond endurance. The roads rapidly grew worse; the mules became exhausted by constant motion and lack of forage; each successive trip to Bridgeport compassed a longer period of time, and each trip reduced the number of wagons and the weight of their contents; at each succeeding issue the ration was diminished; the artillery horses, being least useful in the emergency, were deprived of forage and fell dead in great numbers day by day; and the alternative of surrender, or retreat with great peril and certain loss of all material, seemed only delaying its demand for the desperate election of the army. The thought of surrender could not be entertained, as no large army had yet lowered its colors at the demand of the foe, and the Army of the Cumberland could not be the first to experience this humiliation; and the shortest rations, as long as actual starvation could be averted, could not force that army to turn its back to the enemy. So, with full appreciation of the situation, it bravely awaited the issue.

Early in October, General Hooker, with the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, took position on the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad. His troops, disposed from Nashville to Bridgeport, gave security to the communications between

those points. But this did not give immediate relief to the army at Chattanooga. The Eastern troops had moved by railroad, and were without transportation. They were not needed at Chattanooga, as beyond an imposing but harmless cannonading from the crest of Lookout Mountain, the enemy was not demonstrative. But if they had been essential to the defense of the place, their going was impracticable; and if their advance had not been barred, their presence would have been the harbinger of starvation. It was some relief to the national army to know that reinforcements were so near; and this fact, coupled with the imminence of starvation, was a spur to the origination of a method to open the river and utilize it as a channel of supply. The enemy had firm hold of Lookout Mountain, and his batteries and sharpshooters commanded the river, the roads on the south bank, including the railroad, and the shortest road north of the river. This mastery of the shortest communications forced the supply trains to move from Bridgeport, up the Sequatchie valley, and over the mountains, to Chattanooga, a distance of sixty miles, and at the same time gave Bragg the power to interpose such forces as would overwhelm Hooker should he attempt to approach Chattanooga on the south of the river. In anticipation of an open river, steamboat-building had been commenced long before, at Bridgeport, and a steamboat captured at Chattanooga had been repaired. General Rosecrans had in view the opening of the river, and the erection of store-houses on Williams' Island, situated opposite the termination of Lookout valley, and gave orders to General Hooker to concentrate such portions of his command at Bridgeport as the safety of the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad would permit, and hold himself in readiness to move toward Chattanooga. He also gave orders for the construction of pontoons for a bridge down the river. On the 19th, he directed Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, his chief engineer, to reconnoiter the river in the vicinity of Williams' Island, with a view to making the island a cover for a steamboat landing and store-houses. That day he was relieved as commander of the Army of the Cumberland.

This change was the offshoot of another of broader com-

pass. All through the summer there had been an evident lack of co-operation in the movements of the three armies, whose fields of operation were penetrated by the Tennessee river. Orders from Washington had, to some extent, required indirect or remote co-operation. But the Armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Ohio, being not only organically distinct, but without defined relations, their operations had been directed to widely separated objectives, under circumstances which were adapted to defeat even indirect co-operation.

To secure the future intimate co-operation of these three armies, which in consequence of the issues of their recent campaigns was especially imperative, the Military Division of the Mississippi was created by the President, and General Grant assigned to its command. The posture of affairs at Chattanooga doubtless precipitated this measure as the expression of a radical change of policy in the central theater of war. The President and his counselors feared that General Rosecrans could not extricate himself from the embarrassments which environed him, and that he would abandon his position before reinforcements could reach him. The general's dispatches did manifest that he was not sanguine that he could hold Chattanooga, unless the assistance which he suggested could be afforded; but in no way did he indicate that he thought of withdrawing, except as an absolute necessity, and on the last day of his command of the army, was intent upon maturing the scheme which subsequently was the means of opening the river and the roads on the south bank.

The President's order of October 18th, which created the Military Division of the Mississippi with General Grant in command, placed General Thomas at the head of the Army of the Cumberland. He assumed command formally on the 19th, and General Rosecrans having dictated a farewell to his army, left for Cincinnati before it was generally known that he had been relieved.

At the time of this change of commanders, the Army of the Cumberland comprised the Fourth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Fourteenth Corps and three divisions of cavalry. In compliance with the President's order of September 28th, the Fourth

was formed on the 9th of October, by the consolidation of the Twentieth and Twenty-first, and at the same time the Reserve Corps was attached to the Fourteenth. The compression of four corps into two necessitated a corresponding reduction in the number of brigades and divisions. Under the new organization, there were three brigades in each division, designated as the First, Second, and Third, and three divisions in each corps, similarly distinguished. Major-General Gordon Granger was assigned to the command of the Fourth Corps, and his division commanders in the numerical order of divisions were Major-Generals J. M. Palmer and P. H. Sheridan and Brigadier-General T. J. Wood. The commanders of the First, Second, and Third divisions of the Fourteenth Corps were respectively Major-General L. H. Rousseau and Brigadier-Generals J. C. Davis and A. Baird.

The dominant problem was that of supplies. Upon its solution rested the fate of the army. To this General Grant's first order and General Thomas' first act as army commander pertained. General Grant telegraphed to General Thomas: "Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be there as soon as possible. Please inform me how long your present supplies will last and the prospect for keeping them up." The response was: "Two hundred and four thousand and sixty-two rations in storehouse. Ninety-six thousand to arrive to-morrow, and all trains were loaded which had arrived at Bridgeport up to the 16th; probably three hundred wagons. We will hold the town till we starve. The same day, October 19th, the day the command of the army was formally relinquished by General Rosecrans, General Thomas directed General Hooker to hasten the concentration of his command and his preparations to move, in accordance with the previous instructions of General Rosecrans.

General Grant reached Chattanooga on the 23d in the evening, and the projected plan for securing a lodgment of troops on the left bank of the river, at Brown's ferry, as the initial step in opening the river and shorter roads to Bridgeport, was at once submitted to him. The day following, in company with Generals Thomas and Smith, he made a thorough reconnaissance north of the river, with reference to the feasibility

of the plan proposed. Agreeing with those who had matured the scheme, he authorized its execution. Fortunately, the preparations were far advanced and their completion required little time. General Smith was charged with the enterprise and directed to perfect the necessary arrangements.

General Thomas at once gave specific instructions to General Hooker with regard to the advance of his troops in co-operation with the movement from Chattanooga. He was directed to leave General Slocum, the commander of the Twelfth Corps, with one division, to guard the railroad from Murfreesboro to Bridgeport, and to concentrate the Eleventh Corps and one division of the Twelfth at Bridgeport, in readiness to cross the Tennessee river; move first to Rankin's ferry and afterward to Brown's ferry. He was advised that two brigades of Palmer's division of the Fourth Corps would move on the north side of the river to Rankin's ferry, and that there would be co-operation at Brown's ferry also. These instructions were given at 2.30 p. m. on the 24th, and General Hooker replied promptly that he would move by daylight on the 27th.

The night of the 26th was fixed for the expedition from Chattanooga. The plan of operations was elaborated with great care, and involved the nicest adjustment of co-operative movements as a condition of success. By the river, the distance from Chattanooga to Brown's ferry is nine miles; but across the peninsula, less than half as far. The direction of the river, after curving round a high hill directly west of the town, is to the southwest until it touches the base of Lookout. From that point it trends northwest to Williams' Island. The course of the river defines to the view, from the top of Lookout Mountain, a peninsular hill of singular shape, not unlike the moccasined foot of an Indian, which, in harmony with the conceit, bears the name of Moccasin Point. Brown's ferry is opposite the narrowest part of this hill, south of west from Chattanooga. As a pontoon bridge was to be thrown at this point, General Smith concluded that it would involve less risk of failure to float his boats and a portion of his troops, and land them on the left bank of the river, than to transport them across the peninsula, and operate from the right bank in laying the bridge. Each course suggested disastrous probabili-

ties. In pursuing the former, his boats must pass the enemy's pickets, stationed for seven miles along the left bank of the river, and land under their fire; and in attempting the latter, the enemy might be able to concentrate a sufficient force to prevent the laying of the bridge. His decision to float the boats was made in view of two probabilities—one, that his movement could be made so quietly as not to be perceived by the pickets; and the other, that should the enemy's camp be alarmed, a concentration of troops would not be made at his place of landing. Accordingly, he divided his forces, embarking fifteen hundred picked men under General Hazen, and sending General Turchin with his own brigade, the remainder of Hazen's, and three batteries of artillery under Major Mendenhall, to take position in the woods above the ferry, in readiness to move down to cover the landing on the opposite bank, and cross in support as quickly as practicable, or cover the other troops, in the event of disaster.

The boats moved from Chattanooga at 3 A. M. on the 27th. A slight fog veiled the moon, and the boats, directed by Colonel T. R. Stanley, glided noiselessly with the current. Hugging closely the right bank, they rounded Moccasin Point and moved unperceived to the place of landing. The boats had been called off into sections before starting, and each section was placed under an officer, who knew beforehand his exact place of landing. As the foremost section neared the shore at its appointed place at early dawn, the surprised pickets fired a harmless volley and fled. In quick succession the several sections landed, and the men leaped upon the bank and ascended the adjacent hill to meet and drive back a small force that had hurried forward in response to the warning volley. There was a sharp engagement for a moment, and then all was quiet. The boats first brought over the remainder of Hazen's troops, and soon after Turchin's brigade. Hazen took firm hold of the hill above the gorge through which the Bridgeport road passes to the ferry, and Turchin the one below it. As soon as skirmishers could be thrown sufficiently forward to prevent a surprise, detachments with axes went vigorously to work felling trees and constructing barricades and abatis. In two hours the defenses were such as to bid de-

fiance to the enemy. This accomplished, the pontoon bridge was speedily thrown under the skillful supervision of Captain P. V. Fox, First Michigan Engineers. Although the force engaged was exposed to a vigorous cannonading by the enemy's batteries on the front of Lookout Mountain, General Smith's loss was six killed, twenty-three wounded, and nine missing. The loss of the enemy was probably not less, as six of his dead were left on the field, and six prisoners were captured. Twenty beeves and two thousand bushels of corn were added to the slender rations of the troops. These supplies of hardly appreciable value to a large army under ordinary circumstances, were of very considerable moment at a time when soldiers gladly gathered the fragments of crackers and grains of corn which fell to the ground in transfer.

The conditions of success in the expedition were numerous and intricate. Had any one of the responsible officers failed in his special duty, the movement might have miscarried, but there was no serious default. There was such brilliancy of plan and execution as to call forth the following notice from General Thomas: "To Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, chief engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived, and the ability which executed the movement at Brown's ferry. The preparations were all made in secrecy, as was also the boat expedition, which passed under the overhanging cliffs of Lookout, so much so, that when the bridge was thrown at Brown's ferry on the morning of the 27th, the surprise was as great to the army within Chattanooga, as it was to the army besieging it from without."

Though this success was a source of great mortification to General Bragg, he did not at first discern its full significance. And while he was wasting powder and shells in bombarding the floating bridge, Hooker was moving eastward to give the full revelation of what the lodgment at Brown's ferry was the prophecy—an open river and short lines of supply.

Pursuant to orders, General Hooker put his command in motion toward Chattanooga early on the 27th, crossing on a pontoon bridge which had been thrown the day previous. He advanced to Whitesides, and thence deflected into Lookout valley. At 3 p. m. his head of column was at Wauhatchie,

and as he knew that Longstreet could strike him at pleasure, farther advance was made with caution. Many circumstances favored Longstreet. His points of observation were so numerous and elevated that he could discern all the movements of Hooker's troops, while such was the topography of the valley that he could conceal his own. Between Lookout and Raccoon Mountains there were several sharply defined hills, separated by deep depressions. Through the upper depression the railroad passes to the base of Lookout, where it touches the river, and farther down, the wagon road to Chattanooga deflected to the right through another, while the road to Brown's ferry courses along the western base of these hills.

The road to Kelley's ferry, a few miles farther down the river, turns to the left, where the Chattanooga road turns to the right. The enemy held the hills commanding these roads, and it was anticipated that he would dispute their possession.

The approach of a large force from Bridgeport in a few hours after the lodgment of the national troops at Brown's ferry, must have revealed to General Bragg that the co-operative movements were designed to raise the siege of Chattanooga. It must have been apparent, also, that to prevent such a result, he must either crush Hooker or interpose a very heavy column between him and Brown's ferry. Why this was not done is as inexplicable as the loss of his advantages before the battle of Chickamanga. He did indeed offer resistance to Hooker's advance beyond Wauhatchie, but it was too feeble to prevent it, and another failure was added to the numerous preceding ones.

The head of column of the Eleventh Corps, when a short distance north of the railroad, received a volley of musketry from the adjacent hills. As the exact nature of the attack was concealed by the dense woods, General Howard, by direction of General Hooker, threw a brigade on the right and another on the left. The enemy then fled, and burnt the railroad bridge over Lookout creek in his flight. A few of Howard's men fell at this point, and others were killed as from time to time the column was exposed to the batteries on Lookout Mountain. At 5 p. m. the troops halted for the night, and went into camp about one mile from Brown's ferry.

General Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps remained at Wauhatchie, three miles distant, so as to hold the road leading to Kelley's ferry. Pickets were thrown out from each camp; but no effort was made to maintain continuity of line, the force being too small to afford substantial communications for such a distance, and the troops were divided, as it was deemed important to retain positions which commanded the two roads.

During the first watches there was no alarm; but about midnight, a regiment that had advanced toward Lookout was involved in a skirmish, and an hour later the roar of musketry from Geary's position announced an assault, but not a surprise, as the isolated division was in line of battle before the enemy approached. Fearing that Geary might be overpowered, General Hooker directed General Howard to double-quick Schurz's division to his support. When this division had proceeded a short distance, it received the fire of the enemy from the central hills, which was the first intimation of his presence in such close proximity. In the emergency, Tyndale's brigade was ordered to charge, and the other brigade to hasten forward.

Soon, Steinwehr's division came up to Tyndale's position, when it was discovered that the enemy was occupying another hill in the rear of the one held by the troops which had fired upon Schurz. Smith's brigade of Steinwehr's division was at once ordered to carry the hill with the bayonet. This small brigade marched up the steep acclivity, receiving, but not returning the fire of the enemy; drove a greatly superior force from the intrenchments on the summit, captured prisoners, and scattered the rebels in all directions. Tyndale encountered less resistance, and soon pressed the enemy from his front.

In the meantime, the noise of battle from musketry firing, and occasional discharges of artillery, was of such character as to indicate the progress of a fierce struggle at Wauhatchie. The reinforcements failed to reach Geary, and for nearly three hours he resisted the furious assaults of superior numbers. At last he assumed the offensive, and breaking Longstreet's line, drove his troops from the field.

The enemy had doubtless observed the distance between Howard and Geary, and had interposed his troops in the hope, no doubt, of crushing them in turn. The night attack expressed the enemy's consciousness of the emergency, and his plan to meet it was well devised, but his columns had too little weight to assure success.

General Hooker's loss in killed and wounded was four hundred and sixteen. Among the severely wounded were General Green, and Colonel Underwood, of the Thirty-third Massachusetts. The estimated loss of the enemy was much greater, as one hundred and fifty of his dead were buried in Geary's front, and more than one hundred were captured.

To strengthen Hooker's grasp of the valley, Whittaker's and Mitchell's brigades of Davis' division were moved over the river. The problem of supplies was soon solved. The steamboat which had been repaired at Chattanooga passed the enemy's batteries on Lookout the night of the 28th, and the one at Bridgeport was soon in motion up the river loaded with rations for the army. A good road was soon made from Chattanooga to Brown's ferry, and thence to Kelley's, and work was commenced on the railroad from Bridgeport east. The question now was not how long should the Army of the Cumberland hold Chattanooga, but how long should the rebel banners be permitted to wave on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. This change of problems had been produced by measures commenced by General Rosecrans, continued under General Thomas, elaborated by General Smith, and which, having been approved by General Grant, were executed by his authority.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
CHATTANOOGA, September 23, 1863.

*A. Lincoln, President:*

We hold this point, and can not be dislodged except by very superior numbers, and after a great battle. Immediate disposition should be made for covering our communications, by ordering down every available man from Kentucky to Bridgeport and Stevenson, and having all reinforcements you can send hurried up.

Official:

W. S. ROSECRANS,  
*Major-General*

WASHINGTON D. C., September 24, 1863—3 A. M.

*Major-General Rosecrans, Commanding Department of Cumberland:*

In addition to the expected assistance to you from Burnside, Hurlburt and Sherman, fourteen or fifteen thousand men from here, will be in Nashville, in about seven days. The government deems it very important that Chattanooga be held till reinforcements arrive.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Commander-in-Chief.*

CHATTANOOGA, September 29, 1863.

*Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C.:*

I would not advise the withdrawal of our forces from East Tennessee. Kingston should be strongly garrisoned, the bulk of the troops concentrated for movement in any direction, the cavalry thrown this way to co-operate with us. If forces from Mississippi and Potomac reach us soon, and with the expected strength, it will be sufficient for our success. It is now too late for Burnside to do more than protect our flank, but his forces should be held in readiness to help us in case of emergency. Do not hear from Grant's troops.

W. S. ROSECRANS,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
CHATTANOOGA, October 15, 1863—1 P. M.

*Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C.:*

It is of prime necessity that we should have an efficient and able chief of cavalry, and that every possible exertion should be made to swell our mounted force. I fear that the rebel cavalry force has crossed the river west of us, but without serious damage. We must have mounted force to keep it in check, or it will paralyze this army and compel it to retire from its position.

W. S. ROSECRANS.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
CHATTANOOGA, October 16, 1863—5.30 P. M.

*Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C.:*

Evidence increases that the enemy intend a desperate effort to destroy this army. They are bringing up troops to our front. They have prepared pontoons, and will probably operate on our left flank, either to cross the river and force us to quit this place and fight them, or lose our communications. They will thus separate us from Burnside. We can not feed Hooker's troops on our left, nor can we spare them from our right depots and communications, nor has he transportation. The rains have raised the river and interrupted our pontoon bridge; the roads are very heavy. Our future is not bright. Had we the railroad from here to Bridgeport, the whole of Sherman's and Hooker's troops brought

up, we should not probably outnumber the enemy. This army, with its back to barren mountains, roads narrow and difficult, while the enemy has the railroad and the corn in the rear, is at much disadvantage. To secure this position, at least McMinnville should be made a strong fortified depot, Kingston the same; and for ulterior operations, twenty or thirty thousand more troops put into Tennessee, at easy points to cover the railroad, and subsist until called to the front for advance on the enemy. Additional cavalry force is indispensable to a good future for this army. Burnside must be within supporting distance of us, if we lose this point, his hold on East Tennessee is gone; if we hold it, the rebels can not make much use of the country above, and we shall dispossess them.

W. S. ROSECRANS,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., October 19, 1863.

The general commanding announces to the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland, that he leaves them, under orders from the President.

Major-General George H. Thomas, in compliance with orders, will assume the command of this army and department. The chiefs of all the staff departments will report to him.

In taking leave of you, his brothers in arms—officers and soldiers—he congratulates you that your new commander comes not to you as he did, a stranger. General Thomas has been identified with this army from its first organization. He has led you often in battle. To his known prudence, dauntless courage, and true patriotism, you may look with confidence, that, under God, he will lead you to victory.

The general commanding doubts not you will be as true to yourselves and your country in the future as you have been in the past.

To the division and brigade commanders, he tenders his cordial thanks for their valuable and hearty co-operation in all that he has undertaken. To the chiefs of the staff departments, and their subordinates, whom he leaves behind, he owes a debt of gratitude for their fidelity and untiring devotion to duty.

Companions in arms—officers and soldiers—farewell; and may God bless you!

W. S. ROSECRANS,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
October 19, 1863—11 P. M.

*Major-General Hooker, Stevenson:*

Major-General G. H. Thomas directs me to state that in obedience to the orders of the President of the United States, he has assumed command of the Department of the Cumberland. He desires that you will

use all possible dispatch in concentrating your command and preparing to move, in accordance with the instructions of General Rosecrans, leaving proper railroad guards.

J. J. REYNOLDS,  
*Major-General and Chief of Staff.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., October 20, 1863.

In obedience to the orders of the President of the United States, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the Department and Army of the Cumberland.

In assuming the control of this army, so long and ably commanded by Major-General Rosecrans, the undersigned confidently relies upon the hearty co-operation of every officer and soldier of the Army of the Cumberland to enable him to perform the arduous duties devolved upon him.

The officers on duty at the various departments of the staff at these headquarters will continue in their respective places.

All orders heretofore published for the government of this army will remain in force until further orders.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Major General U. S. Vols.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
CHATTANOOGA, October 24, 1863.—2.30 P. M.

*Major-General Hooker, Stevenson:*

You will leave General Slocum, with one division of the Twelfth Corps, to guard the railroad from Murfreesboro to Bridgeport. The Eleventh Corps and one division of the Twelfth will be concentrated at or in the vicinity of Bridgeport, preparatory to crossing the Tennessee river and moving up the south side to take possession of Rankin's ferry, between Shellmound and Running Water Creek. Look well to your right flank, which may be approached via Island Creek, the Moore road, McDaniel's Gap road, and the Nickajack road.

Two brigades, under General Palmer, leave here this p. m. for Rankin's ferry, which point they will probably reach on Monday evening. It is reported that the steamboat at Bridgeport will be completed by Monday evening. The railroad may also be available. If you can do so, it is better not to move wagons to the south side of the river at present. You will, however, exercise your judgment on this point. Report by telegraph when you are ready. We will co-operate at Brown's ferry, as well as Rankin's ferry. Inform yourself with regard to the roads from Rankin's ferry, via Whiteside's, to Brown's ferry. The object of the movement is to hold the road and gain possession of the river as far as Brown's ferry.

By command of Major-General Thomas.

J. J. REYNOLDS,  
*Major-General and Chief of Staff.*

## CHAPTER XXII.

### BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

THE Confederate leaders and the army commander were sanguine of the success of the siege of Chattanooga up to the very moment of its failure. General Bragg had, for a time, just ground for sanguine expectations, as the elements were his allies. At the time of greatest promise, the oracular Confederate President appeared on Lookout Mountain, and from "Pulpit Rock," as he looked down exultingly upon the beleaguered army, predicted its total ruin. But the loss of Lookout valley, the river, and the direct roads to Bridgeport virtually threw Bragg upon the defensive. It is true that he maintained his lines on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and through the intervening valley, in semblance of besieging effort, until the army with which he had so often battled, leaped from its intrenchments and hurled him and his oft-defeated army from their lofty battlements. But he made no movement of actual offense against Chattanooga during the time the Army of the Cumberland was preparing to assume the boldest aggression.

For four weeks Chattanooga was the scene of the most comprehensive activities. In the rebound from the constraint of investing lines, the menace of starvation, and the foreshadows of direct disaster, the Army of the Cumberland displayed new vigor and spirit, while the resources of the military division were made tributary to the concentration of forces to operate offensively. All the troops of the Army of the Cumberland that could be spared from the rear, especially cavalry and artillery, were ordered forward, and General Sherman, long before ordered to Chattanooga, but delayed hitherto by repairing

roads, was directed to move the Fifteenth Corps as rapidly as possible, paying no further attention to the roads than the swift movement of his troops required. General W. F. Smith, chief engineer, and General J. M. Brannan, chief of artillery, of the Army of the Cumberland, were charged with preparing the fortifications for heavier guns than those with the army, and the latter was empowered to send for as many guns of heavy caliber and such ammunition as should be needed. To facilitate the movements of troops, General Smith was directed to construct pontoons for two additional bridges. The coming of troops, supplies, and munitions, and the din of preparation for a battle, known to be imminent, would have made Chattanooga historic, without the clash of arms which soon electrified the continent, or the previous battle involved in gaining possession.

Battle-fields become a part of history equally with the story of the conflicts enacted upon them. They are mapped on stone and steel, and delineated in pen pictures, appear in historic narration in intimate association with the deeds of heroes. Not alone do the topographical features which suggest plans of battle and dominate tactical combinations become historic, but those also of mere grandeur and beauty, whenever the hosts of war commingle in deadly strife, where nature has been lavish of her gifts. Even the name of him who may perchance offer his humble cot for the fire of war to burn, or its enginery to level, has association on the historic page with him who commands an army. And in all that is grandly concomitant with grandest battle, Chattanooga is pre-eminent.

The town is surrounded with almost all the types of the grand and beautiful in nature. Mountains far and near, rising from water and plain, sharply defined by low valleys and the river curving at their feet; subordinate hills with rounded summits and undulating slopes, and broad plains delicately pencilled here and there by winding creeks and rivulets, are the prominent features of nature's amphitheater, in the center of which is Chattanooga.

Looking to the southwest, Lookout Mountain,\* with bold

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\* This mountain rises two thousand eight hundred feet above the ocean, and one thousand four hundred and sixty-four above the Tennessee river.

front and craggy crest, is seen rising abruptly from the river and the valleys on either side; to the west Raccoon Mountain appears, trending from its river front far to the southwest, parallel with Lookout; to the north, Waldron's Ridge forms the sky line far to right and left; to the east, Missionary Ridge, with indented summit, more humbly takes position, hiding the lofty ranges far beyond; to the south, the east, and to the northeast, stretches the plain where the armies were marshaled for the assault of Bragg's army on Missionary Ridge; and to the southwest, twice across the river, lies the valley from which Hooker crept slyly up the mountain steeps, covered with trees and shrubs, standing and fallen, and with huge fragments of stone, which during the ages have dropped from the ledges overhanging the crest, to give battle on a field suited to the stealthy belligerence of the Indian, but adverse in every phase to the repetition of all the precedents of modern warfare. But this battle-field defies description, and he who would fully appreciate either battle or field, must read the story of the one as he looks down from Lookout Mountain upon the magnificence of the other.\*

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\*Historians have made effort to transmit to the future the significance of the names which distinguish the natural features around Chattanooga. It is no pleasant task to leave groundless the many pretty conceits which have so long passed for facts; but he who would write the truth, must not hesitate to dissipate a myth or disclose a false hypothesis. With only occasional allusion to the various interpretations of Cherokee names, which have so long been accepted as true, their actual meaning, as derived from John Ross, the celebrated Cherokee chief, and from Lewis Ross, his brother, are here given.

“Chattanooga,” originally was the name of a small Indian hamlet, situated near the base of Lookout Mountain, on the bank of Chattanooga creek. It means, in the Cherokee language, “to draw fish out of water,” and hence was applied to the collection of huts, which were occupied by Indian fishermen. The humble hamlet disappeared, and its name, at first suggestive and appropriate, was inherited by the town of the white man, with meaningless application. A somewhat similar name was applied by the Cherokees to the cliffs, rising boldly from the river above the town, which was derived from “Clanoowah,” the name of a warlike but diminutive hawk, which was supposed to embody the spirit of the tribe. These cliffs were the favorite nesting-place of the bird, and hence a name was given which expressed this fact, and which, perhaps, has suggested the myth, that “Chattanooga” means “eagle's nest.”

By a strange misapprehension of the situation, after the coming of Hooker, and the establishment of reliable and adequate lines of supply, General Bragg detached Longstreet's corps, and sent it to East Tennessee to overwhelm Burnside, and regain what had there been lost, with the ulterior object of returning to strike a heavy blow upon Grant's left flank. It is believed that this movement originated with the Confederate President, during his visit of exultation and prophecy. But by whomever suggested or ordered, it was a palpable blunder. If made upon the supposition that Bragg would yet be strong enough to maintain the siege of Chattanooga, it rested upon a conjecture, without warrant from any approximately just apprehension of the posture of affairs at Chattanooga; if upon the supposition that his investing lines would not soon be changed to defensive use, the reason for the movement was equally remote from the truth. The Confederate commander could not have been ignorant of the fact that Longstreet fought a reinforcing column in Lookout valley, and he ought to have known, that as he had drawn

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The Cherokee name for Lookout Mountain did not mean an outlook, but "to look at," and embodied some Indian's fancy, that this mountain was looking at Raccoon Mountain, across the intervening valley. Its present name, however, is infinitely more appropriate; for as an outlook, it is unrivaled, seven states being in view.

Missionary Ridge was called by the Indians, Missionaries' Ridge, from the fact that the missionaries, in passing from their station, at the present site of the "Mission Mills," to Chattanooga, the landing-place for their supplies, crossed it. It was theirs, because they used it.

Taylor's Ridge, near Ringgold, Georgia, made classic for another mountain fight of Hooker's, was so named because Richard Taylor, the second chief of the tribe, during the latter portion of his life, used this ridge in the same way. By a modification of this conception of the relation of persons to places, the Cherokees gave a name to one of their missionaries, who, on preaching tours, frequently crossed the mountains, a name which signified "the one who crosses the mountains."

Will's Valley was named for William Webber, who lived in it, and whose common name was "Will." Webber's Falls, in the Arkansas river, above Fort Smith, derived its name from this man, who, after the removal of the Cherokees to the West, settled at the falls.

Brown's ferry bears the English name of a prominent Cherokee.

The meaning of "Chickamauga" was not known to the Cherokees, and was supposed by them to be a word from the Chickasaw language.

troops from Mississippi to fight the battle of Chickamanga, the victorious army at Vicksburg could be easily transferred to Chattanooga. And yet, in the face of possibilities and probabilities that would have deterred a prudent commander from the first diminution of his strength, other portions of his army were subsequently started to Longstreet's support.

As soon as it had been ascertained with certainty that Longstreet's corps had been detached, General Grant became eager to attack the enemy on Missionary Ridge, to compel him to retain his remaining forces, and recall those that he had detached, as he feared for Burnside, and could help him only indirectly, if at all. Accordingly, on the 7th of November, he instructed General Thomas to attack and carry the north end of Missionary Ridge on the following morning. And having carried this point, to threaten and attack, if possible, the enemy's communications between Cleveland and Dalton. To render the movement possible, he ordered that mules should be detached from the wagons, the horses from the ambulances, and private horses of officers should be taken, if necessary, to move the artillery.

General Thomas and General Smith agreed in the opinion, that the army was not in condition for battle, unless in defense. And after a thorough reconnoissance of the ground, and a full consideration of the condition and paucity of the animals, and the inadequacy of his forces, General Grant decided that the movement was "utterly impracticable until Sherman could get up."\* But the considerations which induced the general commanding to order it, in the first place, found expression through the activity of the army in preparation for the operations which were to drive Bragg from his position before Chattanooga, and open the way for support to Burnside.

Having revoked his order for an immediate movement against the enemy, General Grant busied himself with the formation of a plan of operations for his combined armies, and urged General Burnside to maintain his position at Knoxville, until a battle could be fought and a column moved to

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\* Statement in his report.

his assistance. His plan proposed primary movements by Hooker and Sherman—the former against Bragg's left, on Lookout Mountain, and the latter against his right on the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge.

General Sherman reached Bridgeport with his leading divisions on the 15th, and hastened to Chattanooga to confer with General Grant. After his arrival, Generals Grant, Thomas, Sherman, and Smith made a thorough reconnoissance of the region north of the river, which disclosed the fact that there were good roads from Brown's ferry to the mouth of the North Chickamauga, north of the first range of hills, which Sherman could use, with good prospect of concealing his movement to the place designated for his crossing, to reach the right flank of the enemy. His troops would be in plain view of the enemy at the ferry, but their subsequent concealment by the hills, would leave him in doubt as to their destination, whether to Knoxville, or to some point on the north side of the river, to participate in operations at Chattanooga. It was observed, also, that the north end of Missionary Ridge was imperfectly guarded, and that the bank of the river, from the mouth of the North Chickamauga to his main line, was watched only by a small picket of cavalry. These facts determined General Grant's plan of operations, the first object of which "was to mass all the forces possible at one given point, namely, Missionary Ridge, converging toward the north end of it." This ruling object induced a change of the first plan, so far as it contemplated Hooker's attack upon Lookout Mountain, that Howard's corps might give weight to the proposed assault upon the northern extremity of the ridge. This reconnaissance, made upon the north bank of the river, and conducted in such way "as not to excite suspicions on the part of the enemy," did not develop the fact that Bragg's right flank, at least the extremity of his main line, did not rest upon the summit farthest to the north, but was to rest in battle upon the third one to the south, which was a much stronger position, sepa-

rated from the second by a deep depression—a circumstance which greatly modified the conduct of the battle.

Having formed his plan, General Grant announced it to his army commanders on the 18th, and mentioned the 21st as the time for its execution. It required that Sherman, with his own troops, and one division of the Army of the Cumberland, should effect a crossing of the Tennessee river, just below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, on Saturday, November 21st, at daylight, his crossing to be protected by artillery on the heights to the north, and after crossing the river, to carry Missionary Ridge from its northern extremity to the railroad tunnel. It contemplated that Thomas was to co-operate by concentrating his troops on his left flank in the valley, leaving only the necessary force to hold the fortifications on the right and center, and one division as a movable column, and after Sherman had carried the ridge to the tunnel, and the conjunction of their forces had been effected, by advancing as nearly simultaneously with him as possible, to sweep the enemy from position. It proposed that Lookout valley should be held by Hooker, with Geary's division and the brigades which had been detached from the Fourth Corps to co-operate with him in his advance from Bridgeport, and that Howard's corps was to be held in readiness to act with either Thomas or Sherman.

Upon its announcement, the army commanders and their respective subordinates addressed themselves to the preliminary movements. General Thomas at once directed General Howard to take position between Brown's ferry and Chattanooga, and the two brigades of the Fourth Corps, Whittaker's and Grose's, recalled from position down the river to fill the place of Howard's corps in the valley. He also designated General Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps, Major-General J. M. Palmer commanding, as the support to General Sherman, and ordered Colonel Long, with his brigade of cavalry, to first move on Sherman's left, and when no longer needed, to cross Chickamauga Creek and make a raid upon the enemy's communications. These movements were all made before the 21st.

A heavy rain-storm, which commenced on the 20th and

continued through the 21st, delayed General Sherman, and necessitated the postponement of the battle till the 22d. On the 22d, General Grant proposed further delay, as two of Sherman's divisions had failed to cross the river at Brown's ferry in consequence of the parting of the bridge. At this juncture, General Thomas suggested that Howard's corps should be sent, if needed, to take the place of the divisions that were behind, and that the latter, with Hooker's troops, could form a column to attack the enemy on Lookout Mountain, or at least divert his attention from the movement against his right flank. He thus counseled against further delay, fearing that the enemy should become advised of the plan of operations, and greatly desiring that Hooker should make the movement which he proposed for him. These suggestions were in part approved, though the engagement was postponed as General Grant had proposed. On the 22d, Howard's corps was moved over the river to Chattanooga, and posted between Sheridan's and Wood's divisions in the line to lead the enemy to believe that Sherman's troops, whose passage of the river at Brown's ferry was in plain view, were reinforcing the town rather than moving up the river on the north bank.

During the 22d, rumors reached the national lines that the more recent movements of the enemy's forces indicated their withdrawal. Deserters reported that troops had been sent to McLemore's Cove.\* This fact, and the detachment of forces to march to General Longstreet's support in East Tennessee, produced the impression in the Confederate army that a retreat was meditated by General Bragg. In view of the statements of deserters and a formal notification from General Bragg to remove all non-combatants from Chattanooga, sent on the 20th, General Grant directed General Thomas to order a reconnaissance in front of Chattanooga, that General Bragg might not withdraw his army in quietness, if such was his intent. Under the general direction to ascertain the truth or falsity of the report of General Bragg's retreat, General Thomas organized a movement, which in expression and un-

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\*This movement was induced by the appearance of General Ewing's division of General Sherman's command, at Trenton, in Will's valley.

expected issue was a suitable prelude to the grand battle of which it constituted the initial aggression.

General Bragg could not have been ignorant of the vast concentration of national forces at Chattanooga, and how then he could have felt so secure in his position, or so free to leave it, as to weaken his army to give support to General Longstreet in aggression, or even to save him from destruction, is unaccountable. His greatest weakness was in the length of his lines, and there was extreme hazard in the attempt to hold them with diminished forces. He had with him, after General Longstreet's departure, two corps of infantry, comprising eight or nine divisions, holding, it is true, a position of great strength; but there were nevertheless such advantages to an army of superior strength, having impregnable fortifications and shorter lines, as should have deterred him from detaching any of his remaining forces for any purpose. This, however, he did, and some of his troops in motion toward General Longstreet were recalled in time to participate in the battle.\* There is concurrent testimony from various Confederate sources, to the fact that General Bragg expected General Grant to detach forces to support General Burnside in East Tennessee; but yet, after he knew that none had been sent to follow General Longstreet, he still dared to weaken his army before Chattanooga.†

The enemy's first line of pickets rested a short distance east of the Western and Atlantic railroad, passing in front of the hill which was crowned with Fort Wood, a fortification of marked elevation and strength. Between this fort and the railroad, the ground at first descends abruptly, but soon gently and smoothly, and blending with the slopes of other hills, forms a broad area, suited for the review of an army or its formation for actual battle. Upon this space, about noon on the 23d, several divisions formed in line of battle, in plain view from all the commanding positions held by the enemy. The order from General Thomas to General Granger required that

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\* Statement in General Grant's report.

† This fact is stated in the narrative of the "Richmond Dispatch," and also in a letter, descriptive of the battle, written by a member of General Hardee's staff.

he should throw forward one division of his corps supported by another, in the direction of Orchard Knob, "to discover the position of the enemy, if he still remain in the vicinity of his old camps." General Wood's division having been designated to lead, first deployed before the fort. Then General Sheridan's moved to the right and rear of General Wood; General Howard's corps formed in mass in rear of these two divisions, and General Baird's division took position on the right of General Sheridan, refused in echelon. General Johnson's division was in arms in the intrenchments, in readiness to give support whenever assistance might be needed. These movements were regarded by the enemy as indicating the extension of the national lines to obtain wood,\* or as a mere pageant, and he made no special preparation to resist them.

Orchard Knob, in the direction of which the movement was ordered, is situated half-way from Chattanooga to Missionary Ridge. It rises abruptly to a considerable elevation above the plain. Between it and the lines of the national troops the ground is low, and being at the time covered in part with trees and bushes, was favorable for the concealment of defenses and forces. Along the western base of Orchard Knob, as also over its rocky summit, and for a half mile to the southwest, the enemy had barricades of logs and stones. His line of rifle-pits extended for more than a mile to the north, following the curvature of Citico creek, while across this little stream there were two parallel lines stretching still farther northward. In front of these, which were for the grand guards, were insulated defenses for the picket reserves.

About 2 p. m., General Wood moved rapidly forward, with Hazen's brigade on the right, Willich's on the left, and Beatty's in reserve. This pageant, and yet more than a pageant, attracted the attention of both armies, and in its developments revealed to each the nearness of a general battle. If General Bragg had previously fancied that his position was so strong as to preclude attack, he now had cause to apprehend that the trial of its strength was at hand. And it was

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\* This supposition was mentioned by prisoners, and was stated in a terse narrative of the battle in the "Richmond Dispatch."

soon evident to the national commanders that the enemy was still in position, and that his withdrawal was improbable, except when forced from plain, hill, and mountain.

General Wood's troops, in harmony with the grandeur of the scenery, the pageant which heralded their advance, and the inspiration which the consciousness of making the initial movement of battle in view of contending armies is adapted to create, pressed rapidly forward. His compact lines, marred by no straggling to the rear, swept from position, first the pickets and their reserves, and then moved, without halt or slackened pace, to the attack of the strong line on the hill. Willich meeting with less resistance than was anticipated in the defense of so important a position, at once hurled the enemy from the base and summit of Orchard Knob. Hazen did not so soon carry a lower hill to the right, as the troops holding it fought in a manner better suited to the surroundings and issues of the conflict. But though resisting bravely, they were soon forced by the bayonet to yield position, leaving for capture the Twenty-eighth Alabama regiment and its flag. General Wood lost one hundred and twenty-five men killed and wounded—a fact which attests the gallantry of the quick dash which secured an important position, and gave the type of the grander assaults by which one of the most decisive victories of the war was gained.

As soon as General Wood had driven the enemy from position, General Sheridan moved his division to the right of General Wood, and refused it on a series of small hills trending to the southwest. The hills occupied by Generals Wood and Sheridan comprise nearly all the high ground between Fort Wood and Missionary Ridge, and afforded a good base for operations against the enemy's main lines beyond. From the summit of Orchard Knob, these lines, first and second, were plainly visible running along the base and summit of Missionary Ridge, as also the intervening ground over which the national forces were to pass in the final assault.

At 4 p. m., General Wood was instructed by General Thomas to hold and fortify the position which he had unexpectedly gained, and was informed that General Howard's corps would form on his left. In compliance with instructions, both Gen-

eral Wood and General Sheridan threw up intrenchments in their front, and the former constructed an epaulement for a six-gun battery on Orchard Knob, in which Bridges' battery was placed during the night. As soon as practicable, the Eleventh Corps advanced to form on General Wood's left, and met resistance from the double line of rifle-pits on the north of Citico creek. As, while General Wood was advancing, General Howard had thrown forward Battery A, Fourth Artillery, to cover his left flank, so now, in reciprocal assistance, the former sent Colonel Manderson, with two regiments, to strike in flank the force across the creek. Manderson's fire soon relieved General Howard's right from pressure in front, and the corps attained position.

Thus a most important advantage was gained by a mere tentative movement to discover the position of the enemy—an advantage upon which hinged the final decisive assault of the battle. And not only did this advance on the 23d give the central column a good position from which to assault on the 25th, but it caused General Bragg to transfer Walker's division, General Gist commanding, from Lookout Mountain, to sustain his right against what seemed a most threatening demonstration.

After Orchard Knob had been gained by the national troops, and a long battle front had been formed, with that summit as the center, General Bragg was compelled to elect between a strong left flank on Lookout Mountain and the strengthening of his right, which covered his depot of supplies across the South Chickamauga, at the expense of his left. In removing Walker's division to the right flank, the Confederate commanders were not ignorant of the resulting contingencies, as General Stevenson signaled from the summit of the mountain, at 11 p. m., his conviction that if an attack was intended, it would be upon that position. This action, then, on the 23d, had most intimate relations to General Hooker's success, on the front of Lookout Mountain, the next day.

During the 23d, another of General Sherman's divisions crossed the river, at Brown's ferry, but the bridge again parted, leaving Osterhaus' division, General Woods commanding, on the left bank. As General Sherman had three divisions in

hand, General Grant decided not to delay operations any longer. And as it was improbable that his Fourth could cross in time to participate in his movement against the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge, General Thomas advised General Hooker that if it should fail to cross, he should endeavor with it and his own troops, "to take the point of Lookout Mountain." Later, he informed him that General Grant still hoped that General Woods could cross; but if he could not, in time to join General Sherman, that the mountain should be taken, if a demonstration should develop its practicability. That General Sherman's division might not be prevented, if it was possible for it to cross in time to join him, General Hooker sent a staff officer to the river to ascertain the fact that the bridge could not be joined. As soon as this officer reported, General Hooker made dispositions for his movement, to result either in demonstration or actual attack. Thus it appears that another modification of General Grant's pre-announced plan hinged upon the failure of one division to cross the river, though the consequent movement resulted in turning Bragg's left flank.

At 4 a. m. General Hooker reported that he was ready to advance against Lookout Mountain. His command, Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, Osterhaus' of the Fifteenth, and two brigades of Cruft's division of the Fourth, were all strangers to each other, representing three corps, and allowing Geary's division to go back to recent relations, three distinct armies. But officers and men were true soldiers, and made the acquaintance necessary for unity of action as quickly as the combinations of the battle-field placed them side by side.

General Hooker sent Geary's division and Whittaker's brigade of Cruft's division to Wauhatchie, to cross Lookout creek, and then to sweep down its right bank, to clear it of the enemy and cover the crossing of the remaining forces. He ordered Grose to seize the common road bridge just below the railroad crossing and repair it, and directed Woods to move up his division from Brown's ferry, under cover of the hills, to the point designated for crossing the creek, and support the batteries—one, Battery "K," First Ohio Artillery, on a high

hill without trees, a little north of the stream, and the other, Battery "K," First New York Artillery, on a hill to the rear of the other. He also sent a portion of the Second Kentucky cavalry up the valley to Trenton, to observe the enemy and give warning of danger from that direction. The picket line of the enemy was on the right bank of the creek; the picket reserves were in the valley beyond, and the main force of the enemy was encamped on the mountain side.

On the front of Lookout Mountain, intermediate between base and summit, there is a wide open space, cultivated as a farm, in vivid contrast with the natural surroundings of wild-est types. The farm-house, known as Craven's or "the white house," was situated upon the upper margin of the farm. From the house to the foundation of the perpendicular cliff or palisade, which crops out from the rock-ribbed frame of the mountain, the ascent is exceedingly steep and thickly wooded. Below the farm the surface is rough and craggy. The base of the mountain, next the river, has a perpendicular front of solid rock, rising grandly from the railroad track, which, though in part cut through the deep ledges, does not perceptibly mar nature's magnificent architecture. Over the top of this foundation front the narrow road passes, which, in the western valley, throws off various branches, leading west and south. East and west from Craven's farm the surface is broken by furrows and covered with shrubs, trees, and fragments of stone. On the open space the enemy had constructed his defenses, consisting of intrenchments, pits, and redoubts, which, extending over the front of the mountain, bade defiance to a foe advancing from the river. At the extremities of the main intrenchments there were rifle-pits, epaulements for batteries, barricades of stone and abatis, looking to resistance against aggression from Chattanooga or Lookout Valley. The road from Chattanooga to Summertown, an elegant village for summer resort, winding up the eastern side of the mountain, is the only one practicable for ordinary military movements within a range of many miles. So that, except by this road, there could be no transfer of troops from the summit to the northern slope, or to the valley, east or west, to meet the emer-

gencies of battle, and this road was too long to allow provision from the top for sudden contingencies below.

At 8 A. M. Geary crossed the creek, captured the pickets of the enemy, and then crept up the mountain side until his right, which was his front in the ascent, touched the base of the palisaded summit. The fog which overhung the mountain top and upper steeps, and the dense woods, concealed the movement. Then, with his right clinging to the palisades, he swept round toward the mountain's front. Simultaneously with Geary's first movement, Grose attacked the enemy at the bridge, and having driven him back commenced its repair. The noise of this conflict called the enemy's nearest forces from their camps. They formed in front of their intrenchments and rifle-pits, and one detachment advanced to the railroad embankment, which formed a good parapet and admitted a sweeping fire upon the national troops advancing from the bridge. To avoid the loss of life inevitable in a direct advance, General Hooker directed Osterhaus, now commanding his division, to send a brigade to prepare a crossing a half mile farther up the creek, under cover of the woods. A portion of Grose's brigade having been left at the bridge to attract the attention of the enemy, the remainder followed Woods' brigade to assist in the construction of the bridge. In the meantime, additional artillery had been posted, which, with the batteries first planted on the hills west of the creek, enfiladed all the proximate positions of the enemy. A section of 20-pounder Parrots had also the range of the enemy's camp on the mountain side; and on Moccasin Point, Brannan's guns were in position to open a direct fire upon the front of the mountain.

At 11 A. M. Woods completed the bridge, and soon after, Geary's division and Whittaker's brigade, in line, sweeping the mountain from base to palisade, came abreast. The batteries then opened fire, and Woods and Grose crossed the creek and aligned their troops on Geary's left as it swept down the valley. The troops of the enemy, in the first positions, that escaped the artillery fire, ran into the infantry lines, so that quick overthrow occurred to all the troops that had taken position in the valley and near the western base of the mountain. Many were

killed, more were wounded, and the remainder were captured, and then the line moved onward toward the mountain's front.

The booming of the heavy guns with interludes of light artillery and musketry fire, announced to friend and foe in the distant lines that an action was in progress where battle had not been expected. Quietness reigning throughout the other hills and valleys compassed by the long lines of the contending armies, the contest on the mountain side, revealed by its noise, but as yet hidden from sight, commanded the profoundest attention and interest of far more than one hundred thousand men. Those not held by duty or the constraint of orders, in crowds sought the elevated outlooks, and with glasses and strained vision, turned their gaze to the woods, fog, and battle-smoke, which concealed the anomalous contest. As the increasing roar of musketry indicated the sweep of the battle to the east, the anxiety for its revelation on the open ground became intense. Soon through the clefts of the fog could be seen the routed enemy in rapid motion, followed by Hooker's line, with its right under the palisade and its continuity lost to view far down the mountain. Whittaker held the right, under the cliffs, and below were the brigades of Cobham, Ireland, and Creighton; and this line hurled the enemy from position after position, climbing over crags and bowlders for attack and pursuit, and reached at noon the point where orders required a halt for the readjustment of lines and a more cautious approach toward the Summertown road. But as on the following day, in the assault made by other portions of the Army of the Cumberland, the restraint of orders did not arrest the pursuit of the flying foe, so now these victorious troops swept on. With a plunging fire from above and behind they rolled up the enemy's line, and lifting it from its intrenchments made no halt until the middle of the open ground was gained. Here the enemy met reinforcements and made a more determined stand. Soon, however, Grose's brigade of Cruft's division, and Osterhaus' command, having gathered up the captured on the lower ground, closed on the left, and then the enemy was driven from all his defenses on the open ground, and with broken ranks retreated down the eastern descent of the mountain.

The heavy Parrots and the Tenth and Eighteenth Ohio bat-

teries, under Captain Naylor, on Moccasin Point, rendered important aid to the assaulting forces, by preventing the concentration of the enemy's troops. But the potent cause of the victory was the fact that brave men reached the flank and rear of the enemy's defenses.

The heavy fighting ceased at 2 p. m. General Hooker's troops had exhausted their ammunition and it could not be supplied in the ordinary way, as no trains could reach them. Besides this want of ammunition, as a bar to further fighting, the fog which had overhung the mountain during the day, settled down densely over the enemy. But for these obstacles, and the fact that the enemy could now concentrate heavily to prevent the insulation of his troops on the mountain top, an effort would have been made to seize the Sunnertown road. Hooker, therefore, waited for ammunition and reinforcements. At 5 p. m. Carlin's brigade of the First division of the Fourteenth Corps crossed Chattanooga creek, near its mouth, and ascended the mountain to Hooker's right. The troops of this brigade carried on their persons ammunition for Hooker's skirmishers, in addition to the ordinary supply for themselves. Severe skirmishing was then maintained until nearly midnight.

As General Sherman's movement had been regarded as the leading one compassed by the general plan of operations, the engineer department, under the management of General W. F. Smith, had been pressed to the utmost activity to provide means for crossing his army to the south bank of the Tennessee. Lieutenant Dressen had collected all the pontoons between Brown's ferry and Bridgeport, and Captain P. V. Fox had been engaged in preparing boats for a new bridge. The river at the point selected for crossing, at the time of measurement, was thirteen hundred feet wide, and two bridges were proposed, and one also at the mouth of the South Chickamauga, one hundred and eighty feet in length. As it was expected that the enemy would contest the passage of the river if aware of the purpose to effect it, every precaution had been used to keep the projected bridges a profound secret. The pontoons had been hauled on by-roads to the North Chickamauga creek, eight miles above Chattanooga, and were there launched and concealed in readiness to be floated

down to the place of crossing. The citizens in the vicinity had been put under guard to prevent them from giving information to the enemy. As Saturday, the 21st, had been designated for Sherman's attack, the boats and a brigade to man them were in readiness on the night of the 20th. Subsequently, the causes which delayed Sherman for a time threatened failure to the bridges, as the high water and driftwood which parted the bridges at Chattanooga and Brown's ferry, created the apprehension that the bridges could not be thrown, and that if thrown, they could not be maintained as long as needed.

But when General Sherman was ready to cross, a bridge was promptly thrown. At midnight on the 23d, one hundred and sixteen boats, with a brigade, left the North Chickamauga and floated quietly to the place of crossing. They were landed on the enemy's side of the river, at points above and below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, and were first used to transport troops from the opposite shore. By daylight two divisions were over, and the throwing of a bridge and the construction of a bridge-head were under vigorous prosecution. According to previous arrangements, General J. H. Wilson took the steamer Dunbar from Chattanooga to aid in the transportation of troops. This steamer's help was the more essential, as in consequence of the greater breadth of the river from high water, but one bridge could be thrown. Just as the last boat was connected, General Howard, with Buschbeck's brigade of Steinwehr's division and a small cavalry escort, reached the position. His unresisted advance from Chattanooga developed the fact that the enemy had yielded the river and the greater portion of the valley between the river and Missionary Ridge. At General Sherman's request, General Howard left his brigade to skirmish on the right flank of his line in its advance, and returned to Chattanooga with his escort.

The bridge was finished at 11 a. m., and at 1 p. m. General Sherman moved forward with three divisions in echelon, the several heads of column being covered with skirmishers and supporting forces. Meeting with no serious resistance, the advancing columns soon passed the foot hills, and at 4 p. m.

occupied the two northernmost summits of Missionary Ridge. Artillery was used on the right of the line late in the afternoon, but beyond this and slight skirmishing, the lodgment near the right flank of the enemy involved no action. There was now one summit between General Sherman and the tunnel. Had he gained this, his distinct part of the battle, as first planned, would have been performed. General Grant had expected that he would be able to carry the ridge to about the tunnel before the enemy could concentrate against him, but the intervening hill was the one upon which Bragg's right flank rested.

The crest of Missionary Ridge is divided into distinct summits throughout its whole length by numerous depressions. The deepest of these, between the Tennessee river and Ross-ville, separates the second summit, which General Sherman had gained from the third, which was the strongest position for lateral defense within Bragg's lines. Here Cleburne's famous division was placed. The top of the hill was broad enough for a strong force, and yet sufficiently narrow to permit the formation of strong lines. Heavy barricades, or rather fortifications, constructed of logs and earth, covered the troops on the first defensive line, while the higher ground to the south gave room for successive supporting columns.\* A somewhat thickly planted forest gave additional protection to the enemy. It was the strength of this position rather than ignorance of the strength of the combination against his right flank that induced General Bragg to yield the first two hills to General Sherman. Their abandonment shortened his line, while the depression on his right, and the slopes east and west, placed his enemy under his guns on every practicable line of attack.

At night, General Grant announced to General Thomas that General Sherman had carried the ridge to the tunnel, and advised him that General Sherman had been instructed to advance at daylight the next morning, and that his own attack should be simultaneous and co-operative, either to carry

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\* Subsequently, Cleburne's position became the salient of the line of the right wing, when troops were thrown to the rear to confront General Sherman's left, which rested on the Chickamauga.

the rifle-pits and ridge in his front, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy might require. He also gave directions with regard to General Hooker's action, requiring that if his position on the mountain could be maintained with a small force, and the ascent to the summit should be impracticable from it, that he should move up the valley and ascend by the first practicable road.

After receiving these instructions, General Thomas, in a formal order, congratulated General Hooker and his troops upon their glorious victory, and thanked them for their valorous conduct. He then directed General Hooker to be in readiness to advance into Chattanooga valley, hold the Summer-town road, and co-operate with the Fourteenth Corps by supporting its right, informing him that General Grant had ordered General Sherman to move along Missionary Ridge in the morning with the Army of the Cumberland co-operating.

Before daylight the next morning, anticipating the withdrawal of the enemy from the summit of Lookout Mountain, General Hooker dispatched several parties to scale the palisades. Some daring soldiers from the Eighth Kentucky were the first reach the top and unfurl the national banner. When the morning light first kissed its waving folds, the whole army apprehended the completeness of the victory which had been won the day before. And as cheer responsive to cheer prolonged the expression of joy and exultation, there was a partial utterance of the inspiration, which, at the setting of the sun, found historic revelation through an assault most glorious in conception, execution, and issue.

The evacuation of the mountain top did not give full proof that the enemy had left Hooker's front, and the low-lying mist during the early hours of the day prevented the measures necessary to develop the situation. The fog lifted between 9 and 10 a. m., and the retreat of the enemy was then apparent. His left flank had been turned, and the forces which had held the mountain fortress and the valley to the east had been transferred to Missionary Ridge. General Bragg's defensive line was now only half its original length, and he no doubt still entertained the hope of successful resistance, at least such

as would afford him the safe withdrawal of his army. One\* of his subordinates, at least, advised him to retreat without further battle; but the necessity or practicability of this step was not obvious to him, and he made preparations to maintain his position upon Missionary Ridge.

General Bragg now had his entire army on Missionary Ridge. Cleburne's and Gist's divisions were on the extreme right opposed to General Sherman; his left was held by Stewart's division; his center, by Breckinridge's old division, and portions of the commands of Buckner and Hindman, under General Anderson; and the divisions of Cheatham and Stevenson, fresh from defeat on Lookout Mountain, were in motion toward the right. The two parts of his army before Generals Sherman and Thomas, were commanded respectively by Generals Hardee and Breckinridge.

It was evident early in the morning that General Grant had misapprehended the degree of General Sherman's success the evening previous. The ridge had not been carried to the tunnel, and hence the condition precedent to the co-operation of Thomas and Sherman in a general attack was yet wanting. And as the battle had been delayed to enable General Sherman to get into position on the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge, so now the co-operative movement was deferred that he might carry the one summit between him and the tunnel. General Thomas' troops were therefore restrained from action until late in the day, except in the movement of General Hooker's column toward the enemy's left flank, and the transfer of three divisions to General Sherman.

General Sherman opened the battle of the 25th, in an independent movement, soon after sunrise, by the advance of Corse's brigade from his right center.

General Corse moved down the southern slope of the second hill gained the night before, and under a destructive fire as-

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\* General Hardee's "staff officer" asserted, in his letter, that his chief advised the withdrawal of the army after the loss of Lookout Mountain, and in the account of the battle in the Richmond Dispatch, it is stated that General Bragg gave orders for this movement, and afterward decided that he had not time to make it, and then massed his forces on Missionary Ridge.

cended toward Cleburne's fortified position. He gained a lateral elevation, about eighty yards distant from the enemy's defenses, and held it firmly. Advancing repeatedly from this position, he was as often driven back, and in turn repulsed every attack of the enemy. Back and forward, in the alternations of offense and defense, the struggle was long continued without decisive advantage to either side. In the meantime, General Morgan L. Smith's division advanced along the eastern base of the hill, and Loonis' brigade, supporting Corse on the left, was sustained by the two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith's division. Morgan L. Smith pressed his attack to the enemy's works, but gained no permanent lodgment.

The character and issue of this contest was observed by General Grant from Orchard Knob, and at 10 a. m. he directed Howard's corps, in position on the left of General Thomas' line, to General Sherman's support. This corps, upon arrival, was formed on the left of Sherman's line, with its own left on Chickamauga creek, in room of troops that had previously been sent to the right, to support the attacking column. General Sherman then had six divisions—three of his own under General F. P. Blair, Steinwehr's, and Schurz's of Howard's corps (the Eleventh), and Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps.

Pending General Sherman's first series of attacks, there had been some activity on the right flank of the national army. Early in the morning, General Thomas had directed General Hooker to move with the force that he had led from Lookout valley, except two regiments to hold the mountain, on the road to Rossville. Later, he had ordered him to advance upon the enemy's works, in conjunction with Palmer's corps—the Fourteenth, using General Sheridan, on the right of the Fourth Corps, as a pivot. General Hooker advanced to Chattanooga creek rapidly, but was there delayed to restore a bridge which the enemy had destroyed in his flight from the mountain.

It was evident from the issue of the first conflict on the left of the national line, and from the importance of the position, that General Bragg would maintain his right flank if possible.

General Sherman was threatening not only to turn that flank, but was also menacing his rear and his depot of supplies at Chickamauga Station. When General Grant gave open emphasis to his determination to turn his right flank, by sending General Howard's corps to General Sherman, General Bragg sent his floating divisions, Cheatham's and Stevenson's, to General Hardee. Thus, both commanding generals massed heavily in the vicinity of the tunnel—General Grant, to give weight to his ruling attack, and General Bragg, to maintain his right against the vast concentration to turn it, deeming his left and center fully secured by the left half of his army. Between the two wings of the Confederate army there was now a chasm, corresponding to the interval separating the columns under Generals Sherman and Thomas.

Soon after General Howard had attained position, General Sherman renewed his effort to turn the enemy's right flank. Corse's\* and Buschbeck's brigades again pressed forward, and when the right of their line became exposed, the brigades of John E. Smith advanced in support. The extreme right of the line thus extended, reached well toward the depression or gorge in the western slope, through which the railroad passes to the tunnel. In this gorge, in complete concealment, General Hardee massed a heavy force, and then throwing it upon Smith's brigades drove them in disorder down the hill. This success, however, was only temporary, as this assaulting force was in turn taken in flank by Corse's and Loomis' brigades, and then there was a return to the previous status: Corse's brigade holding the latteral hillock first gained in the morning, with Loomis and Buschbeck in support.

When General Grant perceived that the troops that had advanced almost to the enemy's defenses near the tunnel, had been driven down the slope, true to his purpose of massing forces against the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge, he ordered Baird's division from line on the right of Johnson's to move to General Sherman's support. This order gave General Sherman seven of the thirteen divisions before the enemy.

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\* General Corse having been wounded, Colonel Walcutt assumed command of the brigade.

When Baird moved to the left, General Thomas had eight brigades in line between Chattanooga and the ridge, and General Hooker had seven as far removed on his right as was General Sherman on his left. At noon, when General Grant ordered Baird's division to General Sherman, it could not have been his intention to make an independent movement from his center, since to give overwhelming strength to the turning column on his left, he had detached nearly half of the central forces which were under General Thomas in person. The strength of his left under General Sherman, compared to that of his center under General Thomas was then as seven divisions to eight brigades.

General Baird moved as ordered, following the road on the bank of the river until he had reached the rear of General Sherman's right. He was then informed by the latter that he did not need him, and he then returned to the center and formed his division on the left of Wood. He was ordered to this position to lessen the interval between General Thomas' left and General Sherman's right. His division was in line at 2½ p. m.\*

In the meantime, General Hooker had attained position on the enemy's left flank. As soon as the stringers of the bridge across Chattanooga creek were in position, General Osterhaus threw over the Twenty-seventh Missouri, and soon his entire division, which was followed by the remaining forces. The leading regiment was deployed to skirmish and cover the rapid advance toward Rossville. General Hooker directed the Missourians to engage the enemy briskly as soon as he should be met, and when the skirmishing became spirited, he ordered General Osterhaus to move Woods' brigade to the right and Williamson's to the left. Finding his flanks thus endangered, the enemy retreated beyond Rossville. General Hooker then disposed his troops to sweep Missionary Ridge toward the north. He directed General Osterhaus to cross to the east side, General Cruft to advance on the summit, and General Geary on the western slope and edge of the valley. While General Hooker was forming to advance and turn the enemy's

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\* Statements in General Baird's official report.

left flank, other movements were ordered which broke his center and routed his army.

Soon after Baird's return, General Grant ordered an advance from the center. His order expressed the third radical departure from his pre-announced plan. In it, no movement against the enemy by the central forces in independent action had been prescribed, and yet one had already been successfully made. And now, though the instructions for this day required that General Thomas should move in co-operation with General Sherman, an independent assault was ordered. General Grant had waited for Sherman's success in turning the enemy's right flank since early morning; during the afternoon he had expected General Hooker to move against his left. The day was now nearly gone, and some new measure was necessary, or the sun would set with General Bragg in possession of Missionary Ridge. Four insulated divisions were in line in front of General Bragg's center, now held by less than four divisions, as a portion of Stuart's, on the extreme left, under the personal direction of General Breckinridge, had been directed against General Hooker. Wood's and Sheridan's divisions were in the position attained on the 23d, Johnson's was on the right of Sheridan, and Baird on the left of Wood. These divisions were formed by brigades, from right to left, in the following order: Carlin's and Stoughton's of Johnson's; Sherman's, Harker's, and Wagner's of Sheridan's; Hazen's, Willich's, and Beatty's of Wood's, and Turchin's, Vanderveer's, and Phelps' of Baird's. Two lines of skirmishers covered the battle front, and such troops as were designated as reserves were massed in rear of their respective organizations.

Between 3 and 4 p. m. six successive cannon shots from the battery on Orchard Knob gave the signal for the advance. General Grant's order required that the enemy should be dislodged from the rifle-pits and intrenchments at the base of Missionary Ridge. The statement is made in his official report that it was his design that the lines should be readjusted at the base for the assault of the summit; but no such instructions were given to corps or division generals. Neither does it appear from his report whether he meditated an independent

assault of the summit from his center, or one co-operative with Sherman on the left, or Hooker on the right, as the original plan prescribed for the former or as the issues of the day suggested for the latter.

As soon as the magnificent lines moved forward, the batteries of the enemy on the ridge opened upon them with great activity. General Brannan's large guns in Fort Wood, Fort Cheatham, Battery Rousseau, and Fort Sheridan, and four light batteries on the intermediate hills, which had not been silent hitherto, gave emphatic response. Their fire was first directed to the enemy's inferior intrenchments, and when this endangered the advancing lines, their missiles were thrown upon the summit. This change of direction was soon necessary, as leaping forward at the signal, the eager troops in rapid movement first met the enemy's pickets and their reserves, then his troops occupying the intervening woods, and finally his stronger line in his lower intrenchments, and drove all in confusion to the crest of the ridge. In vain had General Bragg made effort to strengthen his lower line. The advance of the national troops had been so rapid and their movement had expressed such purpose and power, that the very forces that had so often repeated their furious assaults at Chickamauga lost courage and made no soldierly effort to maintain their position, though supported by at least fifty guns, which, at short range, were fast decimating the assaulting columns.

Having executed their orders to the utmost requirement, holding the enemy's lower defenses, the four divisions stood under his batteries, while the troops they had routed threw themselves behind the stronger intrenchments on the summit. General Bragg's right flank had not been turned as first proposed, and General Hooker's attack on his left, though successful, was too remote to affect immediately the central contest. To stand still was death; to fall back was not compassed by orders, and was forbidden by every impulse of the brave men, who, with no stragglers to mar the symmetry of their line or make scarcely a single exception to universal gallantry, had moved so boldly and so successfully upon the foe. There are occasional moments in battle when brave men do not need commanders, and this was one. The enemy held a position

of wonderful strength several hundred feet above them. He had two lines in one behind earthworks, where nature had provided a fortress. These men, however, did not stop to consider the enemy's position or strength, but from a common impulse of patriotism and the inspiration of partial success, leaped forward and dashed up the hill. The color-bearers sprang to the front, and as one fell, another bore the flag aloft and onward, followed by their gallant comrades, not in line, but in such masses as enabled them to avail themselves of easier ascent or partial cover. They advanced without firing, though receiving a most destructive fire of artillery and musketry, from base to summit. The officers of all grades caught the spirit of the men, and so eager were men and officers throughout the line, that the crest was reached and carried at six different points almost at the same moment. The enemy was hurled from position with wonderful quickness; his artillery was captured, and in some cases turned against him as he fled. General Hooker soon swept northward from Rossville, and then the Army of the Cumberland held Missionary Ridge the whole length of its front. General Hardee's forces, opposite General Sherman, alone maintained position.

To this general result, each of the four central divisions and those with General Hooker contributed, in co-ordination and harmony unprecedented in an improvised attack. Each one was successful, though each was not equally prominent in success. From General Bragg's declaration that his line was first pierced on his right—that is, to the north of the house which he occupied as his headquarters—and from the observation of those occupying elevated positions, there is no room to doubt that General Wood's division first reached the summit. Sheridan's and Baird's, on the right and left, almost simultaneously gained the crest. General Wood's troops enfiladed the enemy's line to the right and left as soon as they broke through it, and the other divisions pressed against other points so quickly, that General Bragg's effort to dislodge the troops who first gained his intrenchments by sending General Bate to the right, miscarried at its very inception. After portions of the several divisions had gained the crest, many

isolated contests were conducted with spirit by the enemy, but the fragments of his line were speedily brushed away.

The impulse to carry the summit of the ridge was seemingly spontaneous, though not entirely simultaneous, throughout the four divisions, and from different points several brigades passed beyond the limit fixed by General Grant's order, before there was any concerted action toward a general assault. The division commanders did not arrest their troops, and for a time the corps generals did not give official sanction to their advance. The impression, indeed, so far prevailed, that the movement would not be authorized, that Turchin's, brigade, on the right of Baird's division, was halted when far up the ascent, and Wagner's brigade, on the left of Sheridan's division, was recalled from an advanced position by a staff officer who was returning to General Sheridan from General Granger, with the information that General Grant's order required only that the enemy's intrenched line at the base of the ridge should be carried. Soon, however, it was apparent to all, that the eagerness of the troops had created a necessity superior to the limitations of orders, and this conviction gave unity and energy to an assault, whose transcendent issue justified its otherwise unauthorized execution.

To prevent defeat, Generals Bragg, Hardee, Breckinridge, and others of inferior rank, exerted themselves to the utmost. General Bragg, in the center, was nearly surrounded before he entirely despaired and abandoned the field. General Breckinridge resisted General Hooker, as he ascended the ridge at Rossville, availing himself of the fortifications which had been constructed by the national army after the battle of Chickamauga. His first resistance was quickly overcome by the Ninth and Thirty-sixth regiments of Grose's brigade. General Cruft's division was then formed in four lines on the summit, and with the lateral divisions abreast, moved rapidly forward, driving the enemy in turn from several positions. Many of his troops, that fled east or west, were captured by Osterhaus or Geary, and those who tried to escape northward, fell in Johnson's hands. As soon as General Hardee heard the noise of battle to his left, he hastened to join his troops under General Anderson, on the right of their central line.

But before he could cross the chasm corresponding to the interval between General Sherman's right and General Thomas' left, Anderson's command was thrown into a confused retreat. He then hurried Cheatham's\* division from the vicinity of the tunnel, and formed it across the summit to resist Baird's division, which had advanced northward, after carrying its entire front, in the assault. In a severe contest, in which Colonel Phelps, a brigade commander, fell, General Baird pressed this fresh division northward from several knolls, but was finally compelled to abandon the conflict by the peculiar strength of a new position and the approach of darkness.

The victory was gained too late in the day for a general pursuit. General Sheridan's division and Willich's brigade of General Wood's division pursued the enemy for a short distance down the eastern slope. Later, General Sheridan advanced and drove the enemy from a strong position, captured two pieces of artillery, numerous small arms, and several wagons from a supply train.

During the night General Hardee withdrew his forces from the position which he had persistently held against General Sherman.

While General Grant had been hurrying his preparations for the battle, his anxiety for Burnside had been intensified by unavoidable delays. He knew that Burnside's supplies would not permit him to refuse terms of surrender much beyond the 3d of December, and it was by no means certain that he could resist Longstreet as long as his supplies would last. Now that General Bragg had been defeated, General Grant gave attention equally to the pursuit of the routed enemy and the relief of his lieutenant at Knoxville; and during the evening of the 25th, gave orders looking to the accomplishment of both objects. He directed General Thomas to recall the

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\*General Hardee's staff officer said: "At this juncture, matters looked terrible, and I will never forget the look of anguish written on poor General H——'s face. He sent me hurriedly to make some changes in his other divisions, yet intact, and to hurry one forward to stem the tide of defeat." General Bragg's report mentions Cheatham's division as the one performing this service.

Fourth Corps to prepare for forced marches to Knoxville, and in conjunction with General Sherman to pursue the enemy with his available troops. Accordingly, General Thomas ordered Wood's and Sheridan's divisions to return to Chattanooga, and Generals Hooker and Palmer—the latter with two divisions—to move in pursuit of the enemy.

These generals moved on the morning of the 26th, as ordered, Hooker leading. On reaching the West Chickamauga, Hooker found that the bridge had been destroyed and that the water was too deep for fording. Pontoons had been ordered for such emergencies, but none were up, and the columns were delayed until a temporary bridge could be constructed. After some hours, the men crossed the bridge, the horses swam the stream, and pursuit was resumed without artillery. At Peavine creek there was another stop from similar cause. A bridge was here constructed as quickly as possible, and the troops crossed and moved forward. At this creek the road forks, the right branch leading to Ringgold, the left to Graysville. Hooker took the former and Palmer the latter. Carlin's brigade leading, toward Graysville, soon heard the noise of men and wagons in motion. As the proximity of the enemy was thus revealed, dispositions were made to intercept him if possible. At 9 p. m. his rear-guard was overtaken, and upon receiving a volley from Stoughton's brigade, fled in all directions. The troops proved to be a remnant of Stewart's division, that Hooker had handled so roughly on the ridge the evening previous, and in flight left behind them three Napoleon guns, their colors, and a large number of small arms.

The pursuit was continued, and at 11 p. m. a brigade of the enemy was routed at Graysville, and one gun and a number of prisoners were captured.

On the following morning the two columns advanced to Ringgold. The artillery was still behind, as the pontoon bridges had not been thrown, but the enemy was nevertheless closely pursued. Before reaching the East Chickamauga creek, many captures were made, and the enemy was driven from the bridge and pursued into the town. But a stand was made, beyond where the railroad passes through the gap in Taylor's ridge. General Hooker was still without artillery,

but he determined to feel the enemy at once. Accordingly, skirmishers advanced, and Woods' brigade deployed in their rear under cover of the railroad embankment. The skirmish line of the enemy was soon driven upon the main line, and the exact position of a battery which had been very active was ascertained. To silence the battery by picking off the gunners, the Thirteenth Illinois regiment was thrown forward to seize some houses at suitable distance for this purpose. This movement provoked the enemy to advance against Woods' line. His skirmishers fell back, and the main line repulsed the enemy most handsomely, and followed into the gorge. Cleburne's division was engaged, and its dead and wounded were abandoned as it gave ground. In the meantime, Osterhaus had detached four regiments under Colonel Williamson to move a half mile to the left, ascend a hill, and turn the enemy's right. The enemy was found in heavy force, and Colonel Creighton with four more regiments was sent still farther to the left. Attacks were then made by both Williamson and Creighton, but despite the display of great daring, the troops of both were repulsed with heavy loss. Creighton's brigade held position on the side of the ridge, well sheltered in a depression, and Williamson's returned to the railroad. The enemy having been developed in force in a strong position, troops were moved to support those who had been engaged, and the action was arrested in waiting for the artillery. Between 12 and 1 p. m. the guns came upon the field and were put in position, and other dispositions were made to renew the attack. The heavy guns were planted to enfilade the gorge, and a regiment was sent to ascend the hill on the right, to throw a plunging fire upon the enemy below. But the enemy had succeeded in delaying pursuit, which was the object of his resistance, and upon the opening of Hooker's guns, withdrew, attempting to burn the bridges beyond the town. He was so closely followed, however, that the bridges were saved.

General Grant having reached the field, gave orders to discontinue the pursuit. But in the afternoon, to make the impression of purpose to pursue, Colonel Grose was sent forward with his brigade toward Tunnel Hill. Grose soon encountered the enemy's cavalry and drove the force upon the infan-

try. Ascertaining that there was a strong column in a strong position, he returned to Ringgold.

General Hooker lost, according to his report, sixty-five killed and three hundred and seventy-seven wounded; Colonel Creighton and many other officers fell. The enemy left one hundred and thirty dead upon the field, and two hundred and thirty as prisoners; his wounded was not computed.

Very early on the morning of the 26th, General Davis was ordered by General Sherman to cross his division on the pontoon bridge at the mouth of the Chickamanga and pursue the enemy, and General Howard was ordered to repair a bridge two miles up the creek and follow. The repair of the bridge threatening too much delay, the latter moved down the stream, and crossing his corps on the pontoon bridge, moved on toward the depot of Bragg's army at Chickamauga Station. Davis, in advance, reached that point at 11 A. M., in time to witness the burning of the depot building and the greater portion of the supplies. A short distance beyond, the enemy was found partially intrenched, but was speedily forced to retreat; General Davis pursued and at dark overtook the enemy, when a sharp conflict ensued, but the darkness covered his escape. In the morning, Davis reached Graysville, and found himself in rear of Hooker's command, which he followed to Ringgold.

General Howard advanced through Parker's Gap, farther east, and detached a column to destroy railroad communications between Bragg and Longstreet. Having destroyed a large section of the railroad between Dalton and Cleveland, the detached forces joined the corps.

These movements terminated the pursuit of the enemy. Burnside's condition was exceedingly critical, and General Grant deemed his relief and the continued possession of East Tennessee more important than the farther pursuit of Bragg. He therefore directed General Sherman to give his troops a rest of one day before starting to raise the siege of Knoxville. In consideration of the importance of promptly relieving Burnside, General Grant committed the enterprise to Sherman, giving him Howard's and Granger's corps, and Davis' division of the Fourteenth, in addition to the three divisions of his own.

The destruction of railroad by Howard's troops, added to the

results of Long's raid, effectually prevented the passage of troops by rail from Bragg to Longstreet, or from the latter to the former, if their future plans should require such transfer. Colonel Long having moved on the flank of General Sherman's forces, as directed, crossed the river on the 24th, on the pontoon bridge, and reached Tyner's station on the Knoxville road that night, destroying supplies and rolling-stock at that point. Colonel Long then proceeded to Ooltawah, and captured several wagons loaded with forage. At Cleveland he destroyed a copper-rolling mill, and a large depot of commissary and ordnance stores. From Cleveland he moved rapidly to Charleston, hoping to capture a large wagon train which had been detained there by the parting of a pontoon bridge. Learning, however, that the bridge had been connected, and that the train was beyond his reach, as there was a large force of the enemy on the opposite shore, he returned to Cleveland. Then, having damaged the railroad for several miles toward Dalton, he moved in safety to Chattanooga.

General Grant ordered General Hooker to remain at Ringgold until the 30th, to cover General Sherman's movement toward Knoxville, and keep up the semblance of pursuit.

The official reports of the commanders-in-chief of the two armies do not give their strength. It is probable that General Grant had sixty thousand men in action, and General Bragg forty thousand. The former had thirteen divisions, including two detached brigades, and the latter had eight, with perhaps a corresponding diminution.

General Bragg's loss in killed and wounded is not known. He lost by capture six thousand one hundred and forty-two men, forty-two guns, sixty-nine gun-carriages, and seven thousand stand of small arms. His loss in material was immense, part of which he destroyed in his flight, but a large fraction, which was uninjured, fell to the national army.

The aggregate losses of the armies of the Cumberland and Tennessee were seven hundred and fifty-seven killed, four thousand five hundred and twenty-nine wounded, and three hundred and thirty missing. These losses were small compared with those of other battles of similar proportions, and

exceedingly small in view of the fact that the enemy generally resisted behind intrenchments.

These engagements, in general issue, were exceedingly decisive, both in their proximate and more palpable results, and in their remote and more occult consequences. The blood of "Chickamauga," "Wauhatchie," "Lookout Mountain," "Missionary Ridge," and "Ringgold," and even that of anterior battles, had been directly shed in decision of the question whether a national or Confederate army should hold Chattanooga—a position inviting to each for defense or aggression. Fortified in its outer lines by ranges of mountains, after the battle of Chickamauga, it had been made strong in its inner lines by a broad and high circumvallation, manifold forts and redoubts, and heavy guns. Situated at the confluence of many streams, the diverging valleys suggested aggressive marches, and especially as the gateway to Georgia it was the natural base for an overland bisection of the Gulf States. This martial throne, dominant of strategy far and near, had been the objective of the Army of the Cumberland for nearly two years, and as the result of a battle compassing all the elements of the most brilliant warfare, it fell in perpetuity to its possession, when this grand army cheered in proudest triumph on the crest of Missionary Ridge. The mere possession of Chattanooga, while Bragg's lines stretched over mountain, plain, and hill, from the river on the southwest to the river on the northeast, was of little moment. But the Southern leaders and people knew that a national army at Chattanooga, with full mastery of river, railroads, and diverging routes of aggression, was a direct menace to the existence of the rebellion. And the issue of the battle which gave the Army of the Cumberland the fruits of all its conflicts in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia, produced a startling surprise throughout the South. It is true that there were some in the South who said that the loss of Lookout Valley was equivalent to the loss of Chattanooga. But, as Bragg had detached Longstreet's corps after this loss, and held his lines, notwithstanding the gathering of Grant's forces at Chattanooga, the hope was entertained, that if he could not retake the place, he could at least neutralize it as a base for offensive

operations, and the Southern people were not prepared for the rout of his army from a position deemed impregnable. And his own official acknowledgment of the total defeat and panic of his army was couched in language which made prominent his own surprise at the issue. He said, "The position ought to have been held by a skirmish line against any assaulting column." This statement, though expressive of his opinion of the strength of his position, was by no means true. No skirmish line could have held Missionary Ridge against even a small portion of the brave men who dashed up the steep acclivity. Besides, it was not altogether surprising that his troops were routed. The moral forces were with the assaulting column. The peculiar features of the field revealed to the enemy the transcendent array of the national troops. The battle had opened with the splendid charge of Wood's division, and Lookout Mountain had been wrested from his hands in such a way as to change the martial tone of each army. Those assaulting Missionary Ridge had Chickamauga to avenge, and Lookout Mountain to surpass. And the dashing, yet firm and resolute sweep of the assaulting column for more than a mile, expressed in advance the resistless character of the attack. When more than a half-hundred battle flags, forming the foremost line, approached the crest, the Confederate soldiers knew that they would wave over their defenses, or those who bore them, and a moiety of the twenty thousand men who followed, would fall. The men who fled before this revelation of strength and fiery inspiration, had proved themselves brave on other fields, and were perhaps less to blame than their impassive general, who had failed to perceive the ruling conditions of the battle. The loss of more than twenty per cent. in the two central divisions, in a contest of less than an hour, shows that the enemy did not yield his position without a struggle. There was a panic, but its cause was not mere fear, but the overwhelming impression that resistance was useless.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 7, 1863.

*Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Commanding Department of the Cumberland.*

GENERAL:—News just received from Major-General Burnside, taken in conjunction with information given by a deserter just in, whose statement you have, is of such a nature that it becomes an imperative duty for your forces to draw the attention of the enemy from Burnside to your own front. Already the enemy have attacked Burnside's most easterly garrison of two regiments and a battery, capturing the battery and about half of the forces. This corroborates the statement of the Georgia lieutenant, as to the designs and present movements of the enemy.

I deem the best movement to attract the enemy, to be an attack on the northern end of Missionary Ridge, with all the force you can bring to bear against it, and when that is carried, to threaten and even attack, if possible, the enemy's line of communication between Dalton and Cleveland.

Rations should be ready, to issue a sufficiency to last four days, the moment Missionary Ridge is in our possession—rations to be carried in haversacks. When there are not horses to move the artillery, mules must be taken from the teams, or horses from ambulances, or, if necessary, officers dismounted, and their horses taken.

In view of so many troops having been taken from this valley and from Lookout, Howard's corps of Hooker's command can be used in this movement.

Immediate preparations should be made to carry these directions into execution. The movement should not be made one moment later than to-morrow morning.

You having been over this country, and having had a better opportunity of studying it than myself, the details are left to you.

I am, general, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 18, 1863.

*Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Commanding Department and Army of the Cumberland.*

GENERAL:—All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday morning at daylight. Not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountain, and other places, such definite instructions can not be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan you understand is for Sherman, with his force brought with him, strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee river just below the mouth of Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery),

and to carry the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel, before the enemy can concentrate a force against him.

You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and center, and a movable column of one division, in readiness to move whenever ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as possible, on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well toward the north end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The junction once formed, and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies, by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy.

Lookout valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you, at Chattanooga, or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary.

All the troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in their haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier.

Special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You will call on the engineering department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for crossing your infantry and artillery over Citico creek.

I am, general, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

*Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.*

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CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 20, 1863.

*Major-General Thomas, Commanding Department of the Cumberland.*

GENERAL:—A note just received from General Sherman, giving present position of the forces, shows an entire impossibility for him to get all his troops up and over Brown's ferry before to-morrow night. His attack can not be made, therefore, before Sunday morning, if then. I have written to him to use all dispatch to be ready by that time. You can make your arrangements for this delay.

You can exercise your own judgment about bringing Howard across to-night, as previously directed. The only advantage in it will be in getting continuous use out of the bridges.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT,

*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 21, 1863.

*Major-General G. H. Thomas, Commanding Department of the Cumberland.*

GENERAL:—I have just received a report of the position of Sherman's forces. The raise last night has thrown them back so much that it will be impossible for him to get into position for action to-morrow morning. He will be up, however, against all calamities that can be foreseen, to commence on Monday morning.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 22, 1863.

*Major-General G. H. Thomas, Commanding Army of the Cumberland.*

GENERAL:—The bridge at Brown's ferry being down to-day, and the excessively bad roads since the last rain, will render it impossible for Sherman to get up either of his two remaining divisions in time for the attack to-morrow morning. With one of them up, and which would have been there now, but for the accident to the bridge, I would still make the attack in the morning, regarding a day gained as of superior advantage to a single division of troops. You can make your arrangements for this delay.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,  
IN THE FIELD, November 20, 1863.

*Major-General U. S. Grant, Commanding United States Forces at Chattanooga.*

GENERAL:—As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
BRAXTON BRAGG,  
*General Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,  
NEAR CHATTANOOGA, November 22, 1863.

Operations for Monday, November 23d:

The Fifteenth Army Corps, reinforced by one division of the Army of the Cumberland, is to cross the Tennessee at the mouth of East Chickamauga creek, and advance and take possession of the end of Missionary Ridge—viz., from the railroad tunnel to Chickamauga—hold, and fortify.

The Army of the Cumberland and General Hooker's command are to assist by direct attack to their front.

Details:

\* \* \* \* \*

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.

R. M. SAWYER,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION FOURTH ARMY CORPS,  
CHATTANOOGA, November 22, 1863.

COLONEL:—David Gardner, first lieutenant, company B, Thirty-seventh Tennessee Infantry, Tyler's brigade, Bate's division, Breckinridge's corps, who resides near Knoxville, Tennessee, came in last night, making the following statement: Buckner's and Anderson's divisions moved day before yesterday to McLemore's and Pigeon Coves. Indications are that a general movement is to be made. Baggage is being reduced, and hard bread is being issued. Most of the army is massed between Bragg's headquarters and Lookout Mountain; but few troops on the right of Bragg's headquarters. Reported yesterday that Longstreet occupied Knoxville. Bragg's army now here is composed of four corps, two divisions in each corps, four brigades in each division. The corps are commanded by Hardee, Breckinridge, Walker, and Buckner. Total strength about sixty thousand.

I am, colonel, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

*Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Fullerton, Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff, Fourth Army Corps.*

The movement to McLemore's Cove was made to meet Sherman, who was expected to attack Stevens' Gap.

P. H. S.

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
CHATTANOOGA, November 23, 1863.

*Major-General G. H. Thomas, Commanding Army of the Cumberland:*

GENERAL:—The truth or falsity of the deserter who came in last night, stating that Bragg had fallen back, should be ascertained at once. If he is really falling back, Sherman can commence at once laying his pontoon trains, and he can save a day.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
CHATTANOOGA, November 23, 1863.

*Major-General Granger, Commanding Fourth Corps:*

The general commanding department directs that you throw one division of the Fourth Corps forward in the direction of Orchard Knob, and hold a second division in supporting distance, to discover the position of the enemy, if he still remains in the vicinity of his old camps. Howard's and Baird's commands will be ready to co-operate, if needed.

J. J. REYNOLDS,

*Major-General and Chief of Staff.*

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HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS, November 23, 1863.

Brigadier-General Wood with his division will, as soon as possible, carry out the foregoing instructions, and will be supported by General Sheridan's division, to be posted along near the line of railroad, its right resting about midway between Moore's road and the brush knob in front of Lutte Palmer.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. GRANGER,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

12 o'clock m.

*Brigadier-General Th. J. Wood, Commanding Third Division Fourth Army Corps.*

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11 p. m.

HARDEE:—I observed from the point the movements of the enemy, until dark. The object seemed to be to attract our attention. The troops in sight were formed from center to left. Those on the right moved to center. The troops from Raccoon were in line in full sight. If they intend to attack, my opinion is it will be on our left. Both of their bridges are gone.

GENERAL STEVENSON.

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EXTRACTS FROM THE NARRATIVE IN THE RICHMOND DISPATCH.

When the movement—that of the 23d—was going on, it was observed that the enemy threw a considerable column up the river, further to our right, as if he intended to overlap our line, and compel us to stretch it out to a length that would render it very long and very weak. Can it be that he means to threaten our depot of supplies at Chickamauga Station, and at the same time to draw us away from Lookout Mountain? The idea that Grant desires to advance his lines, in order to get more room and a further supply of firewood, as has been suggested, will not bear the test of reason. A movement on so large a scale looks to ulterior objects, and is intended to initiate operations upon a broad and comprehensive scale.

The result of such a movement will be to compel General Bragg to

weaken his forces on Lookout Mountain (his left), to reinforce his right, which is comparatively weak. Indeed orders to this effect have already been given, and are now being executed. It will never do to let the enemy turn our right, and get possession of our depot at Chickamauga.

General Bragg must therefore choose between Lookout Mountain and Chickamauga. The demonstration to-day was intended, doubtless, to force him to make his election between the two. If he decides to hold Chickamauga, then he must yield the mountain, and throw his army between the enemy's encroaching left wing and the railroad. If he gives the preference to Lookout, then the railroad and his depot must go.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 24, 1863.

GENERAL:—General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill; his left at Chickamauga creek. I have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in co-operation. Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's present position on the mountain can be maintained with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT,

*Major-General Commanding.*

*Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Commanding Army of the Cumberland.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF CUMBERLAND,  
CHATTANOOGA, November 23—10 p. m.

*Major-General Hooker, Lookout Valley:*

If Woods' division does not get across the river by daybreak, he is ordered to report to you, and in that event the general commanding department directs that you endeavor to take the point of Lookout Mountain.

J. J. REYNOLDS,

*Major-General and Chief of Staff.*

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL THOMAS' REPORT TO THE "COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR."

Feeling, as I did, the necessity of avoiding delay, for fear that the enemy should become advised of our plans, immediately upon the receipt of the above letter, (General Grant's, of the 22d), I went to General Grant and advised against any further postponement of our movement,

and suggested that, if needed, the Eleventh corps, then between the two bridges, could be sent to General Sherman to take the place of troops that could not join him, whilst these last, together with the troops already in Lookout valley, would form a column to attack the enemy on Lookout Mountain, or at least divert his attention from Sherman's crossing above. This met the approbation of the commanding general, and on it was based my order of the 23d to General Hooker, to demonstrate on Lookout, and if practicable, to carry the position.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF CUMBERLAND,  
CHATTANOOGA, November 24—12.30 A. M.

*Major-General Hooker, Lookout Valley:*

Intercepted rebel dispatches are to the effect that rebels expect us to attack them on their left in the morning. General commanding desires that you make demonstration early as possible after daybreak, on point of Lookout Mountain. General Grant still hopes Woods' division will get across to join Sherman, in which case your demonstration will aid Sherman's crossing. If Woods can't cross, you can take the point of Lookout, if your demonstration develops its practicability.

J. J. REYNOLDS,  
*Major-General and Chief of Staff.*

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HOOKER'S HEADQUARTERS, November 24—2 A. M.

*Major-General Reynolds, Chief of Staff:*

I am just informed that Woods' division will not be able to cross the river for twelve (12) hours, and in consequence have given directions for it to take position for an advance on Lookout Nose, to be there at sunrise. That there be no mistake as to the crossing, I will send a staff officer to ascertain positively.

MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
CHATTANOOGA, November 24, 1863—9.30 P. M.

*Major-General Hooker, Lookout Valley:*

The general commanding department congratulates you most heartily upon your glorious success to-day, and desires that you convey his warmest thanks to the troops under your command for their valorous conduct. General Grant has just directed that General Sherman move along Mission Ridge to-morrow with his force, whilst our force advances to the front, co-operating with Sherman, and compelling the enemy to show whether he occupies his rifle-pits in our front. Be in readiness to advance as early as possible in the morning into Chattanooga valley, and seize and hold the Summertown road, and co-operate with the Fourteenth Corps by supporting its right. Map sent by courier at 8 o'clock this evening.

J. J. REYNOLDS,  
*Major-General and Chief of Staff.*

## EXTRACT RELATING TO THE BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, FROM THE NARRATIVE IN "RICHMOND DISPATCH."

Very few details have yet been received—too few, indeed, for me to attempt to enter into particulars. The impression prevails in well-informed circles, that the affair has not been well conducted by the Confederate officers in command on the mountain. Our forces had been much weakened the night before by the withdrawal of Walker's division, which was sent to the right, leaving only Stevenson's and Cheatham's divisions behind, both under the command of General Stevenson. General Cheatham arrived on the ground late in the afternoon, having just returned to the army. Up to the time of his return, his division was under the command of General Jackson, the senior brigadier in the division. It was thought that these two divisions would have been sufficient to hold the position against a largely superior force; but not so.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
November 25, 1863—8 A. M.

*Major-General Hooker:*

Leave Carlin's brigade at Summertown road to rejoin General Palmer. Move with remainder of your force, except two regiments to hold Lookout, on the Rossville road toward Mission Ridge, looking well to your right flank.

By command of General Thomas.

J. J. REYNOLDS,  
*Major-General and Chief of Staff.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
ORCHARD KNOB, November 25, 1863.

*Major-General Hooker:*

I wish you and General Palmer to move forward firmly and steadily upon the enemy's works in front, using General Sheridan as a pivot.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Major-General.*

[Passed through Mission Station at 10 A. M.]

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## EXTRACT RELATING TO THE ACTION ON MISSIONARY RIDGE FROM THE NARRATIVE IN THE "RICHMOND DISPATCH."

Grant deployed his immense masses in two heavy lines of battle, and sometimes in three, supported by large reserve forces. The spectacle was magnificent as viewed from the crest of Missionary Ridge. He advanced first against our right wing about 10 o'clock, where he encountered that superb soldier, Lieutenant-General Hardee, who commanded the right wing, while Major-General Breckinridge commanded on the left. Hardee's command embraced Cleburne's, Walker's (commanded by General

Gist, General Walker being absent), Cheatham's, and Stevenson's divisions. Breckinridge's embraced his old division, commanded by Brigadier-General Lewis.\* Stewart's, part of Buckner's and Hindman's, commanded by Patton Anderson. The enemy's first assault upon Hardee was repulsed with great slaughter, as was his second, though made with double lines supported by heavy reserves.

\* \* \* \* \*

The attack upon the left wing was not made until about noon.† Here, as on the right, the enemy was repulsed, but he was obstinate, and fought with great ardor and confidence, returning to the charge again and again in the handsomest style, until one of our brigades near the center, said to be Reynolds', gave way, and the Federal flag was planted on Missionary Ridge. The enemy was not slow in availing himself of the great advantage of his new position. In a few minutes, he turned upon our flanks, and poured into them a terrible enfilading fire, which soon threw the Confederates on his right and left into confusion. Under this confusion, the gap in our lines grew wider and wider and wider, and the wider it grew, the faster the multitudinous foe rushed into the yawning chasm. The confusion extended until it finally assumed the form of a panic. Seeing the enemy in possession of a portion of the heights, the men hastily concluded that the day was gone, and that they had best save themselves.

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EXTRACT FROM THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL  
U. S. GRANT.

Proceeding directly to Chattanooga, I arrived there on the 23d of October, and found that General Thomas had, immediately on being placed in command of the department of the Cumberland, ordered the concentration of Major-General Hooker's command at Bridgeport, preparatory to securing the river and main wagon-road between that place and Brown's ferry, immediately below Lookout Mountain. The next morning after my arrival at Chattanooga, in company with Thomas, and Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, chief engineer, I made a reconnoissance of Brown's ferry, and the hills on the south side of the river, and at the mouth of Lookout valley. After the reconnoissance, the plan agreed upon was, for Hooker to cross at Bridgeport to the south side of the river, with all the force that could be spared from the railroad, and move on the main wagon-road, by way of Whitesides, to Wauhatchie in Lookout valley. Major-General J. M. Palmer was to proceed by the only practicable route north of the river, from his position opposite Chattanooga to a point on the north bank of the Tennessee river, and opposite Whitesides, then to cross to the south side, to hold the road passed over by Hooker.

In the meantime, and before the enemy could be apprised of our inten-

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\* General Bate was probably meant.

† A mistake in time.

tion, a force under the direction of Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, chief engineer, was to be thrown across the river, at or near Brown's ferry, to seize the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout valley, covering Brown's ferry, and orders were given accordingly.

\* \* \* \* \*

Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was detaching Longstreet from the front, and moving him in the direction of Knoxville, Tenn., evidently to attack Burnside, and feeling strongly the necessity of some move that would compel him to retain all his forces and recall those he had detached, directions were given for a movement against Missionary Ridge, with a view to carrying it and threatening the enemy's communications with Longstreet, of which I informed Burnside, on the 7th of November, by telegraph.

After a thorough reconnaissance of the ground, however, it was deemed utterly impracticable to make the move until Sherman could get up, because of the inadequacy of our forces, and the condition of the animals then at Chattanooga; and I was forced to leave Burnside, for the present, to contend against superior forces of the enemy, until the arrival of Sherman with his men and means of transportation. In the meantime, reconnoissances were made, and plans matured for operations. Dispatches were sent to Sherman informing him of the movement of Longstreet, and the necessity of his immediate presence at Chattanooga. On the 14th of November, I telegraphed to Burnside as follows:

"Your dispatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With your showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment, and save the most productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth of Chickamauga creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge, and from there rush on to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack Lookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. This favors us. . . .

(Signed,) . . .

"U. S. GRANT,  
*"Major-General.*

*"To Major-General A. E. Burnside."*

\* \* \* \* \*

Upon further consideration—the great object being to mass all the forces available against one given point, namely, Missionary Ridge, converging toward the north end of it—it was deemed best to change the original plan so far as it contemplated Hooker's attack on Lookout Mountain, which would give us Howard's corps of his command, to aid in this purpose, and on the 18th the following instructions were given to Thomas. [See plan of battle, p. 440, 441.]

\* \* \* \* \*

Early in the morning of the 25th, the remainder of Howard's corps

reported to Sherman, and constituted a part of his forces during the day's battle, the pursuit, and the subsequent advance for the relief of Knoxville.

Sherman's position not only threatened the right flank of the enemy, but, from his occupying a line across the mountain and to the railroad bridge across Chickamauga creek, his rear and stores at Chickamauga Station. This caused the enemy to move heavily against him. This movement of his being plainly seen from the position I occupied on Orchard Knob, Baird's division of the Fourteenth Corps was ordered to Sherman's support; but receiving a note from Sherman informing me that he had all the force necessary, Baird was put in position on Thomas' left.

The appearance of Hooker's column was at this time anxiously looked for, and momentarily expected, moving on the ridge, with his left in Chattanooga valley and his right east of the ridge. His approach was intended as the signal for storming the ridge in the center with strong columns, but the time necessarily consumed in the construction of the bridge near Chattanooga creek detained him to a later hour than was expected. Being satisfied from the latest information from him that he must, by this time, be on his way from Rossville, though not yet in sight, and discovering that the enemy, in his desperation to defeat or resist the progress of Sherman, was weakening his center on Missionary Ridge, determined me to order the advance at once. Thomas was accordingly directed to move forward his troops, constituting our center—Baird's division (Fourteenth Corps), Wood's and Sheridan's divisions (Fourth Corps), and Johnson's division (Fourteenth Corps), with a double line of skirmishers thrown out, followed in easy supporting distance by the whole force—and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge and, when carried, to reform his lines in the rifle-pits with a view to carrying the top of the ridge.

These troops moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge like bees from a hive, stopped but a moment, until the whole were in line, and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to left almost simultaneously, following closely the retreating enemy without further orders. They encountered a fearful volley of grape and canister from nearly thirty pieces of artillery, and musketry from well-filled rifle-pits on the summit of the ridge. Not a waver, however, was seen in that long line of brave men; their progress was steadily onward until the summit was in their possession. In this charge the casualties were remarkably few for the fire encountered. I can account for this only on the theory that the enemy's surprise at the audacity of such a charge caused confusion and purposeless aiming of their pieces.

\* \* \* \* \*

The resistance on Thomas' left being overcome, the enemy abandoned his position near the railroad tunnel in front of Sherman, and by 12 o'clock at night was in full retreat; and the whole of his strong positions on Lookout Mountain, Chattanooga valley, and Missionary Ridge were in our possession, together with a large number of prisoners, artillery, and small arms.

## EXTRACT FROM GENERAL SHERMAN'S REPORT.

I took the first boat during the night of the 14th, for Kelley's, and rode into Chattanooga on the 15th.

I then learned the post assigned me in the coming drama was supplied with the necessary maps and information, and rode during the 16th, in company with Generals Grant, Thomas, W. F. Smith, Brannan, and others, to the position on the west bank of the Tennessee, from which could be seen the camps of the enemy compassing Chattanooga and the line of Missionary hills, with its terminus on Chickamauga creek, the point that I was expected to take, hold, and fortify.

\* \* \* \* \*

As soon as General Corse had made his preparations, he assaulted, and a close, severe contest ensued, lasting more than an hour, giving and losing ground, but never the position first obtained, from which the enemy in vain attempted to drive him.

General Morgan L. Smith kept gaining ground on the left spur of Missionary Ridge, and Colonel Loomis got abreast of the tunnel and the railroad embankment on his side, drawing the enemy's fire, and to that extent relieving the assaulting party on the hill crest.

\* \* \* \* \*

The suddenness of the attack disconcerted the men, and, exposed as they were in the open field, they fell back in some disorder to the lower end of the field, and reformed. These two brigades were in the nature of supports, and did not constitute a part of the real attack.

The movement, seen from Chattanooga, five miles off, gave rise to the report, which even General Meigs had repeated, that we were repulsed on the left. Not so. The real attacking columns of General Corse, Colonel Loomis, and General Smith were not repulsed. They engaged in a close struggle all day, persistently, stubbornly, and well. When the two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith fell back as described, the enemy made a show of pursuit, but were caught in flank by a well-directed fire of our brigade on the wooded crest, and hastily sought his cover behind the hill.

## EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS' REPORT.

In consequence of the bad condition of the roads, General Sherman's troops were occupied all of Sunday (22d November) in getting into position. In the meantime, the river having risen, both pontoon bridges were broken by rafts sent down the river by the enemy, cutting off Osterhaus' division from the balance of Sherman's troops. It was thought this would delay us another day; but during the night of the 22d, two deserters reported that Bragg had fallen back, and that there was only a strong picket line in our front. Early on the morning of the 23d, I received a note from Major-General Grant, directing me to ascertain by a demonstration the truth or falsity of this report.

Orders were accordingly given to General Granger, commanding Fourth Corps, to form his troops and to advance directly in front of Fort Wood, and thus develop the strength of the enemy.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Tennessee river having risen considerably from the effect of the previous heavy rain-storm, it was found difficult to rebuild the pontoon bridge at Brown's ferry. Therefore, it was determined that General Hooker should take Osterhaus' division, which was still in Lookout valley, and Whittaker's and Grose's brigades of the First division, Fourth Corps, under Brigadier General Crut, and make a strong demonstration on the northern slope of Lookout Mountain, for the purpose of attracting the enemy's attention in that direction, and thus withdrawing him from Sherman while crossing the river at the mouth of South Chickamauga. General Hooker was instructed that in making this demonstration, if he discovered the position and strength of the enemy would justify him in attempting to carry the point of the mountain, to do so.

\* \* \* \* \*

Instructions were sent to General Hooker to be ready to advance on the morning of the 25th, from his position on the point of Lookout Mountain to the Summertown road, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat, if he had not already withdrawn, which he was to ascertain by pushing a reconnoissance to the top of Lookout Mountain. The reconnoissance was made as directed, and having ascertained that the enemy had evacuated during the night, General Hooker was then directed to move on the Rossville road, with the troops under his command (except Carlin's brigade, which was to rejoin its division), carry the pass at Rossville, and operate upon the enemy's left and rear. Palmer's and Granger's troops were held in readiness to advance directly on the rifle-pits in front, as soon as Hooker could get into position at Rossville.

\* \* \* \* \*

About noon, General Sherman becoming heavily engaged by the enemy, they having massed a strong force in his front, orders were given for General Baird to march his division within supporting distance of General Sherman. Moving his command promptly in the direction indicated, he was placed in position to the left of Wood's division of Granger's corps. Owing to the difficulties of the ground, his troops did not get into line with Granger's until about half-past 2 p. m. Orders were then given him, however, to move forward on Granger's left, and within supporting distance, against the enemy's rifle-pits on the slope and at the foot of Missionary Ridge. The whole line then advanced against the breastworks, and soon became warmly engaged with the enemy's skirmishers; these giving way, retired upon their reserves posted within their works.

Our troops advancing steadily in a continuous line, the enemy seized with panic, abandoned their works at the foot of the hill and retreated precipitately to the crest, whither they were followed by our troops, who, apparently inspired by the impulse of victory, carried the

hill simultaneously, at six different points, and so closely upon the heels of the enemy, that many of them were taken prisoners in the trenches.

\* \* \* \* \*

It will be seen by the above report, that the original plan of operations was somewhat modified, to meet and take the best advantage of emergencies which necessitated material modification of that plan. It is believed, however, that the original plan, had it been carried out, could not possibly have led to more successful results. The alacrity displayed by officers in executing their orders, the enthusiasm and spirit displayed by the men who did the work, can not be too highly appreciated by the nation, for the defense of which they have on so many other memorable occasions nobly and patriotically exposed their lives in battle.

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EXTRACTS FROM MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON GRANGER'S REPORT.

General Sherman was unable to make any progress in moving along the ridge during the day, as the enemy had massed in his front; therefore, in order to relieve him, I was ordered to make a demonstration upon the works of the enemy directly in my front, at the base of Mission Ridge.

\* \* \* \* \*

In the meantime, the troops holding the woods were driven back to the works at the base of the ridge, their pursuers rapidly following. Here they halted and made a stout resistance, but our troops, by an impetuous assault, broke this line in several places; then sealing the breastworks at these points, opened a flank and reserve fire upon them, which, throwing them into confusion, caused their precipitate flight. Many prisoners were left in our hands, and we captured a large number of small arms.

My orders had now been fully and successfully carried out, but not enough had been done to satisfy the brave troops who had accomplished so much. Although the batteries on the ridge, at short range, by direct and enfilading fire, were still pouring down upon them a shower of iron, and the musketry from the hillsides were thinning their ranks, they dashed over the breastworks, through the rifle-pits, and started up the ridge. They started without orders.

\* \* \* \* \*

Above these men were an additional line of rifle-pits filled with troops. What was on the summit of the ridge they knew not, and did not stop to inquire. The enemy was before them, and that was sufficient. At several points along the line, my troops were ascending the hill and gaining positions less exposed to the enemy's artillery fire, though more exposed to the fire of musketry. Seeing this, I sent my assistant adjutant-general to inquire, first of General Wood, and then of General Sheridan, whether the troops had been ordered up the ridge by them, and to instruct them to take the ridge if possible. In reply to this, General Wood had told him that the men had started up without orders, and

that he could take it if he could be supported. In the meantime, an aid-de-camp from General Sheridan had reported to me that the general wished to know whether the orders that had been given to take the rifle-pits, "meant at the base of the ridge, or those on the top." My reply was that the order had been to take those at the base. Conceiving this to be an order to fall back to those rifle-pits, and on his way to General Sheridan, so reporting it to General Wagner, commanding Second brigade of Sheridan's division, this brigade was withdrawn from a position which it had gained on the side of the ridge to the rifle-pits, which were being raked by the enemy's artillery, and from this point starting again under a terrible fire, made the ascent of the ridge.

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#### EXTRACT FROM GENERAL BAIRD'S REPORT.

The march of Turchin's brigade was directed to a prominent knob, on which were several pieces of artillery, and a small house, used afterward for a hospital. It may be recognized readily by the marks. This I believe to be the first point carried by my command. It is difficult to determine questions of slight precedence in point of time, in a rivalry of this nature. And when all act nobly, they are unimportant. The second brigade, in line going from troops toward the right, perhaps that of General Willich, may possibly have reached its point of aim a little before mine reached theirs, and soon after opened communication with us.

\* \* \* \* \*

As we gained ground toward the left, we approached close by the large bodies of troops collected by the rebel commander to resist or crush General Sherman, and as the attacks of the latter had been repulsed, or were suspended about the time that we commenced our assault, these men were at liberty to be used against us. The time which it took for us to mount the hill was enough for them to recover from their first surprise, and before we had gone far a strong force was ready to confront us.

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#### SECOND EXTRACT FROM GENERAL G. GRANGER'S REPORT.

Brigadier-General Woods had just driven the enemy from his front on the summit of the ridge, when I observed a large force of the enemy coming from that part of the hill occupied by Major-General Sherman, and moving in the direction of our flank. Before General Woods could get his troops in shape to meet them, Brigadier-General Baird opportunely arrived with his division, and went into position on our left. When the enemy came up, a sharp contest here commenced, which afterward lasted till dark.

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